Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History - Michael Gordon, New York Times
... The story of the American occupation of Iraq has been the subject of numerous books, studies and memoirs. But now the Army has waded into the highly charged debate with its own nearly 700-page account: "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign."
The unclassified study, the second volume in a continuing history of the Iraq conflict, is as noteworthy for who prepared it as for what it says. In essence, the study is an attempt by the Army to tell the story of one of the most contentious periods in its history to military experts - and to itself.
It adds to a growing body of literature about the problems the United States encountered in Iraq, not all of which has been embraced by Army leaders.
Lt. Col. Paul Yingling of the Army ignited a debate when he wrote a magazine article that criticized American generals for failing to prepare a coherent plan to stabilize postwar Iraq.
In 2005, the RAND Corporation submitted a report to the Army, called "Rebuilding Iraq," that identified problems with virtually every government agency that played a role in planning the postwar phase. After a long delay, the report is scheduled to be made public on Monday.
But the "On Point" report carries the imprimatur of the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The study is based on 200 interviews conducted by military historians and includes long quotations from active or recently retired officers...
Army's History of After Hussein Faults Pentagon - Josh White, Washington Post
A new Army history of the service's performance in Iraq immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein faults military and civilian leaders for their planning for the war's aftermath, and it suggests that the Pentagon's current way of using troops is breaking the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
The study, "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign," is an unclassified and unhindered look at US Army operations in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2005. That critical era of the war has drawn widespread criticism because of a failure to anticipate the rise of an Iraqi insurgency and because policymakers provided too few US troops and no strategy to maintain order after Iraq's decades-old regime was overthrown.
Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, who authored the report along with the Army's Contemporary Operations Study Team, conclude that US commanders and civilian leaders were too focused on only the military victory and lacked a realistic vision of what Iraq would look like following that triumph...
Download On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign
Order On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign
Update 2
News
US Army's Own Report Faults Poor Planning, Lack of Vision - Voice of America
Public Military History Criticizes Pentagon - FOX News
US History Blames Commander and Lack of Plan - The Australian
Blogs
Reflections on "On Point II" - CAC Blog
Generalship and Iraq - HG's World
Preliminary Thoughts - The Captain's Journal
Update 3
After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell, Rand Report 30 June 2008.
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
Update 4
On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign - US Army Information Brief
On Point Bloggers Roundtable - Department of Defense
Army's Official Iraq War Report Cites Poor Planning - National Public Radio
Prewar Planning and Occupation of Iraq - The Captain's Journal
Comments
Indeed "On Point II" is critical of higher level policies and strategies from 2003-2005 in Iraq.
But after just finishing its Chapter 3 on the rise of the Insurgency in Iraq it acknowledges that pretty much across the board at the tactical level army units learned and adapted very quickly to the challenges presented to them by the Iraq insurgency. According to "On Point II:"
"Without relying on doctrine or experience, US Army units transitioned to a practice of full-spectrum operations that, by the end of 2003, followed many well established principles of counterinsurgency."