The Death Squad Dilemma: Counterinsurgency Policy and the Salvadoran Model by Steve Dobransky, Foreign Policy Journal
This paper analyzes and evaluates the use of death squads in counterinsurgencies. It, particularly, examines the Salvadoran counterinsurgency (COIN) model and its potential applicability to current and future wars. The Salvadoran model involved widespread use of death squads and other paramilitary units both officially and unofficially sanctioned. Despite being hailed as a success by many in the COIN community, the Salvadoran model was not applied in the Afghan and Iraq Wars. This paper attempts to explain the key factors in determining whether or not the Salvadoran model tends to be more applicable in an unconventional war and, if so, whether it can be done successfully. This paper compares El Salvador with other countries that have been engaged in counterinsurgencies and, then, determines what enables some governments to apply full-scale the Salvadoran model and others not to. This paper concludes with the results and then makes recommendations on how the international community can deal much better with the future threats of death squads, including the establishment of an international organization and force to deter and stop if necessary death squad activities…
Comments
"...in both Afghanistan and especially in Iraq who have carried out killings and torture. There, however, is no substantial evidence that these were directly in support of the newly established governments. The closest evidence suggests that the U.S., Afghan, and Iraqi governments have used paramilitary forces to assassinate insurgent/terrorist leaders and high-level personnel but not civilian populations or low-level opponents..."
What is the author using to support this notion? It is not at all in line with what we have seen happen over the last couple of years, ranging from various CIA supported para-military entities, to the vicious and sectarian blood letting that occured in Iraq during 2006-2009, especially around Baghdad. I don't think there is any question that Shia militias associated with the Maliki government, and warlords associated with the Karzai clan, participated in such violence. A much better question to ask would be "when involved in Irregular Warfare, where host nation/local national forces are employing death squads, what policy choices do United States Government actors have?"