Counterinsurgency Options for Ukraine
Vincent A. Dueñas
The most effective strategy that Ukraine can select against Russian-backed separatists is a population-centric approach; with targeted utilization of their growing special operations units pursue militant separatist leaders in a limited enemy-centric approach. The key point being that the targeting of the separatist leaders should only continue to the extent that it serves political goals in Kiev, since this type of “kingpin” strategy cannot account for extensive degree of Russian involvement in the conflict. If it is not already understood, Kiev should acknowledge that they cannot fight to retake Crimea and that outside support is currently non-existent for such an endeavor. Moscow has made clear that it views the annexation of Crimea as an issue of sovereignty over its territory and the release of audio recordings of Russian presidential advisor, Sergei Glasyev, helps to validate the theory that the justification of the Crimean referendum appears to have been a ruse.[i] The cost-benefit analysis of a Crimean campaign leaves only the possibility of a counterinsurgency strategy for the Donbas.
In assessing the root causes for the Donbas separatist movement and their Russian supporters a short history is useful. From the perspectives of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), the region known as the Donbas, they identify culturally with Russia, as the majority their inhabitants are Russian-speaking. The historical background to the region includes its role as an industrial power base for the Soviet Union. Having been declared independent under the fledgling Ukrainian nation over 23 years ago, it came as a surprise to its inhabitants when they realized they were no longer part of the Soviet Union. From that time forward, corruption and lack of interest in the region saw the Donbas’ oligarch’s take control of the mines and industry that did remain.[ii] The events of the Maidan revolution, followed by the annexation of Crimea set in motion the DNR and LHR’s referendum for independence with Russian support. Today, the region survives on the financial support of Russia, with Russian military leaders continuing to spearhead and fund the organization of the separatist factions.[iii] For the separatists, Russia was their natural ally. Although the people of the Donbas, to include some separatists, understand that to some extent their revolution was for the benefit of Russia, they distrusted Kiev even more. Russian information operations that vilify Kiev as fascist, corrupt oligarchs that have no real connection with the people of the Donbas have been very successful.[iv]
For Russia, it seems that the calculus to participate in the Ukrainian separatist movement was driven by their regional strategy to exert influence over former Soviet territories and intervene against the warming up of Ukraine to the EU.[v] The initial steps taken by Russia to seize Ukraine showed a disposition to exert military force precisely because Ukraine was not a NATO member. Having increased cooperation with NATO and augmented defense spending because of the commodity booms and the price of oil through 2014, Russia was content with its knowledge of the limits and drawbacks to the NATO alliance and chose pursue its own agenda in the region. This first became evident during the Georgian invasion of 2008.[vi] Russian foreign policy most likely views its greatest threat as the continuation of western democracy as a viable form of government. In this vein, Russia has consistently shown that it is willing to use Cold War tactics of subversion and espionage, to now include the application of its cyber capabilities, in order to undermine weak governments and destabilize them for their own benefit. The pursuit of such an aggressive strategy with a NATO member directly is not to Russia’s benefit, however, Ukraine, with its historic cultural ties does not pose as great of a threat. At the same time that Ukraine was experiencing unrest in 2014, Putin was experiencing a drop in ratings, thus Crimea and the Donbas presented an opportunity.
Putin probably made a reasonable assessment that the West would not stop him due to the asymmetry of interests - Ukraine is very important to Russia with minimal value to NATO members. This large interest asymmetry suggested NATO would be unlikely to intervene just as NATO chose to do little when Russia invaded Georgia. Additionally, Putin may have determined he needed an external event to consolidate his hold on power due to a 19 percent decline in his approval ratings from 2008-2013.[vii]
Russia’s further desire to simultaneously engage in Syria, while drawing down major support in the Donbas show that the calculus for its involvement is distinctive to the region. The Donbas is important to Russia because they can more easily influence the area and are able to maintain a veneer of legitimacy because a valid self-organized separatist insurgency.
The situation on the ground is essentially a stalemate, as the Minsk II agreement notes there is a ceasefire that most importantly requires the removal of heavy weapons from the frontline. This however, has not occurred due to disagreements over the timing of the removal and agreements by Kiev to undertake political legislation aimed at reducing corruption. Fighting still occurs daily, but one report indicates a possibility that a number of young men that currently fight for the separatists’ movement only do so because of money.[viii] The Donbas ideologues that organize and fight aggressively are a core group that needs to be targeted. The majority of effective fighting forces are Russian, which currently number approximately 8,000 personnel, while the rest of the separatist fight force numbers approximately 35,000 personnel.[ix]
From a Kiev’s view, the promise of more integration with the EU is fading fast, with the Dutch, most recently seeking to limit the promises of integration for the Ukraine.[x] This development signals the hard reality that for the foreseeable future, Kiev will only be able to seek minimal political and diplomatic support for their conflict, as opposed to concrete military commitments. The various dimensions of the population-centric strategy must take on the characteristics of political, military, economic and development efforts, as well the continued expansion of outside great power support. This strategy must account for the root causes that drive support for both the separatist movement primarily, and acknowledge that Russia’s great power support must be targeted as well in order to stand any chance of eventually retaking the territory. This population-centric strategy would most likely have to take place over a minimum 5-year timeline in order to make the necessary changes across the different dimensions and exhaust Russian involvement and support.
The political effort on the part of Kiev, must enforce the Minsk II agreement. Due to Ukraine’s relative weakness against Russia, adherence to the Minsk II agreement would buy it political will from the EU in order to increase its support for key military reforms and operations it wants to undertake. The removal of heavy weapons should be accompanied by simultaneous increases in information operations that will be explained later in the essay. Kiev must also pass more robust anti-corruption laws which include requesting the support of a UN or EU anti-corruption body. This reform will be one of the lynchpins of the government to show international and Donbas populations their commitment to reform. Robust information operations will be key to this reform having the necessary effect and giving it an enduring character. Finally, the Kiev government must hold talks with the “Opposition Bloc” to discuss ways for the government to maintain ongoing dialogues over the discussion of some form of federalization for the region. The government must consider that in order to end this conflict, some form of autonomy for the region will likely have to be conceded in order for there to be a peaceful reintegration of the population and reduce a Russian preponderance to interfere. This autonomy however, will have to include physical government presence back within the region in order to reconnect the population with the government and extinguish the separatist argument that Kiev is detached. The political case must be made for the Donbas population that the responsibility for violence must be placed squarely on the shoulders of separatist leaders and furthermore, show that Russian interference would only serve to make the populations’ plight worse.
The military effort must encompass an enemy-centric component and seek to target separatist leaders from the trenches. An aggressive push for Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) to increase attacks against high-value targets should accompany an aggressive political front. Adhering to the Minsk II agreements to remove heavy weapons will leave the frontline forces exposed, so aggressive targeting should be undertaken to also take out key heavy-weapons sites. Sabotage and subversion by Ukrainian SOF must also be undertaken to reduce separatist organization and capacity. A minimal footprint, but with expanded authority to engage the enemy along the front will provide opportunities for SOF to hone their skills and sow discord among the separatist and Russian ranks. Accompanying this effort, will be the rebuilding of government radio stations in order broadcast psychological messaging about Russian falsehoods. The information operations dimension of this strategy should be undertaken by the military with intelligence services support. Messaging that conveys the manipulation of Donbas populations at the hands of Russia must be aggressively undertaken, specifically, the airing of the audio recordings of Glasyev planning the annexation of Crimea. Other messaging must include the successes of the Ukrainian government in negotiating peace terms and undertaking key corruption reforms. Stories and interviews from defectors and key government figures that emphasize solidarity and shared history with the region should be shared to undermine separatist messaging. Progress on key economic reforms should also be conveyed, along with recordings of EU support and solidarity for the region.
Economic reforms will need to include the approval of a new pension law and the design and approval of a funding package to resurge Donbas industry. Currently the price of food is less expensive on the Ukrainian side than on the Donbas side and work is limited in the Donbas, so the immediate resurgence of support to region should be a point of leverage for the Kiev government.
Development reform must include the government’s push to successfully staff and fund the Agency for the Restoration of Donbas. This agency should spearhead the efforts to rebuild in the region. Kiev should also seek to increase international aid, while the quality of the local government officials must improve. This dimension is arguably the most important during the initial stages of the counterinsurgency strategy after the military has successfully targeted and reduced the military capacity of the separatists along the border. The relative speed with which development projects can be instituted will provide the first tangible evidence of involvement on the part of the government that will color what the local population believes that the government will commit to. Rapid initiation of development projects will provide a starting point for the civilian population to interact with government officials to humanize the involvement of Kiev in their communities.
In terms of seeking outside support, the Ukraine will need to continue pursuing increased diplomatic support with the hope of materializing more concrete commitments in the future. Existing support comes in the form of NATO-member countries and US military trainers that are working to improve the professionalization of the Ukrainian military forces, but are not involved in combat operations.[xi] Although limited in scope of involvement in the conflict, the extent of support is not insignificant and signals NATO’s and the US’ desire to provide a stopgap to Russian involvement. For NATO’s part they have committed to the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), which offers the following:
1 - Advisory support: Resident and nonresident NATO and allied advisers are assisting Ukraine in a broad range of defense issues, including logistics and strategic-level reform.
2 - Defense reform: Key assistance includes capacity and institution building, professional development of civilian employees, and strategic communications.
3 - Defense education: Allied experts are cooperating with eight defense education institutions, three training centers, and the Diplomatic Academy in Ukraine to improve staff skills and develop curricula that meet Western standards.
4 - Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and demining: NATO is conducting humanitarian demining operations and will implement a project to increase Ukraine’s capabilities to counter IEDs.
5 - Explosive ordnance disposal: Allies are supporting Ukraine in disposing of obsolete small arms/light weapons, ammunition, and anti-personnel mines.[xii]
US assistance to date has also been substantial, focusing on non-lethal aid that enhances the operational and technological capabilities of the Ukrainian military:
1 - Training: 350 U.S. personnel training up to five battalions of Ukrainian conventional forces and one battalion of special operations forces, while developing a long-term institutional training capacity.
2 - Equipment: including counter-artillery and counter-mortar radars, secure communications, training aids, logistics infrastructure and IT systems, tactical UAVs, and medical equipment.
3 - Advisers: advancing implementation of key defense reforms, such as promoting civilian oversight, greater efficiency and transparency, and combatting corruption.[xiii]
While this aid is not lethal combat power that translates to the fighting, it is nonetheless an important commitment that NATO and the US is making to the second-largest land army in Europe after Russia.[xiv] It therefore should be top priority for Kiev to increase participation in NATO military exercises and encourage NATO military presence and participation within its borders. An increase in military forces by NATO members is sorely needed to help adjust Russia’s calculus on the extent to which it desires to expand the war in Ukraine. Ukraine needs more weapons and equipment as it attempts to modernize in the middle of fighting a war. Additionally, Ukraine should seek to undermine Russian support to the separatists by gathering as much hard evidence of the Russian involvement and its toll on Russian soldiers to show to the media in order to undermine Russian public support.
The final crucial component to the outside support dimension is the expansion of cyber warfare operations. Where the Ukraine is a region that does not hold great significance to the EU and the US, it does offer a battlefield on which to test cyber capabilities with relative impunity. Specifically, Ukraine needs more expertise on capabilities that would enable it to disable or disrupt command and control systems and logistics systems of the Russian military and the Donbas writ large, in order to undermine the perception that Russia can protect and provide for the people of the Donbas. That Russia does not openly acknowledge the participation of its forces in the Donbas, it can also not cry foul for actions taken against its units in the region. Kiev should look to increase the involvement and utilization of NATO country cyber capabilities to subvert all forms of financing, operations and organization that the separatists and Russians undertake as part of their daily routine. Increasing the cost of conducting operations in the Ukraine for Russia is a key way to reduce their calculus on their involvement in the region. While currently heavily engaged in Syria, the war in Donbas can serve as a proving ground for NATO countries to engage in open cyber warfare to reduce operating capacity of the separatists and Russia.
Ukraine faces an exceptionally difficult counterinsurgency, primarily because of the extensive great power support the Donbas insurgents enjoy from Russia. The separatists’ grievances are legitimate and still plague the region today. Militarily, Ukraine is not enough of a match for Russia and they do not currently enjoy the hard support of Europe’s militaries to risk engaging in a direct confrontation with Russia. Even by fighting a successful population-centric counterinsurgency, they still run the risk of inciting Russia to action if they do not feel they can claim victory.
Ultimately, however, there is no other solution for the Ukraine. Any attempts by Ukraine at this time to use direct force on the separatists and the population through exclusively enemy-centric or punishment counterinsurgency strategies will play right into the psychological warfare trap that paints Kiev as corrupt neo-Nazis that are running a fascist state and will subjugate the population once they regain control.
A population-centric counterinsurgency offers the best opportunity to undermine Russian involvement, end separatist control and negotiate an enduring agreement. The realities that the Ukraine faces external to the country include the realization that integration into the EU will be minimal at best and that NATO membership is not possible in the foreseeable future. However, Ukraine’s capacity to wage an effective COIN campaign and effectively suppress the separatist movement, while simultaneously making key reforms in their government and against corruption, greatly increases the future possibility of integration with western society. The Donbas itself is not clearly with one side or another, but if the results of modernization do not benefit the Donbas, there is no incentive for them to side with Kiev.
End Notes
[i] Melkozerova, Veronika. "Two years too late, Lutsenko releases audio of Russian plan that Ukrainians already suspected." www.kyivpost.com. August 27, 2016. Web. <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukrainian-prosecutors-release-alleged-audio-evidence-of-russias-control-over-crime-annexation-and-civil-unrest-in-eastern-ukraine-421786.html>.
[ii] Antony Butts. Who was Pulling the Strings when Ukraine Unraveled? Reuters "War College", 2016. Itunes Podcast.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Finnery, Nathan K., and Benjamin J. Fernandes. "The Myth of Russian Aggression and NATO Expansion." www.thestrategybridge.org. December 16, 2016. Web. <http://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/12/16/the-myth-of-russian-aggression-and-nato-expansion>.
[vi] Ibid.
[vii] Ibid.
[viii] Ukraine: The Line. International Crisis Group, 2016. Social Science Premium Collection. 8.
[ix] Ibid. 8.
[x] Baczynska, Gabriela, and Toby Sterling. "EU leaders to endorse Dutch demands on Ukraine: sources." www.reuters.com. December 14, 2016. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-eu-dutch-idUSKBN14326Q?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%29>.
[xi] Morelli, Vincent L. Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2016. 30.
[xii] Ibid. 37.
[xiii] Ibid. 32.
[xiv] Peterson, Nolan. "The 2 Largest Land Armies in Europe Tiptoe to the Edge of War and Back." www.dailysignal.com. December 9, 2016. Web. <http://dailysignal.com/2016/12/09/eastern-europe-is-a-powder-keg-ready-to-explode/>.
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Comments
WH language about restoring peace along Russia-Ukraine "border" is bizarre. Fighting is not along the border, it is deep inside Ukraine.
Or as if Ukraine were culpable for Russian invasion. Like saying Poland had a long-running dispute with Nazi Germany.
Diplomatic language means a lot to many...this WH does not quite get that point....
When one reads WH statements....just keep this in mind....
A guide to "whataboutism," the Russian propaganda tactic parroted so well by POTUS Trump
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tnX_ibkICWk
Trump puts US on moral par with Putin's Russia. Never in history has a President slandered his country like this.
https://www.google.com/amp/insider.foxnews.com/amp/article/54120
O'REILLY: Putin's a killer.
DJT: There are a lot of killers. We've got a lot of killers...Our country's so innocent?
BTW....
JUST A SIDE note...the Ukrainian readout was seven paragraphs...the WH version just two sentences.....
Girkin / #Strelkov claims all PMC Wagner fallen bodies in #Syria are cremated in a mobile crematory.
https://twitter.com/dobrijdiadia/sta...5327719497728#
Despite how cynic it sounds (even for #Girkin) this is old & well used #Russian tactics to claim of no casualties.
In 2014 when # of Cargo-200 skyrocketed #Russia employed same tactics + body dumping into abandoned mine shafts.
NOTE:....Girkin should know as he led his merry band of 14 former and active duty spetsnaz out of Crimea into eastern Ukraine to start the so called "separatist" myth....
BTW....mobile crematories were reported in eastern Ukraine during the heavy fighting days of 2014/2015 and even photographed and geo located...and the MSM did not want to believe them....
I have been saying for a long while those so called "separatist supporting civilians" have long ago turned against their own so called mercenaries...that shift has come due to the extensive damage of their own areas at the hands of their own so called separatists.....
Amazing story of how people in a large apt complex told mercenaries to get out of their yard with their howitzers.
https://twitter.com/l_vinchenso/status/827930180618444806
Another indicator of their waning support is the real increase in using twitter and or Russian VK to supply shelling info during the actual shelling attacks.....has increased greatly over the last year vs the period 2014/2015....
This is the strangest of all strange things around Ukraine..now it appears the WH believes that the fighting in eastern Ukraine is all about "a border dispute".....
No mention suddenly of "separatists"....
Azor take notice of that new alternative fact...and from the WH....
QUOTE
Bizarre readout of Trump/Poroshenko call, as if conflict was a border dispute between Russia and Ukraine.
"long standing Ukraine/Russian dispute"......."restore peace along the border"
1. this WH apparently does not fully understand the "long standing dispute" and
2. Ukraine has been trying to get back full control of their "border" since Russian militarily annexed it....
THIS was followed by a public statement by Putin's spokesperson Peskov
"The resumed serious fighting is a early reason to start a dialogue and cooperation between Russia and US including Ukraine"...
THUS the reading between the lines of his statement would be as follows....
Russia escalated attacks on Ukraine, destroyed 30,000 town #Avdiivka to initiate talks with Trump.
NOTICE not a single mention of "separatist rights....defending the Russian language right....or "of improving the living/earning conditions of the oppressed eastern Ukraine Russian speakers"....
If this is in fact correct as stated by Peskov..then the article above needs to be seriously rewritten to match the actual Russian driven narrative....
And it is not about "separatists"....
Outside of the Putin fear of color revolts..the underlying fact is he wants a new Yalta 2.0....and has openly stated that since 2006....
This is how the Ukrainian global diaspora is assisting UAF in the current fighting...
Frontline medics require Skedco and field blood transfusion kits. Contact @alexjerryeva or @johnmquinnv if you can help
Call went out several hours ago and first supply aid being flown in from Canada almost immediately...more coming later....
The combat medical facilities that UAF and the Ukrainian government have built up are actually making a big difference right now in the combat fighting morale....
Ukraine's Emb. to UK
✔
@UkrEmbLondon
We're enormously grateful to #UA doctors, who made everything possible in 4hrs operation 2 save eyes of wounded in #Avdiyivka UK journalist
He had been hit by an Russian GRAD artillery strike along with other UAF..and was treated as if he was another UAF needing medical assistance and immediately evaced along with four other wounded UAF....
People who are going to the military hospital to donate blood for wounded Ukrainian fighters.
http://qha.com.ua/en/health/people-actively-donate-blood-for-wounded-uk…
Medics Home Front @MedicsHomeFront
Our first-aid kits ready to be shipped to the frontline in eastern Ukraine:
https://www.facebook.com/iryna.guk/posts/1381548591883261
BTW....no such lines on the "separatist" side of the fighting....bare bones medical treatment and then medical evac back to Russia in Rostov or St. Petersburg....
IMPORTANT if actually conformed as true.....
Zakharchenko reprimanded by the Kremlin: will lose command of "DPR" if he loses Yasynuvata bridgehead
And lately his forces are losing inch by inch the overall bridgehead.....to the UAF....
This is what the so called term "creeping offensive" is all about...this bridgehead actually belongs to Ukraine under Minsk 2 so they are simply retaking what Russia took from them in 2015.....
And now the UAF is on equal military footing and the rearming and the retraining by NATO and the Ukraine defense industry is paying off....as the UAF has the far better fighting morale and officer/NCO leadership and the backing of the Ukrainian population as a whole...a big difference right now...
And a major plus no one talks about..vastly improved combat medical services leading to a far better UAF medical survival rate that in 2014 and 2015....with combat medics literally risking their lives to make it into the combat zones under heavy fire...female combat medic and her driver killed yesterday by Russian ATGM.....driving a clearly marked RED CROSS ambulance
Top 10 fakes of Russian propaganda in 2016
https://informnapalm.org/en/top-10-fakes-russian-propaganda-2016/
Comments from a journalist who is very familiar with Ukraine and Ukrainian activities......
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/02/03/the-u…
QUOTE
Maxim Eristavi is a nonresident research fellow with the Atlantic Council and co-founder of Hromadske International, an independent news outlet, based in Kiev.
The citizens of Ukraine have never had any illusions about the international community’s willingness to take their side in their bloody conflict with Russia. Ukrainians collectively roll their eyes whenever one of their well-meaning friends abroad expresses “grave concern” about Moscow’s aggression, because those fine-sounding words are so rarely followed by concrete actions.
But at least they knew they could count on the Americans. Ukraine and the United States have enjoyed friendly relations for a good 25 years now. And over for the past two years — ever since Moscow seized and occupied the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, and then launched its invasion of the country’s eastern territories shortly thereafter — Ukrainians always saw Washington as their most important diplomatic ally. That was especially true when it came to maintaining and imposing sanctions aimed at holding the Russian military in check.
Now that long-standing alliance appears to be over. On Jan. 28, President Trump spoke on the phone with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The conversation, by all accounts, was marked by an air of friendship and conciliation. In the hours that followed, the fighting in eastern Ukraine suddenly spiked.
The number of explosions tracked by monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) skyrocketed from 420 on Jan. 26 to 10,330 on Jan. 31, the sharpest increase ever recorded by the observers.
Targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure have left potentially hundreds of thousands of people in the region without water even as they face temperatures well below freezing.
Ukraine now confronts a major humanitarian crisis, as thousands of civilians in the government-controlled town of Avdiivka huddle in the dark and cold under intense shelling by combined Russian and separatist forces.
This appalling situation prompted a public outcry from several countries. But as the fighting escalated, many Ukrainians were desperately waiting for a strong statement of support from their biggest ally, the United States. It never came — at least not in the form they were hoping for.
Few in Kiev ever really had illusions that the new U.S. president would continue his predecessor’s policy of criticizing and constraining Russia for violating their country’s territorial integrity. Many Ukrainians had suspicions about Trump.
For many years, Trump associates earned big money in Ukraine by lending their skills as consultants and advisers to the spectacularly corrupt ex-president Viktor Yanukovych. As a candidate,
Trump made his sentiments amply clear by refusing to meet Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and demonstrating his admiration for Putin.
Even so, the break between the two allies came much faster than anyone in Ukraine had expected — and at the worst possible moment.
It took the State Department almost two days to come up with a reaction to the escalating violence. Finally, on Jan. 31, a spokesman in Washington issued a shockingly bleak statement that didn’t mention Russia once. This is a drastic departure from the previous language used by the United States, which was notable for exposing and acknowledging Moscow’s predominant role in the conflict.
The U.S. Embassy in Kiev, meanwhile, limited itself to a single tweet expressing concern about children trapped in the fighting. During the crisis of 2014-16, Ukrainians had come to view the embassy as a messaging powerhouse offering round-the-clock statements of support.
Now, it’s true enough that Ukraine’s political elites cheered a surprisingly strong statement from the U.S. mission to the OSCE blaming Russia for the escalation; it was published a few hours before the State Department reaction.
But it soon became clear that this message was a lonely exception, perhaps representing a last desperate act by some U.S. official intent on sticking to the old course.
Ukrainians took heart from the statement by the Trump administration’s new ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, who denounced “the aggressive actions of Russia” and pledged to keep sanctions in place until Moscow pulls out of Crimea. But it is all too evident in Kiev that her sentiments are not shared by the one man who counts. Only strong words from the State Department or the White House itself would be enough to undo the damage at this point, and Ukrainians aren’t holding their breath.
In any case, the United States’ refusal to take a decisive stance on the violence in eastern Ukraine sends a clear signal to Kiev: The friendship is over. And it doesn’t really matter whether the shift is the result of skillful Kremlin maneuvering or some sort of concessions offered by the Trump administration out of public view.
The United States’ reaction to the latest carnage in eastern Ukraine offers a disturbing snapshot of the new geopolitical reality that is now taking shape.
U.S. disinterest also enables radicals within the Ukrainian political elite by removing all constraints on their behavior, too. Some members of parliament recently traveled to the front line to join far-right paramilitaries in enforcing an illegal “economic blockade” of the occupied territories.
The sudden evaporation of strong international support for Ukraine has brought crucial reforms to a halt as corrupt elites suddenly don’t feel any pressure to deliver on the conditions tied to Western aid packages.
The end of the U.S.-Ukraine alliance will also have a terrible effect on civil society, which remains crucial to the country’s continuing transformation. It’s nearly impossible to count all the times in the past three years when pressure from the U.S government, often low-profile, helped activists to deflect attacks on independent journalists; to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) people; or to push forward urgently needed reforms.
All this should provide some idea of the damage Trump’s policies are already causing in Ukraine.
And I suspect that our country won’t be the only one affected.
Considering that the Donbass Russians that voted and fought for federalization have become pawns to Russia's will and are now also subsidized directly by Moscow, the deal has not panned out too well for them. There is no industry entering into the Donbas from Russia, only money, which will not last forever. Additionally, I am unsure of who you are referring to when you say "our filthy political system and execrable 'culture.'" The recommendation is for the Ukraine to use what it has at its disposal, not to recommend any actions that the US should take.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that in the Donbas region 20% of the population quietly supports the Kiev government, 60% is persuadable to some degree, and 20% are either die-hard separatists or "volunteers" from Russia. By those notional portions, a population-centric counterinsurgency will get no more than 80% of the way there. Full victory will require killing or expelling the remainder, and that takes real force.
Keeping the use of that force within the insurgency/counterinsurgency guise that does not cause a general war with Russia is difficult, but possible. First, it has to be Ukrainians doing the fighting, preferably without distinctly foreign-supplied equipment. Overt outside involvement makes a Russian escalation more defensible and makes a more undeniable challenge to the Russian government.
Second, it has to be methodical and measured, both to not alarm the Kremlin to escalate the fight, and to exhaust the genuine Ukrainian separatists through attrition: if the local proxies die off or require increasing levels of long-term support, "winning" becomes more costly to Russia.
Maj. Dueñas,
Thank you for your response to my rather blunt critique. It seems that the responses to most pieces in the SWJ Journal are not followed by the original authors.
Far from taking a "dispassionate" perspective, you are providing recommendations for Ukraine to cope with a very difficult situation and to press on despite being trapped between a rock and another rock that is larger and more jagged. That suggests a certain passion for Ukraine's plight. I am glad that you acknowledge the “extremely limited outside support” for Ukraine: the Free Syrian Army has received more support (e.g. TOWs, small arms), and the Humvees given to the Iraqi Army (to fight Daesh and then given by Baghdad to Hezbollah to fight the FSA) are no doubt superior to those donated by the US to Ukraine.
You might ask in reply to my comments: are we merely to conclude that Ukraine has no options and then to walk away? It would place me in a difficult position as I do not believe that Russia should be rewarded for conquering its neighbors yet again, as it was by the Concert of Europe, and the Allies in both 1919 and 1945.
Your point about the War in Donbas beginning as an insurgency rather than an invasion, that was co-opted by Russia, is an interesting one. My understanding is that armed insurgency began with Russian intelligence and special forces operatives leading small groups of local collaborators to occupy government buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk, and gauging the loyalty of Ukrainian police, intelligence and military forces in the area. These mostly bloodless probing raids continued until the insurgents met with resistance at a police station in Kramatorsk. Basically, I have considered local collaborators to be mere astro-turf: local undesirables pressed into service to lend the insurgency an air of legitimacy.
Do you have any information with respect to the breakdown of opinions in Donbas, and how the polls and demographics have changed as the war has gone on and as refugees have fled to Russia and government-controlled Ukraine?
Your argument about driving a wedge between Donetsk/Luhansk and Moscow is an interesting one. What could wipe Putin’s smirk off faster than the local warlords denouncing him as an aggressor?
RE:
1. I agree that most Ukrainians want integration into the EU, but given the Russo-Ukrainian War and the EU’s internal dissension, Ukraine may find itself excluded from both the EU and EAEU. It will probably also find that the benefits of membership in both are less attractive than prior to the conflict.
2. Agreed, but by the time this process is complete, the difference between Donbas and Ukraine may approximate the German or Korean divides.
4. I would disagree here. From an asymmetrical perspective, Ukraine is defeated only insofar as it desires to regain Donbas. What if Ukraine were to officially pursue reunification while practically containing Donbas and focusing on moving the rest of the country forward? Donbas would revert from a Russian asset to a Russian liability. Russia and its collaborators would keep the war hot along the line of contact, but Ukraine could reinforce the front such that any (pro)Russian offensive would be impossible without a full-scale, overt and joint Russian invasion, which would certainly bring the attention of the EU and NATO, and probably result in advanced Western arms and “volunteers” flowing into Ukraine.
6. I agree with your perspective on the population of Donbas. Ukraine was not a true nation-state from 1991 to 2014. Most Ukrainian expatriates (post-1991) referred to themselves as Russian or Soviet, and seemed embarrassed about their nationality. Yet the EuroMaidan protests have caused an explosion of nationalist fervor, as crises are wont to do. However, this revival was more in the central and west areas, where Ukrainian nationalism has always been strongest. The people of Donbas seem rather indifferent as to whether they are in Ukraine, Russia or in a reconstituted Soviet Union, and probably part of this is due to the mass murder and population transfers that occurred during the Soviet period.
Lastly, you may want to consider your recommendations from the perspective of preventing annexation by Russia. Perhaps if Kiev can’t have Donbas, it can start its own insurgency in Donbas, ensuring that no one can comfortably control it?
Cheers,
Azor
Edited: 2/4/17
Azor,
Thanks for taking a critical eye to my writing and risking a migraine ;-)
I should begin by highlighting that I attempted to take a dispassionate view of what the Ukraine should do, considering that abdicating control of the Donbas is not an option. Kiev will most likely refuse to capitulate to Russian interference and needs to figure out a way forward given those constraints. What I am suggesting therefore, is a unilateral strategy for the Ukrainian government to undertake, considering that only extremely limited outside support exists from NATO/EU. The conflict in Donbas did in fact begin as an insurgency with figures like Andrei Purgin and Alexander Zakharchenko that successfully rallied local support within the Donbas civilian population to at least tacitly support their political cause (the Donetsk People's Republic) backed by separatist militias. This insurgency was, almost simultaneously, bolstered and overtaken by Russia's great power support. Fair point on my use of "Options", of course I am emphasizing precisely that there aren't many.
Pt 1. Since the majority of Ukraine leans towards more integration with the EU, what other markets would you point them to? Good point about Russia's failure to adhere to the Minsk II agreement. My intention was not to ignore Russia's violations, but rather to point out that I believe Kiev has little other recourse (if they still desire to gain access to EU markets) than to continue supporting Minsk II even though their forces are must violate the agreement as well just to defend themselves.
Pt 2. I agree that anti-corruption efforts will take a generation. Anti-corruption efforts represent the meaningful government reforms that can be used as propaganda directed at both the population and insurgents by Kiev as part of David Galula's First Step (Destruction or Expulsion of the Insurgent Forces). The government needs to co-opt the separatists' message of a corrupt and detached Kiev from the Donbas, which will take a long, long time.
Pt 3. You are right, federalization is extremely risky. To go back to your comments from point 2, my recommendation for federalization rests on the necessity of anti-corruption efforts and co-opting of the separatists' message in order to stand a chance of success after at least a generation.
Pt 4. Pressure by Ukraine needs to be maintained to some degree if Kiev seeks to regain the Donbas in any capacity. The use of SOF represents the economy of force effort by the military aspect of the COIN strategy, taking into account that plans to withdraw heavy weaponry poses a significant risk and may not be feasible in the end. Kiev would need to speak exclusively to the Dontesk People's Republic. This is much easier said than done and in this respect I do not have much more to offer. Russia needs to be sidelined to the extent that it is possible in any negotiations.
Pt 5. I know right!
Pt 6. I do not believe or suggest that the population en masse would emigrate to government-held Ukraine or rise up against the separatists. Most of the population is suspicious that they are caught in the middle of a conflict that does not really represent their interests from either side. I believe that they want to remain exactly where they are. What the evidence does suggest, however is that there is a crack in the perception of imbalance between what the separatists claim and what is reality. Thus, if the Ukraine was able to retake the territory at some point in the future, the population could lend itself to support the government if the population-centric strategy is pursued successfully. As you suggest, the region will probably still need major subsidies in order to be retained if it is regained by Kiev.
You are correct in describing Kiev's inability to defeat Russia militarily, however my premise is that they should not give up and that their only option currently is a population-centric strategy with a limited enemy-centric component.
The conflict in the Donbas began as an insurgency and just because Russia drives much of the conflict today, does not negate the population-centric actions that Kiev needs to execute if they intend on retaking the region. Failing to address the core reason for the population's tacit support of the separatist and pro-Russian movements dooms the Ukraine to have yet another territory permanently ripped from their hands.
So perhaps, Azor, the Ukraine may yet stand a chance, even though your comments denote otherwise. Ultimately, I would have to disagree with your assertion that the Ukraine should just abdicate the region and allow Russia to annex it as they did Crimea.
I am however, thankful for the solid critiques that you were able to provide.
I’m sorry Maj. Dueñas, but my initial reaction to this essay was a giant eye-roll that caused a slight headache.
Forgive me for asking, but was there a 2,750 word minimum for submission? It feels as though I read through pages of unnecessary boilerplate to get a regurgitation of what I, Moscow, Kiev, Brussels, Washington, Donetsk and Luhansk are already well aware of.
You refer to the conflict in Donbas as an insurgency in the title, when in fact it is more of an invasion. Your title also declares that you are presenting “options” for the Ukrainian government. However, in your introduction and conclusion, you state that Ukraine has no military options in either Donbas or Crimea.
I will attempt to distill your recommendations to Kiev:
1. Enforce the Minsk II agreement
You claim that enforcing it will be useful in procuring support from the EU, but then you also claim that, “the promise of more integration with the EU is fading fast”. Kiev’s rationale for integration would be access to markets, remittances from Ukrainians working in more prosperous EU member states, for improved political representation internationally through the EU, and for EU spending. Yet the EU’s regional economic, migratory and spending disparities led to Brexit, and new members and associates will probably be offered far less benefits than say Poland and the Baltic republics were.
You have clearly ignored Russian and pro-Russian violations of Minsk II from the outset, with Debaltsevo being a glaring case. Despite Kiev’s adherence to Minsk II and protestations of (pro)Russian violations, no state or organization has been able to offer Kiev any recourse other than admonishments to continue adherence.
2. Anti-corruption
This process may well take a generation to complete, so I fail to see how this initiative will have any near-term impact on the conflict. Moreover, neither Russia nor its CSTO/EAEU partners show any signs of reforming their incredibly corrupt mafia states, of which Donbas, Chechnya, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are the worst offenders. Clearly, corruption is not seen in the Kremlin as a threat to its support even in areas where its hold is seemingly less assured. So, how is anti-corruption a “counter-insurgency option”?
3. Talk federalization/autonomy with the insurgents
This is exactly what the Kremlin wants, permanent seats on Ukraine’s “board of directors” with the ability to spoil or veto policies and legislation that the Kremlin disapproves of. This political solution is a one-way street and I highly doubt that it would lead to Ukraine regaining control over its open eastern border. Nor will these representatives of the insurgent districts be democratically elected by the local population.
4. Ukrainian SOF targeted killings of insurgent leaders, sabotage and subversion
Firstly, Moscow kills enough insurgent leaders to keep the turnover too high for comfort. Secondly, who will Kiev talk to in respect of recommendation 3 above? Thirdly, what about retaliation? Fourth, what happens when Russia responds conventionally and Ukrainian heavy weapons are safely secured and stowed away?
5. Enhance cyberwarfare capabilities
Duh.
6. Emphasize the economic attraction of integration with Ukraine rather than Russia
You claim that food is cheaper in Ukraine than in Donbas and that there are more work opportunities, but this only suggests that civilians in Donbas should or will emigrate to government-held Ukraine, not that they will overthrow the insurgents and Russians in order to reintegrate. Perhaps the region would still be worse-off regardless and require major subsidies from the rest of Ukraine as part of pacification?
Overall, you seem to be advocating a Northern Ireland solution to the conflict: liberal use of special forces and intelligence against combatants combined with political and economic incentives (equality) for non-combatants and defectors. Yet in that conflict, the British could mostly seal off Northern Ireland and the Irish military was not involved; if it were, the British Army would have sacked Dublin inside of 72 hours. Unfortunately for Kiev, it cannot defeat Russia militarily.
So perhaps, Maj. Dueñas, you should go back to the drawing board and come up with some real options. As for American aid, where are the Javelins and TOWs?
Excerpt from:
Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operation:
"In Donbas, some individuals and ethnic groups support the separatist movement instead of the government in Kiev. Some of the reasons (i.e., the incentives) individuals support the separatists include a general sense of mistrust toward the central government in Kiev, according to political science writer Elise Guiliano’s 2015 study “The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk.”22 Guiliano reports that a significant minority feel betrayed by the government, which they claim conducted “discriminatory demographic redistribution within Ukraine.”23 Some believe economic policies such as potential European Union membership will hurt their interests, and some are opposed to certain government policies. Therefore, while some share a sense of political and economic loyalty to Russia, the incentives leading individuals to support the separatists vary. Each group or individual may have different motives for their micro-decision to support separatists’ goals, but the macro-result is considerable support for the separatist movement. Furthermore, as individuals, groups, and states interact, micro-decisions can change over time and cause the collective result to shift."
I see that you're not in the most humorous mood. Having said that, it's the same temperature where I am as in Berlin, and I had to wade through slush in my runners to get a coffee.
I know that the Russo-Ukrainian War only has room for one "sheriff", and I agree that Russian interference is crucial for the insurgency, which was evident in the summer of 2014.
However, this does not mean that the people of Donetsk and Luhansk feel the same as the people of Lviv and Ternopil.
I have read rough estimates of 60% of the local populace being indifferent, bracketed by 20% each of pro-Ukrainians and pro-Russians.
Do I think that the pro-Russians of Donbas would have been capable of defeating the Ukrainian Army, however decrepit it was in early 2014? No.
Do I think that they could have engaged in subversion and low-level guerrilla warfare? Yes.
Dating back to "The Ruin" in the 17th Century, Ukraine has been torn between east and west as Russia devoured Ukraine, except for a decreasing portion that was part of Poland and then Austria.
The EuroMaidan aside, the history of political violence in Ukraine indicates a greater aversion to Catholic Poland, Lithuania and Austria, than it does to Orthodox Russia.
Remember how the Catholic Flemings preferred union with the Catholic Walloons, rather than their co-ethnic Protestant Dutch? Well, now blood is more important than faith it seems. In Ukraine, independence from Russia seems to be more important than enmity toward Poland and Lithuania, both of whom have been helping Ukraine, disregarding OUN revivals...
Azor...then explain why it took Girkin and his merry band of 14 launching the so called "separatist" movement out of Crimea...
And then why did it take 17,000 Russia troops with tanks and artillery to assist those so called "separatists...after the rag tag UAF had largely defeated the so called "separatists"....and only after the Russian invasion were the "separatists" were able to reestablish themselves....
Uh oh!
Someone dared to write an essay with the word "Ukraine" in it, and expected no outlaws to show up in town!
I'm interested in his case for local support for Russia and/or aversion or indifference to Western Ukraine.
Why?
Firstly, Ukraine has been torn between east and west for 400 years.
Secondly, Putin tends to avoid occupying areas where he is not assured of some local support from the population.
While Moscow's lack of enthusiasm for annexing Donbas is obvious, there must be at least a substantial minority that supports the Russian presence.
As someone who has been posting on the Ukraine thread since the Russian military annexation of Crimea........
Sorry...there was no true Donbas style separatists....go back to the thread and you will see that a group of quasi unemployed and or rather employed former and active duty Russian spetsnaz under the leadership of Girkin or Stelvov as some know him depending on which name he uses on twitter led a rag tag group of 14 from Crimea into Donbas....
BTW...when he was tossed out as Commander by the Russians he used to post on twitter stating that the "separatists" had largely failed and that Russia was indeed behind his moves...lately after so many of the former "separatist" Commanders seem to be blowing up in their own cars and or being shot in Moscow...he is as quiet as church mouse....
It was not the locals screaming "the Ukrainians are talking our language away from us" or "Ukrainians are keeping us poor" as the Donbas region actually held a large number of companies that employed an equally large number of people....besides a single Russian friendly Ukrainian oligarch ruled the area and still does and still is Russian friendly....
We urgently need to get to the reality that this was/is not a separatist movement and back to the realization that this was a ploy by Russia to grab Donbas using any excuse that allowed them denialability after Crimea as it offered a border region to Crimea controlled by Russian friendlies not the Ukrainian government and laid the groundwork for a potential land bridge to Odessa and on to Moldavia....which is now led by a proRussian President in a largely fraud driven recent election....
If you followed the initial various attempts to control Donbas by Girkin/Stelvov he did have some initial success in the follow on Maidan confusion and the fleeing of their corrupt former President.....
He suffered though a major defeat in the attempted takeover of Odessa a major goal of Russia in order to make Donbas a viable economic entity.
THEN somewhat surprisingly the rag tag UAF undermanned and underequipped began defeating the Girkin led forces in battle after battle and were on the verge of actually defeating this Russian led civil war....PUSHING Russia into making the decision to either accept defeat of their "separatists" or move in themselves.
THEN the Russian Army stepped in and we are where we now are.....
The Ukrainian government does have a plan to retake Donbas but on their terms and it is a long term goal.....what is interesting is now even those ethnic Russians who largely and vocally supported Russia and Girkin have mellowed and often state they want it to go back to what it use to be as the killing and destruction hurts them as Ukraine as a whole has marched on and is developing economically nicely actually...and corruption is being addressed head on....which will take time to beat down...but at least it is being addressed.....
The biggest weapon Ukraine has is simple and it is working actually ...make their Maidan transition work...develop and expand the economy and beat down massive corruption then Donbas will follow....
BUT that is exactly why Russia is still involved because if Ukraine is able to show to the Russians and say Belarus that there is a different way forward and is not tied to Russia what will Russians say and do in the end????
Putin is deathly afraid of "color revolts".....as he should be as 5T USDs simply disappeared at the height of the Russian economic boom period...into the pockets of Putin and his oligarch inner circle....
By "underlying issues" I mean the corruption in Ukrainian society that benefits the political and business class, to the particular exclusion of the Donbas region which was culturally more pro-Russian from the onset. When the limited benefits of integration with the EU began to materialize, they decidedly did not arrive at the steps of the former Soviet Union's industrial center. Russia, ever the talented opportunist, realized that there was a huge political bang for their buck in the Donbas, which it capitalized on. The population appears to be equally suspicious of both the government claim that the Donbas matters to the Ukraine and that the Donetsk Republic has not been usurped by Russian priorities. To just keep fighting without a change in great power support, which does not appear to be materializing, would be purposefully detrimental for the government. On the flip side, Ukraine does not appear to be willing to just give up and accept another loss after Crimea to claim peace.
By "underlying issues" do you mean joining the EU and NATO? I don't see where the insurgency comes from if it wasn't felt in pro-Russian quarters that Ukraine would join both. If so there is no reason to bother with anything other than rejecting the Russian position and fighting or announcing that Ukraine will join neither under any circumstances and having peace. "Good governance" won't overcome nationalism or Russian worries about NATO expanding.
While I can understand the rejection of an exclusively "hearts and minds" approach, the population is the ultimate goal in any counter-insurgency. Ukraine had a real separatist movement that was co-opted by Russian involvement, but which stemmed from, what I believe were legitimate complaints about the lack of resources and attention from Kiev, which were amplified by the Maidan movement that was a world away from Donbas. Unless the Ukraine decides to launch an all out assault to retake the Donbas, which would pit them unilaterally against Russia, their best option is to wage a counterinsurgency fight to address the underlying issues which started the separatist movement in the first place and which would remain if the Donbas was retaken. Looking long-term, a semi-autonomous Donbas governed by Kiev, would still likely see oligarchs connected back to Russia in an attempt to continue undermining Kiev. That problem would only be addressed by good governance, which I belive begins now with a population-centric strategy. Its a two-pronged battle against both grievances of the population and militia/military forces.
"The most effective strategy that Ukraine can select against Russian-backed separatists is a population-centric approach."
It should be clear by now that "Pop-Centric COIN" was a charade designed to give a career boost to certain ambitious flag officers and their supporters. If the enemy are Russian nationalists supported by Russia- complete with a safe haven and supply depots- then no amount of good deed doing will have any effect. Jobs programs and women's empowerment classes will do nothing by soak up resources and provide employment for international NGOs.