The Battle of Wanat Study
What is it?
The Contemporary History on the battle of Wanat is a study written by the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The study focuses on the July 13, 2008, battle in Afghanistan's Waigal Valley during which nine American Soldiers died and 27 were wounded defending their small outpost against a much larger force of insurgents armed with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons. CSI conducted an extensive study on the actions that took place at Wanat in order to provide a transparent look at ourselves as an Army, identify lessons learned, and implement those lessons learned across the force. Lessons learned greatly enhance the preparedness of our leaders and increase success during combat. The contemporary history on Wanat can be viewed here.
What has the Army done?
The Combat Studies Institute, a subordinate organization of the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Center - Leader Development and Education (CAC LD&E), has provided a comprehensive look at the battle and actions at every level, from the Soldiers on the ground up through the chain of command. This study looks at the event from a variety of different perspectives, to include official Army investigations, and interviews with Soldiers and leaders who were there. In addition, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has created two new publications after the events at Wanat that are aimed at capturing lessons in similar circumstances. Those publications are: Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan Handbook No. 09-37, published in June of 2009; and Small-Unit Operations Leader's Reference No. 09-38, published in September of 2009.
What does the Army have planned?
In addition to the Contemporary History, CSI has also constructed a "virtual staff ride" of the battle of Wanat to facilitate learning for Intermediate Level Education (ILE) students and throughout the Army. Other elements of CAC are also involved in helping the Army learn from this battle. The Combined Arms Center - Training (CAC-T) will provide these lessons as part of their programs, products and services delivered Army-wide through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), at the Combat Training Centers, and through interactive training scenarios in its Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2) software. CAC will also facilitate open discussion on the topic through professional Army blogs and social media sites.
Why is this important to the Army?
We are a continuously learning organization, focused on building a balanced Army capable of prevailing against hybrid threats. CSI produces timely and relevant military research publications and contemporary operational history for the Army that feeds our learning process. We know from experience that institutional growth comes from looking at an event such as the battle of Wanat from all aspects. Historical studies are the mechanisms that help us do that.
Comments
@ move forward,
Thank you for your well considered response, and no, I was not at the battle, nor a member of 2/503. I am an USAF vet from another era. I wrote a non-fiction book proposal (Troops in Contact) about this incident, which received some attention, but never got published. During my research and investigation of the incident I was able to speak to dozens of the battle participants and/or family members of the deceased. During more than a few conversations with them they made it clear to me that COP Kahler and OP Topside were rationing water and had no fuel for the bobcat and other vehicles. (guntrucks). You may be correct, I'm just relaying what was told to me. One parent speculated that the water shortage caused the men to work on filing Hesco barriers at night to avoid excessive perspiration because the bobcat was inoperative.
I agree with you about the tendency to second guess using hindsight. I also agree that this unfortunate incident is a tremendous training tool for future combat ops.
That being said, I think about the Armys decision to evacuate the COP. I am reminded by the words of the noted COIN expert David Kilcullen: "The equivalent of 'exploitation in counterinsurgency is rapid follow-up with humanitarian and economic assistance, and rapid establishment of long- term security measures to protect the population and to confirm them in their decision to support the government."
Searched for a 173rd ABN Williams at Wanat and found none. My sincerest regrets if you or "The Punisher" had a family member or friend killed/wounded there.
If you access the Wanat study, on page 88 (not pdf page) you find this quote from SSG Benton:
<i>"We also tried to pack as much water and food for two days. I dont remember the exact numbers but we kind of eyeballed it and were like "This is good." Wed done this before so we knew we could live off this much food and water for the next two days while doing hard work. We were prepared for at least two days of food and water. We had ammo out the ass and anything we could bring to defend our positions."</i>
The platoon arrived near midnight of the 8th/9th July, they received 15 cases of water on the 11th from two "jingle" trucks, and more with the commander who arrived via CH-47 helicopter on the 12th. The battle began at 0420 the next morning on the 13th.
The fuel was a problem for the Bobcat due to either an inoperable fuel pump or an incorrect/missing part. It did not run out of fuel in its tank until the 11th and the pump problem was rectified on the 12th when the commander and Chinook arrived.
A route clearance package had been attacked in an earlier operation, and was unavailable to escort other contractors with construction supplies. In addition, it had rained hard and the road was not in the best of shape for large trucks close to the camp.
May agree with you on the negative influence of the Apache attack on 4 July. Believe the true number is not the 17 of a list provided Americans, but was certainly more than a few. However, the victims may have had their vehicles hijacked so the misunderstanding was entirely reasonable.
Also disagree with JJM's belief that the wedding incident attack in Nangarhar province had no effect. Folks have cell phones. Word travels. But if JJM is one of those involved in crafting the study as his initials may so indicate, than he certainly knows a lot more than those of us who read and studied every word of the previous and current study and other investigations.
The bottom line is that war involves uncertainty. Human's cannot anticipate every contingency or be expected to have zero defects, particularly after enduring 14+ months in an intense, austere combat conditions. Iodine tablets and hand-pump water filters were available but went unused. Enough ammo was available to the point that weapons malfunctioned from excessive rates of fire before ammo ever ran out. The ANA could have patrolled because they were drinking local water.
TIVO-like playback of Wanat now, cannot be used to expect Leaders to have had crystal balls then. Wanat involved tragic circumstances Soldiers had little control over, even as they attempted the right thing in closing a more dangerous COP Bella to safeguard their inbound comrades in arms.
Future direct support unmanned aircraft for the bigger picture, and systems like the small unmanned ground vehicle to cover local deadspace may enhance our foglights in the fog of war. Until then, study of Wanat for training purposes is the most constructive activity to ensure similar attacks are mitigated in the future. Theater leaders already are foregoing similar combat outpost locations in favor of ones closer to larger population centers, or more defensible terrain.
Why is there no discussion about the dearth of fuel, ammo, water and other critical supplies in this thread?
I also take exception to the view that the previous collateral damage incidents with civilians played little or no role in fomenting the attack. It may be true that the "doctor" killed on the 4th was a Talib sympathizer, but for the people in that region he and his two female nurses represented the only people allowed to examine and treat the women in the entire valley. That is a huge deal when you consider that most Afghan childbirths are attended by midwives, and a substantial number of those result in the death of the mother and/or child.
Perhaps instead of worrying about the Admiral's tour, ROCK-6 should have been touring villages with the "doctor" and his staff to generate more popular support?
I am embarrassed at how the Army ignored critical findings and opinions from General Patraeus and LtGen Natonski's congressionally mandated independent investigation. The study is factual but highly selective in presenting all of the truth. The Study repeatedly blames the platoon for tactical mistakes while makeing excuses for the lack of leadership from the company, battalion and brigade. What is the most embarrassing is the the paragraph in the last chapter: Although the battalion and brigade commanders did not visit Wanat before the battle and Myer only arrived the day before, this was hardly an example of command neglect. These commanders had busy schedules and multiple operations going on during the period 8-12 July. On 11 July, Ostlund escorted Admiral Michael Mullen, the senior American military officer, in a tour of the Korengal Valley and otherwise had a full slate of meetings with local officials and leaders throughout the AO Rock region.
If the readers think this is an acceptable excuse for leader oversight of what was the company, battalion and brigade main effort then I hope you are not in the Army.
LtGen Natonski cites in his investigation: "The failure of the battalion commander to visit Wanat or have a field grade officer visit Wanat during the operation and the failure of the Company Commander to travel to Wanat prior to 12 July resulted in a lack of awareness by leaders regarding the supply status of Wanat the poor location of OP Topside, the lack of patrolling by 2nd Platoon and the status of defenses at Wanat."
The CSI report fails to cite General Patraeus main finding that the battalion and brigade failed to adhere to US Army doctrine of maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces two levels down.
The CSI report is a poor attempt by the Army to protect company and field grade officers that made significant leadership failures through their tactical arrogance.
The Punisher
the dinner with the Wanat elder referred to as "Ibrahim" is mentioned in the monograph. However, CPT Myer, the company commander, took little heed of the warning because the locals in general and Ibrahim in particular, always claimed their was going to be an attack and, in most cases, the attacks never happened.
BTW the facts in the article linked in an earlier post about the wedding party attack are wrong. The village of Kacu (more properly Katsu)is not located in Nuristan but is, in fact, located in Nangarhar Province south of the large city of Jalalabad close to the Pakistani border in the same range of mountains where the Tora Bora caves were.
In many of the attacks on civilians, the Taliban/ Al Qaeda forces bait the Coalition into attacking by firing upon troops in the close vicinity of civilians or outright using the civilians as human shields. And, even when civilians are not killed, they then lie and say they were. Since their IO seems superior to ours in such matters, the news spreads both to locals and to a western press eager for such bad news stories before friendly forces can reply. What is rarely mentioned, but is cited in the CSI study, is that the Coalition forces, led by Afghan government officials, did a large campaign after the 4 July attack to dispell the enemy's misinformation. The then Nuristani governor was also fired by Karzai for spreading, almost immediately, the enemy propaganda. Incidentally, that governor never visited the Waygal Valley in his tenure and the local district governor, whosae headquarters was in Wanat, but whose residence was in the enemy-invested village of Aranas, was fired after the battle for being an enemy sympathizer (to put it nicely).
I need to point out that the wedding party event did not happen in Nuristan but took place in Nangarhar Province south of Jalalabad, one valley away from Tora Bora. This was a great distance (maybe 100-125 miles) from Wanat and a different ethnic group (Pashtuns versus Nuristanis at Wanat). That attack was not mentioned as a contributing factor because it was not a contributing factor.
Also the 4 July Apache attack did not kill 17 civilians. That was well-orchestrated enemy propaganda. A detailed investigation by the Army only found one civilian (a Pakistani doctor who worked in the Bella clinic) to be varied as being killed and he was suspected of being an enemy agent. The names of the 17 released online almost immediately proved to be unverifiable (i.e. fake). The whole settle ment of Bella probably did not have 17 people living in it. The apache attack did deter any further attacks on Bella and allowed its smooth evacuation on 8 July.
This is much different (and better) than the earlier leaked study with several new historians involved. The differences between the earlier and final versions are substantial.
Those differences are also why I'm always suspicious of historians because their slants on an event always seem to come through leaving you unsure who/what to believe. Other observations:
- Good job on the photos and diagrams. Wish there was a simulation on the Army Training Network like there is for a similar later incident.
- The study newly mentions that around the same time as the July 4th Apache/trucks incident that killed 17 civilians and insurgents (and wounded a key insurgent leader), there was another civilian wedding collateral damage incident that reportedly killed 40+ in nearby Nuristan. Yet neither was listed in the conclusion as a contributing factor to the Wanat attack or a lesson to be careful when engaging near civilians.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/11/afghanistan.usa
- Was equally surprised that the need to insert the "fog of war" angle as a lesson appears to have caused the omission of the earlier fact that at the dinner the night before the attack, Ibrahim asked CPT Myer whether UAS were in use. Both TOW and LRAS3 sensors are mentioned as mitigating factors indicating adequate resources. Yet the ability of UAS to find the same insurgents is down-played...because UAS were not on hand just prior to the attack. If an armed Predator/Reaper or Grey Eagle had been on station all night, it may have reacted far sooner with a missile attack in the dead space north of and hillside house southeast of OP Topside where 8 died.
- Liked that no blame was attributed or implied upon the 173rd ABN leaders.
- Applaud that it points out that it was reasonable not to expect imminent trouble since Chosen company had an average of 7.1 TICs per month versus the 3 other TF Bayonet line companies that averaged 14.8 to 24.7 TICs.
- Also, attacks against other valleys were ongoing while Wanat was initially quiet during the first few days of the move from COP Bella to Wanat
A long read but well worth it, very detailed and insightful. Three principal points that I took away:
1. The Taliban changed their TTPs to achieve tactical surprise. Nobody expected nor predicted this.
2. ISR, construction support, crew-served weapon allocation, etc., were all dependent on making judgment calls about limited resources. Claims of negligence or incompetence on the part of senior leadership do not hold up, in my opinion.
3. The Waygal Valley, like the Korengal Valley, is an example of human terrain that the coalition will likely never win over to the government side. Even in a perfect world that would allow a sufficient number of boots on the ground, I think that districts such as these will always be neutral if not hostile.
"The Punisher" [obviously a reference to the mascot of C Co] ignores or downplays certain facts that were made in the CSI study. What is actually "embarassing" is his uninformed commentary and failure to present the complete argument given in the CSI study.
The Wanat area was quiet during the period 8-12 July. No enemy activity. This is in contrast to both the situation at the nearby Bella outpost before it was abandoned on 9 Jul and the remainder of the TF Rock AO. The company commander was at Bella until the evening of 9 July. He had to spend 10 July at Camp Blessing participating in the investigation of the 4 July Apache attack at Bella, which was a big deal. The investigation had already been delayed until Bella was shut down. Because of road clearance difficulties caused by an IED which disrupted the road clearance unit on 8 July, and a shortage of aircraft, this CPT was unable to get to Wanat on the 11th. But he did get there on the 12th. The battalion commander had a tight schedule but it did originally include a site visit to Wanat on the 10th. However the disruption of the road clearance unit made it impossible for him to go that day and the rest of the period 11-12 July were consumed with the CJCS visit to the Korengal valley and previously arranged key leader engagements. REMEMBER, again, Wanat did not have a shot fired during this period! Natonski's conclusions that the senior officers neglected Wanat reek of political expediency and Campbell's revocation of the reprimands was just and correct. As GEN Campbell stated well in his review, none of these decisions made by those officers were unreasonable. Even the platoon's use of the terrain and employment of forces seems reasonable with their appreciation of the situation. No one expected a mass attack so soon after occupation of the position without any kind of preliminary actions (check the statements of all the participants!) Sometimes the enemy does the unexpected. The chain of command did have systems in place to respond to such contingencies which were executed immediately.
why put a COP sided by 3 mountains? Plunging fire is a killer, also the LRAS is said not to have picked up men so close. Weren't they warned by villagers about an impending attack? The report is out and places blame on men who cannot defend their actions. Then they pulled out some time right after. Should have bombed it to dust when the hadjj was picking thru Chosen's things. Wat a heartbreaker.
r.bryan: The old man Gen. Giap always referred to as uncle, Ho Chi Minh, upon being briefed that the French were establishing a position at Dien Bien Phu, is recorded to have taken a helmet and pointed into the bottom bowl, saying there were the French. Then he ran his finger around the top rim, describing this is where we will be.
It must (in fact I personally know it is) be a hell of a note to men that have fought and died for a seemingly important position, to find they are withdrawn after the battle, and the position abandoned.
It also is a hell of a note that the Army didnt do a better examination and briefing to the next-of-kin, and public in the first place
instead of this alternating back-and-forth horses butt affair that only further lead to distrust and confusion.
If the battalion and brigade commanders had reservations enough about the location to recommend it be closed, regardless of their personal operating tempo and distractions, someone, if not them personally, should have paid a visit.
Perhaps that someone having a fresh perspective would have smelled trouble - exceptionally good commanders do smell trouble - young 1stLt Brostrom apparently did.
Anon,
If you think Wanat was a bowl, look at the study's COP Bella pictures. It only could be resupplied/reinforced by air. Wanat was the district center and had district police theoretically on our side. Wanat was just 5 miles from COP Blessing and its ground QRF that did respond because there was a road to Wanat. Wanat had 5 HMMWVs with crew-served weapons that only could be parked in the valley.
COP Bella being closed was near a home of Gulbuddin Hekymatar so no bad guys there, right? When you are satisfied that Bella needed closing and that experienced Soldiers could do that better than new replacements, then read about COP Ranch House on a hilltop near Aranas that still was attacked repeatedly.
The study mentioned that after the Wanat attack, and subsequent demolishment of many buildings, there was no hope of recapturing H&Ms, not that there ever was much chance in that location anyway.
The briefing of families could have gone better but suspect General Campbell was somewhat shocked by his treatment. The families should take solace that Wanat is being used for training and the Army Training Network also now has a downloadable simulation for training purposes.
In your second to last paragraph, keep in mind that the battalion commander was escorting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was there because he knew the beating the battalion had taken as a whole. If you saw Restrepo, that was the company experiencing 24 TICs a month compared to Waigal valley's 7. In the movie hear the company commander offer to build a road to Chowkay valley which was also hard hit and also was in the battalion sector occupied by a company experiencing more TIC than Waigal/Wanat.
Around 15 COPs had to be manned in the battalion. At 73 men, COP Kahler at Wanat had far more than most.
Young 1LT Brostrum was a hero as part of the first QRF to run to OP Topside. He was correct to know it might need reinforcement. He lacked the organic RSTA tools to help him look for threats in dead space and from an overhead perspective. The study downplays the value of overhead ISR, but the Captain S-2 bravely fought for it against a LTC...and lost. The LRAS saw one small group much too late and multiple others had already closed too close for artillery and JDAM support.
Thank you for your unemotional and straight forward reply Move Forward. I am aware of the differences the French faced and that of Wanat: consider it a metaphoric trope.
You will also recall there was an original hurry-up analysis done that was leaked-out which seemed more in line with absolving blame than anything else, which resulted in LtGen Natonski's redo examination at the urging of Gen Petraeus.
I do not want to play a blame game, but my Army needs to do better and understand events such as these that wouldn't have raised eyebrows in past wars, will today.
They were all good Soldiers given a lousy deal and hopefully, we'll "move forward."