A Threat to ISAF COIN Implementation
by James Sisco
Download The Full Article: Karzai's Governing Strategy
Karzai's initial governing strategy, focused at centralizing power within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), has failed. He perceives that US and international com-munity support for his regime is eroding. Therefore, Karzai is systematically build-ing a coalition of regional powerbrokers in preparation for a post-American Afghanistan. By strategically reshuffling provincial, district, and ministerial positions, Karzai is gradually reproducing the powerbrokers' political and economic patronage structures he tried for seven years to displace with his own. He is doing so to create the political space required to maintain his family's influence beyond the 2014 elections or to exit the presidency intact.
Implementing this strategy allows President Karzai to achieve his objectives due to three effects. First, and most importantly, he begins to break his dependence on the international community for his administration's survival. Second, he is able to leverage remaining international assistance to secure continued powerbroker interest in the short-term viability of GIRoA. Finally, Karzai can choose to reconcile with the Taliban to reinforce his bargaining position. This new Karzai governing strategy mitigates the conse-quences of the impending decline in international support, though at the expense of the Afghan population and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency (COIN) implementation.
An effective counter to Karzai's power sharing strategy is a bottom-up, grass roots COIN implementation that directs international resources toward village-level and civil society capacity. GIRoA, the Taliban, and local powerbrokers have very little legitimacy with the population. Building legitimate, accountable governance capacity at the village level buys ISAF valuable time for reform efforts to take hold. Rebalancing Afghan society, so that the local areas exert more influence and checks on powerbrokers and GIRoA, stands to make the entire political structure more accountable.
Download The Full Article: Karzai's Governing Strategy
LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan at ISAF HQ within the Force Reintegration Directorate. He previously serviced in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of ISAF, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Gentlemen,
I hope this sheds some light on our overall effort and answers your individual questions.
Dr. Dave Ellis, a SOCOM political scientist and I began this initiative 7 months ago designed to address perceived issues stemming from the current implementation of ISAF COIN strategic programs. We authored a series of papers intended to develop understanding for senior decision makers regarding the current political, economic, and cultural environment. We also provided recommendations to effectively implement ISAFs fundamental COIN strategy to protect and improve the lives of the Afghan population to securely govern and develop their country themselves.
THESIS: GIRoA is presently a kleptocracy based on power sharing agreements and an "economy of extraction," not production. This unfortunate reality prohibits the Afghan population from receiving significant benefits from the existing top-down COIN implementation. To achieve our objectives, Afghanistan must be economically rebalanced by moving this 85% agrarian based society above a subsistence level of existence. Doing so creates disposable family income, excess agricultural capacity, develops robust local markets, and expands governance and justice at the village and district level. This, in turn, creates new economic and political organizations and structures that can pressure provincial and national GIRoA to be more responsive to the population. A population empowered by growth of personal wealth will have a vested interest in national stability and pursue continued economic growth; thereby promoting fair governance at all levels.
SOTF-S, S9 adopted this proposal and invited Dr. Ellis to assist in implementing it into their Civil Military Operations (CMO) plan. The SOTF-S CMO plan, developed during December 2010, merged ideas to focus on Village Stability Operations (VSO) phase and conditions-appropriate development activities synchronized with the Afghan crop lifecycle.
The activities start with the understanding that building family wealth and disposable income is fundamental to national economic growth. Raising family disposable income 10% per year over 4 years will increase wealth by ~50% and create the resources at the village level for local governance and expand Gross Domestic Product. The CMO plan focuses on recapturing lost crop preservation techniques to raise families above subsistence; improving agricultural and cash crop yield for extra income; and re-introducing basic secondary, value-added processing to expand the economy, like chicken farming, cashmere harvesting, and preserves to expand the economy. The program is currently under way with master farming training events, NGO fairs for identifying Afghan trainers, and linking activities to local government. SOTF-S is working closely with RC-S Stability Operations, the Regional Platform, and TF RAIDER in the implementation of this plan.
This initiative, which is demonstrating success in its initial phases, can and should be adopted and applied to other initiatives. One example is The Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process (APRP). APRP could benefit greatly by integrating the SOTF-S model into its operations. Expanding the economy by focusing on family wealth generation requires small relatively inexpensive, Afghan-led training activities that avoid the pitfalls of large, expensive and bureaucratically cumbersome foreign-funded programs. And this design offers reintegrees more tangible opportunities for sustainable economic livelihoods well after Coalition forces have moved on.
The current strategy of focusing distribution of aid via national-level GIRoA entities has empowered it to further its kleptocratic interests. Reorientating the flow of aid from a top-down to a bottom-up strategy not only robs the current patronage network of its ability to distort and corrupt GIRoA entities, it also places assistance closer to the target of these strategies: the Afghan population. Afghanistan has a low absorptive capacity for direct foreign aid. By designing and implementing low-footprint aid programs, like the current SOTF-S model, to provide knowledge and basic tools, the strategy reduces oval costs while directly improving the lives and livelihoods of the Afghan population.
The objective of this proposal requires a shift in our overall focus but, is very achievable and will guarantee success for our overall mission.
Afghan society and its history are rooted in a primary belief in local power. GIRoA can only progress and achieve legitimacy if its local societies are empowered. ISAF will only succeed in establishing a stable and secure Afghanistan by promoting the growth of personal wealth, and subsequently a vested interest in the success of GIRoA by individual Afghans and their families through the advancement of the primary Afghan social and governing construct - the Afghan village.
James
There needs to be intense reform and investment at both the local and central parts of Afghanistan. Not only is conflict 80% political and 20% military, the 80% in Afghanistan is virtually 100% local.
We may all feel that this has already being done - but our impatience is part of our downfall and drives our domestic political frustrations. From an anthropological perspective, and at the risk of being elitist, it is anachronistic to think that this could be acheived in Afghanistan in 10years. We forget that Western democracy has been developed over a long period of history, numerous revolutions and civil wars that eventually resulted in founding principles cemented in documents such as the Magna Carta, and the Bill of Rights of 1689, which followed the deposing of James II. And of course the oldest written constitution in the world, the United States of Americas Constitution 1787. Citizens in every local town in the United States have had over 220 years to recognise and respect their constitution within a free and open society.
Afghan tribes and villagers experienced democracy for the first time in 2004. Yet, this has not diminished the primacy of local power and authority in resolving disputes and negotiating local issues. It could well be that because the introduction of democracy, constitution and rules of law to Afghanistan was through foreign intervention rather than an organic revolution; it will take even longer to cement a top down deontological approach to the rule of law.
Im not sure I agree with your line: "GIRoA, the Taliban, and local powerbrokers have very little legitimacy with the population." Unfortunately, the Taliban have far more legitimacy than any member of GIRoA in many Districts. They deliver swift justice, are locally connected, provide identity and appeal to the conservative DNA that is embedded within most Afghans provincial areas. Quite frankly as long as they agree not to allow foreign insurgents or trans-national terrorists to establish a base, that is not a bad measure of success at a local perspective.
There is a group that has enormous potential. The youth of Afghanistan are where our efforts should be focused as much as with the powerbrokers. (this is probably aready being done so I apologise in advance)
Many of the young Afghans I employed were well educated, savvy, technoligically connected and have been exposed to the plethora of choice and opportunities through the tools of globalisation (ala Thomas Friedman the world is flat).
The up and coming youth with a slightly different view of the world should be supported and potential leaders identified across politics, business, community, law & order and international engagement.
Unfortunately, the intoxicating lure of political tenure is hard to resist. There is no doubt that Karzai will be doing all he can to remain in office beyond 2014.
We also have to accept that just like there is a US and an Australian and French way of doing things there is also an Afghan way that of us have experienced both good and bad.
Jason
Interesting take... this is what I published June 16, 2010.
Karzais Counterinsurgency Strategy
By Mac McCallister
Marc Ambinder, politics editor of The Atlantic, explains that there exists a general perception among theorists and policy planners in the Pentagons policy shop that General McChrystals counterinsurgency strategy has failed to sustain Hamid Karzais government in critical areas and is therefore destined to ultimately fail.
"This is not how the war is supposed to be going. . ."
So, why isnt the war going as planned? Maybe we should assess the counterinsurgency effort from President Karzais perspective and focus less on our Americo-centric point of view.
What is President Karzais counterinsurgency strategy?
President Karzais "clear-hold-build-consolidate" approach to counterinsurgency is mostly political. Politics in counterinsurgency is about the distribution of power and political strategy all about influencing the will and actions of both your allies and adversaries.
Afghanistan is a place where you fear your friends as much as you fear your enemies.
To "clear" the field of competitors in Kandahar, President Karzai installs his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai to administer the province. Ahmed Wali Karzai enters into relevant patronage relationships with local families to "hold" and control the territory. The members of Ahmed Wali Karzais newly established patronage network then "build" and "consolidate" control.
The Karzai administration now controls Kandahar.
If President Karzai trusts his brother to expand his patronage network in Kandahar, could this be why the local administration and Kabul are less than enthusiastic about our proposed military operations in the area?
President Karzai, through his brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, is also allied with Matiullah Khan in Uruzgan province. Matiullah Khan controls the northern approaches (trade routes) into Kandahar City and staging areas into Hazara territory. His militias will eventually be integrated into the central government security forces (if history is an indication for how local strongmen are integrated into the state security apparatus).
Now, lets take it one step further. President Karzai is also allied with Nangahar Governor and Karzai loyalist (for now) Gul Agha Sherzai. Gul Agha Sherzai continues to undermine the local poppy economy and now controls the distribution of development aid to assist in consolidating his position and power in the province. A major trade route connecting Kabul, Jalalabad and Peshawar in Pakistan is located in Nangahar province.
President Karzai is presently engaged in direct and indirect negotiations with select Taliban factions to exploit the movements more ambitious leaders and inherent rivalries.
I personally give President Karzai a hell of a lot more credit for how he is managing his "clear-hold-build and consolidate" strategy than his naysayers. But then all that is needed to bring peace to Afghanistan and for the Karzai government to be considered legitimate is for him to eliminate corruption, distribute basic services and to administer the rule of law equitably amongst all Afghans--just like we do in the United States. . .
James,
You had me at "hello," and held my attention as you built your argument, but lost me at the end. You did a good job of highlighting the centrality of the Karzai regime to the current state of insurgency in Afghanistan, but then, inexplicably you flip a 180 and conclude, "so therefore we must build from the bottom up."
I realize building from the bottom up is how we are attacking the problem currently. I realize you have a boss and are in country. I also realize we have crafted a virtual sanctuary around the Karzai government and protect their activities, but your conclusion left me curious. Is this a paper merely an effort to rationalize and justify current approaches to the insurgency and overcome a major aspect of concern? From where I sit your conclusion just does not fit your argument. You argue "the head, the head, the head," and then conclude, "therefore we must engage the feet."
Why not engage the head? I realize the ISAF mission statement begins with the phrase: "In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan."
Let me suggest replacing the word "Government" with the word "people" in the mission statement, and then have the staff conduct a new mission analysis with your excellent points regarding the government included in that analysis. I suspect that new COAs will emerge.
Sanctuary is indeed a major problem in the insurgency in Afghanistan as it is in most all insurgencies. Artificially contrived sanctuaries are perhaps even more dangerous, and certainly more tragic, than physical ones outside ones control. But until we are willing to take on the sanctuary we have created for the Karzai government we are really relegated to merely managing and suppressing the symptoms of the insurgency and the pursuit of a "decent interval" that allows us to withdraw with our pride intact.
You are asking good questions, so keep up the good work. My only concern is that you are allowing your circumstance to overly shape your answers.
Cheers!
Bob