Small Wars Journal

The US Army's Shift to Irregular Warfare

Wed, 04/07/2010 - 3:49pm
The US Army's Shift to Irregular Warfare

by Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane

Download the full article: The US Army's Shift to Irregular Warfare

Part of today's challenges within the US Army are the ongoing debates of whether future conflict will require us to continue to develop more robust COIN and irregular warfare capabilities or to maintain our edge in conventional warfare expertise. To settle these debates we must examine the nature of today's wars. Unlike the bi-polar world of our recent past we are now facing many smaller conflicts...conflicts that are not necessarily defined by war, but, rather run the gamut from engagements to confrontations to combat. And while new conflicts aren't necessarily growing at an alarming rate, the old ones are not going away. This presents us an era of conflict, of persistent conflict, where our combined capacity to engage will be greatly challenged. Our solution is to focus on developing our officer and NCO leadership.

The Army needs agile and adaptive leaders capable of handling the challenges of full spectrum operations in this era of persistent conflict. These leaders must be creative and critical thinkers; they must be confident and competent communicators; and they must be capable of operating with a comprehensive approach to meet these emerging challenges. Leaders will be required to contend with offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously as well as integrate combined arms and host nation forces.

This article asserts that successful counterinsurgency relies on an equally developed irregular warfare mindset. Fueling this mindset is change...lots of it...and in various forms and venues. Using the framework of DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities) and combining it with a resource- informed, integration-focused, and outcomes oriented approach, a formal holistic effort can be made to confront today's and tomorrow's hybrid threats. Let's examine what the Army has done in the last few years to prepare adaptive leaders for the complexities of irregular warfare and full spectrum operations.

Download the full article: The US Army's Shift to Irregular Warfare

Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane is the Deputy Commanding General, Futures and Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) of the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Military Academy and a Master's degree in Joint Command, Control, and Communications from the Naval Postgraduate School. LTG Vane is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He Commanded the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and the US Army Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss, Texas.

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Comments

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Sat, 04/17/2010 - 4:45pm

Bob: glad you responded as this shows the true disconnect from TRADOC to reality.

BUT before I respond to the point by point comments I will recommend to Bob that he reads a CALL NewsLetter No 07-01 dated Oct 06 which I use as a baseline for viewing events since 2006--I would in fact say that if one understands the comments in the article then one will find that much has not changed since the article was written in the various problem areas. Yes new technology, report formats, or new training courses but outside of that what has really changed concerning the areas they point out?

1. First, he claims that actual changes to MOS training courses to reflect realities did not start taking effect until the 2007/2008 timeframe. I have interviewed numerous officers and soldiers that have attended TRADOC MOS courses. They claim that changes began to occur much earlier in the 2001/2002 period.

RESPONSE: Having come back from Iraq as a senior interrogator trainer to the basic interrogator course and EAIT course in mid 2006 there was a constant "rub" between the experience returning from the field and what was told to us "you cannot possibly want to make changes to the training in the middle of a war-TRADOC will not support it"--this led to a number of really good trainers giving up on the attempt to make the training revelant and they went back to Iraq or Afghanistan---during 2006 returning Army interrogators felt they were being punished to have to go to the school house. It was also "known" that Army units would pawn off the poorer personnel to the sschoolhouses and retain the better personnel inside the BCTS---at least through to the end of 2007 early 2008. Heck Army manning did not start to fill empty slots at the Ops Grp, NTC until 2009 so please recheck you information.

RESPONSE: check the current BOIC and AOIC courseware and how many paras are used to talk about DOMEX/SSE and Multifunctional Teams?--what one at max two total paras?

RESPONSE: In June 2007, Gen. Kemmins then TRADOC G2 was told during a briefing at the NTC that HUMINT was failing during BCT rotations---it took until mid 2009 just to the required MI ARFORGEN deployed, tested and implemented into the NTC as well as other CTCs even after he declared 2008 to be th MI year for the CTCs--Ie DCGS was finally fully deployed in 2009 after countless code rewrites and numbers of contractors just to get it to "play nice with other tools". Do I have to go on with further examples up through late 2009 and early 2010?
Example, DOMEX/SSE was introduced into the NTC in June 2007 and then anchored in each scenario since then but up through late 2009 every BCT was still failing in getting the basics even right on finding/handling captured enemy documents--attempts to get them to the world of Cellex and Medex were failures and are still failures through 2010. Even the first uses of a battlefield forensics team "Multifunctional Teams" ended in failure in May 2009 as the BCT Staff had no earthly idea on how to use the two highly skilled teams.
EXAMPLE: the NTC never really pushed HUMINT operations replications through most of 2007-2009 as the roles were not built out for it even after repeated requests to Ft. H. MSO never really got off the ground until late 2009 early 2010--so please correct me if
I am wrong on this subject.

2. Second, he notes that "in 2007/2008 BCTs and Divisions received equipment and training while deployed in the middle of the fight." This comment does not give credit to the Army for providing the latest technology and capabilities to units in the warfight.

RESPONSE: What I was saying is that it came often to late for training on the equipment and was deployed but never used---check with any number of returning BCT S2s about their experiences with the MI ARFORGEN.

3. Third, concerning comment that "due to high OPTEMPO ... experience never really allows for BCTs to build their own inherent institutional knowledge bases - all KB resides with the individual and not the unit."

RESPONSE: if you comments were so totally correct then every BCT attending any CTC should walk through them in a breeze--BUT that is not the case---they attempt to rely on the tried and true method of what I call "been there done it and you cannot tell me anything new"-especially after three rotations into Iraq---prove me correct in these observations.
EXAMPLE:
Everyone knows SBCTs get perference on anything--ie a standard BCt might have at deployment 10-12 HUMINT collectors---just during a NTC rotation a SBCT might have 50-60 Humint collectors--NOW tell me that TRADOC does not know that.

4. Fourth, his claim that "CIED slowdown in attacks in Iraq cannot be really contributed to our CIED efforts" is also inaccurate.

RESPONSE: Bob do I really need to list the over ten articles released in just 2010 that point out the fact over and over that it was both the Sunni and Shiite insurgent groups that actually for whatever reasons turned down their attacks on US forces! Maybe when the Iraq Security Agreements came into play they realized the war was over but they have since continued to use IEDs against Iraqi security forces on a daily basis-but not against us.

Example:
"Meigs, who spent much of this time at JIEDDO battling perceptions that his task force was a waste of money, did say the training his teams provided troops in the field greatly decreased the number of lethal IED attacks in Iraq as they learned to better spot the devices. The various Sunni "awakenings" movements, where insurgents decided to quit attacking U.S. patrols with IEDs and chose to side with the U.S. military in order to survive the Sunni vs. Shia civil war in Iraq, was a big reason IED attacks dropped so dramatically in 2007."

Read more: DoD Buzz | Afghan IEDs Show Rapid Adaptation

5. Fifth, author claims that the "Regular Army can in fact replace the SF community ... and this is the opening round for RA to claim FID." Significant capacity shortfalls led the General Purpose Forces to also develop skills in MTT areas.

RESPONSE: ask any SF officer or enlist personnel if they feel that Big Army is breathing down their necks and if they feel if Big Army has in fact moved into their battlespace?
GPFs have learned MTT work which is really FID not because they were filling capacity shortfalls --it was directly related to the Iraqi Security Agreements signed in 2008 and the Army had to urgently respond to the agreements in order to maintain personnel in Iraq---this was done via the new concept called the AABs--where is the TRADOC doctrine for the AABs?

6. Sixth, the comment that "there is no centralized IW training center" may be accurate, however, also not necessarily relevant.What makes good sense is to continue to improve the Combat Training Centers which use the military decision-making process (MDMP), red teaming, war gaming, and expertise from functionals such as WIT, PRTs, MTTs, HTTs, DOMEX, and others to practice complex, realistic, and demanding training in an operational environment that not only confronts BCTs with challenges with insurgencies, but with realistic combined arms situations. However, in fact, COM-ISAF has ordered BCT leadership to attend COIN training center in Kabul.

RESPONSE: Where is the TRADOC doctrine on the above mentioned "enablers" ie WTI (was originally WIT), CEXE, DOMEX, COIC/JTCOIC, HTTs, PRTs, LEPs, Title 50 OGA groupings, FBI, ASW,---just where is the doctrine concerning those groups and their doctrinal interaction with a BCT? There is no doctrine as these organizations are not at this time considered to "programs of record"---this also goes for the JTCOIC which was actually deployed for the first full time at a CTC at the NTC in April 2008 not in the timeframe of 2007 as you indicate. If in fact the original MOU/MOA is used to replicate "reachback" which was the original remit of the JTCOIC then virtually every BCT that has gone through the JTCOIC scenario has failed. The JTCOIc has in fact gained a new lease on life by becoming a Divisonal ACE and providing the role of a Div. ACE as most CTCs do not have that capability to replicate based on their lack of manning strenght especially in the MI areas. So please Bob do not infer that my information is dated!

7. Seventh, he claims that the Army does not teach "open source warfare" as a standing doctrine of IW. Many officers that are knowledgeable of open source warfare techniques would note that these skills have been a backbone of training for some time.

RESPONSE: Bob--this comment reflects exactly what I am saying is a core failure even by TRADOC. "Open source warfare-OSW" is a theory to explain the evoluntionary development speed by the Sunni insurgency expounded by John Robb in early 2004, and presented several times in 2004 and 2005 to Congressional briefings and written about in his recent book "Brave New War" which actually points more towards 4/5GW.
It should be noted that 101st carried the book in their hip pockets in 2007 as they deployed.

Even a recent interview with Gen. Oates the new JIEDDO Cmdr is starting to indicate that what they thought "worked" in Iraq is not working in Afghanistan--you think anything that gives a far better understanding of why that is might be the basis of a real deep discussion which led me to assert OSW is being ignored in all Army levels as it clashes with the concepts of the COIN FMs---still stand by that comment.

NOT open source materials. So please when you critque me understand the theories and terms.

8. Eighth, Outlaw 7 notes that the JTOIC is involved with "hand feeding information to the BCT" and that the COIC/JTCOIC are repetitive. This information appears to be about two years old. During the early 2007 stage, the CTC scenarios were not robust or in depth enough to properly replicate the complex INTEL environment required to conduct a thorough AtN.

RESPONSE:
See the response to number six but will copy it to here again.
There is no doctrine as these organizations are not at this time considered to "programs of record"---this also goes for the JTCOIC which was actually deployed for the first full time at a CTC at the NTC in April 2008 not in the timeframe of 2007 as you indicate. If in fact the original MOU/MOA is used to replicate "reachback" which was the original remit of the JTCOIC then virtually every BCT that has gone through the JTCOIC scenario has failed.

The JTCOIc has in fact gained a new lease on life by becoming a Divisonal ACE and providing the role of a Div. ACE as most CTCs do not have that capability to replicate based on their lack of manning strenght especially in the MI areas.

NOTE: It should be noted that in 2008 COIC did have a training department that was the original developer of the model currently being replicated by all JTCOIC elements but as the JTCOIC empire grew it sucked away the original mission from COIC and now one even hears in the community that JTCOIC does not need the mothership COIC any longer but hay that is just RUMINT.

NOW let's really see the comment by Bob concerning Attack the Network--(AtN)---CAN anyone at TRADOC, COIC or JTCOIC give one a coherent defintion of just what the heck "AtN" is? Now one cannot provide a definition as there is no defintion--it gets constantly spun anew when a new tool is needed or new funding is needed--but at it's core there still is in 2010 NO defintion!

THE new answer to trying to defeat Afghan IED cells is a the concept of "social network analysis-SNA"---can anyone including BoB please define that one to me---they point to the new but in older tool called ORA which is really a glorified visualization tool for link analysis but can it provide COAs for a Cmdr's decision making process-NO.

9. This is one important area that Bob has overlooked---CoIST---there is a major issues with that and it would take far to much time to go into all the points. Try to tie the developments of CoIST to TRADOC doctrine, training, toolsets, and now the lack of manpower needed to make CoIST effective.

So Bob critque away BUT please get your facts correct and please understand the nature of the beast before you decide I do not know what I am talking about.

What I miss the most from TRADOC is that one would like to hear a spade called a spade and then fix the problems--accept responsibility where needed, fix the problems and move on--not telling everyone how great the world is and then be losing the current CIED fight in Aghanistan.

The last five years of observations and reality is what has pushed me to finally put it paper and publish. Just not sure many will actually believe the disconnect.

Outlaw 7 (not verified)

Sat, 04/17/2010 - 5:28pm

Bob---what is TRADOCs answer to this comment.

In fact, the current Collect-Update-Analyze-
Prioritize cycle requires 36-48 hours and results in significant (>80%) information loss.