Grand Tactics and the Modern Battlefield
By Justin Baumann
Introduction
"Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain." - Sun Tzu [1]
In 1772, French General Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert, wrote, Essai général de la Tactique (General Test of Tactics or General Essay on Tactics), which likely contained the first recorded instance of the term “Grand Tactics”. [2] Guibert used his military insight to develop “Guibert columns”, in addition to other advancements in command and control, to help increase the mobility of infantry units just prior to the Napoleonic era. [3] Guibert’s foresight in building the French Army based on the principles in his book helped Napoleon win a significant number of victories throughout the European continent, and the doctrine of this Guibert-designed Grande Armée was instrumental in Napoleon’s early success. [4]
Franco-Swiss military theorist Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, in his book The Art of War (1836), which many American Civil War officers studied at West Point before the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, described grand tactics as “the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results.” [5]
In the 20th century, famed American military theorist John Boyd described grand tactics as “[Operating] inside [the] adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create a tangle of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts [the] adversary observes, or anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive.” [6]
As the U.S. Army transitions to Great Power Competition (GPC) and Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCOs), [7] it will need to prepare to manage and lead large-scale formations to successfully defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. Major Darfus Johnson said, “Military theorists such as Jomini, recognized that the coherent movement and employment of large self-contained, independent formations were a more complex operation than simple tactics could describe. Furthermore, the actions of these independent formations while important strategically were not always strategically decisive. This situation obviously required delineation between simple tactical action on a small scale to those actions taken by large formations that could prove decisive. Thus, the term grand tactics originated to describe the maneuver and employment of these large formations.” [8]
This article examines the concept of “Grand Tactics” through the lenses of “Operational Art” and “Defeat Mechanisms” to provide the reader with a cursory understanding of these topics and their relationship to modern war. It then describes two combat vignettes, The Battle of Jena-Auerstadt in October 1806 by Napoleon against the Prussians, and the Nagorno-Karabakh War in September 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Finally, this article will discuss the implications these concepts have for modern U.S. Army warfighting doctrine and conclude with a discussion about using grand tactics and new technologies to maximize our army’s capabilities in Mobility, Intelligence, Communications, and Leadership.
Grand Tactics and Defeat Mechanisms
Grand tactics and modern concepts of “Defeat Mechanisms” share many similarities. The Army describes defeat mechanisms in ADP 3-0 Offense and Defense as “a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). Tactical forces at all echelons use combinations of the four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. There are also stability mechanisms used in the conduct of stability.” [9]
But there may exist an infinite number of different sets of defeat mechanisms depending on the operating environment, so featuring an exploration of defeat mechanism theory and grand tactics can help us visualize at scale how to define and best employ our forces in modern war as echelons and operations become nebulous during high intensity or large-scale combat operations. School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) founder and retired Brigadier General Wass de Czege himself was a proponent of 3 types of defeat mechanisms: attrition, disintegration, and dislocation. [10] Some authors or readers may disagree with the concept of grand tactics, but by understanding its relation to and employment of defeat mechanisms at the tactical and operational levels, commanders and their staff can design more successful operations across domains. [11]
Grand Tactics and Operational Art
Grand tactics encompasses the defeat mechanisms that exist across the tactical and operational levels of war, while operational art describes the intuition or creative imagination of the commander related to Coup d'œil (pronounced koo de ye) [12] and Fingerspitzengefühl (pronounced finger shpitz en ge fuel), [13] while conducting operations.
Dr. Patrick Sweeney, a former professor at the Naval War College said, “This aspect of operational art [Coup d'œil] is honed through operational experience and the study of military theory and history. Some examples of intuition include sensing the approaching culmination of an enemy or one’s own force, or envisioning an imaginative approach to strike an enemy or to conceal one’s own force’s vulnerability.” [14] We’ll see an example of this from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War later.
Clausewitz himself remarked, “When all is said and done, it really is the commander's coup d'œil, his ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of good generalship. Only if the mind works in this comprehensive fashion can it achieve the freedom it needs to dominate events and not be dominated by them.” [15]
But operational art is not to be confused with the operational level of war. Commanders at all levels practice operational art to bridge the gap between tactics and strategy. [16] Major Robert Todd, in his monograph about operational art on the Italian front during World War I said, “Because grand tactics are so similar to operational art there is a danger that the operational commander may pick up the packet of plans containing grand tactics, and use them instead of the packet containing operational art plans to build the span [connecting tactics and strategy].” [17]
Finally, Major Brian Fleming, in his 2011 SAMS monograph, The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art, says that “Doctrinally, Joint Publication 5-0 defines operational art as the ‘Application of creative imagination by commanders and staff supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war…without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements.’ Metaphorically, operational art relates to an ocean current that directs the movement of water through various configurations and strength. As such, operational art is the bridge between strategy and tactics.” [18]
With the advent of unrestricted operational art, it is important leaders understand the distinction between defeat mechanisms as an alignment of tactical and operational military maneuvers to defeat the enemy, and operational art as a commander’s intuition and cognition on the battlefield. The levels of war and what modern grand tactics encompasses can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1: Levels of War during WWII in the Pacific [19]
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign Against Prussia
“Tactical competence can rarely attain victory in the face of operational incompetence, while operational ignorance can squander what tactical hard work has gained.” – Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2 Campaigning [20]
In the summer of 1806, the French began to build up their forces near the borders of Prussia near Saxony. The Prussian Army at that time had only performed two operations in the previous 45 years and had issues with their promotion system. In response to these moves by France, the Prussians mobilized their forces. They offered an ultimatum to Napoleon hoping for a political solution, but peace was not an option at this point and the Prussian and French armies began planning to meet each other in battle. [21]
The Battle of Jena-Auerstadt is important to our study of grand tactics because it was a pivotal moment for the development of many doctrinal concepts and theories that U.S. Army doctrine is based on today. Clausewitz himself was captured shortly after the battle [22] and Jomini was a protégé and staff officer during the battle for one of Napoleon’s generals, Marshal Michel Ney. [23] Clausewitz’s mentor and future Prussian Army reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst was also present at the battle. These men were present to watch Napoleon’s conduct of grand tactics and operational art from both sides of the conflict and they wrote down and studied what they saw. Napoleon’s sweeping victories and mastery of the art of war were synthesized through their writings, experiences, and analysis. This battle provides a good example of many Napoleonic-era grand tactical concepts and movements. [24]
In the early stages of the battle, the French used their superior mobility to outpace and surprise the Prussians to gain a position of advantage. The development of Le Bataillon Carré (pronounced Le buh tai yon Ka rey) or “The Square Battalion” formation, allowed Napoleon to maneuver his forces with much greater speed and responsiveness than his Prussian counterparts which led to their rout. [25] Had it not been for the training and doctrine of The Square Battalion based on Guibert’s contributions, it is unlikely the French would have been skilled enough to “swing to the left” and defeat the Prussians like they did. This superior mobility caught the Prussians off guard. Napoleon was able to use a defeat mechanism combination of mobility, intelligence, communications, and leadership with the help of Le Bataillon Carré to defeat the Prussians. Figure 2 shows Le Bataillon Carré in action as employed by Napoleon leading up to the battle.
Figure 2: The Jena Campaign; Le Bataillon Carré (The Square Battalion) [26]
Another method Napoleon employed to execute his vision of grand tactics in this battle, in addition to Le Bataillon Carré, was his use of the military staff. Dr. Nafzinger says, “If any one significant innovation can be attributed to the period of 1792-1815, it must be the development of the army staff. As the wars of the French Revolution erupted, armies had very rudimentary staffs. Generals had small groups of aides, to whom they allocated various duties, and there were a few major functions that were assigned to senior officers … It was the French and, most probably, Napoleon himself who brought the first truly modern military staff into existence.” [27]
Napoleon’s use of his staff allowed him to better integrate communications and intelligence in controlling the French forces. This was instrumental in outmaneuvering the Prussians and led to the fall of Berlin shortly thereafter in 1806. The battle itself was the culmination of the war and an early victory for Napoleon. The generals of this era needed to use these grand tactics because of the size of the forces being controlled. If the United States is required to fight in much larger numbers during large-scale combat operations or expansive hybrid wars, we will need a proper understanding of grand tactics to better wield our evolving formations at scale. Figure 3 illustrates the final phases of the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt.
Figure 3: Jena-Auerstadt, October 14, 1806: The Main Phases of the Battle of Jena [28]
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War
“When the Yom Kippur War broke out in October 1973, [General] DePuy saw opportunity disguised as distraction. He said later that the war was ‘the most fortunate thing for us because it dramatized the difference between the wars that we might fight in the future and the wars we had fought in the past. And it drew our attention to those differences and to the current state of affairs in the U.S. Army. We became concerned first of all that we missed one generation of modernization during the Vietnam War, and the Russians were one to two generations of equipment ahead of us.’” – Henry Gole [29]
Just as the 19-day Yom Kippur War showed General DePuy how a modern Army might fight leading to the concept of AirLand Battle doctrine, so too has the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War shown the American military how a modern army might fight using a range of new technologies such as Loiter Munitions (LM), swarm drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), attack videos, and other high-tech weapons, which are available to both state and non-state actors alike. [30] Understanding better the “why” of how Azerbaijan won and applying it to our own infantry ground forces will better equip us to win in future modern combat operations. [31] Figure 4 illustrates how the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War unfolded over a period of 44 days from 27 September to 10 November 2020.
Figure 4: 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War [32]
According to Colonel (Retired) John Antal, “The first phase of the Azerbaijani effort was to employ their newly acquired high-tech UAVs and LMs [Loiter Munitions], in addition to conventional artillery and rockets, to take down the Armenian air defense and command and control (C2) network. They did this in the first weeks of the war. Armenian air defense, made up of older Russian-made systems, could not stop the Azerbaijani UAV and LM attacks. Even when the Armenian air defense systems were operating, the aerial top-attack weapons penetrated the airspace and knocked out the defenders.” [33]
It appears from this recent conflict that a new modern form of blitzkrieg can exist with the use of unmanned drones and effective armored ground formations and artillery support, if properly employed. The Azeris were able to penetrate Armenian defense networks using these new technologies purchased from a host of foreign partners such as Israel and Turkey to turn the tide of war in their favor.
As mentioned earlier, the Azeris were able to practice excellent tactical unrestricted operational art through their creative application of new and old technologies. In their article, What the United States Military Can Learn from the Nagorno-Karabakh War, authors Nicole Thomas et al. say, “At the onset of the conflict, Azerbaijan leveraged Soviet-era AN-2 biplanes to deceive and expose Armenian air defenses. Though decades old and intended to serve as traditional manned aircraft, the biplanes’ conversion to unmanned decoys allowed Azerbaijan to conduct low altitude flights into the highly contested environment—and more importantly—into the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) of Armenian air defenses. These improvised UAS were repurposed as decoys and flown to the front lines to force air defenses to give away their location and enable targeting by TB2s. When the Armenian air defenses targeted, engaged, and destroyed the perceived threats, they inadvertently broadcasted their positions to Azeri unmanned aerial attack platforms that flew at higher altitudes—enabling the Bayraktar TB2 and kamikaze drones to destroy higher-payoff targets like the Armenian air defense systems.” [34]
They go on to state: “It is worth noting that traditional rotary wing assets were not used during these attacks. The high density of ADA [Air Defense Artillery] systems across the battlefield presented too great a risk for more expensive manned aviation assets.” [35] It is possible these modern developments have made the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and similar platforms obsolete. The need for these aircraft in conjunction with specific combined arms maneuvers may still have relevance, but why worry about losing pilots or requiring downed pilot rescue operations when the same functions can be done remotely? It seems highly prudent to retool and replace Apache and Kiowa maintenance and acquisition lines of effort for drone attack and reconnaissance helicopter platforms and begin tactical and operational testing to codify in doctrine.
Some analysts will conclude a strategic victory by Azerbaijan based on many factors. One is the amount of money spent on the military: “Between 2006 and 2019, Azerbaijan invested nearly $29 billion in its military compared to Armenia’s roughly $6 billion during that same period.” [36] Another strategic foresight by Azerbaijan was the way they used their drone strikes in conjunction with propaganda and influence operations. [37] John Antal writes, “Every precision UAV and LM attack was captured in high-definition video through a secure data link. The films depicted burning tanks and devastating explosions among groups of Armenian soldiers. The Azerbaijanis used these gruesome videos in countless propaganda films on the Internet and social media platforms. Armenian’s [sic] viewed this footage and feared for their soldiers. In this propaganda effort the Azerbaijani message was loud and clear: ‘We are winning. We will bring you death from above with our drones and you can’t stop us.’ As Armenian losses surged and their lines continued to fall back, morale suffered.” [38]
While it is certainly true Azerbaijan made decisive strategic decisions prior to the outbreak of the war, they required effective grand tactics to successfully execute their strategy. New technologies are useless if not employed correctly. The Azeris were able to overpower and out maneuver the Armenians quickly when it mattered because of this combination and symmetry between doctrine and technology.
Finally, the use of these new technologies would not have been as effective if the Azeris had not used them in combination with traditional armor attacks, which eventually led to their success in the culminating Battle of Shusha. The Azeris were able to expertly maneuver their armor forces around hardpoints while using Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) drones and artillery to overcome the Armenians. [39] This final push into the city of Shusha led to a negotiated peace and a victory for Azerbaijan. In the end, the makeup of their defeat mechanisms against Armenia constituted a combination of superior mobility and intelligence capabilities. If these capabilities were disjointed or not properly coordinated, the Armenians may have prevented defeat. By properly combining grand tactics, defeat mechanisms, and operational art against enemy forces, the Azeris were able to win. [40] Figure 5 shows the Azeri’s final push into Shusha.
Figure 5: The Battle of Shusha [41]
Just like Napoleon, the Azeris made important strategic decisions well before the war began in building their army. This superior strategic foresight allowed their forces to properly implement effective grand tactics on the battlefield after hostilities began. John Antal goes on to conclude that “As the 1973 Yom Kippur War was studied as an example of modern combined arms operations during the late 20th century, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War holds lessons in the dynamic clash between attack and defense, the use of technology, and conduct of cross domain maneuver for today. The increasing ‘democratization of technology,’ whereby high-tech weaponry such as UAVs and LMs become available to all, and the secure tactical video produced by these weapons that depicts the violence of each strike used as a powerful propaganda tool, has serious implications for western military forces.” [42]
Conclusion
“[This] reveals that operational art is not obsolete, and that the U.S. military by harnessing the new technologies and subordinating them to sound doctrine, can develop a force more lethal than any before in history. The commanders and planners for this new force with the new systems will be wizards of chaos and order.” – Major Darfus L. Johnson, 1999 [43]
John Boyd, in his popular “Patterns of Conflict” lecture, uses the example of the Mongolian success in war to highlight 4 asymmetries that he believes allowed them and others to be successful in battle throughout history. These asymmetries the Mongolians possessed were advantages in Mobility, Communications, Intelligence, and Leadership. By maintaining a superior force in these four areas, according to Boyd, it enabled the Mongols to be successful in warfare even while frequently outnumbered. [44]
The conclusion of this article then, is not to over rely on new technologies but focus energy and attention on using those new technologies to increase Mobility, Communications, Intelligence, and Leadership capabilities across the tactical and operational force. Technological changes have taken place throughout history and will continue to do so, [45] but technology and doctrine must work to complement each other. To conclude with words from Major Johnson: “Perhaps the lesson learned here is that to be successful in war the operational artist must strike a balance between technological capabilities and operational doctrine. The artist that is better able to strike this balance, achieve this wonderful symmetry, will be able to define what constitutes operational art.” [46]
This article was researched and written between November 2021 and February 2022. It was submitted to Infantry magazine but lost in their editorial process for 13 months. The opinions in this article are the author’s own, and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity with which he is associated
Notes
[2] De Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte. (1772) Essai général de la Tactique: Precede d’un Discours sur l’Etat Actuel de la Politique Et de la Science militaire en Europe, Volume 1. Forgotten Books. London (2018). ISBN: 978-1-333-17923-6. p. XCIV
[3] Abel, Jonathan. (2016) Guibert: Father of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN: 978-0-8061-5443-5. p. 66
[4] Ibid p. 6
[5] Jomini, Antoine-Henri. (1838) Précis de l'Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire. The Art of War. Greenwood Press (1971). https://archive.org/details/artwar00mendgoog/page/n12/mode/2up p. 178
[6] Colonel (Retired) Boyd, John. (1985) Patterns of Conflict. Dan Grazier YouTube Channel (2015). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiI8UteC29g 1:45
[7] Lieutenant Colonel Alexander, Eric; Captain Andrew Beck. (2021) Transition Planning in Large Scale Combat Operations. Infantry Magazine. https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2021/Fall/PDF/Fall21_INFMAG.pdf
[8] Major Johnson, Darfus L. (1999) Wizards of Chaos and Order: A Theory of The Origins, Practice, and Future of Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA370245.pdf p. 5
[9] Department of the Army. (31 July 2019) Army Doctrine Pamphlet 3-0 Offense and Defense. p. 2-4
[10] Major DeLancey, Douglas J. (2001) Adopting the Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege Model of Defeat Mechanisms Based on Historical Evidence and Current Need. School of Advanced Military Studies. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA393858.pdf p. 7
[11] Colonel Oliviero, Charles S. (2021) Praxis Tacticum: The Art, Science, and Practice of Military Tactics. Double Dagger Books Ltd. Ontario, Canada. ISBN: 978-1-7773121-5-2. p. 23
[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d'%C5%93il
[13] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fingerspitzengef%C3%BChl
[14] Sweeney, Patrick C. (2010) Operational Art Primer. The United States Naval War College: Joint Military Operations Department. https://www.benning.army.mil/MSSP/PDF/nwc_sweeney_op_art_primer_16jul2010.pdf p. 2
[15] Clausewitz, Carl von. (1832) On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (1989). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-01854-6. p. 578
[16] Brigadier General (Retired) Wass de Czege, Huba. (2011) Thinking and Acting Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art is Not a Level of War. Small Wars Journal. Accessed 07 February 2022. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/operational-art-is-not-a-level-of-war
[17] Major Todd, Robert C. (1992) Operational Art on the Italian Front During the Great War. School of Advanced Military Studies. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1105657.pdf p. 4
[18] Major Fleming, Brian P. (2011) The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA545789.pdf p. 29
[19] Sweeney, Patrick C. (2010) Operational Art Primer. The United States Naval War College: Joint Military Operations Department. https://www.benning.army.mil/MSSP/PDF/nwc_sweeney_op_art_primer_16jul2010.pdf p. 3
[20] Department of the Navy. (1997) Marine Corps Doctrinal Pamphlet 1-2 Campaigning. https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201-2%20Campaigning.pdf p. 98
[21] Clausewitz, Carl Von. (1888) Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner Grossen Katastrophe; Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, X, Berlin, 1888. Translated by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza. https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/1806/Clausewitz-ExcerptsFromNotesOnPrussia1806.pdf#zoom=100
[22] Bassford, Christopher. (2019) Clausewitz and His Works. Clausewitzstudies.org. https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/Works.htm
[23] Dr. Johnsen, Bill. (2017) Baron Antonie [sic] -Henri Jomini, Theories of War. U.S. Army War College. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KM-mOvHO4GE 5:04
[24] Marshal Ney, Michel. (1833?) Military Studies: Battlefield Tactics and Army Organisation During the Napoleonic Age. Leonaur Books (2021). ISBN: 978-1-78282-924-9.
[25] Dr. Nafzinger, George (Captain USNR Retired). (2009) Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations (New Edition). Helion & Company Ltd. ISBN: 978-1-914059-58-2. “The Bataillon Carré worked on the same principle as Jomini’s advanced guard and main body. Once contact was made by one of the four formations, the French used their superior staff to redirect the movement of the other three formations. Their goal was the same as Jomini’s: to strike the enemy in his flank. The only difference was that instead of an advanced guard of a few regiments holding the enemy in place, Napoleon used a complete corp.” p. 274
[26] Chandler, David G. (1966) The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company. ISBN: 0-02-523660-1. p. 469
[27] Dr. Nafzinger, George (Captain USNR Retired). (2009) Imperial Bayonets: Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations (New Edition). Helion & Company Ltd. ISBN: 978-1-914059-58-2. p. 258
[28] Chandler, David G. (1966) The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Company. ISBN: 0-02-523660-1. p. 487
[29] Gole, Henry G. (2008) General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War. The University Press of Kentucky. p. 240
[30] Colonel (Retired) Antal, John. (2021) 317. Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Convergence Podcast. U.S. Army Mad Scientist Laboratory. Accessed 07 February 2022. https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/317-top-attack-lessons-learned-from-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war/
[31] Major Johnson, Darfus L. (1999) Wizards of Chaos and Order: A Theory of The Origins, Practice, and Future of Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA370245.pdf p. 47
[32] Centanni, Evan and Djukic, Djordje. (01 December 2020) Political Geography Now. https://www.polgeonow.com/2020/12/nagorno-karabakh-control-map-after-ceasefire-withdrawals.html For greater detail on the advance of Azerbaijan forces, please see the map located here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_war#/media/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_War.svg
[33] Colonel (Retired) Antal, John. (2021) Death from Above: How Secure Tactical Video Transmission Impacted the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/45460690/Death_from_Above_How_Secure_Tactical_Video_Transmission_Impacted_the_Second_Nagorno_Karabakh_War p. 2
[34] Nicole Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Matt Jamison, Captain (P) Kendall Gomber, and Derek Walton. (2021) What the United States Military Can Learn from the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-united-states-military-can-learn-nagorno-karabakh-war
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Brigadier General (Retired) Wass de Czege, Huba. (2010) The Art of “Campaigning” to Inform and Influence. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/527-wassdeczege.pdf
[38] Colonel (Retired) Antal, John. (2021) Death from Above: How Secure Tactical Video Transmission Impacted the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/45460690/Death_from_Above_How_Secure_Tactical_Video_Transmission_Impacted_the_Second_Nagorno_Karabakh_War p. 3
[39] Lee, Rob. (2020) The Nagorno Karabakh conflict: military lessons for middle powers. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xf8f26mY9fs 34:45
[40] Amble, John; Spencer, John. (2021) Inside the Battle of Shusha, The Urban Fight That Decided Last Year’s Nagorno-Karabakh War. Modern War Institute at West Point Podcast. https://mwi.usma.edu/inside-the-battle-of-shusha-the-urban-fight-that-decided-last-years-nagorno-karabakh-war/
[41] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Shusha_(2020)#/media/File:Battle_of_Shusha_(2020).svg
#/media/File:Battle_of_Shusha_(2020).svg){kind=link}
[42] Colonel (Retired) Antal, John. (2021) Death from Above: How Secure Tactical Video Transmission Impacted the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/45460690/Death_from_Above_How_Secure_Tactical_Video_Transmission_Impacted_the_Second_Nagorno_Karabakh_War p. 4
[43] Major Johnson, Darfus L. (1999) Wizards of Chaos and Order: A Theory of The Origins, Practice, and Future of Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA370245.pdf Abstract.
[44] Colonel (Retired) Boyd, John. (1985) Patterns of Conflict. Dan Grazier YouTube Channel (2015). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46M1_CWFXug 15:54
[45] Abel, Jonathan. (2016) Guibert: Father of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN: 978-0-8061-5443-5. “Three major developments occurred before 1770: the adoption of the socket bayonet around 1698, the use of cadenced step in 1754, and the development of Guibert columns in 1769.” p. 53
[46] Major Johnson, Darfus L. (1999) Wizards of Chaos and Order: A Theory of The Origins, Practice, and Future of Operational Art. School of Advanced Military Studies. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA370245.pdf p. 16