by Bill Van Horn, Small Wars Journal
The So-Called COIN Debate and Institutional Memory (Full PDF Article)
I've been following with some interest the debate between the "Nagl-ites" and the "Gentile-ites" (for lack of better terms) regarding the supposed future of the Army. Both sides make some good points and some weak points, but what really strikes me is the historical vacuum both sides have established for their discussion. Neither camp seems —to admit that there IS military history before Vietnam, or that we've seen this debate many times before. And in almost every case the debate ignores the reality that created it, preferring to seek refuge in what appears to be a distorted view of the past or a dream picture of the future.
I'd like to frame this discussion with two propositions. The first is that for the majority of its history, the U.S. Army has been a force that was used mainly for internal security or COIN-type missions. And the second proposition is that for the same majority of its history the Army has rejected that role; the amount of force in that rejection varying based on external considerations.
The So-Called COIN Debate and Institutional Memory (Full PDF Article)
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Comments
@Schmedlap,
To your point about the Army's performance and lack of casualties in Desert Storm and the Iraqi invasion, you failed to mention that air assets effectively neutered Saddam's ground forces before any significant ground contact was initiated.
There is no such thing as a "100 hour war" in Desert Storm; nearly 3 weeks of constant bombing prior and overwhelming air support during decisively contributed to the 100 hour land portion.
In OIF, most conservative estimates place Iraqi armor units at only 10-30 percent combat effective by the time our ground forces made contact. "Shock and Awe" that was derided by most was merely what the cameras saw. The real work was being hammered home on the armor formations outside of Bagdhad.
Bottom line is we are a joint force that has no match in the world when applied effectively. It's time to apply lessons correctly, as this paper points out, and try to find a balance that will keep us well ahead of any competitors.
And to a similar extent that's what the Army saw when they engaged Mexico in the 1840s...an army that was stout on paper but lacked certain other qualities. Losses there were low (comparatively speaking, at least, for the US in terms of battle casualties), and I would say that the Mexican experience contributed in at least a small way to the many misconceptions that both sides carried into the Civil War. Major conflict is costly if you're facing a competent opponent.
Agree with the author. And I would also add another bit of historical perspective.
If our idea of training for a "conventional" war means being able to conduct BDE and DIV sized combined arms operations with as few casualties as in Desert Storm, even when fighting against formidable opponents, then we will never be proficient enough and any additional operational requirements will be viewed as a distraction from this goal.
And here is where the historical perspective comes in. Desert Storm, Just Cause, and the invasion of Iraq are historical anomalies in terms of friendly casualties. Two of those anomalies were against the same hapless enemy, and the other was against a hopelessly over-matched enemy in a country where we already had a ground presence before the battle kicked off. We were spoiled over the past two decades. Our expectations are too high for an undertaking as violent and unpredictable as war.
If we were to fight a conventional war against a formidable opponents and to lose 100 men in a one-day, BDE-sized, offensive operation, that would not be an indication of poor training or a dulling of our conventional warfighting capability. It would be an indication that we are fighting a war.
The author is dead on about this debate being a part of the Army for a long time and I would also submit this debate precedes even the Civil War and Army operations in the West post Civil War. The Army was heavily engaged in the 2nd Seminole War (1835-42) and the senior leadership of the Army (most of whom had earned their spurs against the British in the War of 1812) was getting concerned the skills required to fight a big European conventional foe were eroding as a result of the irregular small unit fight being conducted in Florida. So in the summer of 1839 a 'camp of instruction named Camp Washington was set up in Trenton New Jersey for the purpose of retraining units in large scale maneuvers. Some units were even pulled from the combat zone in Florida to participate, and then sent right back after the camp was over.
But yet this same Army that ended the war in 1842 fighting an irregular foe was able to pull it together 4 years later for the Mexican War and defeat the Mexican Army in straight up conventional battle. Then at the end of that war that same Army found itself scattered across multiple forts in company sized units garrisoning the newly acquired territory and again engaging in irregular operations.
Interestingly enough when the question came up on how to garrison the new frontier there were two schools of thought. 1) Large forts with concentrations of units that would periodically ride out in long patrols to overawe the Natives Americans or 2) Scatter the troops in small units across multiple forts to provide constant presence. As we now know the second argument won out because it was felt that in option 1 once the patrols left the area and the Natives Americans wanted to get restless and hit some wagon trains or farms there was no local Army unit there to prevent the attack or respond. Funny how this precedes the current 'Big-FOB v JSS discussion by about a 150 years. I guess the past is present.
Very thoughtful and accurate essay. As one who lived in and with the Army from Korea until today, the author is quite accurate in his assessments. Charitable but accurate. Very charitable, even.
He is correct in stating we need to be capable of entering a major war and yet must also not forget lessons learned the hard way in the last few years. Relearned, actually. We learned them all before and just neglected them. Hopefully we will not again make such a mistake.
The fact is that Elihu Root's small Army mobilized for World War I, learned some lessons, incorporated them and now, almost one hundred years later, has not let go many of those ideas that were an answer -- not necessarily the best answer even then -- to <i>some</i> problems. Those lessons stood us generally in good stead for World War II -- where, unfortunately, we also learned some more bad lessons that have not been totally beneficial over the last 60 years.
The lessons of World War II were generally in my observation not helpful in Korea or in Viet Nam. They have apparently been far from helpful in this war
If we do not radically revise our recruiting, accession, entry training, professional military education and personnel processes we will yet again fail the nation. Anyway you cut it, that's what we did initially this time around. The Army fixed it and deserves an Attaboy for that -- but we erred badly early on, largely as a result of flawed policies.
We may not be so lucky as to have a slightly more incompetent opponent next time...