The Army #Operating Concept: An Insider’s Perspective by Daniel Sukman, The Bridge
The recently published 2014 Army Operating Concept (AOC) broadly defines how the Army will operate in the near, mid, and far terms. In a bureaucratic sense, the AOC defines capabilities that are required of an Army that will one day make its way through the JCIDS process. However, from a personal perspective, the AOC represents a challenge. It is a challenge to the warfighters and leaders who have been a part of an Army at war for the past thirteen years. To me, the AOC is a challenge to shape and form the Army and its future leaders and build the foundations of its success in the years to come…
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From my new Army Times in a "State of the Army" article entitled "Win in a Complex World:"
"The new operating concept envisions a joint force working in a wide range of locations and scenerios, mirroring the reality of today's fights."
Army Chief of Staff GEN Odierno:
"In the past, we maybe focused on one big fight somewhere. We believe, with the new Army Operating concept, we have to do multiple small-scale things simultaneously. You've got to be a bit more flexible, a bit more adaptable ... You have to be prepared to operate around the world."
TRADOC Commander GEN Perkins:
"If you look at (AirLand Battle), you have to fight to win. What we're saying here (in Unified Land Operations) is if you focus on winning, you may not have to fight ... there are different ways to get after that (winning) ... You may win without fighting, but you cannot win if you are unable to fight."
"We are becoming a (U.S.)-based Army, so getting somewhere and transitioning quickly and being effective, we have to figure out how to do that."
<blockquote>From a strategic perspective, the AOC discusses what conflicts may look like through the lens of current conflicts. ISIL, Russia, and North Korea certainly represent challenges to Combatant Commanders today. In 2025 and beyond, the crisis with Ukraine and Russia may be over, but the “little green man” challenge may pop up in another theater. ISIL may be a remnant of history, but radical groups bent on death and destruction will still be a threat to the United States and our friends and allies.</blockquote>
This and the concept that the future is unknown and unknowable are some of the few concerns I have about the concept. A "little green man" challenge is not anything you can sell Congress and the President on as future realistic threats requiring a large active Army.
The Ukraine crisis may be long over by 2025 because Russia may own all of Ukraine. That does not mean the Russian threat has ended. The Chinese may never attack Taiwan, or make trouble in the East or South China Seas but that does not mean they are not a primary threat. If they were not, we would not be seeing a Pacific Pivot or Shift or whatever we are calling it these days. Both these threats have been around since 1945 and 1950 respectively and show no sign of dissipating. Both have large capable Armies that may require a large active U.S. Army to deter and defeat them at unknown times and places wherever their Armies are used aggressively.
ISIL may be a remnant of history in 2025 but given nothing used but very limited airpower launched from many hours away, that seems unlikely. Also unlikely is that peace will break out all over the Middle East or North Korea. Let's also not forget that while it is unknowable if Israel will strike Iran if we don't, recent history would indicate a strong possibility that they could which possibly would drag us into a conflict. We also have worldwide treaties and vital interests that require plans for ground defense even if the time and "exact" place where such action could occur are unknown. If we are going to use history to back into the future as I've heard General Perkins say, what better use of history than <strong>recent</strong> history.
LTC Dan Ward had an article on RealClearDefense that tongue and cheek accused the Acquisition system of developing exquisite systems to keep other nations from being able to afford them and by scaring them from developing their own due to the potential problems they will face. That's not altogether that untrue. Certainly, nobody plans to have acquisition problems but equally certain is that very few nations can afford many of these stealth jets in any significant numbers. That is why I question the concept's notion that every Tom, Dick, and Harry nation out there will be buying our technology on the open market.
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/10/12/waste_americas_secr…
Ask General Atomics how easy it is for another nation to buy a Reaper, Predator, or Gray Eagle...and BTW I don't work them. But the idea that we need an exquisite penetrating air-refuelable UCLASS for instance when we already have penetrating stealth fighters and bombers is just dumb. Equally dumb is to think we want to penetrate China or Russia with any aircraft that could be perceived as carrying nuclear weapons. BTW how is this penetrating aircraft going to see through China's crazy smog level to discern a mobile missile from another truck? Don't forget that the mobile missile also may be in a tunnel.
However, I will submit it is equally unlikely to believe that either we, nations with sub $10 billion defense budgets, or non-state actor groups will build lots of really cheap UAS or UGVs that weigh very little, are inexpensive, have long endurance and a large payload, cheap effective sensors and that can swarm around without causing airspace or fratricide/collateral damage problems. Swarming UAS, for instance, are just as likely to swarm around until they find no target whatsoever and subsequently get wasted crashing into the ground (that hopefully we or civilians are not occupying). In contrast, the Reaper that does not use all its healthy ammo load flying for a full day can return to base and try again another day...because it is protected by those exquisite F-35s/F-22s we <strong>did</strong> buy.
Finally, I sense from some of this author's and concepts comments that we may be returning to the post-Vietnam days when all our instructor's had Vietnam experience but we hardly ever talked about Vietnam and SF as an example for the future. When we say that Iraq and Afghanistan are in the past (Afghanistan?) and indirectly imply we won't be doing counterinsurgency again because this President says as much, it probably is asking for a repeat of past problems and imposing a future need to relearn old stability operations lessons. In a complex, uncertain future aren't we just as likely to require both insurgency-support and counterinsurgency with ground forces given examples of recent history?
It is great that the Army is funneling more officers into State Department fellowships and other liaison jobs. However, let's hope that these officers can express that many diplomatic and aid solutions actually hinder the ability of our Army to be effective in Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. If you leave old colonial borders intact that leave intact "unified" large blocks of competing ethnic identities under one identity's domination trouble will result. Even greater trouble is likely when identities friendly to opposing ethnic or religious sides are in adjacent nations. Then invariably the Army will get blamed for upfront diplomatic mistakes of the State Department, National Security Advisor, and President...such as insistence that we fight a war with no ground combat forces and only token numbers of bombing missions.