How We Got to the Syria Mess - Washington Post
Americans and Europeans are seeing the results of four years of U.S. disengagement in the Middle East. A country destroyed, with half its people displaced from their homes. Hundreds of thousands of refugees besieging an unready Europe. And now, Russian warplanes bombing U.S.-allied forces as American officials alternate between clucking reprovingly and insisting bravely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be sorry in the end. That is a tempting dream, but it represents the same wishful thinking that got us here in the first place.
How did we get here? It’s worth recalling, briefly, a bit of history. When Secretary of State John F. Kerry took office at the beginning of President Obama’s second term, he argued that Syria could be saved only with a political solution: The United States did not want to repeat its Iraq mistake and chase President Bashar al-Assad and his regime out of office with nothing to take their place. But, he said, the regime would not negotiate seriously until its opposition was strengthened, and so Mr. Kerry and others in the administration favored U.S. assistance, including training for the rebels, protection of safe zones where they could begin to govern without fear of Mr. Assad’s barrel bombs and chlorine gas, some arms and other military aid.
Mr. Obama would never agree; or rather, sometimes he agreed, and failed to follow through, and sometimes he just said no. Mr. Kerry was left with no option but diplomacy, in particular begging Russia and Iran to bail him out…
Comments
Revolution Syria as driven by the Syrian civil society has:
Too many enemies:
•Assad regime
•Russia
•Iran
•Hezbollah
•Iraqi Shia gangs/so called militia
•Mercenaries from AFG and Pakistan
•ISIS
•PKK / PYD
•World’s hypocrisy
ADD as if this was not enough for the Syrians to deal with---- the total lack of US leadership--and we wonder why Syria is so convoluted???
They may look rag tag but they are fighting exceptionally well----
Day Five of Hama Battle
Dispite Russian close air support Assad-forces not able to advance in northern Hama
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKzoLmmdFLY …
Looking more stalemate and this was supposed to be easy portion of the Russian/Iranian campaign.
The little Russian backed Assad advancement in Tal Sukayk & Atshan seems to have been fully reversed by the rebels in Hama today
Bill M---now the FSA MANPADs are coming into play--Mi-8 shot down by FSA.
VIDEO (#Russia(n)?) Mi-8"Hip"Helicopter hit with AA Missile #Hama #Syria
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOsx1SF3LDo&feature=youtu.be&t=5s …
pic.twitter.com/DPSziOtUaE
Will be interesting to see if the RuAF now adjusts their height to keep a safe distance from MANPADs.
Bill M--this goes to indicate just how the Russian involvement is actually uniting the anti Assad front into a more coherent army group.
There have been three very strong Sunni armies fighting in Syria--northern Sunni army group, central Sunni army group and the southern front Sunni group led by FSA. With IS as one of the three army groups--they are more central and a tad northern group.
Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, FSA, Jund al-Aqsa and Faylaq al-Sham formed a new ops room y'day to co-ordinate ops on Atshan front.
Local activists confirmed regime didn't capture Tall Skayke or Atshan villages but only took a Hill & few advanced positions S & E Atshan.
IMHO--I do not think the Russians General Staff fully thought through the consequences of their invasion into Syria.
The Russians in a single move have done more to unit the various Syrian groups than four years of fighting--now they truly have a "common enemy" Assad/Putin which has declared the fight to be now a "Holy War".
WHY does Putin want the US so badly to be in his "coalition"--think about it--- because if he fails and he will--THEN he can blame the US for the home audience and his face is "saved".
Worth watching this Russian BM30 cluster strike on Hama village--and it is not an "extermination war"????
Footage
Epic Russian MLRS salvo hits town in #Hama province.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t69eqVfMYDk …
These types of Russian cluster strikes on Syrian villages and towns is just driving the anti Assad forces into deeper cooperation.
Makes the US look complacent/or we simply appear to not even care in the face of civilian deaths--WHEN the WH never utters a single word against the strikes.
Bill M--here we highly differ--first take the eastern Ukraine--the UAF begged for US ATMs and I would guess facing over 400 rather modern Russian MBTs and over 1000 IFVs would tend to make you more than nervous from their perspective.
The UAF ATM version is now coming into the UAF in higher than normal numbers with their respective hunter killer teams much in the Syrian model which I think actually limited the Russian use of MBTs which hardly played a role in the last few months.
Secondly, it was the improved UAF tank units themselves after intensive retraining that began to hit more accurately that also limited the use of Russian MBTs. You will have noticed in the fighting before the momentary lull the Russians were attempting break through with a tactical armored infantry approach ie FV/MBT mix with infantry that was mostly failing due to heavy arty return strikes and a very determined UAF ground infantry AT response.
Right now let's look at the reality on the ground--for whatever reasons the FSA and it's southern Sunni army was steadily moving in the direction of Damascus and the Alewite homeland.
Then look at the way the Syrian Army is configured--mainly armored infantry with tank support as there are vast areas of Syria that have little population so to move just plan infantry takes time and trucks--with armo you can use fewer ground troops--we ourselves even tried that in VN ie now today with the 1st Cav which was first airmobile then now basically an heavy armor unit with limited infantry.
IT was the Russian/Syrian tanks/IFV that for the first three years of the fighting kept the anti Assad forces bottled up and constantly losing.
NOW ask the simple question what turned in the last year of heavy fighting?
1. better command and control out of the MOM and MOC in Jordan
2. better basic infantry training --one saw this in the fighting style change of the FSA--after every big win over the SAA in typical Arab and I hate using the term typical Arab fashion they would just keep on going in an ad hoc fashion losing any coherent battle formations and lose fighting steam--NOW after each battle there is a reconsolidation phase, a replan phase and then and only then do they move forward---AS if they are awaiting further intel inputs and plans from the MOM/MOC before moving
USING this method they have gained a large amount of territory and at the same time were fighting IS and retaking IS controlled territory all the while moving towards Damascus.
All of this was not known in the US due to basically a lack of Syrian reporting by the US MSM. So who wanted the US civil society to be kept in the dark about Syria???
Heck it took social media reporting on the Syrian Assad chemical strike on his own people killing over 1400 to actually "wake up" US MSM--interesting if one goes back over that period on just how little initial MSM there was on the chemical attack until the MSM could no longer ignore the massive coverage being pushed by social media.
3. NOW comes the TOW--if you are facing as a basic infantry unit with support from a few captured MBTs, some limited artillery and basically having only mortar, SPG9s, RPGs and a few MLRSs what then "protects" you from SAA ground attacks ESPECIALLY when the SyAF controls the air space and you are under constant air strikes?????
Absolutely nothing...........
Enter the TOW---the TOW has basically now flipped the battlefield and equalized it--it is taking the armor advantage away from Assad and making it a more equal infantry fight where the "fighting moral of one's own troops" is the key advantage and here the SAA has been on a losing run and has basically lost their fighting moral THUS enter more Hezbollah, more IRGC AGAIN and mercenaries from AFG, Pakistan and more coming from Russia.
The use of the TOW hunter killer teams was a old Cold War tactic envisioned for the AH-64 Apaches which would practice hide and seek against MBTs in Europe during every Reforger exercise.
We did have in the Cold War days a ATM but in the 90mm range--the TOW is in another class by itself and can defeat anything up to the T80 --we need to see if they can get a hit on the T90s the Russian have brought in to see it's effectiveness against the new T90.
The TOW has now made it at least on the ground in Syria an "equal fight"--the air strikes side needs to be addressed rather soon than later as the Russians are using literally using cluster munitions strikes (air, BM30 and TOS-1A) against anything that looks, acts and appears to be "civilians" not combatants--they certainly not being used against the Russian declared reason for being in Syria--the Islamic State.
So we have a Syria that has "chemically gassed" their own population basically Sunnis' and now we see both Russia and Syria attempting to "exterminate" Sunnis via "cluster munitions" strikes against civilian targets. BTW the driving of Syrians as refugees out of the country think about it actually lowers the over all Sunni population percentages--so is it 'ethnic cleansing" by Putin/Assad?
Until there is a battlefield victory or a near victory by the anti Assad force neither Putin nor Assad are going to negotiate on anything.
Both have publicly stated that--- so I am not just what the Obama administration think's they can do to stop the Russia/Syria airstrikes NOR make any moves against IS in Syria AS Russia has basically extended their RuAF air protection over IS.
KEY QUESTION or the entire SWJ readership:
Who six months ago would have ever guessed that the Russian Air Force would be flying air protection missions and ground support missions for the Islamic State---????
NOW my guess is and knowing the deep dislike now between the KSA and Putin you will start to see limited numbers of MANPADs starting to show up via Turkey and the KSA--limited at first--shown via combat videos and actually firing at Russian helios and aircraft as a not so subtle warning--
AND again what does a MANPAD do perception wise??--it forces Russian aircraft higher, limits the use of low flying attack MI24s and basically changes the battlefield to make it equal again.
JUST known to be in the hands of the FSA changes the Russian planning perceptions.
BASICALLY Obama has with his foot dragging for over the last four years--virtually no game plan left to use thus the recent WAPO article stating he is "abandoning Syria".
I myself for a long time have viewed Syria far more strategic in the ME than most here at SWJ---the Med position, the oil/gas fields that are in fact there, it's proximity to Lebanon, Israel and if Syria becomes Sunni governed--IT finally breaks the Khomeini declared "Green Crescent" strategy and cuts off Hezbollah from Iran. Plus it effectively limits the Shia Iraq which is now an Iranian proxy state.
How many here in SWJ really really remember just how Hezbollah got into Lebanon in the first place and just how they settled in the Bekka Valley region?
I do-- I watched them close up and personal as they marched in with their Green Islamic Banners flying "claiming " they are going to "support their fellow Shia" in the Lebanese civil war BUT once they arrived in the Bekka they made absolutely no attempt to support anyone but themselves.
THIS was the first true Iranian military expansion under the "Khomeini Revolutionary Islam Doctrine" of Islamic revolutionary warfare and it actually began the creation of the "Green Crescent" that exists today from AFG to Lebanon. AND the IRGC still drives on that "Khomeini doctrine".
ALSO with the heavy Sunni inflow of Syrian refugees into Lebanon-- Lebanon is actually becoming a "Sunni nation".
I remember my history lessons very well from that period as it seems many in DC have "forgotten" them.
The next three weeks are going to get very interesting if we see a single MANPAD fired--just fired --does not even have to hit anything--then let's see the Russian reaction ie the nightmare of AFG all over again for the homeland population back in Moscow.
The list of interests is a start, but I am not convinced that any of them are worth going to war over, or that going to war will necessarily advance the cited interest. Specifically:
<i>Demonstrating more expedited (Russia launched 64 strikes in a recent 24 hour period while we launched only 2 in Syria) and obvious commitment/resolve to instill confidence that the U.S. is an effective Middle East partner and ally, able to deter or defeat state and non-state adversaries through multiple, credible DIME capabilities </i>
Paertner and ally to whom? The US has neither partners nor allies in Syria. This seems to be an argument that we have to go to war to prove that we have the means and will to do so, which seems less than convincing to me.
<i>2) Preventing ISIL from spreading elsewhere to include Africa, AfPak, potentially India/Indonesia, Sinai, Europe and U.S. via infiltration, recruitment of individuals/groups, “refugees,” organized terror, and lone wolves </i>
I greater US engagement really likely to achieve this? Direct engagement with the US would erode the IS territorial base, but going head to head with the Great Satan is likely to increase the group's profile and ideological appeal and is likely to accelerate the emergence of allied groups and copycats. Right now the Russians are setting themselves up as the demon of the day for Sunni radicals worldwide. Do we really want to challenge them for that position?
<i>3) Precluding a major exodus of true refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere and reducing humanitarian suffering by those who stay behind so refugees return to more than rubble</i>
Short of a full on US occupation/pacification campaign, how do we accomplish this? Backing a few factions is more likely to escalate the conflict and drive even more refugees.
<i>4) Facilitating Sunni self-rule in parts of Iraq and Syria thus precluding future trouble and spread of extremism to GCC and other Sunni states</i>
Self-rule and extremism are in no way incompatible, and we would be silly to think that we can dictate the ideological leanings of a new Sunni state. Any emergent Sunni state is going to be used by the Saudis to try to counter the spread of Shi'a influence, and the Saudis will have more influence than we do. We cannot assume that the Sunni are going to cooperate with us just because we set up a state for them, especially if that state follows geographic logic and leaves them ruling a barren desert without oil, water, or arable land.
<i>5) Establishing greater Kurd self-rule and partnership in parts of Iraq and Syria since Kurds are potentially our best area allies and locations they control offer safe basing opportunity within range of nearby ISIL trouble spots ala Kuwait and Russia's Tartus port </i>
Unacceptable to Turkey, a position that no amount of negotiation is going to change. The US is in no position to assure that an emerging Kurdish state would not become a haven for Kurdish separatists in Turkey.
<i>6) Suppressing spread of Iranian control, influence, and terror beyond Iran, Iraq Shiite, and Syrian Alawite areas to preclude spread of Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon, Yemen, and Shiite populated areas of the GCC and threats to Israel</i>
How exactly to you propose to accomplish that with US military force? Seems an unlikely prospect at best. With Saddam gone and Assad crippled, the Sunni and Shia are going to fight until they are exhausted and maybe someday settle in their own way. That's not a fight that any outside power can do more than temporarily suppress. There will be no externally imposed "solution".
<i>7) Precluding Russian expansion of arms sales and influence in the Middle East and attempts to thwart U.S. supported rebels. Avoid WWIII while simultaneously deterring further Russian aggression in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and elsewhere.</i>
Deploying US force only encourages US antagonists to look to Russia for military, diplomatic, and economic support. I don't see how a proxy war with Russia really serves US interests, especially given the strong possibility that Russia's Syrian adventure will turn out to be more liability than asset to them.
<i>9) Facilitating localized “Awakening” security of current ISIL-seized areas to avoid continued conflict in areas shared by Alawites and Sunnis, or ISIL and moderate Sunnis</i>
Possible, perhaps... but are we going to simply assume that such an awakening will occur and that it will be favorable to us?
<i>10) Precluding WMD proliferation in the Middle East states and acquisition by ISIL or Sunni/Shiite/other extremists (see this week’s bust of nuclear smugglers)</i>
Again, it is hard to see how greater US involvement is going to do anything but exacerbate this problem.
<i>11) Minimizing oil price disruption (Russia’s opposite interest that may explain their Syrian presence), and minimizing U.S defense infrastructure and troops in Syria while still improving chances of making other interests a reality </i>
How does Syria affect oil prices? Their exports are at best insignificant. Minimizing US troops and infrastructure is not consistent with other goals that would effectively require full scale occupation.
Realistically, none of these goals will be advanced by selecting and supporting a proxy. They would require a full on war effort from the US. Are they worth it? Does the political will exist for a war and an extended occupation/stabilization mission with a high probability of failure?
<i>Now it’s my turn to inquire. What makes the Philippine Islands more important as a U.S. vital national interest than Syria and ISIL are now and its “offspring” could be in the future? Given a functioning Philippine Army and government, and very small percentage Muslim population on primarily a few of 7000 mostly unimportant islands, why should we worry? If you worry about Muslims in Indonesia which has such a large Muslim population, it would be more understandable---but ISIL could affect them, too. Do we want to use our military only for “easier” vital national interests requiring limited commitment?</i>
I'm not quite sure how to interpret this. I do not see any necessary or useful role for US military forces in the Philippines or Indonesia, and the interests in the two areas seem too different to compare directly. I do not see any US interest worth going to war over in Syria. I also don't see any US interest worth going to war over in the Philippines or Indonesia, but since nobody is proposing going to war there it seems a moot point.
Certainly boundaries have been forcibly altered in the past... much of the chaos and violence we see in the developing world is a consequence of arbitrarily and externally imposed boundaries. Realistically, though, I think any external attempt to dissolve Iraq and Syria and create a new group of states is going to be opposed, subverted, and dismantled by everyone from the UN to the groups on the ground. There are simply too many conflicting interests in play to imagine that everyone is simply going to submit to a project like that, or that it could be sustained by anything but an massive, open ended, and horrendously expensive US commitment.
Dayuhan keeps asking; we keep reminding him. It’s not about the attractive vs. wretched girl we want to take to the prom (funny BTW). Rather it is our own self-interest that unless we prevent our cousin from going and getting addicted to drugs and knocked up by the local drug dealer, we will end up supporting her and her twins when she moves into our house and steals all our stuff to support her habit and offspring—and if we don’t help her she burns our house down, but she might anyway on one of her highs:
<blockquote>I hear a lot of talk about "US interests" in Syria, but nobody seems willing to say what those interests are.</blockquote>
1) Demonstrating more expedited (Russia launched 64 strikes in a recent 24 hour period while we launched only 2 in Syria) and obvious commitment/resolve to instill confidence that the U.S. is an effective Middle East partner and ally, able to deter or defeat state and non-state adversaries through multiple, credible DIME capabilities
2) Preventing ISIL from spreading elsewhere to include Africa, AfPak, potentially India/Indonesia, Sinai, Europe and U.S. via infiltration, recruitment of individuals/groups, “refugees,” organized terror, and lone wolves
3) Precluding a major exodus of true refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere and reducing humanitarian suffering by those who stay behind so refugees return to more than rubble
4) Facilitating Sunni self-rule in parts of Iraq and Syria thus precluding future trouble and spread of extremism to GCC and other Sunni states
5) Establishing greater Kurd self-rule and partnership in parts of Iraq and Syria since Kurds are potentially our best area allies and locations they control offer safe basing opportunity within range of nearby ISIL trouble spots ala Kuwait and Russia's Tartus port
6) Suppressing spread of Iranian control, influence, and terror beyond Iran, Iraq Shiite, and Syrian Alawite areas to preclude spread of Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon, Yemen, and Shiite populated areas of the GCC and threats to Israel
7) Precluding Russian expansion of arms sales and influence in the Middle East and attempts to thwart U.S. supported rebels. Avoid WWIII while simultaneously deterring further Russian aggression in Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, and elsewhere.
8) Attempting negotiated transition away from Assad while protecting Alawites from potential genocide by Sunnis and finding means to split territory and major cities into Sunni and Alawite enclaves
9) Facilitating localized “Awakening” security of current ISIL-seized areas to avoid continued conflict in areas shared by Alawites and Sunnis, or ISIL and moderate Sunnis
10) Precluding WMD proliferation in the Middle East states and acquisition by ISIL or Sunni/Shiite/other extremists (see this week’s bust of nuclear smugglers)
11) Minimizing oil price disruption (Russia’s opposite interest that may explain their Syrian presence), and minimizing U.S defense infrastructure and troops in Syria while still improving chances of making other interests a reality
Now it’s my turn to inquire. What makes the Philippine Islands more important as a U.S. vital national interest than Syria and ISIL are now and its “offspring” could be in the future? Given a functioning Philippine Army and government, and very small percentage Muslim population on primarily a few of 7000 mostly unimportant islands, why should we worry? If you worry about Muslims in Indonesia which has such a large Muslim population, it would be more understandable---but ISIL could affect them, too. Do we want to use our military only for “easier” vital national interests requiring limited commitment?
Also, please excuse this former contractor desk jockey/instructor (and enlisted/officer Soldier with 4 years of overseas tours but admittedly no combat experience) who has lots of time to learn about all aspects of our Joint military and how we have fought recent wars and could potentially fight future ones. Although I tend to look forward rather than back, I note that over the years many have managed to redraw boundaries multiple times going back centuries ago to very recently:
• Many Middle East, Africa, and Asia boundaries were drawn after WWI and in the colonial era.
• During/after WWII, the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences changed boundaries.
• AfPak, India, and Bangladesh boundaries were created only recently in the spectrum of history.
• Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the Golan Heights changed boundaries in the last 42 years—and ironically many insist on a two-state Israel solution while refusing to consider one in Arab lands.
• The Sinai changed boundaries three times in the last 48 years.
• Sudan and Yemen changed boundaries and split or rejoined relatively recently.
• The Balkans changed boundaries with new nations formed.
• East and West Germany changed boundaries and unified.
• North and South Korea stayed separated while the Vietnams consolidated.
• Berlin and Baghdad were split cities with Berlin well inside East Germany.
• Many colonial African national borders have changed in the past 50 years.
• National borders changed after the Cold War and most recently appear to be changing in Crimea, parts of East Ukraine, and areas of Georgia.
Why does anyone believe that if it was done in the past, it couldn’t and won’t be done in the future particularly given advantages of GPS and modern aerial photography and mapping tools and concrete barriers proven to work in Israel, Berlin, and Baghdad?
Hey Bill, been a while, hope all's good in your part of the world...
Completely agree with most of what you say here, especially on the need to "reframe what this conflict is about that, identify what our interests are, and then develop a feasible strategy to get after those interests". Clarity of purpose is critical to success; can't get what you want if you don't know what you want. The one thing the Russians have working for them in this is that they have a clear purpose: keep Assad in power. Whether or not they can do that is another question, but at least they know what they want to do. Unless the US can identify a similarly clear purpose, we are at a disadvantage from the start in any strategic contest. If there is no clear policy goal, the need to engage has to be questioned.
I am not so convinced that "President Bush's war was about removing Saddam and neutralizing his alleged WMD program". I think the neocon clique that designed the war and sold it to Bush had goals well beyond that. They believed that they could rebuild Iraq into an inclusive democracy that would stand as an example to the rest of the Middle East and undercut the autocratic systems that prevailed in the region. As an example of the potential of democracy the reconstruction of Iraq was of course an absolute (and I believe inevitable) failure, and by the time Obama took office the choice was between pursuing a clearly failed strategy and trying to disengage. Neither option was particularly desirable, and chaos was likely both ways. Of course when the decision to disengage was made the Syrian civil war was not and could not have been anticipated.
Any assumption about what might have happened with a different policy seems to me too hypothetical to be of any real use, and any retrospective "what if" has to be seen in terms of both risks and opportunities.
Where it goes from here is an open question, but it's likely to go down before it goes up. It's really easy for desk jockeys to draw out nice repartitioned "solutions" with neatly defined Sunni, Shia, Kurd, and Alawite states, but nobody, least of all us, is in a position to dictate outcomes, and getting from here to there is going to involve a whole lot of mess no matter who does what.
Bill M. said:
"President Obama confused ISIL in Iraq as a continuation of President Bush's war, a war he promised to get us out of. President Bush's war was about removing Saddam and neutralizing his alleged WMD program."
The above appears to be an incorrect characterization of both "Bush's war(s)" and President Obama's view of same.
Bush's wars seems to have more to do with transforming outlying states and societies (especially those in the Greater Middle East) more along modern western political, economic and social lines.
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/14/world/fg-domino14
It is these such wars -- to achieve rapid, radical and comprehensive state and societal change in such places as the Greater Middle East -- that President Obama promised that he would get us out of.
This, because:
a. The premise upon which these such wars had been based (to wit: such ideas as universal values and the overwhelming appeal of our way of life),
b. This such "prerequisite for invasion and regime change" premise/idea proved -- in the clear light of day -- to be glaringly false. (Thus, the chaos that currently reigns.)
Thus, the two understandings offered below:
1. That while transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western lines may, indeed, be very much in our best interests. (We might gain greater power, influence and control, throughout the world, via these such favorable transitions. Likewise, outlying states and societies, transformed more along modern western lines, might become less of a burden/problem for the world as a whole and become, instead, more of an asset thereto.)
2. Due to a clear lack of such things as universal values, etc., however, these such transformations will not be the quick and easy task that we imagined. (One that might be accomplished, immediately -- if at all -- by such things as "regime change.")
In the light offered above, to conclude with Bill M.'s following suggestion:
"It is time to re-frame what this conflict is about, identify what our interests are, and then develop a feasible strategy to get after those interests."
Sounds like you are trying to restart the myth that the Stinger pushed the USSR out of Afghanistan, even though the USSR decided to pull out before the Stinger was introduced. I haven't seen a TOE stop Assad's use of barrel bombs, and it won't stop ISIL's swarming attacks. At best it neutralized Assad's armor vehicle advantage. The TOE also won't unify the various resistance groups, so even if a more robust covert aid program resulted in Assad falling, no one has any idea what would happen next. You are grossly over simplifying and making broad assumptions. You don't have anything to offer strategy wise that hasn't already been tried and failed.
If it was truly in our interest to remove Assad, we should have done it with conventional forces. If Iraq was stable, again a counterfactual on my part, we may have had a chance working with regional allies to stabilize Syria and prevent a post Kaddafi Libya. However, since Iraq wasn't stable there would have been little hope we could have stabilized and shaped an outcome that would increase our strategic power. In the feasible lane we could have established safe zones, provided more support to the resistance, and certainly could have been more aggressive against ISIL. That may have resulted in three desired effects. First, limit the scale of the humanitarian disaster (it also gives us access to the people and all that implies). Second, continued support for the resistance, before Russian overt involvement, could have forced Assad to a political settlement (revisit below). Third, targeting ISIL more aggressively would reduce the principle near term threat to the region and West.
Now that Russia has intervened, and they have strong interests there based on the access it gives them, providing more support to the resistance may still be a good course of action, but the risks need to be reassessed. War is interactive, the longer it drags out the more opportunities it will present for external and internal actors to seize to pursue their own interests that have little to do with the original reason that the conflict emerged. This conflict is no longer principally about a few thousand Syrians fighting one another to maintain or replace the existing government. Now the outcome of this conflict will have repercussions well beyond Syria's borders. It is time to reframe what this conflict is about that, identify what our interests are, and then develop a feasible strategy to get after those interests. President Obama confused ISIL in Iraq as a continuation of President Bush's war, a war he promised to get us out of. President Bush's war was about removing Saddam and neutralizing his alleged WMD program. It then evolved into something else that Al-Qaeda exploited, that the Shia exploited, and that the Kurds exploited. Today it is a civil war that has little resemblance to the original war. Failure of the administration to recognize that, reframe, and intervene further to the left indicates our perceptions of a situation tend to freeze in time. This conflict won't be solved by providing more TOEs, providing more TOEs will probably help, but we ought to have our eyes on the bigger picture.
Russia's electronic warfare units are jamming Nato's communications in #Syria
http://bit.ly/1Mk0R3B
pic.twitter.com/yvHdD7vHze
Really worth listening to----
Video: @masoudtarek on "The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform"[/B] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B2PFzCjOd-w …
Still no comments out of the WH except accusing others of "mumbo jumbo" WHILE at least the Syrian anti Assad forces the CIA are supporting are doing well in the face of Russian aggression they see as true agression--what a striking difference.
Either #Syria rebels are getting really good with TOWs or the #Russians have started building their tanks with LEGOS
Comment from rebel social media--kind of hits the point---
Dear Russian soldiers, Think Again Turn Away from #Syria
A few of the many Russian tank graveyards in Afghanistan
The claim that "that didn’t happen until Ronald Reagan armed the Afghan mujahideen with Stinger missiles that started blowing Russian warplanes and helicopters out of the sky" has been repeatedly and effectively debunked, on SWJ among other places. It's a pleasing fantasy, but it's fantasy.
The question is not how America can counter Putins moves, but whether it should. What's the gain? There US has left a vacuum in the region because the US presence there was expensive and unproductive... and talk about the US failure to "stay the course" in Iraq is just silly. What course?
Moscow’s definition of success, re: this New Cold War, in much the same as our definition of success in the Old Cold War.
In both instances, this definition of success comes under the heading of "containment" and/or "roll back."
Thus, Russia (and China and Iran?) today, much like the U.S/the West back-in-the-day, seeks to:
a. Prevent their rival from gaining greater power, influence and control -- in certain regions of the world -- this, by
b. Spoiling/undermining their rivals attempts, in these regions, to favorably transform and assimilate certain other states and societies.
The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria (etc.?) to be viewed along these "expansionist nation" (today: the U.S./the West) versus "containment/roll back nation" (today: Russia, China and Iran) lines.
Q: Thus, the job of the U.S./the West in these such New Cold War circumstances?
A: Much the same as the job of the Soviets/the communists during the Old Cold War and re: our containment/roll back efforts against them back then, to wit:
To determine if, and if so, how, to now proceed -- this, in the face of these new -- and indeed flagrant -- containment/roll back challenges.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...e28_story.html
How America can counter Putin’s moves in Syria
By Condoleezza Rice and Robert M. Gates October 8 at 9:08 PM
Condoleezza Rice was secretary of state from 2005 to 2009. Robert M. Gates was defense secretary from 2006 to 2011.
One can hear the disbelief in capitals from Washington to London to Berlin to Ankara and beyond. How can Vladimir Putin, with a sinking economy and a second-rate military, continually dictate the course of geopolitical events? Whether it’s in Ukraine or Syria, the Russian president seems always to have the upper hand.
Sometimes the reaction is derision: This is a sign of weakness. Or smugness: He will regret the decision to intervene. Russia cannot possibly succeed. Or alarm: This will make an already bad situation worse. And, finally, resignation: Perhaps the Russians can be brought along to help stabilize the situation, and we could use help fighting the Islamic State.
The fact is that Putin is playing a weak hand extraordinarily well because he knows exactly what he wants to do. He is not stabilizing the situation according to our definition of stability. He is defending Russia’s interests by keeping Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power. This is not about the Islamic State. Any insurgent group that opposes Russian interests is a terrorist organization to Moscow. We saw this behavior in Ukraine, and now we’re seeing it even more aggressively — with bombing runs and cruise missile strikes — in Syria.
Putin is not a sentimental man, and if Assad becomes a liability, Putin will gladly move on to a substitute acceptable to Moscow. But for now, the Russians believe that they (and the Iranians) can save Assad. President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry say that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis. That is true, but Moscow understands that diplomacy follows the facts on the ground, not the other way around. Russia and Iran are creating favorable facts. Once this military intervention has run its course, expect a peace proposal from Moscow that reflects its interests, including securing the Russian military base at Tartus.
We should not forget that Moscow’s definition of success is not the same as ours. The Russians have shown a willingness to accept and even encourage the creation of so-called failed states and frozen conflicts from Georgia to Moldova to Ukraine. Why should Syria be any different? If Moscow’s “people” can govern only a part of the state but make it impossible for anyone else to govern the rest of it — so be it.
And the well-being of the population is not the issue either. The Russian definition of success contains no element of concern for the dismal situation of the Syrian people. Refugees — that’s Europe’s problem. Greater sectarianism — well, it’s the Middle East! Populations attacked with barrel bombs and Assad’s chemicals, supposedly banned in the deal that Moscow itself negotiated — too bad!
Putin’s move into Syria is old-fashioned great-power politics. (Yes, people do that in the 21st century.) There is a domestic benefit to him, but he is not externalizing his problems at home. Russian domestic and international policies have always been inextricably linked. Russia feels strong at home when it is strong abroad — this is Putin’s plea to his propagandized population — and the Russian people buy it, at least for now. Russia is a great power and derives its self-worth from that. What else is there? When is the last time you bought a Russian product that wasn’t petroleum? Moscow matters again in international politics, and Russian armed forces are on the move.
Let us also realize that hectoring Putin about the bad choice he has made sounds weak. The last time the Russians regretted a foreign adventure was Afghanistan. But that didn’t happen until Ronald Reagan armed the Afghan mujahideen with Stinger missiles that started blowing Russian warplanes and helicopters out of the sky. Only then did an exhausted Soviet Union led by Mikhail Gorbachev, anxious to make accommodation with the West, decide that the Afghan adventure wasn’t worth it.
So what can we do?
First, we must reject the argument that Putin is simply reacting to world disorder. Putin, this argument would suggest, is just trying to hold together the Middle East state system in response to the chaos engendered by U.S. overreach in Iraq, Libya and beyond.
Putin is indeed reacting to circumstances in the Middle East. He sees a vacuum created by our hesitancy to fully engage in places such as Libya and to stay the course in Iraq. But Putin as the defender of international stability? Don’t go there.
Second, we have to create our own facts on the ground. No-fly zones and safe harbors for populations are not “half-baked” ideas. They worked before (protecting the Kurds for 12 years under Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror) and warrant serious consideration. We will continue to have refugees until people are safe. Moreover, providing robust support for Kurdish forces, Sunni tribes and what’s left of the Iraqi special forces is not “mumbo-jumbo.” It might just salvage our current, failing strategy. A serious commitment to these steps would also solidify our relationship with Turkey, which is reeling from the implications of Moscow’s intervention. In short, we must create a better military balance of power on the ground if we are to seek a political solution acceptable to us and to our allies.
Third, we must “de-conflict” our military activities with those of the Russians. This is distasteful, and we should never have gotten to a place where the Russians are warning us to stay out of their way. But we must do all that we can to prevent an incident between us. Presumably, even Putin shares this concern.
Finally, we need to see Putin for who he is. Stop saying that we want to better understand Russian motives. The Russians know their objective very well: Secure their interests in the Middle East by any means necessary. What’s not clear about that?
I hear a lot of talk about "US interests" in Syria, but nobody seems willing to say what those interests are.
Staying out of wars where we have no clear business being involved used to be a US value. Might be one of those traditions we need to get back to.
Claims that the US administration is "indecisive" seem to me to be without basis. The administration made a clear decision to avoid commitment and engage only at a level that could be backed away from if needed and would not generate mission creep. That's a decisive choice. You may or may not like the decision, but that doesn't make it any less a decision.
Since when has failure to step into quicksand been "humiliation"?
Is Obama Admin on verge of strategy of humiliating abandonment of both US interest and US values in #Syria?
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-09/white-house-is-weighin… …
Thanks Outlaw for posting the Michael Weiss link. RC, I watched it yesterday and had a slightly different take.
<blockquote>I find arguments such as that useful when trying to convince people there is very little genuine religious inclination within the leadership of all these factions. Many folks have bought into the IS narrative and are perpetuating their hard-core religious image and their position at the Sunni vanguard holding back the Shia horde.</blockquote>
Weiss mentioned in his video that the current Middle East narrative and conspiracy theories involve “Obama hates Sunnis” which you probably acknowledge as dangerous for the West and useful for ISIL and lone wolf recruiting. He mentioned the redline betrayal and other squandered good will. So you can understand why young Muslims who are idealistic don’t necessarily need to be true believers to get recruited by internet narratives that <i>appear</i> to have some basis in reality (Sunni vs. Shiite, fun-travel-adventure). Then again, many ISIL foreign fighters become suicide bombers, so one could conclude that many recruits have pretty “genuine religious inclination” or they would not be offing themselves.
Weiss also said he believes Baghdadi does indeed have an apocalyptic vision. But you are right that most of the former Baathist and current ISIL leaders probably just want more Sunni and personal power/wealth/women.
<blockquote>Rather than some retired 4 star Crusader telling me about God, I would love to see the reaction in the KSA if a 4 star went of TV and said Assad and the House of Saud must cut off their supply lines to IS if we hope to bring peace to the region. If nothing else it would send a message that Machiavelli had finally made it to CentCom and our head was now in the game.</blockquote>
Liked your Machiavelli reference but given the bloated NSC’s past behavior one doubts they will take that advice and any bold new CENTCOM ideas would be thwarted. Outlaw’s Bloomberg article seems to indicate rumored NSC recommendations of further inaction in Syria with John Kerry and Samantha Powers fighting that idea. Remember when Weiss mentioned giving up on ISIL, wrapping it up, and presenting it to Hillary Clinton with a note saying from Barrack with love? It also was shocking but perhaps not surprising that Weis mentioned an NSC newbie who when asked about the complete Iraq withdrawal in 2011 said that if it worked out they would take credit, and if it didn’t they would blame George W. Bush.
Which U.S. former (presumably) 4-stars are you talking about? Generals Keane and Petraeus had a lot to do with the Surge but I don’t recall either mentioning that this was a religious war. Maybe more leaders and pundits should publically inquire why KSA is not taking in Sunni refugees. Generals Keane and Petraeus did see value in supporting the Sunnis during the Surge even though many had U.S. blood on their hands—but so also do the Shiites militias and Iranians we now are cooperating with. So whether any of them are true believers, they definitely are fighting along Shiite/Alawite and Sunni lines with some religious basis. Yes/no?
Also recall that Weiss mentions that ISIL fears another Awakening more than anything else. He cited how they would approach known Awakening families and make the Sheik confess on camera to being a collaborator. They then behead him and kill his family and bury them all in a mass grave to deter others with similar ideas.
However, that was Iraq ISIL. What about Syrian potential-Awakening families? Recall that Weiss mentioned an entire refugee camp in Turkey with nothing but defectors from Assad’s Army, and he wondered why they had not been exploited. Couldn’t some of those former Syria soldiers train locals if we dropped off weapons in a Chinook after some “clear” air assaults and Hellfire action preceded by a few GMLRS rounds and A-10 strafes?
At the very conclusion of his talk Weiss said that Arabs are developing strong anti-Americanism due to Syrian neglect and he said some will say that has always been the case but he emphasized that this was anti-Americanism 2.0. He also mentioned that many think America is at best incompetent and at worst is sinister. Don’t forget the refugees who Weiss said were converting many Europeans to extreme anti-Muslim thinking. Thanks President Obama and NSC.
Outlaw,
Interesting Weiss's take on Assad's relationship with IS. Weiss claimed Assad helped create them after the Sunni Awakening as a counter to the revolutionary energy emerging within Syrian society.
I find arguments such as that useful when trying to convince people there is very little genuine religious inclination within the leadership of all these factions. Many folks have bought into the IS narrative and are perpetuating their hard-core religious image and their position at the Sunni vanguard holding back the Shia horde.
I have seen this so many times (along time ago I thought it true - despite the evidence) but if you penetrate these organizations you eventually come to recognize it is complete bullshit. Watching the IS depicted in the media (should have known better) I could see all the familiar characteristics of the charade but the internet's ability to capture extreme violence up-close cloaked a psychotic mask over the usual Broadway Joe semantics.
Weiss description of IS selling antiquities (in a fit of pique they smash the big ones coz DHL refuse to ship the big ones! LOL the Buddhas at Bamiyan didn't stand a chance), protection rackets, bootleg oil, selling electricity to the regime, drug smuggling, people trafficking etc injected some much needed clarity into my jaundiced observations.
This helps explain the Russian targeting of the non-IS rebels. Broadway Joe probably has a red phone connected to Assad's bedside table to give the co-ordinates for their friendly Fruitcake.
The Mafia is a good frame of reference. Nearly everyone would dismiss immediately if the Mafia adopted a Catholic fundamentalist persona and started speaking Latin when explaining their business. For some reason when the same type of organization wears dish-dash, wrap 5 meters of cotton around their heads and quote the Arch-Angel Gabriel everyone believes in God again. The leadership of these organizations, albeit Pak, Iranian, Saudi, Syrian, Russian have always found this reaction hilarious.
Rather than some retired 4 star Crusader telling me about God I would love to see the reaction in the KSA if a 4 star went of TV and said Assad and the House of Saud must cut off their supply lines to IS if we hope to bring peace to the region. If nothing else it would send a message that Machiavelli had finally made it to CentCom and our head was now in the game.
RC
Really worth listening to---he is probably one of the currently most knowledgeable journalists on the IS, Iraq and Syria right now---
.@michaeldweiss on vivacious form here, dismantling #ISIS, #Assad, @POTUS, etc, in a terse hour http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/74949365 …
<i> track me over on the Syrian military thread and you will get all your answers without having to bombard me</i>
Ironic, coming from the SW empire's leading bombardier. Who else around here replies to his own posts, or posts dozens of times without reply? The running monologue is not particularly informative, if you must know.
<i>you really do need to sit down and take an intensive three day course in ME history focusing just on Syrian history---Syria is far more important to the strategic interests of the US THAN Iraq ever was end of story--really do your homework--remember US FP only used Saddam as a containment of Iran concept and when we no longer needed that containment what then was the US FP? </i>
I am familiar with the history, thank you very much, and I can't figure out what you are trying to say here. If you believe there is a strategic interest in play, please explain clearly and concisely what that interest is and what must be accomplished to serve it.
<i>We will never have any influence over Iraq as it has shifted to a Shia state under the Shia hegemony of Iran and the majority ethnic population of Syria are what again?</i>
Yes, the last round of decisive US action in the area set up Iran as the dominant power and established a disenfranchised Sunni minority ripe for radical exploitation. That should remind us that decisive action does not necessarily serve US interests, especially when nobody seems to know exactly what interests are being pursued.
<i>LASTLY--I will flip the argument and directly ask you this---
IS the US indecisiveness in Syria ACTUALLY allowing Russia and the IS to tactically align themselves in Syria and de facto the entire ME?</i>
What US indecisiveness? The US administration made a decision not to commit to any proxy or any course of action in Syria, and has stuck to that decision. You may not like that decision, but that doesn't make it indecisive... and in all honesty you have presented no very compelling argument against that decision.
Do you suggest that Russia is simultaneously aligning itself with Assad, Iran, and IS? Sounds an uncomfortable group of bedfellows. I don't envy Putin.
<i>HAS this tactical alignment allowed both Russia and the IS to even share the same "strategic end state" for the ME??</i>
No.
<i>HAS in fact the Russian FSB and Iranian IRGC been far more supportive of the IS since say 2011 with the above two part question in mind?</i>
I don't have enough evidence to support an opinion. I have seen claims and allegations, but those aren't evidence.
I wish you would stop ranting, calm down, and actually make a coherent point, but that is clearly as far outside the realm of plausibility as a productive US intervention in Syria.
Dayuhan--two points and they are short-----
1. track me over on the Syrian military thread and you will get all your answers without having to bombard me
2. you really do need to sit down and take an intensive three day course in ME history focusing just on Syrian history---Syria is far more important to the strategic interests of the US THAN Iraq ever was end of story--really do your homework--remember US FP only used Saddam as a containment of Iran concept and when we no longer needed that containment what then was the US FP? We will never have any influence over Iraq as it has shifted to a Shia state under the Shia hegemony of Iran and the majority ethnic population of Syria are what again? WHY do you think the Assad theory of driving all Sunni out of the country is not a valid tactical and strategic decision?
LASTLY--I will flip the argument and directly ask you this---
IS the US indecisiveness in Syria ACTUALLY allowing Russia and the IS to tactically align themselves in Syria and de facto the entire ME?
Second part of that question is---
HAS this tactical alignment allowed both Russia and the IS to even share the same "strategic end state" for the ME??
THIRD part of the question---
HAS in fact the Russian FSB and Iranian IRGC been far more supportive of the IS since say 2011 with the above two part question in mind?
THINK hard before you answer----
Come on Bill---right now the latest German polling of Syrian refugees indicates only 8% will remain--stop the bombing and they all agree they would return.
How can you argue that Syrians are not fighting for Syria--rough and they are rough figures indicates upwards of 37K are fighting alone with FSA--that does not count the hundreds of other smaller Syrian local defense groups--this excludes the foreign fighters of JN/IS---so roughly under arms inside Syria as Syrian residents fighting Assad is close to 80-90K.
And they are not fighting??--- come on Bill.
Track me over on the Syrian military thread and you will see they even graduated a new class from their Military Academy in Aleppo,
Outlaw:
Q: What percentage of these "civil society" folks -- of military age -- are willing to immediately return to their countries and take up the fight against Assad and/or IS now?
A: Zero percent?
Q: What percentage of these same military age "civil society" folks would be willing, if not to return to their home country and join the fight against Assad and/or IS now, to at least volunteer to immediately begin training, so as to embark upon such a "fighting" mission in the very near future?
A: Again, zero percent?
Trust -- and/or conform to the wishes of -- these such "civil society" folks ?????????
Dayuhan--we must learn to trust civil societies regardless of just how chaotic they get----WHY because they reside there not US citizens.
Survey of refugees in Germany
73% Fled #Syria Gov bombardment
58% Support No Fly Zone
52% Return After Assad cedes
https://translate.google.co.uk/translate?sl=de&tl=en&js=y&prev=_t&hl=en… …
SURPRISE surprise--over 52% would actually return.
<i>This may simplify “shape” and “clear” using the lower cost, reduced blast, and direct fire tools mentioned earlier, at some point transitioning by leaving behind limited Syrian trainers from elsewhere... Can you envision any new armed group more evil than ISIL or as united toward an expansionist caliphate rather than localized security goals?</i>
I think you underrate the challenge of stabilizing these areas once ISIS is defeated. First, while ISIS is not a locally rooted insurgency, it is not entirely an occupying force either: they are in the areas they are in because they have some local support. Whether or not that continues after their behavior is not knowable, but we cannot assume that the locals will welcome us as liberators or that power will naturally devolve to groups with purely local concerns. Certainly whoever takes over will be less evil than ISIS, but we are not in the business of fighting evil, and it is far from certain that whoever takes over will share or support US strategic goals.
<i>If negotiation with Turkey fails, we postpone Kurd formal statehood but not Kurd partnership.</i>
"We" postpone? By unilateral decree? I'm not sure we have the ability to impose our will to that extent, or that the other groups and states in the picture will accept our assumption that we should be making those decisions.
<i>We would attempt to negotiate with the Iranians, Assad, Sunnis, Kurds, Turks, Jordanians, Russians, and other coalition partners to achieve compromise preferences of all parties, stipulating that certain small areas should remain under Assad or new Alawite leader control. </i>
Again you assume that the US is in the position to stipulate and have its stipulations meekly accepted. I do not think this realistic. Iraq should have taught us that even with superior military force available our efforts to dictate outcomes are tenuous at best, and that even when people superficially submit to us they will do everything in their power to undercut our program and advance their own. I would not assume that any US stipulation is going to be respected.
<i>At some point the Sunnis will conclude that they will never gain control of Baghdad or the oil-and-Shiite-rich areas farther south. They will be forced to compromise or live with ISIL which has to be worse.</i>
I'm not sure that the binary proposition "us or ISIS" is realistic. Any way you look at it, the Sunni come out big losers: their natural geographic slice of the two states involves has no oil, no water, no arable land. They are going to be disgruntled, there's a lot of radicalism there, and the Saudis etc will be very eager to manipulate that sentiment to use against the emerging Shi'a power that arose when we handed over most of Iraq's populace to Iranian leadership. Do we have the ability to dictate the outcome there? I think not.
<i>You continue to mention a Sunni area vacuum, Turkey intractability, and Iranian expansion that could occur if ISIL is eliminated using Kurd and Sunni partners. Unmentioned are the perils of the status quo </i>
The status quo is an absolute mess, but it's not our mess. If we go to war - because that is what you suggest - and impose our vision of a reconstructed Middle East, that mess becomes our mess. Others will have a huge stake in undermining our efforts, and we will have am equally huge stake in sustaining them. That translates to decades, likely generations, of commitment to a highly uncertain outcome, at enormous cost. Does the US have the political will and the money to see that effort through? It will be a long hard slog with no assurance of success, and in fact a significant possibility of failure and a near certainty of unexpected and unintended outcomes. Is that something to which we are prepared to commit? If we ain't gonna finish, best not to start.
<i>Your first sentence is somewhat akin to “Bill C”-like revisionist history insofar as you did not mention the errant beliefs in the presence of WMD and “they will welcome us.”</i>
I don't think those were ever more than peripheral excuses in the first place.
<i>In contrast, if we had partitioned Iraq when we first achieved “Mission Accomplished” and held all the power, we could have created separate budgets and DIME approaches to all three states to include imposing oil revenue sharing. We could have transitioned three separate security forces with more incentive to hold their own territory and less inclination to become insurgents. </i>
Yes, that option existed. It was rejected, at east in part because a unilateral US decision to partition a UN member state would have terminated the coalition, elicited a violently negative reaction from the region and the UN, completely isolated the US, and set up a running conflict over the terms and boundaries of the partitioned areas. The Shi'a portion would have come under Iranian domination, the Sunni portion would have come under Saudi and Islamist influence, the Kurds would have gone their way and gotten a violent reaction from Turkey. The US would not have been able to prevent any of it, and when it went to merde the US would have had sole responsibility for trying to hold it together. Of course all that will happen anyway, in slow motion, but again that just underscores the reality that the US cannot dictate outcomes. That was the essential madness of Iraq. The pragmatic option - keep the army intact and install a new dictator - was not politically acceptable, and the other options - try to transition to unified democracy or impose partition on terms dictated by us - were not realistically possible.
<i>Meanwhile, a new administration of either party will have a much tougher job overcoming “retrenchment” than if bolder action had occurred earlier.</i>
The current administration spent two full terms trying to disengage from the mess that our last round of bolder action got us into. Again, bold action without a clear, practical, and achievable goal just makes a mess... and I do not see clear, practical, and achievable goals on the table, with all due respect.
There is a current pattern of discussion that portrays Syria as the hot chick at the ball, and sees Putin waltzing her off to a motel while poor Barack huddles against the wall with his weenie in hand. Using the same analogy, a more accurate picture might be that Putin is waltzing off to a motel with the STD-afflicted larded up hound dog that no other boy at the dance would touch with a ten foot pole, with her shotgun-toting buck toothed redneck pappy stalking them all the way. I see no reason at all for US to try to cut in with a bold move. We have head-butted enough tar babies to last us a while, let someone else take over that thankless function for a while.
All quotes are Dayuhan’s comments further below—a good debate continues.
<blockquote>Whether or not ISIL is an insurgency, they do control territory and if they are eliminated a power vacuum will result in that territory. It is very optimistic to think that local control will spontaneously emerge and take over. More likely armed groups will contend to fill the vacuum.</blockquote>
Although it is not COIN, COIN-like concepts may and may not apply. There is no need for us to “hold” or “build” and unlike in OIF and OEF, mostly foreign fighters will have greater difficulty hiding amongst local populations. This may simplify “shape” and “clear” using the lower cost, reduced blast, and direct fire tools mentioned earlier, at some point transitioning by leaving behind limited Syrian trainers from elsewhere, small arms, ammo, and RPGs for locals during one of our air assault and attack helicopter raids. Aerial pattern-of-life analysis could identify influential businesses and households with military-aged males that are not part of ISIL. Can you envision any new armed group <strong>more evil than ISIL</strong> or as united toward an expansionist caliphate rather than localized security goals?
<blockquote>It is of course true that Iraq and Syria effectively no longer exist as functioning states. That doesn't mean the US can simply decree that these states no longer exist and delineate new boundaries redrawn to meet our preferences. That is not a realistic goal, because the parties on the ground are not simply going to submit to our will.</blockquote>
We would attempt to negotiate with the Iranians, Assad, Sunnis, Kurds, Turks, Jordanians, Russians, and other coalition partners to achieve compromise preferences of all parties, stipulating that certain small areas should remain under Assad or new Alawite leader control. When that failed in some areas we would agree to disagree, look at reality on the ground, and our coalition would attempt to impose our will when current reality did not suffice. We would agree not to attack the Syrian Army in announced zones and promise to engage them outside those zones.
If Assad’s helicopters, airpower, and air defenses were already smoldering on the ground due to our stealth aircraft attacks, one would suspect Assad would be inclined to negotiate and comply to survive. We would leave it to the FSA, Outlaw’s TOWs, and other groups to take on any Russian ground forces venturing outside certain areas. We also could help Alawites and Sunnis, plus Iranians and Russians to partition cities like Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus using concrete T-barriers we bring to their ports for their installation using lessons of Baghdad and Sadr City.
As mentioned earlier, we know the Syrian Army already is pretty much avoiding ISIL areas, as are the Russians and Iranians. Therefore, our external coalition must clear ISIL using Joint military tools more extensive than current tens of daily airstrikes in Syrian areas. Iraq Sunni areas are trickier because it makes little sense for Shiite forces to dominate Sunni areas which might occur if we cleared ISIL from those areas for the Iraqis. If war is a battle of wills, we are losing given current half-hearted efforts to degrade ISIL’s and Assad’s “will” in Syria, and our misguided efforts to help a Shiite Iraq dominate Kurds and Sunnis. If ISIL is surviving weak air attacks or is looking heroic in fighting the Iraq Army, their recruitment efforts succeed.
<blockquote>The Kurds of course love the idea of their own state, but no amount of negotiation will make that acceptable to Turkey because a Kurdish state will become a base and an inspiration for Kurdish separatists in Turkey... that will happen and the US is not in a position to assure or pretend that it won't. The Sunni are not going to go into docile submission mode and accept a territory that has no oil, no water, and no arable land.. is there any realistic reason to think that such a state will end up ruled by "moderates"? Is there any reason to think that Iran, the Iraqi Shi'a, and Assad will stay neatly in the territory we allocate for them?</blockquote>
Yet Kurd areas and Kurd fighters are the key to so much in both Iraq and Syria. They dominate areas within range of ISIL and assure few green-on-blue attacks in commonly occupied FOBs we would create together. Turkey likes Kurd oil. Black market oil also is making its way there via ISIL. If negotiation with Turkey fails, we postpone Kurd formal statehood but not Kurd partnership. The Beiji refinery north of the Kurd-dominated Tikrit could become the basis for revenue sharing with Sunnis. ISIL already is located primarily along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers so water and irrigated land is available for Sunnis who are not extreme. At some point the Sunnis will conclude that they will never gain control of Baghdad or the oil-and-Shiite-rich areas farther south. They will be forced to compromise or live with ISIL which has to be worse.
You continue to mention a Sunni area vacuum, Turkey intractability, and Iranian expansion that could occur if ISIL is eliminated using Kurd and Sunni partners. Unmentioned are the perils of the status quo with a worst-case ISIL that is not getting weaker, and a refugee crisis that is a humanitarian, economic, and terror nightmare. Iranians, Soleimani, and now Russia currently have no counterbalance other than ISIL and other weaker Sunni fighters in West Syria. Iraq leaders continue to withhold arms meant for the Kurds. Iraq and Syrian Sunni hatred toward everyone at the way they are being treated through commission by the Shiites and omission by the U.S. and its “allies” can only increase with current trends and relative inaction.
At some point if we are to succeed, a more Machiavellian approach is required toward all opponents and even allies in Iraq and Syria. We can continue to allow Russian Generals to walk into our embassy and demand that we withdraw from their airspace, or we can demonstrate no such intention and the fait accompli of a smoldering Syrian air force using stealth aircraft that the Russians currently cannot touch. We don’t need to down Russian aircraft but most certainly can conduct air attacks with little risk of being shot down. If we occupy FOBs in Kurd territory with Kurds and the FSA, common sense escalation risk and NATO rules would indicate that we will not be attacked in those FOBs by Russian or Turk aircraft. Russia’s Syrian bases would be vulnerable to retaliatory attacks if they struck our FOBs and don’t forget that MAD thing. An eastern Syria, Jordan, Saudi air corridor could remain even if Turkey and Iraq pulled airspace access and we had to close our embassy and withdraw our forces from non-Kurd Iraq.
<blockquote>Bush went into Iraq with a clear goal: transform Iraq into an inclusive, unified, modern democracy. Unfortunately this goal, while clear, was completely unrealistic, and of course we could not achieve it. Obama's strategic goal ever since has been to back away and disengage from that failed and hopeless effort. If we are going to adopt a new strategic goal - and again, we cannot have a strategy without a clear goal - it has to be one that is realistic and achievable, and I'm afraid that dissolving Iraq and Syria and redrawing the map by unilateral decree is not realistic. A new map will evolve, in time, but it is not going to be sustainable if it's imposed by any outside power. Committing ourselves to a project like that is a sure prescription for failure.</blockquote>
Your first sentence is somewhat akin to “Bill C”-like revisionist history insofar as you did not mention the errant beliefs in the presence of WMD and “they will welcome us.” That said, you nailed it in describing the folly in believing that once Iraq fell, an inclusive and unified democracy was realistic given the Sunni-Shiite-Kurd divide. In contrast, if we had partitioned Iraq when we first achieved “Mission Accomplished” and held all the power, we could have created separate budgets and DIME approaches to all three states to include imposing oil revenue sharing. We could have transitioned three separate security forces with more incentive to hold their own territory and less inclination to become insurgents.
Yes, a new map will evolve in time, however, time is not on our side given current inaction and paralysis through poor NSC analysis. By the time January 2017 comes around, ISIL still will be in charge of large areas, gaining recruits, infiltrating fighters to spread the caliphate, and promoting increasing numbers of lone wolf attacks abroad. Russia and Iran will be entrenched doing whatever they want quite effectively with little regard for collateral damage. Meanwhile, a new administration of either party will have a much tougher job overcoming “retrenchment” than if bolder action had occurred earlier.
<blockquote>Putin has a clear goal: keep Assad in power. Whether or not that goal is realistic remains to be seen, but he can have a clear strategy because he has a clear goal. If the US is to have a strategy, we need a clear goal too... but do we really want to commit ourselves to something as aspirational and improbable as what you propose above?</blockquote>
You keep talking goals, end states, and strategies without acknowledging that current ones are not working and are making matters worse. Furthermore, our relative inaction <strong>facilitates</strong> the goals of Putin, Assad, Soleimani, Khamenei, Baghdadi, and al-Abadi while leaving most everyday Sunnis and Kurds facing the crushing vice of Shiites on one side and ISIL on the other.
In this case, the goal is less difficult than the means of getting there as roadblocks and uncertainty exist from factors internal and external to Iraq and Syria. However, bold action and adaptation can overcome adversity and ambiguity. If these wars taught us anything it is that our military can adapt rapidly if given the chance. Add to that Patton’s lesson that “a good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week.” Unfortunately, at this rate a good plan won’t even start execution until after inauguration day in 2017 and a viable plan currently is not even being contemplated.
You speak of "the civil society concerned" as if it were a unitary entity. It's not. It's a fragmented mass of armed factions fighting for power and control. The process of making a decision on what they truly want is going to be long abd bloody, because different factions want very different things.
I don't see how your proposal to arm and train one faction is compatible with your stated goal of "letting the Syrians figure it out" and "allowing others to develop what they see as their own future". Are we taking sides, or are we letting them figure it out? Can't be both.
I agree completely that Russia is doomed to fail. If we take sides, are we not doomed to fail also?
We have to accept that the Syrians are figuring things out, their own way. It will be a long and bloody process and it is likely to end with the dissolution of Syria. Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and others are already in it. Are we really going to make matters any better by ratcheting up out own involvement in an effort to match the doomed Russian play?
Dayuhan--if the Syria civil society has already demanded their form of rule of law, good governance and transparency which they did in 20111 and that triggered a mass murderer to unleash something akin to genocide on his own civilian population THEN it is up to the Syrians to decide.
Your use of the term end state is interesting--actually I would call it a dream that was voiced in 2011 by a 70% majority that had no influence at all in their dictatorship by a minority ethnic group.
The end state that you seek from me---my answer is to let the Syrians figure it out and handle IS--just give them the tools and moral/financial support as are the Sunni Front States and be there in the end to assist with the humanitarian side and any assistance THEY request in rebuilding a war torn country.
I have been saying this virtually every time you ask.
We do have a political influence that Obama seems unwilling to use--the force of a moral idea--meaning let the civil societies decide for themselves and assist were needed--this will get us far further in the new 21st century.
ACTUALLY think about it--the Syrian "Spring" sprung up AFTER Obama's speech in Egypt as it did in other Arab countries. HIS speech hit a nerve among the civil societies--THE core problem was--THERE was nothing behind the speech.
BTW--you stated so many times here we had no proxy in the fight--we do and still do the FSA--the exact same FSA the Russians ridiculed two days ago and then took a massive beating from yesterday.
NOW if you are following my thinking we have a large voice now within the FSA WHY because we provided trainers, munitions and the TOW---do not think for a moment when this is all over that does not give the US a voice at the table.
BUT here is the unique difference--the CIA has been treating the FSA as an equal NOT as a proxy--even the CIA has learned from past mistakes--equality the great equalizer.
YOU must realize the value of allowing those that live there to fight their own fight--they are then fighting for a flag and nation the two great motivators TOTALLY missing in Iraq--WHILE they may pray to Allah and they might seem to be radicals----they still fight for a Syria they themselves envision. So let them fight for a dream, help them in that dream without US boots/planes and THEN be fully willing and able to assist in picking up the pieces with together them not doing it for them.
BTW--at no cost of US boots on the ground and not a single US AF plane in direct support.
YOUR own quote:
we have to be for something... what is it?
MY answer---why not for a change let the civil society concerned make the decision on what they truly want--that would be different for a change and actually refreshing.
WHY not be for allowing others to develop what they see as their own future?
Russia is doomed to fail as they are actually following the old model of "telling a society" what it should be --and in this age of global interconnectability--THAT is a fatal decision.
Outlaw...
Again, you are avoiding the key question. Forget about TOWs, FSA, social media for a moment and focus on the basics.
What is our end state goal?
Putin has a clear goal: keep Assad in power. That may not be realistic, but it is clear, and because he has a clear goal he can have a clear strategy. You can't have a strategy without a goal, and the reason the US is accused of having no strategy in Syria is that the US has no strategic goal, beyond staying out to the greatest possible extent.
So, clearly and simply, what do you think the strategic end state goal in Syria should be? It can't just be about being against ISIS and Assad, we have to be for something... what is it?
FSA-SF officer greets Russians (in ru!) & warns Putin:
Don't let #Syria be a 2nd Afghanistan!
https://youtu.be/ClP26jJ8Zjs
FSA destroyed more than 30 regime equipment in rural Hama, including 18 tanks & 4 BMPs. pic.twitter.com/Jhv5cUrsYJ
TOW rules............
الله @HadiAlabdallah
Hama's hospitals overcrowded with deaths from both Assad and Russian troops. Among the killed are a Russian officer and at least 3 soldiers
Outlaw: Never forget:
"A classified State Department report expresses doubt that installing a new regime in Iraq will foster the spread of democracy in the Middle East, a claim President Bush has made in trying to build support for a war, according to intelligence officials familiar with the document.
The report exposes significant divisions within the Bush administration over the so-called democratic domino theory, one of the arguments that underpins the case for invading Iraq.
The report, which has been distributed to a small group of top government officials but not publicly disclosed, says that daunting economic and social problems are likely to undermine basic stability in the region for years, let alone prospects for democratic reform.
Even if some version of democracy took root -- an event the report casts as unlikely -- anti-American sentiment is so pervasive that elections in the short term could lead to the rise of Islamic-controlled governments hostile to the United States.
"Liberal democracy would be difficult to achieve," says one passage of the report, according to an intelligence official who agreed to read portions of it to The Times.
"Electoral democracy, were it to emerge, could well be subject to exploitation by anti-American elements."
The thrust of the document, the source said, "is that this idea that you're going to transform the Middle East and fundamentally alter its trajectory is not credible."
Even the document's title appears to dismiss the administration argument. The report is labeled "Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes."
The report was produced by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the in-house analytical arm.
State Department officials declined to comment on the report. Intelligence officials said the report does not necessarily reflect the views of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell or other senior State Department officials.
Daunting Challenges
The obstacles to reform outlined in the report are daunting.
"Middle East societies are riven" by political, economic and social problems that are likely to undermine stability "regardless of the nature of any externally influenced or spontaneous, indigenous change," the report said, according to the source.
The report is dated Feb. 26, officials said, the same day Bush endorsed the domino theory in a speech to the conservative American Enterprise Institute in Washington.
It's not clear whether the president has seen the report, but such documents are typically distributed to top national security officials.
"A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region," Bush said.
Other top administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, have made similar remarks in recent months.
But the argument has been pushed hardest by a group of officials and advisors who have been the leading proponents of going to war with Iraq. Prominent among them are Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, and Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an influential Pentagon advisory panel.
Wolfowitz has said that Iraq could be "the first Arab democracy" and that even modest democratic progress in Iraq would "cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran but across the whole Arab world ... "
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/14/world/fg-domino14
Thus, given the Arab Spring -- and our specific question here re: "how we got into the Syrian mess" -- can we say that President Bush Jr., and certain of his advisers, were wrong in suggesting, and in heavily promoting, such things as "universal values" and a "democratic domino theory?"
(Albeit, an Arab Spring which would have many of the problems [and more], expressly addressed then, by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research?)
Bill--we got into this mess because a large group of moderate individuals inside the Syria civil society stood up and demanded the rule of law, good governance and transparency and then were joined by ever larger groups of individuals in other towns and village in Syria.
THEN the ruling dictator a minority ruler decided to brutally suppress his civil society which is 70% Sunni using the Shia Iraqi militia, Hezbollah, and the Iranian IRGC and his SAA and SyAF---ALL Shia.
So call a spade a spade and clearly point the finger at the current war crimes dictator in Syria---he clearly played the regional hegemony card and when that failed the superpower card.
BUT never forget exactly what triggered this mess that has led to 250K killed and millions on the move.
As I have explained before, the way we got into the Syrian (etc., etc., etc.) mess was via:
a. A determination to transform outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines. And, via:
b. An understanding that this would be relatively easy task; this, given what we believed, post-Cold War, was the "universal appeal" of our way of life, our way of governance and our corresponding values, attitudes and beliefs.
Acting on this such determination, and these such beliefs, we proceeded to do -- or to suggest -- "regime change."
Problem:
We soon learned that our "universal appeal" ideas -- noted at "b" above -- simply did not hold sway.
(And in those cases where populations might embrace our such ideas and ambitions, they showed absolutely no willingness to fight and die to achieve these goals. Rather, these agreeing [but non-fighting] populations simply fled to areas where others had fought and died to achieve their freedoms.)
These such matters, outlined above, effectively rendering our decision to do and/or to promote "regime change" -- as our way forward in the early 21st Century -- as a historically horrible idea?
The consequences of which (state and societal disintegration, terrorism, chaos and suffering, refugee flows, death and destruction, Putin stepping in to try to halt and/or deal with the madness) are now before us?
Like the chart------
This is the updated diagram of geopolitical relationships in the Middle East with Russia included.
pic.twitter.com/rnMaQMZgHh
Obama’s preferred method for dealing with disagreement is denigration.
President ‘Mumbo-Jumbo’ http://on.wsj.com/1L34xXz via @WSJ
For those that believe it is impossible to push back and or defeat Russian information warfare--the following.
Ah.. the power of open source analysis via social media.
BTW this was a crowdsourced project--rare actually.
Initial Findings of the Crowdsourced Geolocation and Analysis of Russian MoD Airstrike Vid via @bellingcat https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/10/06/initial-findings-of-the… …
One hour after these findings were released Russian info war media wnet into overdrive attempting to counter the report of the poor Russian bombing campaign directed supposedly against IS.
BREAKING: #RussiaVsISIL operation prompted smear campaign in world media - @mfa_russia
http://sptnkne.ws/
One very small mistake in this Putin led Russian game of chicken and we are into WW3--it is that easy now in Syria.
http://www.interpretermag.com/putin-in-syria-more-close-calls-between-r…
Russia Violates Turkish Airspace For Second Time
13:48 (GMT)
Over the weekend, Russian jets crossed from Syrian airspace into Turkish airspace, a dangerous and uninvited "mistake" since Turkey is a member of NATO.
That prompted a strong response from Turkey.
And yet, today NATO says that Russian jets violated Turkish airspace twice, not just once. CNN reports:
"Russian combat aircraft have violated Turkish airspace," Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, according to NATO's website. "This is unacceptable."
Stoltenberg elaborated at a news conference.
"We also have seen two of them, two violations of Turkish airspace," he said. "Intelligence that we have received provides me with reason to say it doesn't look like an accident."
The first violation of Turkey's airspace is reported to have happened Saturday. The second was Sunday, officials said.
The headlines, then, are slightly misleading, since Turkey's statements that it would shoot down Russian aircraft in its airspace came yesterday and both incidents occurred this past weekend.
Still, the incident has increased tensions in the region. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned today that Russia's actions could damage the relationship between Ankara and Moscow, a relationship which has been very good lately. Russia and Turkey are cooperating on the energy front, with Turkey playing a key role in several Russian plans for new natural gas pipelines which would deliver gas to Europe while bypassing Ukraine.
France 24 reports:
"If Russia loses a friend like Turkey with whom it has a lot of cooperation it is going to lose a lot of things. It needs to know this," Erdogan said in Belgium at a press conference alongside Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel broadcast on Turkish television.
Turkey believes that the Russian mission in Syria fundamentally changes their game plan, which was already damaged because of Western non-committal. BBC reports:
Turkey's government has been enraged by these Russian incursions - and by Moscow's military intervention in Syria as a whole.
First, any violation of Turkish airspace could lead to the object being shot down, which would dramatically escalate events. Second, there could be a mid-air collision close to Turkey's borders, as this is the first time since World War Two that Russian and American combat planes have been in the skies over Syria. But third, Russia's air strikes are the final nail in the coffin for Turkey's "buffer zone" idea in northern Syria.
Ankara has continually pushed for this, ostensibly to allow some of the two million Syrians in Turkey to return - though critics say it's designed to break up areas controlled by Syrian Kurds, who Turkey see as a threat.
There was already opposition in the West to the plan. But Russia's air strikes will make it almost impossible to implement.
Today, Russia seems to have confirmed this theory -- as long as Russia is in Syria, there will not be a no-fly-zone:
Russia claims that these incidents were a mistake, but NATO is clear -- these cross-border infiltrations were not a mistake, and Russia is playing a dangerous game. Bloomberg reports:
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg condemned the Russian intrusion into Turkey’s airspace and on Tuesday called it deliberate provocation.
“This doesn’t look like an accident, the violation lasted for a long time compared to previous violations of airspace,” Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels. He called on Russia to stop targeting civilians and Syria’s legitimate opposition, and to avoid coming into conflict with U.S.-led forces fighting Islamic State in Syria.
Even if Russia does not violate Turkish airspace again, however, Russian and NATO aircraft are now operating in very close proximity, increasing the chances of an international incident. The commander of the US air campaign in Syria says that Russian planes have now traveled within 20 miles of US aircraft, and even closer to unmanned drones operated by the US. This picture demonstrates the problem. Russian planes are yellow, US planes are green
You miss the point, again. Forget about TOWs, forget about FSA, focus on us.
What. Is. Our. Goal?
What is the end state that we are trying to achieve? We can't have a strategy without a clear and realistic goal, because the strategy is what you do to reach the goal. Without a clear and realistic goal, all you can do is flail, and fail.
Putin knows what he wants: keep Assad in power. I don't think he can do it, and I expect he'll dig himself into a world of trouble trying, but at least he has a clear goal, which means he can have a strategy. What is our goal?
Until that's clear, we have nothing, and no reason to participate.
Fareed Zakaria actually makes sense, unusual these days...
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-syria-whose-side-is-the-unit…
PS: I realize that the FSA's social media shills are cranking up the volume these days, as they see an opportunity to get into our pockets. But really, must you believe everything they post?
My friend --then you have not read my comments thoroughly----
"Outlaw doesn't seem to know, beyond vague generalities."
I have repeatedly pointed you towards FSA and their apparent unlimited delivery of TOWs--WBTW has made them the number one target of the RuAF if you have been following the social media comments.
BUT hey maybe this will help you focus--the program that is being mentioned is in fact the FSA.
N°1 #Syria myth is the 'lack' of US support narrative
CIA assistance to rebels is the most extensive program they ran for years - worldwide
People confusing "CIA backed" (ie armed with TOW ATGMs) with US trained, two separate things.
Right now FSA has grown to over 35,000 combat fighters who have largely survived four years of war which has made them extremely combat savvy AND they have been beating IS in local fighting with them.
We are already on the ground AND if the reports are correct concerning Obama and he as we know constantly states things but then there is not much behind the words--Obama has allowed the CIA to allow the FSA to work together with JN money wise and weapons as well.
Whether or not ISIL is an insurgency, they do control territory and if they are eliminated a power vacuum will result in that territory. It is very optimistic to think that local control will spontaneously emerge and take over. More likely armed groups will contend to fill the vacuum.
It is of course true that Iraq and Syria effectively no longer exist as functioning states. That doesn't mean the US can simply decree that these states no longer exist and delineate new boundaries redrawn to meet our preferences. That is not a realistic goal, because the parties on the ground are not simply going to submit to our will. The Kurds of course love the idea of their own state, but no amount of negotiation will make that acceptable to Turkey because a Kurdish state will become a base and an inspiration for Kurdish separatists in Turkey... that will happen and the US is not in a position to assure or pretend that it won't. The Sunni are not going to go into docile submission mode and accept a territory that has no oil, no water, and no arable land.. is there any realistic reason to think that such a state will end up ruled by "moderates"? Is there any reason to think that Iran, the Iraqi Shi'a, and Assad wil stay neatly in the territory we allocate for them?
Bush went into Iraq with a clear goal: transform Iraq into an inclusive, unified, modern democracy. Unfortunately this goal, while clear, was completely unrealistic, and of course we could not achieve it. Obama's strategic goal ever since has been to back away and disengage from that failed and hopeless effort. If we are going to adopt a new strategic goal - and again, we cannot have a strategy without a clear goal - it has to be one that is realistic and achievable, and I'm afraid that dissolving Iraq and Syria and redrawing the map by unilateral decree is not realistic. A new map will evolve, in time, but it is not going to be sustainable if it's imposed by any outside power. Committing ourselves to a project like that is a sure prescription for failure.
Putin has a clear goal: keep Assad in power. Whether or not that goal is realistic remains to be seen, but he can have a clear strategy because he has a clear goal. If the US is to have a strategy, we need a clear goal too... but do we really want to commit ourselves to something as aspirational and improbable as what you propose above?