Small Wars Journal

The Way Out of Afghanistan

Tue, 01/04/2011 - 5:50am
The Way Out of Afghanistan by Ahmed Rashid, The New York Review of Books opinion. "Here is a possible step-by-step approach, involving all the players, that is intended to build trust and confidence in the region so that ultimately negotiations with the Taliban can take place."

Comments

davidbfpo

Tue, 01/04/2011 - 4:06pm

Ahmed Rashid writes well, uncomfortable reading for all those who believe they are creating policy and implementing policy. Note, I refrain from using the adjective War. Yes, his proposals are from an accomplished, respected journalist; at least they are clear - unlike much of what we in the West are told. All that is needed now is a good dose of magic, alas that is what is required to get such a wide agreement.

Well written certainly, but with some disturbing gaps.

First, early in the article Rashid discusses the non-Pashtun population and their adamant resistance to negotiation with the Taliban. When it comes to the 10-step program this major problem is glossed over, mentioned in passing in point number 10 with the proposal that "The Afghan government works to build a national consensus inside the country among all ethnic groups, civil society, and the tribes before entering into formal negotiations with the Taliban". How this is to be achieved, given the sentiments of the non-Pashtuns, is not discussed.

Second, the critical issue of Taliban relations with AQ is treated very peripherally, with a reference to the Taliban "publicly dissociating themselves from al-Qaeda". "Dissociating" seems rather flexible, and its not clear whether this would mean the Taliban stating that they no longer like AQ, or more concrete steps, such as handing over bin Laden and key associates. This is a key issue - the key issue from the US perspective - and a major possible obstacle.

Third, it's all very well to talk about "the most sensible among the Taliban", but will the most sensible speak for the organization and its various factions? Have they sufficient influence to make a deal and keep it?

Fourth, a great deal is made of the opinion of former Taliban officials who are (naturally) very willing to negotiate if they can be set up in comfortable circumstances in some other country. I've no doubt that in such circumstances they'd be perfectly willing to negotiate forever... but for who would they speak?

Fifth, we have to accept that at this point anything that freezes the status quo works for the Taliban. NATO has already set a date for withdrawal. The US has to spend enormous sums to sustain its troop presence, and is anticipating a drawdown. Karzai can be counted on to misuse any time he's given. Why would the Taliban not want to start a negotiation, draw it out for a few years, declare if failed (easy to manage) and resume the fight with our resources and patience further depleted?

Could go on, but enough for now. Sounds wonderful overall, but the devil's in the details, and there's no shortage of them.

carl (not verified)

Wed, 01/05/2011 - 2:27pm

Mr. Rashid's article was very good and I found two statements to be of great import.

The first is "Iran has joined with India and Russia to ensure that Pakistan is unsuccessful in dominating Afghanistan."

The Pak Army/ISI is determined that they will dominate Afghanistan. Iran, Russia and India are determined that they will not. There doesn't seem much room for compromise here. Unless somebody changes their mind, this seems a situation whereby each side will fight to the last Afghan to win. The most effective thing may be to actually seriously try to see that the Pak Army/ISI "changes its assumptions that it must dominate Afghanistan." We haven't seriously tried to do that and it might work...or not.

The second statement of import Mr. Rashid made is this regarding the Taliban, "Their main concern right now seems to be how to break free from Pakistan, something the US can help them do only when it is ready to support peace talks."

That is something that can be worked with and dovetails with the first statement. This may only be able to be done if they can gotten out of the physical reach of the ISI as Mr. Rashid suggests, though with the risks mentioned by Dayuhan.

The key to all this is, as it has been, in Pakistan; and in Pakistan it is in that part of the Pak Army/ISI that wants to keep running the same course they have been running. If they can't be persuaded to change things will get worse and worse, first for the Afghans, then everybody else. Ultimately that course will destroy Pakistan.