To Design or Not to Design (Part Two)

For GM-

I agree about COIN. But from my perspective, the issue on how/why/where we do COIN as a military instrument of power reflects the tension in our organization on how the Army defines itself (Builder's thesis in 'Masks of War')- do we train for full spectrum operations and emphasize high intensity (HIC) while implementing some lessons learned from OIF and OEF into our low intensity (LIC) doctrine and training procedures?

I look to our national training centers and the inevitable pendulum swing back from doing nothing but COIN for a decade back to the HIC/defense/LIC phases of old- the FSO rotation is back- but why?

Builder makes the claim that military branches reinvent themselves while staying true to old "golden era" perceptions of how they were the lead military IOP solving American conflicts- and that military branches often place their own desires for self-relevance and exclusive occupation of the "tip of the next conflict's spear" above even the national interests of the country. For instance- if the Army still holds to conventional glory of pitched battle against large standing armies where physical lines of operation and operational depth (deep, close, rear)continue to embrace Clausewitz and Jomini with armor, infantry, and aviation (and artillery too)...then is not COIN once again isolated as the 'whimpy kid' during dodgeball selection on the playground of military thought?

COIN puts all of the goldern-era concepts and procedures at disadvantage: CAS works better with prop A/C in penny packets under ground force command (arguably- and the USAF is unlikely to ever support that position, because...) Our armor does not work in Afghanistan, and our linear campaign plans for infantry to close with the enemy doesnt work either. The big dogs in COIN are the same ones as UW- small decentralized SOF or para-military forces that work local security and isolate the fish from the pond without draining the entire pond in the process. COIN makes senior military leadership pull a gag reflex because on our long list of military victories in 200 years, COIN doesnt do so well. Sure, we did well in the Philippines in 1899-1901 (Linn's book), and one could argue that the Great Plains Indian Wars after the Civil War were also successful- but I don't consider those true COIN since we were displacing or openly slaughtering all villages we discovered. Vietnam was a strategic disaster with tactical success built on the model of WWII golden-era superior fire power, mass and maneuver, and a focus on destroying the enemy. "We had to destroy the village to save it." But let me converge back to my point that design offers some truth about COIN and FSO.

Since COIN is the red-headed stepchild for military action because it reduces conventional strengths and often exploits institutional weaknesses; COIN is not what the military decision makers want to invest in or plan for. Now, of course we will add some more to FM 3-24 and perhaps introduce some coherent doctrine that does away with the silly nuances between FID and SFA someday (that is another rant I could go on); but as for hardware, training, force projection, modularity, professional education, and recruting- the Army is going to return to what it self-identifies as and embraces as it's true calling: conventional forces engaged in total war. Throw some 'hybrid' aspects around the edges and you can call it FSO- but the lion's share of cost, gear, training, capability, and capacity is oriented toward the war that is less likely to occur in the future. The Soviet Bear did not attack, and now that it is gone, there is no real rival. China is a giant, but not an offensive military one. India is an ally; and even if it wasn't, those countries are not bent on some sort of eschatalogical war strategy like the way Moscow was framed for many decades (Anatol Rapoport). In essence, we will only fight small and annoying enemies that embrace lower spectrum conflicts- COIN is one excellent tool for them. Instead of re-aligning our military to perpare for this as our primary mission, we keep it as a side requirement and are on the journey back to a conventional FSO focused 'total war' military.

Probably alot of folks disagree, but that is my perspective from the foxhole right now.

Ben

The critical requirement of holistic contemplation of a complex system is the ability to recognize the institutional biases of one's own worldview and organization- that is the essence of 'problematizing' or 'critical thinking' or 'reflective designing'- they each abandon the cycle of repetition and reinforcement that the traditional scientific and military institutionalism flourishes upon. Kuhn talks of 'paradigm shifts' and Taleb uses 'Black Swan events'- both speak to the difference between suprise and astonishment when you anticipate a system incorrectly. The problematizer is not afraid to challenge the core tenets of his own worldview with the cycle of destruction and creation- he does not simply add on to the existing structure and idolize past accomplishments as 'the golden road to success.' Linn in 'Echo of Battle' and Builder in 'Masks of War' make arguments that the military is continously in a cycle of doing just that- recycling idols and refusing to actually destroy anything that holds value or dogmatic sentiment.

The problematizer risks death when seeking truth with the emperor- he can be killed if he fails to please the emperor with the 'truth'- framing the complex system and exposing a worldview that explains instead of describes...but he also can be killed for making the emperor destroy something within his own worldview that is sacred; something that must be destroyed in order to appreciate the deep understanding that the problematizer brings. So, when a military organization categorically rejects a design deliverable because it presents within the operational approach the requirement to destroy something of deep institutional value (conventional warfare with a peer military IOP perhaps?)- the organization lashes back and 'kills' the problematizer. For instance- we keep trying to replace our fallen Soviet juggernaut of a rival with a new 'superpower' enemy that will fight us conventionally- we now use China; but China is NOT Russia...the mold does not fit- but that truth is problematic because if there is no "rival" willing to play conventional war by our rules, then our entire military worldview within strategy, procurement, doctrine, readiness, funding, etc- is false. If the only 'rivals' out there will only fight us in hybrid or asymmetrical formats- if that is indeed the new propensity of the complex system, then we must in turn create and destroy large sections of our entire military worldview in order to adapt to this new system and gain advantage...Are We?

In answer to Dr. P's March 13, 11:49 PM post:

Sorry for taking so long to respond--my life is busy between school and soccer.

About myself: I am a junior at Furman University studying Political Science and Philosophy. My thesis is titled "A War for All Ages: Thucydides on Politics, Religion and Human Nature in his "The History of the Peloponnesian War." My studies have led me to become interested in war because it reveals human nature very differently than peace, i.e. the motion of war is when human nature is best revealed because people are acting out "who" they really are. I respect the soldier's way of life because of the discipline and sacrifice it demands.

About reflexivity: I am taking the word reflexive from linguistics and applying it to a philosophic concept of reflectiveness. In further thought, I think my word choice of "reflexivity" is cumbersome because it has a lot of other grammatical connotations (some of which are appropriate in terms of design, i.e. the way a reflexive pronoun throws emphasis back upon the subject's action affecting himSELF).

The concept I was trying to convey with regard to my understanding of "Design" is that self-awareness is required to "construct" an approach that is sensitive to the ontological edges of the environment whatever it may be. Thus "Design" must reflect back upon the designer in a way that is indicative of the designer's Worldview. If the designer's Worldview is open, fluid, and agile then the Design of his strategy will be such as well. The designer must be intentionally reflective when designing or else caveats of his Worldview that he does not expect may become Achilles' heals in his construction. This is a point straight out of Daoism's "DaodeJing".

I apologize for my word choice, but hopefully have now cleared it up to some degree.

Regards,

Grant Allard

Grant-
no rewording necessary; even if you did intend it as criticism, I am my own worst critic and what makes me cringe now when I re-look at this series is how often I struggle with balancing what I call 'fancy foo-foo words' with more tactical jargon that the majority of the force is more comfortable with. Perhaps the challenge is all about what Hayden White and Peter Novack talk about with content and form, objectivism and subjectivism, and recognizing the swirling interaction of interiorities and exteriorities (A Thousand Plateaus and Naveh)- bottom line is that while I attempt in this series to break through the barrier I see between conceptual and detailed planning worldviews, I think ultimately I only scratch the surface. There is a paradigm shift afoot, as Dr. Paparone mentioned earlier, and where this takes the military is yet to be figured out. I don't know if the end state is going to be design-heavy and detailed proceduralism light, or some mix, or if design gets tossed to the graveyard...but it appears that the current generation of military planners and doers need to come to some conclusion on when, why, and how design (agreed- it is a terrible word; I liked Systemic Operational Design because each word meant something) is used.

For Grant Martin-
I also am a bit disappointed when I re-read this article series; when I wrote these I was early on my design journey at SAMS. This body of work essentially beats up the Army in terms of doctrine and institutional bias on how design is an unwelcome visitor. Since then, I have moved onto different work that attempts to bridge this gap between conceptual and detailed planning but without the cumbersome 'design' words in the final product. It reminds me of a telling conversation I had a few months back with an 06 after I had chated him up about design, non-linear approaches, and swarming that could replace the traditional LOO/LOE products for a design deliverable. He replied with "this is great! I love it- but I need you to draw it for me on a LOE with an end-state." So, right now I see the biggest challenge for design is that once a design team (or the CDR) achieve the 'deep understanding'- what forms do they employ to convey that understanding to the rest of the force in a manner that ensures acceptance and cohesion? Vocab is one aspect, as are graphic depictions and conceptual structures (LOOs, PLOs, LOEs...) but what is the right balance between PROCESS and PROCEDURE?

I thought of another analogy to kick around on this- suppose the CDR wears some red sunglasses when applying the traditional linear reductionist perspective set in the detailed planning worldview- but they had to take those glasses off and don a pair of blue glasses to 'see' the operational level of the design onotological worldview- to acheive the deep understanding? One problem is that our military leadership do not want to take off their red glasses at all, and when they do, they say "wow, this is nice- but can you make it all look red for me?" To play with the metaphor further- we need to engineer some sort of '3D glasses' that use red and blue lenses together in synergy as a transitional worldview when going from an 'all red' to an 'all blue' or vice-versa worldview. Commanders need to be open to taking off the red sunglasses, and desigers cannot expect the red world to implement everything blue without some distortion and transition in the process. Perhaps the 3D synergy of red-blue lens cooperation as a metaphor could evolve further- through inovative design doctrine, operational vocabulary, and educational reform in the military to facilitate design-specific requirements?

Just some thoughts. Also- I will try to hit you on AKO, but if you are at the same location you were when your articles published on SWJ earlier, I am slated to come your way right now...

Ben

Thank you all for elucidating answers to my questions. This helped point me toward a better understanding.

It seems to me that that "Design" faces similar challenges to political philosophy--especially as it was practiced by the Greeks. "Design" seems to be asking questions starting with 1) "What is reflection?" and moving toward 2) "Who should reflect?" and then 3) "How does reflection become practicable in the 'real' world?" "Design" seems to share in common with Classical political philosophy the necessity of intentional reflection for the "good" of some greater whole (the City in philosophy's case and the Command in the military's case).

So what do the Classics have to say, in short?

Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides all point us toward the necessity of intentional reflection in politics because they see that such reflection can make individuals better people and, more importantly, keep the City from committing costly errors (such as the Sicilian Expedition).

Yet, that is not the whole story. For the Classics also realize that most people want SIMPLE. After all, Plato both proposes the rule of philosopher-kings in the "Republic" but reminds Glaucon that this is laughable because most people would never put up with philosophers being in charge. In other words, "Design" faces a similar challenge as does Classical political philosophy because "Design" seeks to promote an intentional reflexivity and awareness, which is hard for people to do when they have become accustomed to living in other ways. I take MAJ Zweibelson's second argument to be addressing in large part this challenge, but at the level of the language people choose to use. This leaves me with the question -- is it language use or the process of perceiving the world itself that should be addressed in order to help planners see the world ontologically?

Part of the intentional reflexivity of "Design" seems to be an inherent development of "self-knowledge." The features of the environment are complex (and in a state of flux) in such a way, it seems that the only thing we can know is ourselves. This seems to be MAJ Zweibelson's chess example. But I would like to take this one step further.

Perhaps we ourselves are also in a state of complex flux thus making the "self-knowledge" for which we search a moving target. Then what we need to find is not a particular fact but the intermediate factors that are working upon us. In the chess player terms, the real challenge (or obstacle) we face is not just realizing our performance is inhibited because our dog died, but naming the changing emotions that we feel because our dog died. In one moment we may be able to focus, while in another we may feel rage, and in another sadness. The change within ourselves is also disturbing to the design of our strategy because we are ourselves stationary, discrete individuals. Then the character of our planning must be about the very Worldview we plan at an ontological level and not just about the particular techniques we use to plan. We must clear our Worldview of conception entirely so that we can view the situation in front of us as it exists ontologically. In the chess game example, this requires us to take a deep breath, empty our mind, and focus on the game in front of us.

In military terms, is the method to get us to this point "Design"?

Thank you for expanding my thinking. I appreciate the opportunity to learn more about this way of seeing the world.

Regards,

Grant Allard

Chris- have you checked out Hayden White at all for vocabulary and word meanings? My problem with design vocabulary and tactical vocabulary is that there are so many options that all sort of mean the same thing, but to different people, at different points. I prefer 'deep understanding' because it points to the more formitable word 'metacognition'- but that word is painful in tactical applications. Naveh enjoys 'cognitive synergy' which runs in the pack with your 'social cognition.' Another Israeli military author I am reading uses 'dual soldier' as the polar opposite of 'Strategic Corporal'- the dual soldier is the physical manifestation of your organization exercising 'deep understanding/cognitive synergy/harmonization/orchestration....' and the USMC's beloved Conklin employs 'cohesion' for much the same concept.

The point you make about appreciation- the humbleness factor- for me, that is where Folcote's 'problematization' really shines as a great operational word. The humble requirement for appreciation/understanding implies that in the journey to seek truth, you must question everything, to include deeply rooted tenets within your organization and self. To accomplish deep understanding or appreciation, you might need to acknowledge that a core principle that defines everything about your organization (apply any 'jus ad bellum' or 'jus in bellos' principle for the US military here) might be one of the factors that is defeating your ability to understand and transform the system. To acknowledge that your organization is the first thing that requires transformation implies a level of humbleness that 'problematizing' encompasses, and all to often, our military culture routinely rejects. McFarlane's initial attempts at the Iraqi 'awakening movement' in OIF 2006 reflect precisely how this usually goes.

Grant-

Let me attempt to answer your questions;

1. Design doctrine for both the Army and Marines states now that 'design' pervades every aspect of planning. That makes for a nice bumper sticker, but is it done in practice? Generally, I would argue no. Part of that problem goes directly back to the rival worldviews and rigid institutionalism that my paper and Dr. Paparone discussed above.
2. Instead of Plato's cave, I have another analogy that might work here and this was successful in our design course after we kicked it around. Imagine you and I are going to play a game of chess. You are a very experienced chess player, but I just started playing last month. As we sit down to play our game, if you take the detailed planning 'reductionist' or 'positivist' and detailed worldview, all of my planning efforts would encompass the peices on the board. The military uses a variety of similar procedures (not processes) such as the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), the Marines use Marine Corp Planning Process (MCPP), and the Joint and Air Force brethern use Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) which, although they are all different flavors of ice cream, they nonetheless espouse the same linear and reductionist worldview. For our military planners out there, you might easily imagine a planning cell running the paces through MDMP on how to do the chess game. We would span all of the peices and how they move, all of the possible strategies on the board, and even the board could be converted into a modified combined obstacle overlay (but that would work even better if we were instead playing Stratego). You get the point- the detailed planning processes focus on THE CHESSBOARD. Design is radically different- it goes "above the chessboard." While my 'desired endstate' is to defeat your King on the board, my 'problem' has nothing to do with any particular peice on the board. My 'problem' is actually in the exteriority of the chess board (smooth space)- it is your superior chess skill! Now, I cannot directly attack your 'chess skill' and as any phenomenon in a complex system, while I confront that as my 'problem', you confront something else. Perhaps your dog died yesterday, and you are not focused on the chess game. Your grieving process over your lost pet is actually your 'problem' for the game, and it is something I am likely unaware of, and have no influence over anyways. This is the critical part of how rival worldviews of conceptual and detailed planning operate in seperate methodologies and conceptual planes. I will wage war on the chess board against you through tactical and detailed planning by moving chess peices in a reductionist, linear manner- but I understand the holistic propensity of the system as something I cannot directly attack or alter, and in this game I face the chance of losing because of skill, not actual peice location.
3. Your third question is the true focus of my series of essays on design, and I think it is the biggest challenge with design and the military today. Suppose we gain deep understanding- so what? Can we convert that into a linear form so that detailed planning can actually use it? Or do we "go down the rabbit hole" so far that our discourse becomes jabberwocky and the detailed planners disregard design entirely? The most important figure in that tension is the military commander of the organization- he is the central figure in detailed and conceptual planning; he is responsible for both worldviews to engage in discourse and deliverable exchange while understanding the nature of both. The detailed side wants to 'tacticize' and 'proceduralize' everything; the conceptual side might conduct belly gazing until hell freezes over; the CDR must ensure that design understanding transfers over to the detailed side maintaining the essential content of design, but in a new form- a form that translates to detailed methodology. The reverse must occur as well; detailed planning observations and information must lose its container that encourages linear causality, and enter the conceptual worldview devoid of linear and reductionist bias. This is easier said than done. How Commanders educate their organizations on design, and how they establish doctrine, discourse, and the interaction of theory throughout all planning processes becomes paramount for unit cohesion when confronting ill-structured problems in complex systems.

I will preface my comments with the fact that I am empirically ignorant of war; I am a young philosopher. Therefore I read SWJ in leisure because it helps me understand the warrior's way of life. War seems to reveal very different things about politics, religion, and human nature (think Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War") than does the quiet lull of peace (say in Plato's Republic).

The questions that linger with me as I read this article all regard the "ontological approach" (page 10). Possibly because ontology requires a type of awareness that breaks free from the routine of average everydayness because our routine itself is significant in these considerations.

1) How deep ought the ontological approach pervade through planning?

2) Does this ontological approach require a greater contextual awareness of the very way planners interact with the World just by existing, i.e. philosophically: eating, drinking, breathing, thinking and militarily: the planners presence changes the very way the population and enemy interact (that's a poor example)?

3)And once you have cultivated such an awareness, how do you keep the people who are planning operations from getting sucked "down the rabbit hole" of philosophic inquiry but stay mindful of their mission? (I was thinking of the latter half of Plato's Allegory of the Cave here).

I apologize if these questions are uninformed, ignorant, or just plain dumb. I found this article very fascinating and wanted to understand it better.

Thank you for writing such an interesting article.

Regards,

GA

My appologies- on page 10 it should read 'third article' instead of 'second article.' My last-minute editing apparently did not catch all the glitches!

V/R
Ben