ISIS: The Inside Story

This response below was a response of mine to the question thread concerning COIN--a failure?

What surprises me most about this article is the simple fact that was all known to the US IC and MNF-I TF134 as early as 2006 and still it did not interest them.

They were so focused on kill/capture of AQI they could literally not see the trees from the trees and it cost us dearly plus it covered up the fact that we were in guerrilla war and that COIN as practiced by the US Army would have never worked.

You will notice the comment in the article that many had joined simply because they had been invaded by an outside power (ie nationalism as a valid reason to fight)--many gave that exact same reason to me over and over but we could not get the IC to recognize it.

The last paragraph of the article is the most telling as it foresees even current US policy as producing nothing again but failure because we simply do not "understand" what we are "seeing" which was the same mistake from 200-2010--seems w never learn.

If our national civilian leadership was smart they would be building a specific strategy just on that last paragraph.

RantCorp---would agree that your five points did in fact apply to say the 1920 folks---but a majority of Ansar al Sunnah and much of the Salafist side of Islamic Army in Iraq were into not the five points you mention as the individual Emirs tended to hold a religious sway over their individual cells.

There were others that made it into the system via JSOC and or selected BCT targeting where your five reasons for fighting were not their core reasons.

All I heard from well over 1000 detainees were the constant words, torture, Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, Americans beat/mishandle Iraqi's and on and on---the Abu Ghraib scandal and Gitmo hurt us badly and still does in Iraq.

What many Americans tend to not know---theses same accusations could be heard coming from the various Sunni tribal leaders and again many Americans tend to think insurgents are somehow not part and parcel of a general Sunni society which they are especially in Iraq where their tribal affiliations are still solid which we can see in their ongoing support to IS.

You almost had to cut through the "perception" chatter in order to get into a conversation and if they were treated with respect and you built a good rapport you would often hear the words---"did not know Americans could be friendly--not what we expected for treatment"---but not many in the TF 134 system displayed the ability to build rapport---remember 2005-2007 was marked by heavy fighting and IED usage-with the Shia side starting to kick in with their EFPs- countered by an equally heavy "let's pay back for 9/11 attitude".

We were in fact in a deep phase two guerrilla war and never really saw it and in a guerrilla environment COIN will never work.

Would even venture the comment that what sufficed as COIN --meaning whose ever definition was used was doomed to fail and did fail due to the Abu Ghraib scandal and everything around Gitmo.

In any UW environment the concept of "perception" plays a massive role among the population and you know as well just how rumors are part and parcel of UW especially in Iraq and in the ME in general.

Well worth the read.

"If there was no American prison in Iraq, there would be no [Islamic State] now. ... It made us all."

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story …

Background to Camp Bucca---in mid 2006, I had to literally shake the national IC tree in order to get their attention meaning I had strong reporting on the ongoing AQI/IAI insurgent hands on training that was occurring within the Abu Ghraib prison camp and we had absolutely no collection requirements for their ongoing activities ---when I first started writing reports on their insurgent training activities I had to fight to get the reports into the system--after several hit Washington then suddenly everyone realized we had a "Insurgent University" in the middle of Abu Ghraib being supported by the US Army.

Then in typical Army fashion it was decided to simply ship anyone identified as part of the "Insurgent University" to Camp Bucca and there is where this article then picks up on the continuing insurgent education where we the US Army provided shelter, air conditioning, great health care, three great meals, soccer, and flat screen TVs towards the "university's" efforts.

And yet some still continue to "claim COIN was successful"?

The last portion of the article is telling and goes to the heart of why current US policy towards IS will not work.

“It’s not that I don’t believe in Jihad,” he said. “I do,” he continued, his voice trailing away. “But what options do I have? If I leave, I am dead.”

The arc of his involvement with what is now the world’s most menacing terrorist group mirrors many others who now hold senior positions in the group: first a battle against an invading army, then a score to be settled with an ancient sectarian foe, and now, a war that could be acting out an end of days prophecy.

In the world of the Bucca alumni, there is little room for revisionism, or reflection. Abu Ahmed seems to feel himself swept along by events that are now far bigger than him, or anyone else.

“There are others who are not ideologues,” he said, referring to senior Isis members close to Baghdadi. “People who started out in Bucca, like me. And then it got bigger than any of us. This can’t be stopped now. This is out of the control of any man. Not Baghdadi, or anyone else in his circle.”