The Use of Fusion Cells to Establish Unity of Effort Between SOF (Yin) and Conventional Forces (Yang)
by Captain Paul Lushenko
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America's Special Operations Forces (SOF) have historically shared an adversarial, but necessary, relationship with conventional counterparts due primarily to intra-service rivalry, personality conflicts, and mission secrecy. Yet, the SOF-conventional operating paradigm mirrors a yin-yang dynamic in which both forces are seemingly disjunct but nevertheless complementary when synchronized: "...there is contradiction as well as harmony, and...unity in multiplicity." While yin-yang fluctuate in time and space, inherent opportunity costs ultimately compel balance. As the world's de facto leader against extremism, America has necessarily expanded SOF's global presence to undermine savvy militants and shadowy networks outside the mission and capabilities scope of more mechanical conventional forces. Consequently, the "wall of secrecy" once maintained by SOF has been lowered to synchronize all facets of the military within the contemporary operating environment (COE) in which SOF and conventional forces more deliberately cooperate.
As the Intelligence Officer of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) re-deployed from eastern Afghanistan in the fall of 2009, my experiences reinforced the gravity of establishing unity of effort between SOF (yin) and conventional forces (yang) to exploit intelligence, capabilities, and mission opportunity costs. The development of a Brigade-level fusion cell in eastern Afghanistan fostered operational harmony, resulting in heightened, non-doctrinal partnership; deliberate intelligence sharing; joint planning and operations; and innovative leadership to more effectively conduct irregular warfare including counter-insurgency (COIN). By streamlining the opportunity costs of SOF and conventional forces through the fusion cell, our JSOTF empowered the conventional Brigade's more important Lines of Effort (LOE), undermined the Haqqani Network's (HQN) strategic objectives, precipitated the reconciliation of mid-senior level HQN leaders, and promoted legitimacy of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through an aggressive Information Operations (IO) campaign.
Download the full article: "Partnership 'Till it Hurts"
Captain Paul Lushenko is currently assigned as a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar at The Australian National University's (ANU) Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy. He was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment in Fort Benning, Georgia as an Intelligence Officer. His deployments include multiple tours to Iraq and a recent deployment to Afghanistan where he served as the J2 for a Joint Special Operations Task Force. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2005 (B.S., International Relations) and is studying for dual masters in diplomacy and international relations.
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My intent was to briefly diagram the success of fusion cells in OIF, acknowledge their transition to conventional control in both OIF and OEF, and offer several case studies relating the importance of fusion cells to future OEF successes - the most pressing and tenuous mission.
I incorporated my experiences cooperating with fusion cells while deployed to Iraq on pages 5-6. As described, albeit in general terms, fusion cells in Iraq represented the benchmark standard for development of their counterparts in Afghanistan:
"The success of fusion cells imparted an expertise to conventional units particularly concerning Time Sensitive Targeting (TST), ISR management, and ISTs that eventually focused pre-deployment mission readiness exercises at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center.20 Ownership of fusion cells eventually migrated to conventional control in Iraq and spurred the current transition of fusion cell control from SOF to conventional units in Afghanistan."
The success of JSOTF operations, aided greatly by fusion cells and conventional units, is well publicized especially following the promotion of GEN McChrystal as COMISAF (previous JSOC Commander as reported by numerous open source publications). Significant operations include the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AQIZ #1) and Abu Qaswarah (AQIZ #2). Moreover, I imagine fusion cells continue to facilitate joint operations against AQIZ Senior Leaders (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/abu_ayyub_… dex.html).
The "surge" of Soldiers, resources, ideas, and talent in Iraq has provided increased security to train Iraqi National Security Forces, ensconce democratic institutions and processes, and legitimize the Iraqi government. Based on the undeniable success of OIF, America has shifted strategic focus to neutralize AF/PAK insurgencies, co-opt PAKMIL/PAK GOVT support, and train Afghan National Security Forces (perhaps the most viable strategic objective). Fusion Cells can greatly aid our nations revamped efforts in Afghanistan; however, in my opinion, they are not currently utilized to their full potential (I just redeployed from Afghanistan two weeks ago after a shorter rotation and witnessed much of the same). As the entirety of the 101st ABN DIV deploys to eastern Afghanistan, "... capability will arise to coordinate ISR and more appropriately nest counter-terrorist operations with COIN to maximize the combat effectiveness... "