The Syria Card

The Syria Card

By David J. Haimsky

The ongoing, peace talks between Israel and Syria have been relatively underreported in the news media, and are surprisingly seldom discussed in policy circles in Washington, despite the fact that their potential success will drastically change the political landscape in the Middle East in Washington's favor. That is why the Bush Administration's lack of involvement in this process is all the more puzzling.

President Bush is widely perceived as a "lame duck" president. His recent European tour failed to bring out crowds of protesters that have greeted him every time he stepped foot on the continent in the past, not because people have warmed up to his policies, but simply because they regard his tenure in office as effectively over. His popularity ratings at home and abroad remain at an all-time low and people on both sides of the political spectrum are waiting anxiously for January's changing of the guard. Bush, however, is determined to go down in history as the president who had taken on terror networks and rogue states in defense of democracy worldwide. The prospect of an Israeli-Syrian peace provides an historic opportunity for him to at least partially meet that objective, while reversing some of the policy setbacks of his administration.

Why Now?

Israeli-Syrian peace efforts are not a new occurrence. During the mid-1990s, the Clinton Administration attempted to mediate between the two sides before and during the implementation of the Oslo Accord. However, the Israelis' reluctance to part with the entire territory it captured from Syria in 1967, coupled with the lack of political will on the part of the Hafez al-Assad government to compromise led to the collapse of the talks.

Despite recurring tensions, however, the two sides avoided open conflict for 35 years. Even when Israeli warplanes blew up a purported nuclear site in the Syrian desert, Damascus did not respond militarily, in part because it was embarrassed over its alleged violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and wanted to avoid further scrutiny on this issue, and in part because it regarded the cost of retaliation to be greater than any potential benefits thereof. Therefore, an uneasy détente has continued to rule the day. Why then, is there now a pressing need to alter the status quo?

The answer lies in the complex political interplay between numerous state and non-state actors, the most significant of which are the US, Israel, Syria, Iran, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), Hamas, and to a lesser extent, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Syria has been a major sponsor of Hizballah, the Lebanese Shia organization that has waged a war of attrition against Israel for two and a half decades. It has also played host to just about every Palestinian organization fighting Israel and provided varying degrees of arms, training, as well as financial and logistical backing to these groups, which justified its designation by the US as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Syria's alliance with Iran, by far the biggest supporter of Hizballah, also helped facilitate transfers of arms, money, and personnel through its borders, serving as a sort of lifeline between the patron state and its client organization. Furthermore, this alliance helps Tehran mitigate the effects of international isolation, in response to its nuclear program and emboldens the theocratic regime to take on an increasingly more confrontational stance towards the US and the international community. In short, Syria's policies continue to destabilize the region and have effectively derailed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process numerous times.

Israel, for its part, has actively sabotaged Syrian initiatives by undercutting its influence and credibility abroad. The aforementioned attack on Syria's perceived nuclear facility, as well as the alleged involvement of Mossad in the February 13, 2008 assassination of Imad Mugniyah (Hizballah's top military commander) in Damascus serve as recent examples of such efforts.

As this game of tit for tat drags on, both sides have failed to achieve their main objectives—Syria has been unsuccessful in regaining the territory it lost during its 1967 war with Israel, while Israel has fallen short of preventing Syrian-sponsored extremist groups from penetrating its borders. If the two sides have not accomplished their goals in the past 35 years, there is no reason to believe they will realize them in the future by maintaining the status quo. Pursuing their objectives by renewing open conflict has been all but ruled out, since it's considered far too costly and extremely risky for both sides. Mutual compromise, on the other hand, is the only remaining viable alternative out of this deadlock.

Any comprehensive peace deal, however, would have to entail painful concessions from both sides: Israel must be prepared to return the Golan Heights to Syria, a move that two-thirds of the Israeli public opposes. In return, Damascus would be expected to satisfy Israeli (and US) security concerns by designating the returned territory as a demilitarized zone, breaking with the terrorist groups it has supported over the years (including Hizballah, Hamas, and PIJ), and distancing itself from Iran. Such an exchange would, in theory, enable both sides to achieve their political goals, while fostering greater regional stability.

What's in it for the US?

If the Camp David Accord is to be regarded as a model for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, then any deal would have to have the blessing of the US, which would essentially translate into billions of dollars in aid and other economic incentives for both sides. What would make such a colossal allocation of taxpayer dollars a good investment?

1. It would isolate Iran

- The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is arguably the biggest challenge to US national security. Damascus's alliance with Tehran exacerbates this threat because it increases the possibility of a transfer of nuclear materials to Hizballah, and/or other state/non-state actors through Syrian territory, which would undoubtedly pose a nightmare scenario for the US, Israel, and the international community as a whole. A comprehensive regional peace deal has the potential to erode this dangerous alliance and, in so doing, further isolate Tehran from one of its crucial allies.

2. It would deprive Hizballah of one of its biggest sponsors

- Hizballah remains a major source of instability both, internally and externally. It frequently obstructs democratic processes and the rule of law in Lebanon by violently confronting government forces, as evidenced by last month's fighting in Beirut. These types of spectacles put the country's delicate demographic balance to the test and raise the possibility of a renewed, protracted civil conflict. More importantly, however, Hizballah continues to pose a direct, as well as indirect threat to the US. Its involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, which claimed the lives of nineteen US servicemen, is indicative of the group's capabilities and intentions. The fact that its operatives continue to conduct periodic surveillance on US facilities worldwide serves as a reminder that American interests remain potential targets of the group. Aside from its terrorist activities, Hizballah's smuggling, counterfeiting, drug running, and other black market operations inside the US are detrimental to the economy and pose a formidable challenge to law enforcement agencies. A peace deal that would require Syria to stop underwriting the group's activities would not only deprive Hizballah of one of its major sponsors, but would isolate it from its chief patron, Iran, by cutting its lifeline through Syria. That is not to say that such a measure would bring down this highly sophisticated and resilient organization. However, it would certainly deal a heavy blow to the group by constraining its operational environment and its sources of revenue.

3. It would curtail the entry of foreign fighters from Syria to Iraq

- Syria, being one of the main entry points of foreign fighters to Iraq, has created numerous obstacles for the US during the course of its counterinsurgency efforts there. Notwithstanding the fact that al Qaeda in Iraq is currently in decline, the battle is far from over and the revival of this terrorist network remains a real possibility. If Syria is to be compelled to cut its support to extremist organizations and crack down on their activities within its borders as part of a comprehensive peace deal, al Qaeda in Iraq would be further isolated, thus, improving the capacity of the US and Coalition Forces to stabilize the country. The anticipated draw-down of US forces in Iraq will constrain the Coalition's ability to root out al Qaeda, which further magnifies the importance of this measure.

4. It would prevent Syria from developing nuclear capabilities

- Syria's alleged attempt to construct a secret nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance would pose almost as much of a threat to the US as Iran's nuclear program, if it was to succeed. International monitoring provisions that would ensure no such attempts would be made in the future could be incorporated into a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel and would provide the necessary assurance of Syrian compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Way Forward

Of course, a peace deal that would deliver the aforementioned strategic advantages for all sides rests on the brazen assumption that, as rational actors, the US, Syria, and Israel will eventually come to regard their mutual interests in non-zero sum terms. It is also based on the notion that they will find the political will to make painful sacrifices in order to meet their long-term goals. Whether such an assumption is valid can only be determined by putting it to the test. The US, for its part, can increase the chances of success by playing an active role in the process and offering both sides substantial inducements for reaching an agreement, while raising the costs of failure to do so. In this effort, America is, at least initially, likely to have much more success with the Israelis than with the Syrians, given its longstanding strategic partnership with the former. Nonetheless, the government of Bashar al-Assad knows that it stands to gain much more from close ties with Washington than with Tehran and thus, will be hard-pressed to meet the conditions of peace, even if it means betraying its ally.

Despite its shortcomings, the Bush Administration proved capable of reaching accommodations with its former enemies in the past. The renewal of diplomatic ties between the US and Libya in the summer of 2006 illustrates that the Administration is not beyond compromising with those whom it regards as adjuncts of the "Axis of Evil." Libya's strongman, Mu'amar Qaddafi, eventually succumbed to American and European pressure to suspend his nuclear program, renounce terrorism, and take responsibility for his government's role in sponsoring the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, by compensating the families of the victims. However, the US did not obtain those concessions by demands alone. A complex and intricate engagement process was under way for years, which included congressional delegations to Tripoli and high-level talks that were based on mutual interest, rather than competing positions. This process provides valuable insight into how we can effectively engage Syria without compromising the tenets of our national security strategy.

Like Libya, Syria is a police state run by an authoritarian dictator that has no interest in the spread of democracy. However, both leaders have proven to be pragmatic enough to weigh the costs of non-compliance vis-í -vis the benefits of cooperation with the international community. The challenge lies in presenting Syria with concrete and well defined policy alternatives to the status quo that are in line with its own national interests. Syria's strategic importance to the US is much greater than Libya's, which is why President Bush would be well advised to engage Damascus diplomatically during his remaining months in office, rather than continuing to lambaste it as a belligerent state-sponsor of terror. In our struggle to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions and cement peace in the Middle East, Syria is the wildcard that the US ought to play at this critical juncture.

David Haimsky is a civilian analyst with the US Department of Defense. He holds a M.A. in Political Science from San Diego State University and specializes in Middle East affairs. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not represent the policies or opinions of the U.S. Government.

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