The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War

Thanks for the article, but there really wasn't anything radical presented here. Also, Torie's historical references are incomplete in my view. She completely forgot to mention the use of privateers during the Revolutionary War, and the use of numerous contractors during the expansion into the West during the 1800's. From the range detectives, contract lawmen, pony express riders, wells fargo, bounty hunters, armed cowboys, to the hundreds of civilian scouts used by the military and civilians, security contractors were pretty important at that time.

Not even a mention of the most famous contractor, William Cody, who happens to be one of the few civilian contractors to receive the Medal of Honor for combat actions as a civilian scout for the US Army.

I would have also liked to see a mention of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the US Constitution which grants congress the power "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" The Letter of Marque is proof positive that the US had a legal mechanism in which to control contractors or 'privateers' during times of war, and yet here we are floundering around trying to re-invent the wheel? lol Did I mention that we are not a signatory of the Declaration of Paris? Hell, even Ron Paul has tried to introduce the LoM twice for use in this war, and yet it gets no mention? John Nagl even mentioned Art 1, Sec 8, Para 11 in his 'inherently governmental' testimony to congress, yet no mention in this paper?
http://www.cnas.org/node/4689

The other historical reference that is missing here, is the one about PMC's that have actually won wars. The South African company called Executive Outcomes is the only modern day PMC that was contracted to win a war, and did so within budget. They actually accomplished that task, and that should be food for thought for anyone here that doubts the potential of PMC's for warfare. If anyone here would like to further analyze this concept, I highly recommend checking out Eeben Barlow's blog, who happens to be the CEO of this company. (Also, did I mention that the UN actually approached this company to stop the Rwandan genocide back in the nineties?)
http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/

Privateers are another example of private industry being successful at doing great damage upon an enemy during times of war. Because there was a legal mechanism in place to use privateers(letter of marque), and appropriate business rules (license and bonded), privateers were in fact very effective during the Revolutionary War. They ravaged the logistics and commerce of the British during that war, and the war goods and ships captured and won through prize courts infused wealth into the local war economy of the colonies. We didn't have much of a navy back then, but boy did we like our privateers.

George Washington was an investor and supporter of privateers (read George Washington's Secret Navy or Patriot Pirates) Thomas Jefferson was quoted as saying "Every possible encouragement should be given to privateering in time of war." Privateers even outnumbered the Continental Navy at the time.

So with that said, I absolutely agree with the main point of the article. That the government should be hiring more auditors to watch over these contracts. No argument there. My question here is who do we have to fire or reprimand for not getting this job done? Because hiring more auditors to watch over this stuff has been screamed for and written about in numerous studies, publications, books, and articles for a long time now. To make this happen requires leadership, and I have yet to see it. Hell, the federal fire services do a better job of managing the thousands of contractors they watch over for forest fire fighting duties, than the DoD does with their contractors for war duties. Doesn't anyone talk with each other in government? lol

I would also like to add that the government has a love affair with the contracting mechanism called 'lowest priced, technically acceptable'. This is a great contracting mechanism for finding a company to rake leaves at a federal building lawn. No one's life is really impacted if those leaves are not properly raked. I don't mind if the government uses the lowest priced company, with employees that are technically acceptable for this job.

What I do mind is applying this contracting mechanism to things like protecting lives in war zones. The TWISS contract in Iraq is one example of the outcome of LPTA. We have companies fielding the cheapest guards on earth, with all of the companies competing with each other for finding a cheaper source. We have Ugandans and Kenyans guarding facilities and bases right now, and I have heard of talk of Sierra Leone guards being looked at because they are 'cheaper'.

The companies are all racing to the bottom when it comes to winning and keeping this contract, and the quality of guards continues to decrease. Did I mention the strikes and all the criminal problems with these low paid guards? The vetting is virtually non-existent, both medically and background. Even the pay for the expats watching over these guards is rock bottom, thus causing a revolving door effect.(shift leaders take the job, only to get a foot in the door and jump contract for something better) Or worse yet, guys take the job because they couldn't get a job else where.(low qualifications, or past problems) You get what you pay for as they say.

I am also not alone with this disgust of LPTA. Congress just attached this law to the latest NDAA For Fiscal Year 2011. Too bad congress couldn't have made this a separate law, or attache it to something else, because it is a good one.

Finally, some statistics are in order. The latest death toll of contractors in this war is 2008. For this year alone, contractor deaths have surpassed military deaths in this war.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0910/092210kp1.htm

The numbers of contractors working in the war has also surpassed the military numbers as well. I estimate it at close to a quarter million, if you were to count the contractors of all the agencies and NGO's. Not to mention the thousands of contractors that have participated in the war at one time or another over the last nine years. That is about all I have, and hopefully this will add some more perspective to this 'misunderstood private dynamic of modern war'.

If anyone has questions, feel free to reach me at my blog called Feral Jundi. (www.feraljundi.com) I am a security contractor, and I blog about security contracting in this war.
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H.R.5136 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Reported in House - RH)

SEC. 323. PILOT PROGRAM ON BEST VALUE FOR CONTRACTS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY FUNCTIONS.

(a) Pilot Program Authorized- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a pilot program under which the Secretary shall implement a best value procurement standard in entering into contracts for the provision of private security functions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In entering into a covered contract under the pilot program, in addition to taking into consideration the cost of the contract, the Secretary shall take into consideration each of the following:

(1) Past performance.

(2) Quality.

(3) Delivery.

(4) Management expertise.

(5) Technical approach.

(6) Experience of key personnel.

(7) Management structure.

(8) Risk.

(9) Such other matters as the Secretary determines are appropriate.

(b) Justification- A covered contract under the pilot program may not be awarded unless the contracting officer for the contract justifies in writing the reason for the award of the contract.

(c) Annual Report- Not later than January 15 of each year the pilot program under this section is carried out, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an unclassified report containing each of the following:

(1) A list of any covered contract awarded for private security functions in Afghanistan and Iraq under the pilot program.

(2) A description of the matters that the Secretary of Defense took into consideration, in addition to cost, in awarding each such contract.

(3) Any additional information or recommendations the Secretary considers appropriate to include with respect to the pilot program, the contracts awarded under the pilot program, or the considerations for evaluating such contracts.

(d) Termination of Program- The authority of the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program under this section terminates on September 30, 2013. The termination of the authority shall not affect the validity of contracts that are awarded or modified during the period of the pilot program, without regard to whether the contracts are performed during the period.

(e) Discretionary Implementation After September 30, 2013- After September 30, 2013, implementation of a best value procurement standard in entering into contracts for the provision of private security functions in Afghanistan and Iraq shall be at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) Definitions- In this section:

(1) The term `best value' means providing the best overall benefit to the Government in accordance with the tradeoff process described in section 15.101-1 of title
48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

(2) The term `covered contract' means--

(A) a contract of the Department of Defense for the performance of services; or

(B) a task order or delivery order issued under such a contract.

(3) The term `private security functions' means guarding, by a contractor under a covered contract, of personnel, facilities, or property of a Federal agency, the contractor, a subcontractor of a contractor, or a third party.

SEC. 324. STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION FOR PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS.

(a) Third-party Certification Policy Guidance- Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue policy guidance requiring, as a condition for award of a covered contract for the provision of private security functions, that each contractor receive certification from a third party that the contractor adheres to specified operational and business practice standards. The guidance
shall--

(1) establish criteria for defining standard practices for the performance of private security functions, which shall reflect input from industry representatives as well as the Inspector General of the Department of Defense;

(2) establish criteria for weapons training programs for contractors performing private security functions, including minimum requirements for weapons training programs of instruction and minimum qualifications for instructors for such programs; and

(3) identify organizations that can carry out the certifications.

(b) Regulations Required- Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall revise the Department of Defense supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to carry out the requirements of this section and the guidance issued under this section.

(c) Definitions- In this section:

(1) The term `covered contract' means--

(A) a contract of the Department of Defense for the performance of services;

(B) a subcontract at any tier under such contract;

(C) a task order or delivery order issued under such a contract or subcontract.

(2) The term `contractor' means, with respect to a covered contract, the contractor or subcontractor carrying out the covered contract.

(3) The term `private security functions' means activities engaged in by a contractor under a covered contract as follows:

(A) Guarding of personnel, facilities, or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a third party.

(B) Any other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in the performance of their duties.

(d) Exception- The requirements of this section shall not apply to contracts entered into by elements of the intelligence community in support of intelligence activities.