It may be time to figure out what the MOOSEMUSS acronym would turn into with the addition of a “C” for cooperation. The big lesson the International Community should draw from the last ten years in Afghanistan is that cooperation must be a key principle of war if they hope to achieve peace. The author argues that in addition to the traditional principles of war and the American Joint principles of war one more principle should be added. The lack of cooperation among the nations and organizations involved in Afghanistan has multiplied the difficulties found there; but in areas where cooperation has existed progress has been visible. Legitimacy and Unity of Effort are two of the most complicated aspects of modern war and to better achieve them all the actors on the battlefield must cooperate.
The Nine Traditional Principles of War
The nine traditional principles of war are sound. They were learned by trial and error over centuries and mastered by only a handful of great commanders. Knowledge of their meanings does not mean a leader will be successful in battle and choosing not to follow them likewise does not ensure defeat. Readers of this journal are surely familiar with them but for the sake of others here they are.
Maneuver ~ Objective ~ Offensive ~ Security ~ Economy of force ~ Mass ~ Unity of command ~ Surprise ~Simplicity
The observation that many Soldiers operating on the modern battlefield make is that there is something missing from this list. In order to be effective today, leaders at the strategic, operational and tactical level, must figure out how to get all the different actors on the battlefield to work together. That is where cooperation comes in. Before moving to cooperation two more lists of principles are examined. Once the military started to think in terms of Joint Operations the United States learned that the nine principles needed to be augmented
The Principles of Joint Operations
The US Military based on years of experience in irregular warfare added three additional principles that when combined with the traditional nine creates the Principles Joint Operations.[i] The three additions are:
Restraint ~ Perseverance ~ Legitimacy
To irregular war historians it is clear that without these three additions it is difficult to keep a force in the field. Many historians of general war would likely argue that legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance are the cornerstone of all military interventions if the goal is to see peace take hold among the population after the major battles have ended. Legitimacy is arguably the most critical principle on this list but is often the most neglected concept. It is certainly one of the most vulnerable areas for any force involved in modern war. Next we look at the final traditional principle of the U.S. Military.
Unity of Effort
All of the principles of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) are included in the Principles of Joint Operations except for Unity of Effort. This term points us towards the importance of cooperation in war zones where unity of command is not possible because of the diverse character of the actors present. The concept goes hand-in-hand with Unity of Command, which is focused on clearly conferring one commander the authority to get things done. The purpose of unity of command is to extract every bit of combat power out of a force so that it can be applied at the right place at the right time. In other words in order to achieve unity of effort, coordination, and synchronization one single commander needs to be in charge.[ii]
Unity of Effort
According to Joint Publication 3-07 (MOOTW), “Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose.”[iii] So, while military units achieve unity of effort through unity of command, to get the myriad of non-military actors involved in modern war to work together something else is needed. This article calls for the achievement of unity of effort by applying the principle of cooperation.
Cooperation
The author is not alone in calling for something beyond Unity of Command. The new U.S. Army doctrine emphasizes the need for integration, coordination, and synchronization of elements inside and outside the military chain of command in order to achieve its desired effects.[iv] This emphasis recognizes that the U.S. Army not only needs the other U.S. military services to win wars but also the cooperation of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. This concept of getting all the rowers to pull on the oar at once is called unified action.[v]
Cooperation
Why is cooperation the right concept to achieve unity of effort and unified action? Whereas coordination, integration and synchronization imply that a leader has the authority to organize and harmonize the organizations in his area of operations cooperation denotes that no such authority exists. Cooperation is synonymous with working together, coming to an agreement, and/or give and take.[vi] These latter three terms more aptly describe what is needed to accomplish missions on today’s battlefield. Cooperation augments unity of command and creates the legitimacy needed to underwrite a mission. The final section of this article describes a case where a mission was accomplished by applying the principle of cooperation in Afghanistan.
Cooperation success in Kabul
In order to assist the Afghan government in achieving its desire to begin the Reintegration of low-level anti-Afghan Government fighters and Reconciliation with Insurgent Leaders the ISAF forces under General McChrystal developed an organization to enhance cooperation of the numerous stakeholders involved with the concept. Under the leadership of Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb a diverse team of people from a variety of military and civilian organizations cooperated to transform the concept of reintegration and reconciliation from a vague idea into international policy in less than one year. This organization was known as the Force-Reintegration Cell or F-RIC.
The keys to success were creating a shared understanding among the stakeholders involved in the process, providing them with a clear purpose, and developing the appropriate incentives to get them to cooperate. Some of the stakeholders in this enterprise included military personnel, Afghan leaders, lawmakers, presidents and prime ministers, diplomats, intelligence officers, non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, the media, universities, regional and international organizations, government aid organizations, neighboring and regionally concerned nations, and the myriad of anti-Afghan Government fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The first step towards cooperation was to correctly identify who all the stakeholders were inside and outside the military and government. To achieve the necessary cooperation among this diverse group required that the people assigned or volunteering at the F-RIC be drawn from among of these stakeholders. Additionally the F-RIC spent a large amount of its time studying the problem and gaining an understanding of the motives of the stakeholders. Finally the F-RIC learned to give and take with each of the stakeholders until they reached a workable agreement. This is a very simplified version of events but serves to highlight the complexity of the tasks given to the military and the need for the concept of cooperation on today’s battlefield.
Conclusion
It is likely that the current principles of war will continue to influence leaders in combat. If the world learns the lessons of modern war it may add the principle of cooperation to this short list of valuable ideas. On the other hand militaries may fall back to the advice a seasoned Sergeant Major once gave to a future British Chief of the Imperial General Staff when he was just a cadet. According to the NCO who watched Cadet Slim furiously studying the principles of war:
“Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad, there’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts the most, when he ain’t lookin!”[vii]
But then again if you have ever tried this Sergeant-Major’s theory out with a village elder, a United Nations employee, a diplomat, or a human rights worker you probably found that it was not very successful. In summary cooperation can help leaders achieve unity of effort when unity of command is not an available option. Cooperation enhances legitimacy and helps to build a shared understanding of the problem and the achievable solutions. Finally cooperation is a principle that can be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
[i] Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Headquarters Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 11 August 2011. p 1-2.
[ii] Ibid. p GL-18
[iii] Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, Headquarters Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 16 June 1995. pp viii, II-1 to II-3.
[iv] Army Doctrine Publication Number 3-0, Unified Land Operations, (formerly FM 3-0) Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC, 22 September 2011. Page iv.
[v] Joint Publication 3-0, pp xi and 1-8 to 1-12.
[vi] Stein, Jess, Ed. The Random House Thesaurus, Random House, New York: 1984.
[vii] Slim, Field-Marshal Viscount William. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945. Cooper Square Press Edition, New York, 2000, Page 551. Field-Marshal Slim believed his success during WWII was based on adherence to the Sergeant-Major’s single principle of war.
Comments
If we're going to engage in coalition and whole of government and whole of society efforts, then cooperation is needed. On the other hand, what MAJ Howk is calling a principle is actually a course of action, a COA that we're going to do combined/joint. A principle of war should apply whether we're fighting unilaterally or as a member of a coalition, and this one doesn't.
It also falsely implies that we have to cooperate to achieve our military objectives. We don't, and too many times for unsound reasons we're too quick to form multinational coalitions which often severely degrade our ability to follow the other principles of war. The illusion of international legitimacy is apparently more important than winning at the operational and tactical level.
If you look at the four strategic lines of effort diplomacy, information, military and economic (or even expanded to DIMEFIL), we probably need a war czar like entity in some cases to synch the efforts, and I suspect the best individual to do that doesn't wear a uniform. That would allow the military to actually focus on its core capability of securing area and conducting offensive operations (its core mission), and of course due to its manpower it would play a supporting role to the other strategic LOEs, but not get distracted to the point they lose sight of their core combat role.
The old grumpy Sergeant Major was right, and I suspect some day in hindsight the officers who don't get it will after they have time to reflect on the effectiveness (or lack there of) of recent coalition operations.
Hmmm......I'm having a hard time articulating my immediate objection to this recommendation. Perhaps a quick review of the principles' purposes and their corollaries might illustrate.
Maneuver - retain the ability define the place of engagement : corollary - denies the enemy the ability to choose the place of engagement
Objective - have an achievable and clear objective : corollary - permits mass and economy of force while ensuring unity of effort
Offensive - gain and maintain momentum over the enemy : corollary - denies the enemy the ability to plan; forces the enemy to react
Security - maintain awareness of threats and plan for their mitigation : corollary - denies the enemy the ability to surprise
Economy of Force - employ forces judiciously to preserve combat power and extend operational life of the effort : corollary - deny the enemy the ability to decisively: engage, attrit, and fix friendly forces
Mass - concentrate combat power/resources at the time/place of greatest effects : corollary - overwhelm the target environment to force enemy attrition, loss of C2, and supply disruption
Unity of Command - concentrate authority in a single command element to ensure unity of effort : corollary - shorten the response to commands and developments; minimize communication channels
Surprise - ensure plans and activities are not detectible/deducible by the enemy to prevent enemy preparations and to maximize effects : corollary - deny the enemy the ability to maneuver, mass, and secure his forces
Simplicity - ensure plans are clear, with fewest variables to minimize confusion and ensure understanding of objectives : corollary - maximize efficiency by ensuring clarity
These principles (i.e. foundational considerations) of military operations are just that, principles. They are applicable everywhere and at all times. I don't say that flippantly. They are doctrinal foundations that require they be referenced and applied at all times as a matter of professional excellence. While even foundational elements are subject to revision and evolution, that process must be conservative and careful (think US Constitutional amendments) to maintain the integrity of the principles as basic elements.
Along those lines, even the principles of Joint operations smack of careless politicized aggrandizement to show "enlightenment." Even if they are to be taken at face value, their universality in warfare is questionable. Restraint is a moral impulse that can be amended, e.g. for psychological effect. Perseverance is a meta-principle, much like "unity", it is always wanted, it is immutable, it is self-evident and it is like saying 'if you want to run 100 meters, you have to run for 100 meters'. Legitimacy, this one is perhaps the closest in value as a principle. After all, one may have the authority to act, but not have the proper "OK's" checked; we don't operate in vacuums. But even it, as defined in JP 3-0, is self-evident. It is a condition that must exist before war is undertaken. Is it a principle to guide planning in the prosecution of war? Perhaps, but as defined it does not inform the commander or the strategist. If it is a matter of defining when an action can be taken or not, based on the "stakeholders", then the principle that follows should be defined clearly and basically, e.g. "Legitimacy - Ensure all strategic and tactical decisions conform to established laws and authorities; purpose - to ensure minimal disruption in support to plans and efforts; corrolary - minimize the impact of challenges on law and authority". Instead, we have a definition that waxes on morality and rightness.
I challenge the proposal for cooperation to be included on these grounds. What, about cooperation, makes it a basic professional requirement that cannot be subverted by any other principle? While I agree that cooperation can and often is a critical piece in the solution to many problems, I can easily disregard it to ensure Surprise, or Maneuver, or Unity of Command. So, it is not basic, it is not foundational, nor is it always beneficial. I would extend the argument to say that it can be subordinated under Unity of Command. It is critical in the case of the US methods for war because we flood the theater with agencies and organizations that we do not, as matter of practice, subordinate to a unified command. There is no necessity or principle that says that US Departments and Agencies (US D/A's) can't be subordinated to or managed by the ground commanders in a combat theater. We do it in other spheres. For example, US Ambassadors have immense authority over almost all US D/A's in a given country. In many (I would say most) it is a choice that forces the consequence of needed cooperation, not a basic feature of warfare.
My dos pesos