Small Wars Journal

Hoist With His Own Petard

Thu, 07/21/2016 - 3:54pm

Hoist With His Own Petard

Matthew C. Payne and Joe M. Schotzko

To say the results of the recent Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) selection board were quite disappointing may well be an understatement for some.  A decline in selection rates was not unexpected given the reduction in battalions and brigades and the downsizing across the Army.  Most branches experienced a somewhat predictable drop off in selection rates.  No one, however, predicted that over half of all Field Artillerymen who were considered for selection to LTC in the primary zone would be passed over.    

According to Field Artillery Branch’s analysis of the promotion board, the Field Artillery promotion rate to Lieutenant Colonel was 10.3% from above the zone and 48.9% in the zone with zero officers selected from below the zone.  This is an alarming statistic that has Artillerymen across the army concerned.  When compared to Infantry percentages that were 17.1 % from above the zone, 78.8% in the zone and 8.3% from below the zone and Armor not far behind with 12.5%, 69.4%, and 8.2 % respectively, the statistics are even more troubling.   What is most disheartening is one of the trends that lies beneath the promotion board data. 

The Army wants Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commanders and Division Chiefs of Fires who can synchronize in time and space multiple indirect and direct fire assets.  There is a requirement for Artillerymen who understand the science of forward observation and technical fire direction as well as the art involved in crafting a scheme of fires that employs assets and provides effects in support of a scheme of maneuver.  Did the FY2016 LTC Selection board get it wrong?    

Analysis of the recent board results indicated that most Field Artillery Majors who served as Fire Support Officers (FSO) in Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) were not selected for promotion to LTC.  Only 31% of the officers selected in the primary zone by the FY2016 LTC board previously served as a Fire Support Officer at the BCT level.  Further analysis would seem to indicate that the reason for this was that 77% of the BCT FSOs received “center of mass” block checks on their officer evaluation reports.  On over three dozen Brigade Fire Support Officer evaluation reports reviewed by the board, fewer than five had an above center of mass block check.     

DA Pam 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management states, “Commanders should assign their best majors as brigade FSOs for the development of the officer and to provide the best support to our maneuver commanders”.  If senior Artillerymen are not assigning their best Majors to be Fire Support Officers they are doing their maneuver brothers a disservice and short changing their own profession.  By failing to afford the best and brightest of the Field Artillery Majors the key and developmental opportunity to serve as an FSO, they are depriving the BCT Soldiers and leaders of the technical and tactical expertise they need to fight and win in a complex and uncertain environment today.  The FSO coordinates and synchronizes much but owns nothing. This is an extremely difficult job that requires an officer who understands Fires and Maneuver, Lethal and Non-Lethal effects, the Operations Process and Targeting. 

FM 3-09 states the Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commanders in their role as BCT Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) are the Commander’s primary advisor for planning, coordinating, and integrating field artillery and fire support in the execution of assigned tasks.  Likewise, the FSCOORD is responsible for the oversight of training, certification, readiness and professional development of all Artillerymen across the fires support system of the formation.  No other job so uniquely provides the opportunities to cultivate these skills as BCT FSO position.  No other job is quite as likely to grow a high performing Field Artillery Battalion Commander.

On the other hand, if Artillerymen are in fact assigning some of their best and brightest to BCT FSO jobs, then there may be even greater concerns.  There is already speculation around the proverbial water cooler that Field Artillery officers serving in BCT FSO jobs, and being rated and senior rated by maneuver officers, are not being “taken care of.”  Terms like “cannon fodder”, “profile padding” and “profile builders” are thrown around.  Lending credence to this line of reasoning is the statistic that 68% of those officers who served their KD time in Field Artillery Brigades were selected for promotion to LTC, whereas only 47% of those completing KD time in a BCT were selected for promotion.  If this is the case, Maneuver Officers rating BCT FSOs need to understand that they are being afforded the opportunity to vote on their next Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commander.  Taking care of Infantry or Armor officers at the expense of Artillerymen effectively gives that vote away. 

With such low promotion numbers the battalion command board will be forced to select a majority of MAJs recently chosen for promotion for battalion command.  So, no matter where the problem lies, slating or rating, over the next few years we will have serving Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commanders who lack the key and developmental experience of being a BCT FSO.  Further exacerbating the problem is the perception that time spent serving as a BCT FSO places an officer “at risk” for promotion.  “It won’t help you, but it sure can hurt you.”  There will be a tendency for good officers to stay away from BCT FSO positions and mentors recommending alternative career paths.

Comments

Sorry to hear about this but thanks for sharing. Sometimes promotion rates by branch trend back the other way, if not then it's on to possible solutions, they're few and imperfect and it depends on how bad the problem gets before implementing some:

- Info campaign to mvr community. Lecture at their conferences about what you've written. It's still tough though, since it's human nature to take care of one's own, and as you've pointed out they're potentially doing just that. Plus we have to recognize high possibility that most or all of those mvr bn S3/XO top blocks given were actually deserved, and the mechanics of the OER system as is - well, you know. The message will at some point boil down to "you possibly messed over some Bde FSOs and in so doing you're not picking the next FA Bn Cdrs" but the vote belongs to the SR and they're also wanting to pick the next Mvr Bn Cdrs (even though that effort is right up against their peers who are doing the exact same thing). Still, the info campaign is worth doing and I recommend it first.

- Message to HRC. Again, tell them about what you've written. And again, still tough though. Can't tell boards how to vote. Can't tell boards that some COM OERs are superior to other ACOMs. Well, maybe a Bde FSO COM is superior to a Unit Librarian ACOM, but certainly not superior to a mvr (or any, for that matter) bn S3/XO ACOM. So, I don't think the board can be blamed harshly (we'd need more info to prove that anyway, e.g. if FA MAJs in great numbers are getting ACOM in Bn S3/XO time and also getting COM in Bde FSO time and all other file things look fine and then in significant numbers non-selected for LTC then obviously we can point to a systemic problem).

- Consider this: how bad does it have to get before you make the Bde FSO a CPT position (and of course get some other force structure in return)? Then if they get COM they can easily survive it to MAJ on the strength of their battery command OER.

- Consider this: how bad does it have to get before you tell the mvr community to provide their own Bde BSO? Folks can figure out how to do the work of other branches (starting from day 1 on the job all these FA officers have to do the work of other branches: BMO, S-1, S-2, S-4). (If it got to the point that any MAJ who had a Bde FSO COM OER was a non-select for LTC then this would seem a good option.)