Struggles Implementing an Exit Strategy

I have spent two years in the Middle East as a Marine and after my honorable discharge; I decided to pursue an MA in International Relations. From there, I took my knowledge and experiences and applied them to a research position that focuses on Afghan culture. I am not claiming to be a subject matter expert; I just wanted to voice a concern regarding the increase of local defense initiatives currently taking place.

At times, while researching aspects of Afghanistan’s complex culture, I come across information that gives me a glimpse into the military’s tactics behind their population-centric COIN strategy. More often than not, I see rising indicators of their successful implementation. For instance,  I notice trends that civilian casualties are down, Taliban are being killed or captured regularly, schools are being built in rural villages, agricultural expertise are being shared with local villagers, etc. Then, every so often, there are moments that completely level my belief that the military has the slightest understanding of Afghan history or their complex culture. This is one of those moments where the military does not fully grasp the complexities of the Afghan culture.

There is a growing debate on how the U.S. can leave the country knowing that the Taliban is still influential and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is unable to provide security once we leave. Ground application of the current exit strategy appears to revolve around the creation of local fighting forces. The solution combines the Taliban with the concept of local defense forces.[1] However, leaving Afghanistan with insurgents as a “local defense force” could be disastrous.

Figure 1.  AFRP Demobilization Trends

Supporters of the latest revision to the demobilization and reintegration program support the union because they see informal-armed groups as a potential job-creation mechanism. The GIRoA can boast that, as of May 2011, there have been 1,852 reintegrees accepted into the program. (Figure 1)[2] However, there are no quantifiable definitions of success or methods for evaluating the programs’ effectiveness. Nor are there any definite examples proving that these reintegrees are finding local jobs that do not include some local security element. Those who oppose the reintegration component argue that it creates dangerous perverse incentives for those afforded an opportunity to join local militia groups.[3] In essence, without knowing reintegrees’ motivations for joining the informal armed groups, we could be arming people who are more concerned with protecting themselves from other informal armed groups than with protecting and serving a government that most consider corrupt as hell. In addition, many argue that arming various groups will distort mechanisms that are already functioning such as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

Although both sides make valid arguments, my concern is with how the local fighting force initiatives are being implemented; specifically, the ways in which the military is involved with the vetting and hiring processes of these programs.

For example, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), which began in 2006 in southern Afghanistan, was tasked with “ensuring government control of territory” and “taking part in joint operations with ANA, ANP and the National Directorate of Security (NDS).”[4] Unfortunately, local warlords were able to infiltrate this program, placing their loyal fighters within the newly formed system, ultimately becoming a valuable resource for warlords to exploit weapons and money. The program shut down in 2008 because, “it turned out to be a divisive militia, often biased toward a particular tribe and manned by a large number of drug addicts and petty criminals.”[5]

 Another local fighting force is the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), stemming from a pilot project that focuses on providing locally based security in Pashtun-dominated areas; the program closely resembles a “neighborhood watch” program.[6] The members of this program are filtered through local leaders and the Afghan government sanctions their final approval. Eventually, this program is supposed to be assimilated into one of the national military forces. Supposedly, local leaders are to pick candidates who will not only fight against the Taliban but will also be loyal to GIRoA.

Truthfully, there have been so many “initiatives” that I could continue for another page but I would rather get to the main point. Overall, since August 2010, the Afghan government has organized thousands of villagers to fight against the Taliban.[7] Yes, there have been isolated cases of success but there have also been, as explained above, serious setbacks. It’s bad enough that Coalition Forces (CF) are entertaining the idea of bringing former insurgents into local military forces, which has been successful  in only a handful of places around the world[8], but it’s even worse that coalition forces are attempting to mimic a traditional fighting force with a 21^st century spin. A misunderstanding of what is considered a local fighting force could cause a major obstacle to the program’s success.

Arbakai’s and Militias

The various “initiatives” today stem from an understanding of both an Arbakai and a militia as they relate to Afghanistan. The 21^st century spin on the traditional Afghan defense forces such as an Arbakai and a militia is that the CF and GIRoA’s want to be heavily involved in their recruiting and vetting processes.

 Historically, the Arbakai system is based on Pashtun traditions. The system is set up to perform three main tasks for a community. These are to: (a) implement the jirga’s decisions (forum for settling grievances); (b) maintain local law and order and; (c) protect and defend the borders and boundaries of the tribe or community. The Arbakai are fed, housed, and paid by the local community in this non-governmental entity. By doing this, the community and the Arbakai function together and act independently from any state authority. In addition, although it is a non-government run system, Arbakai are highly structured around tribal ties and local customs. An ameer (commander), for instance, is in charge of the overall system and membership is drawn from the ranks of the mirah - men living according to pashtunwali - who “exist in every extended family, community, sub-tribe and tribe.”[9] Because of the tribal dynamics that bond an Arbakai to the community, the decision-making processes are conducted within a tight knit group.

Militias, on the other hand, are not bound to the same responsibilities of an Arbakai. They are free to act on their own interests and communities do not control their behaviors as they do with an Arbakai. Various warlords and even Afghanistan’s communist regime of the 1980’s have mobilized militias to perform various security tasks. Once completed, they are supposed to be disbanded. However, according to Antonio Giustozzi, the disintegrated militia of Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, sought new financial ventures and created a “mafia-like” organization in the North.[10]

Both militias and Arbakais are small units and share the same role of providing security for a community or local interest, but there compositions and capabilities vary considerably. Arbakais are a “…community policing system grounded in volunteer grassroots initiatives.”[11] They are, as mentioned above, fed and paid by the local community. Militias, on the other hand, receive a stipend for their services. Lastly, unlike militias, locals believe that it is an honor to be a member of an Arbakai.[12]  Mohammad Osman Tariq, of the Crisis States Research Centre, outlines the important distinctions between the two:

If the Arbakai are put in a situation where the whole population does not trust them, they will be seen as militias rather than Arbakai…The Arbakai system needs to be separated from the political and economic objectives of influential individuals and government authorities. It must be controlled by a representative group that will make collective decision based on equal and inclusive participation.[13]

The local groups created today seem to be based on the Arbakai system; a system that the government hopes will bridge the gap between local fighting forces and the government. However, the Arbakai system has been successful in the past specifically because it operated within a vacuum created by the absence of a formal government. Attempts to inject a role for the government into a system that relied on its absence could have unintended consequences.

I understand the desire to bridge the community with a government representative. I just don’t know what the long-term consequences could be when arming locals who have “reintegrated” back into society with aspects of an Arbakai system that, historically, has been highly functional because there was no government interference.