Undue Emphasis of the Army #Operating Concept by Krisjand Rothweiler, The Bridge
The Army Operating Concept (AOC) at the outset seeks to answer three big questions: What level of war will the concept address, what will be the operating environment and what is the problem that needs solving? The AOC then goes on to answer this in the preface and beyond with some examples that seem to miss the mark on both scope and nature of the environment as it pertains to the Army itself. After addressing many of the human aspects of conflict, the AOC starts looking at the technologies it might need in the future to wage war and build partners. While that is fine for external readers of the document, it leaves little comfort to the soldiers now serving that “big Army,” nor does it address the cost of service to the man or how to address this in order to continue the full-alert status the AOC seems to prepare for.
When discussing the environment, it would be appropriate to include the aspects impacting both friendly forces and threat. Yet from the outset, and continually through the document, the AOC seems to misunderstand the Army it addresses, particularly regarding the aspect of organizational culture. If the Army – an institution of people, not systems – is going to plan for the future of warfare, it has to understand itself today. In several instances, the AOC addresses human and intellectual attributes (creative thought and initiative, p. 5; the Army’s ability to establish a military government, p. 8; use of cognitive sciences, p. 13) that are seemingly inconsistent with the current culture of the Army (at the aggregate) and can only be truly developed with significant cultural shift…
Comments
<blockquote>A secondary area receiving undue emphasis is the role of technology on the environment. After opening with a discussion of the “contest of wills” and the importance of capability in the context of endurance, the AOC puts significant emphasis on the use of technology to make the Army better and more capable. Admittedly, technology can be a powerful thing when used appropriately, but finding the funding balance between gadgets and field time is critical.</blockquote>
Recall that technology applies across the range of doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities solutions that this concept involves. The AOC also mentioned “contest of wills” in more than one instance such as the quote below:
<blockquote>Fundamentally, war will remain a contest of wills.11 Although advances in technology will continue to influence the character of warfare, the effect of technologies on land are often not as great as in other domains due to geography, the interaction with adaptive enemies, the presence of noncombatants, and other complexities associated with war’s continuities.</blockquote>
There are numerous counterpoints to this and technology is simply an extension of our will to win. It is understood that the open skies and seas optimize conditions for some technology better than the complexity of the ground domain. However, our most recent primary problem has been consolidating mission gains the Joint force “accomplished” in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya so that a stable environment remained as we transitioned to host nation security. That is the primary responsibility of the ground domain and technology can greatly assist it. Korea, Syria, and the Ukraine certainly wouldn’t be any different.
Geography may be a technology limiter due to complex and urban terrain, however, technology also can assist in finding hidden targets. Also, the very size of many theaters and smaller AOs often challenges individual dismount ability to cover it all. If you can’t walk it all or respond on foot as a QRF/reserve, you need assistance from safe armored vehicles, fast aircraft, and precision fires with appropriate range, payload and warhead size, and lethality. Troops also need the ability to live for longer terms closer to the AO without exceeding prudent risk, i.e. FOBs and COPs, not to mention manned/unmanned patrols, OPs, and other information collection capabilities (reconnaissance/surveillance/security/intelligence) often involving technology.
Future FOBs/COPs/points of entry/AAs also require technology to simplify and <strong>reduce</strong> logistics and energy demands because otherwise it is difficult to get excessive logistics to forward troops and their machines over intertheater distances and within the theater. Recall the difficulty in getting supplies and equipment over long routes to Iraq and Afghanistan. This problem is partially solved by future unmanned convoys, because many casualties were maneuver support forces vulnerable to IEDs and ambushes. Rotorcraft resupply is a costly solution but technology can reduce fuel consumption, and both precision fixed wing airdrop and unmanned aircraft can resupply, as well.
Some say we won’t need FOBs/COPs in future warfare which is a lesson we risk unlearning if wide area security and setting conditions are two of our claimed core competencies. Such FOBs/COPs put Soldiers/Marines closer to both the enemy and protected civilians and simplify logistics vs. “find and get to the patrol without revealing their location.” Interaction with both adaptive enemies and local noncombatants also can involve technology such as IED-defeat and protection, defeat of threat precision and regular mortars and rockets, automated translators, not to mention the information collection tech listed earlier such as towers and aerostats. Lethal solutions around civilians require greater precision that allows smaller warhead size to safeguard noncombatants and reduce collateral damage.
<blockquote>In the past 100 years, most major conflicts have not been won through superior technology, but through superior training and desire. The Germans in the 1940s had many technological advantages yet lost to Allied will and volume.</blockquote>
This is generalization that is questionable at best given Hitler’s choice of a two-front war, Russian winters, lack of organic German resources and its vulnerable manufacturing and cities susceptible to our airpower launching from sanctuary.
<blockquote>In today’s world, the commitment of violent radicals to their cause or a cartel to illicit income is able to circumvent U.S. technological capacity more days than not.</blockquote>
But imagine how many casualties we would have experienced attempting to “Consolidate Gains” and “Shape the Security Environment” had we not fielded MRAPs, jammers, and information collection tools to bust up networks and attack IED-emplacers and other HVI. Imagine if we had lacked the AH-64s to halt the ISIL advance on the Baghdad airport or had driven everywhere in Afghanistan instead of flying and suffered additional IED casualties and ambushes as a result. I would further suggest that had the State Department and host nation will existed, Afghanistan poppy crops easily could have been curtailed.
<blockquote> But by setting the stage to maintain budgetary pace with the other services, the Army may find itself in 2020 with rooms of gear and no one to use it. The AOC should instead concede that the Army need not be a high-tech service, but leave that to the other branches of the military.</blockquote>
The difference being overlooked is that technology and offset from threats is why both the air and sea domains experience very few casualties relative to the ground. Technology has the potential to reduce casualties and increase effectiveness in killing those who would inflict casualties upon our Soldiers and Marines. Tech can reduce crew size ala Strykers and better utilize underused crewman such as tank loaders who could monitor and operate unmanned systems. We should concede nothing with the goal of a more effective and survivable ground domain in mind.
<blockquote>Advanced technologies will transfer readily to state and nonstate actors.</blockquote>
I don’t buy that the small quantities and lesser capabilities that budget-limited threats can buy on line or produce in Iran or North Korea for instance, will in any way be comparable to our technological capabilities. Onesies and twosies of internet tech and small low-flying indigenously-produced UAS for instance are not a major threat compared to our hundreds of larger RPA/UAS. Besides, the primary means of dealing with such threats include EW, direction-finding for enemy jammers and comms, and other tech like our own UAS and Switchblades, directed energy, and active protection. In addition, it is utterly illogical to claim that marginal and near peer threats will have advanced technologies, yet we should “concede that the Army need not be a high tech service.”