Transcript: Charlie Rose Interview with David Kilcullen - International Herald Tribune
Comments
Interesting points about the seductiveness of doctrine. I think anytime we attempt to codify a "how", we are constrained by the means available to articulate it. Its a balancing act between maintaining the conceptual integrity of complex ideas that reflect military art, and providing the benefit of those complex ideas to the broader population. This translation often turns "art" into "science", and leads practitioners to look for prescriptive solutions and lists, while overlooking the descriptive idea that allows for flexibility given the conditions. This is one of those Clausewitz vs. Jomini things for me.
Looking back over the transcripts, Im not sure Kilcullen did not try and make that point, but just like its difficult to package in an FM, it does not lend itself to an interview either - just as I wish there would have been time to discuss more about the role of airpower in small wars and counter insurgency, the scope of the interview could not accommodate it.
I think the point about binary relationships is useful - it makes me think about a number of things. Man lives on land, so wars fought on land will involve civilians and they will enter into relationship. War is also waged for a political purpose - so that relationship is still present even when the field of battle might be more remote or isolated from a civilian population. Go back as far as you can, but I think youll find it a constant at some point within the broader conflict - its one of the reasons I think Thucydides so useful, because the Peloponnesian war runs the gamut over a long period of time - so long it alters cultural norms. The American Revolution, or American Insurrection if you are more Anglo inclined, also runs the gamut. Look at the civil violence between those loyal to the King and those opposed. Look at the rift between Franklin and his son. Lots of angles in the American Revolution to consider.
I got to thinking about the previous doctrine -how often the diagrams depicting formations, battle drills, and higher echelon tasks and types of operations were often laid out pool table style to provide focus in illustrating the idea - however, it could lead you to believe there was only a binary relationship to consider. Even our CTCs until only a few years ago did not really replicate much more then a binary relationships - there were few resources to do more. Even the combat towns were built in ways that did not really represent people living there often with covered and concealed routes leading up to them - towns plopped down in the middle of a forest vs. having the natural clearing for agriculture that develops and spreads outward as populations grow, or the other attractions that normally lead to settlements - the MUCT site at FT Knox is a great example. These types of things encouraged our viewing military operations as binary relationships. When the CTCs introduced media teams, etc. we were dumbfounded and annoyed - why couldnt these guys just get out of our way and let us concentrate on killing the enemy so we can save the town - no matter that wed blown it up.
I think to some degree Kilcullen was right - about distinguishing the two (binary and not binary) - before post Thunder-Run we lived under a fiction of a binary relationship in our operations and our doctrine - we preferred it that way. TEWTs to population centers made guys real nervous - all that civilian traffic and infrastructure to get in the way of fields of fire and maneuver - the idea of NFAs and RFAs dont sit well with us - they get in the way. However, weve come face to face with the other then binary and we are learning to deal with it.
It is my opinion that the COIN doctrine is no more seductive then any other doctrine - its just another set of pliers, or what have you in the box. Kilcullen is a guy who makes me think and makes me consider things from a different angle - I dont always agree with him, nor have I fond anybody I completely agree with - alive or dead - I expect thats true for most of us.
Best Regards, Rob
What follows is a critique of Kilkullen and not a gush. My critique is blunt. I do not attack him personally but the words he either said or didnt say in the interview.
I use the transcript of the Charlie Rose interview with Kilkullen as my source document. I center my critique on three areas; Kilkullens stated conception of conventional war; his stated conception of what counterinsurgency war is; and one key element of the war in Iraq that he appears to have forgotten to mention in the interview.
Kilkullen characterizes conventional war as "binary." This is a hyper-simplistic characterization of conventional war. In the narrowest sense by focusing on a very specific set of tactical circumstances can one even think to call conventional war "binary." For example, one could argue that at the Battle of Cowpens there was a binary element of attack by the British general Tarleton against Morgans militia and continentals. In this battle there was an attack, a defense, and a series of counterattacks. So OK in this very limited sense it was binary. But move beyond the level of the simple tactics of engagement and view the conventional aspect of the American Revolutionary War for the British and Americans and it becomes anything but binary. It was non-linear and complex to say the least.
Yet characterizing conventional war as "binary" is the trick that the coin experts play on the unsuspecting. The trick is that you reduce conventional war down to a level where it is perceived to be easy and simple to carry out. Then you counter this false characterization of conventional war with a conception of counterinsurgency war as being complex and multi faceted. But the Coin expert seduces the unsuspecting by then bringing them into the fold of understanding. The Coin experts point out the complexity of counterinsurgency relative to the purported simplicity of conventional war then they offer an answer to the complexity of coin: that the coin experts have figured out how to do it, can explain it, and can master it, which then makes the unsuspecting feel like they now understand and are a part of the solution. The Charlie Rose interview is a perfect example of this process.
Kilkullen in the interview continues his characterization of conventional war as "enemy centric." In this I agree with him. Conventional war is enemy-centric. How could it not be? If it were not enemy-centric then it would not be war since wars most basic element is fighting, as Clausewitz said. So without and enemy to fight you do not have war.
But then Kilkullen goes on to continue his contrast between conventional war and counterinsurgency war by characterizing counterinsurgency war as not enemy-centric but population centric. This is where I fundamentally disagree with Kilkullen and was essentially my point in my AFJ "Eating Soup with a Spoon" piece. Clearly, the vast majority of contributors and readers of this blog conceive of counterinsurgency through the same eyes as Kilkullen and his apparent intellectual mentor, David Galula: That the population is always and must be the center of gravity in counterinsurgency.
Specifically in Iraq I see the war there as a Civil War. So in my view of the war in Iraq you can not set aside the enemy or insurgent from the people as Kilkullen does because the people within this civil war make up the warring sides.
By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct Kilkullen removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns the war in Iraq into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus Kilkullen actually removes the element of friction from war too. Now in Iraq under Kilkullens conception a series of scientific processes can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Since the enemy is removed as the center element in war, the element of friction is gone too. This is why the current American Army Coin doctrine is so seductive. Because it creates the idea in the minds of the practitioner that if I just follow the processes that this doctrine lays out I can be successful in Coin. It also creates in the minds of policy makers that if we just listen to the Coin experts and force the knuckle-dragging conventional army into submission we can win any Coin fight that we choose to get involved in. Providing of course the American people will stay on board for 10-20 years.
Rob Thornton in a blog posting commenting on the Kilkullen interview wished that Kilkullen had mentioned the issue of jointness in Coin. I wished Kilkullen would have mentioned that at the date of the Charlie Rose interview with him close to 3,800 American soldiers and marines had died in Iraq and thousands and thousands had been seriously wounded.
A good interview. Charlie Rose posed some very good questions within a sufficiently broad context to discuss COIN theory and practice. For those unable to attend the seminar, but who downloaded the slides, the seminar was similar, but a little more structured (as could be expected in comparing a seminar with an interview).
One point I wish Dr. Kilcullen could have discussed a bit more would have been the Joint COIN environment. The interview brought up the issue of air power in a COIN environment and Dr. Kilcullen had some good observations about its role(s)and potential uses. Given we have a significant thread discussion on the SWC on this subject, as well as MG Dunlap's (USAF)articles and some other "Air Power" threads, it might interest SWC members to listen in. I think he's on to something, and perhaps this might be a good subject for a future blog or article.
Short of that maybe we can grab a transcript from the show and put those thoughts on the thread (this is where I'm hoping LawVol, Steve or Slap will volunteer).
Thanks for posting the link and bringing it to the attention of the SWC/SWJ community.
Best regards, Rob