Small Wars Journal

Unintended Consequences

Fri, 02/13/2009 - 4:59pm
Thanks to Colonel Bob Jones for his post on Small Wars Council on the topic of Mindset, which triggered some of my recollections oon the sort of allied subject of unintended consequences and their lingering effects. The Brigade structures he referenced were being adjusted for the Army National Guard and were being formed for the Active Army assistors at the time cited in the Post as a result of the activation of three Army National Guard Brigades for Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm in 1990-91. The activation of those three Brigades had been resisted by senior Army leadership but was forced by political pressure. In an effort to delay the potential dispatch of the Brigades to the operational theater, the Army elected to rotate all three Brigades through the National Training Center. In the event, the 'war' ended prior to their deployment.

One result of that failure to be deployed as a result of deferring to process as a forestalling tactic was an unintended consequence of little desired Congressional involvement. As I recall, the Defense Appropriation Acts of 1992 and 1993 dedicated 5,000 experienced Active Component soldiers. All captains had to be branch qualified and all NCOs, mostly SSG and above and had to have recent troop experience.

At the time those structures came into being, I was working in a large headquarters and happened to be in the Commanding General's Office when he telephonically questioned a Senate staff member of his acquaintance as to why Congress had passed a rather convoluted law that led to the establishment of the Advisory 'Brigades.' The response was to the effect that Congress wished to ensure that in future wars The Army National Guard Brigades were deployed. The General's response to the Staff person was "Well, you haven't done that. There's no assurance as I read this law that will happen and what you have done is create a bureaucratic nightmare that will waste Active Component Spaces and is likely to be a detriment to the Reserve Components..." or words to that effect.

Thus, a lack of clarity of purpose and a concentration on process and minutia by Congress led to an unintended consequence of massive effort, disruption and cost that accomplished little. Fortunately, after some turmoil and unnecessary costs, that failure was recognized and rectified and today's Training Support Brigades comprised of soldiers from all components resulted in a far better structure.

Regrettably, the other failure cited in that Post has not been rectified. That is the Army Training System using Tasks, Conditions and Standards as the principal individual and unit training methodologies. As Colonel Jones stated in the above linked Post, "...Failure of an essential task is to fail the entire larger task. So any AC army unit (if ever held to evaluation) would have say 2 of 40 subtasks that they must do correctly to pass." That was held to be true at the time; later it was realized that sub task failure need not cause a major task failure but interpretation is still seen as problematic by some.

The process says that we train to standard, and is an effort to provide objectivity by defining 'tasks' down to a pass / fail grade for an easily identified discrete element that may be a task or a sub task or simply an enabling skill with multi-task applicability. What is lost in this is the fact that effective training evaluation most often has to be subjective particularly as numerous sub tasks are frequently combined as they must be in combat. As often, omission of one or more tasks -- or the addition of some not normally included -- may have no effect on mission (or primary task) accomplishment.

There has been recognition that Conditions can vary widely. "Enter and Clear a building" is a task. "Given a structure with a defending enemy element" is the condition, "Enter and clear the building with minimal exposure to enemy fire" is the standard. Whether the unit involved is to clear a two room mud hut, a 20 room mansion, a strip shopping center, nine story office building or the Mall of America can result in significant differences in execution and outcome. It was assumed the evaluator would suitably modify the conditions based on the unit's capabilities and facilities available, but this all too frequently did and does not happen, thus further reinforcing a one size fits all mentality.

The system has admittedly been refined over the years and it now recognizes that many of the early identified 'Tasks' are in fact sub tasks or enabling skills or abilities; that most tasks are performed in conjunction with other tasks and thus that task integration itself becomes a 'Task.' The new FM 7.0 and FM 7.1 continue the process of fixing the process and are great improvements over their predecessors. However, the underlying architecture remains an insidious problem in spite of much improvement.

Improvement is not rectification. The process still forces the Trainer to concentrate on the minimums and lower order efforts. It creates a product that can perform a number of tasks to standard but who or which still may not be able to function effectively in combat.

That we have been as well trained as we actually have been over the past 30 years is testimony to the fact that good trainers have overcome a flawed system. Both yesterdays and today's leaders and trainers deserve a great deal of credit for that. However, the process itself is terribly flawed, is based on 1960s educational technology and was specifically developed to cope with the far lower enlistment and accession standards of 1975, a much trumpeted 'fifth grade reading level.' That old process has some merit for the training of a large conscript Army upon mobilization. We are not now such an Army and are unlikely to be one for many years -- and adequate warning is almost certainly going to be available in event such effort becomes necessary.

Today's accession population is vastly different and far better educated. A very poor 'system' is still being used in spite of major changes in the trained population, in doctrine and in the availability of far more current techniques.

Thus an unintended consequence of adoption of what was at the time recognized by some as a flawed training process is that it further succumbed to bureaucratic inertia and is now hostage to the real -- but manageable -- cost of changing embedded infrastructure including publications and documentation.

These are but three cases of unintended consequences that have had an adverse impact on the Army; a decision to stall Congress, a statute that intended to do something it did not do and adoption of a training process that actually stifles learning, adaptation, innovation and the all critical initiative -- necessities for combat success. All three examples show that reliance on process as opposed to establishing goals or outcomes is terribly flawed -- yet we continue to fret over process...

Fortunately, the law has been changed slightly and the current process is an improvement. Cosmetic changes have been made to the training system and provide some improvement; far better, we are realizing the benefits of Outcome Based Training and we can hopefully we can consign the Task, Conditions and Standard process to the dumpster. The issue should be mission accomplishment ability. Excessive dictation of how to get there is stifling, removes necessary challenges from the purview of subordinate leaders, unnecessarily burdens senior commanders and forces them to interfere with their subordinates to the point of distraction for both. More damaging, we are not inclined to trust our subordinates because we know they are not fully trained. Why do we accept that?

All the foregoing is summed up, I think in this quote from an interview with the author of "The Echo of Battle: the Army's Way of War", Professor Brian McAllister Linn at Bellum, A Stanford Review Blog:

"A final word. The Army is unlikely to win a particular war, much less all wars, unless it starts thinking a lot more seriously about war and a little less about process and procedure."

Comments

Ken White

Sat, 02/14/2009 - 5:11pm

In the late cretaceous period, prior to 1975; there were Army Subject Schedules which were lists of tasks, enabling knowledges and skills (not the same things) in a logical order. These existed for all ranks, specialties and MOSC. They were fairly comprehensive but not dictatorial. There were protectively marked supplements that were the tests for each separate Subject Schedule. To my knowledge, the rumor that these Subject Schedules were eliminated due to the unfortunate abbreviation to be derived is not true.

There were also Army Training Programs; same thing once removed and designed to guide unit training. One was produced for each TOE. Comments above applies except for the test and the fact that 'ATP' was acceptable in polite company..

Then, there were Army Training test, the infamous ATT. These also existed for every TOE and they were developed as a result of WW II experience to include a demanding test of most actions a unit could be expected to perform. It was, in effect, the graduation exercise to be completed before the unit could deploy.

As an example, the Rifle Squad Test was a movement to contact, meeting engagement, withdrawal, hasty defense and hasty attack, consolidation and preparation for other missions. It took a little over two hours for a Company (usually with an Ad hoc committee of the Wpns Plat Ldr and NCOs with support and OpFor from the Wpns guys) to test each Squad. Thus, a Company could test all its rifle squads in two days and their Weapons Platoon Squads on a third day.

The Platoon test amplified that, took about 24 hours and was conducted by the Battalion with generally the Asst S3 as the Chief Umpire. Some units would run lanes, three Plat at a whack with the S2 and Asst S3 Air as additional umpires. Company Tests were three days or so and run by Regiment/Brigade, usually a whole Bns worth of Cos would be concurrently tested. Battalion tests were three or four days and run by Div.

These tests were generally all conducted by elements two echelons higher. This was done reasonably fairly but there were penalties for failures, unit dependent. Generally, platoon or company level failures just brought a 'fix it' and a retest unless there was a really bad error, then a new leader was possible. At Bn level, the penalty for error was more severe on the rationale that the more senior commander had less excuse for and less margin for error. Reliefs were not uncommon. This disturbed some...

The ARTEP was conceived post-Viet Nam in an effort to do four things:

- remove the peaks and valleys in unit training and readiness caused by the cyclical annual nature of the ATP schedules and the ATT conduct usually in late summer. The flaw in that logic was that the personnel system causes most peaks and valleys due to personnel turbulence. Others are caused by our flawed budget process and the vagaries of the US social calendar (which should not be an impactor but is)

- remove the punitive aspects of the ATT by replacing finite standards with amorphous condition dependent standards. This was done by emphasizing that an "ARTEP Evaluation was not a test..." It was done by a crew of young Captains working at Benning, a couple of whom I happened to know and was sold to the senior leadership (with the connivance of PersCom who objected to relief of Commanders -- that messed up the OPD rotation schedules...).

- remove the unit 'owning' the evaluated element from the process to 'insure objectivity.' the practical effect was to complicate the effort (at least in the early days)and increase the support load. This was done partly st the reuest of Congress who always wants 'more objectivity' -- they like numbers. Unfortunately.

- nominally allow more command discretion in training by allowing the Commander to design his METL. The obvious flaw in that was that METL design immediately got yanked up the chain; to wit: "You have to add these tasks to your METL." "Sir, I considered that and did not, I don't think I need to do those." "Well, I do. Add them." Thus, Bde Commanders (at a minimum) too frequently ended up telling Company Commanders and even Platoon Leaders what training they needed.

The Objection to the Subject Schedules was that they were too rigid -- not true, Commanders could modify them as needed. To the complaint about the ATP being too rigid and not all encompassing. Laughable. Take a given ATP /ATT and compare it to a like unit ARTEP today. Very little difference...

The ARTEP change came first and was largely personnel community driven (i,e. no reliefs for failure, no <u>implacably</u> finite standard). As an example of the flawed system, then LTC (later LTG) William S. Carpenter deliberately failed an ARTEP based Operational Readiness Test in 1974 simply to prove there was no penalty for failure.

The T.C.S process followed, with all its flaws.

The end result is that the Army used to test commanders and units and if you failed, you couldn't take that unit to combat. Now, no test, just go forth and do great things. That's a little simplistic, I know and neglects the CTC 'experience' (which is not an annual thing and which some Commanders will not have to undergo) -- but the basic point is valid, we do not test units for fear of their failure yet we will commit them to a war...

Schmedlap

Sat, 02/14/2009 - 3:51pm

I was never a fan of task, conditions, standard (when I was in the school house, I think they were trying to change it to "action", condition, standard - that was around the same time that they wanted to change METT-T to METT-TC and then rearrange it into a more logical MTETT-C). But, I did not realize that the TCS thing was a recent phenomenon. How did things work before that? Did the Army trust junior leaders to train their Soldiers and units and allow Battalion Commanders to develop their own criteria for whether their companies were "certified"?