Washington's War by Colonel Douglas MacGregor (USA Ret.)
The human and material cost of America's occupation of Iraq is reaching a climax. The ongoing "surge" of ground combat troops into Baghdad and its surroundings is producing higher U.S. casualties, exacerbating intersectarian violence and draining the last reserves of American patience.
Like the French Army in Algeria and the British Army in Ireland, the generals in Baghdad are discovering that soldiers and Marines in Iraq control only what they stand on, and when they no longer stand on it, they don't control it. Meanwhile, the Army grinds itself to pieces while the national military leader¬ship stands by watching, clinging to the promise of more troops for a larger ground force in the future — a promise that is irrelevant to the challenge we now face: getting out of Iraq...
Maintaining American Influence by Colonel Robert Killebrew (USA Ret.)
From the day the Iraqi insurgency began until today's "surge" strategy, the U.S.-led war in Iraq has followed an entirely predictable course. Absent making Iraq the 51st state, it has been pretty clear that to give its newly democratic government any chance of survival, the Iraqi security forces, and particularly the army, would have to be rebuilt.
Why the rebuilding lagged, and how the various opposition groups gained the upper hand in Baghdad and throughout Iraq, is a story for another day. But by the time the president announced his surge strategy, the various insurgent groups in Baghdad and elsewhere had clearly gained momentum over government forces. Now, American troops and their Iraqi allies are back in the neighborhoods, contesting for the upper hand...
The Immorality of Leaving Iraq by Seth Cropsey
That Americans are irritated and frustrated by the war in Iraq is clear. What is less clear is what voters want to do about it. If President Bush could convince people that more of the progress Gen. David Petraeus has demonstrated can bring enough order to reduce violence and inch Iraq toward stable political institutions, would most Americans still want to pull up stakes and bring the troops home? Probably not.
George Patton comes closest to the truth: "Americans," he famously insisted, "love a winner and will not tolerate a loser," an observation that offers a losing Republican president as little solace as a Democratic-controlled national legislature that calculates it can claim credit for ending a war while escaping the blame for its loss — and more importantly, what is likely to follow the loss. And if the hysterics that Bush's name generates could be brushed aside for a moment, Americans might even reflect that where Abraham Lincoln went through a platoon of commanding generals before finding a winner, Bush — although he took too long to do so — got a winner the moment he decided he'd had enough of what had already been tried...
Assessing the Surge by Ralph Peters
U.S. commanders with whom I spoke in Anbar province in August were worried — worried that their Marines would get bored in the absence of combat action. Enlisted Marines on return tours of duty expressed surprise verging on bewilderment that cities such as Fallujah, long wracked by insurgent violence, were calm and open for business. Foreign terrorists who once ruled the streets still launched minor attacks, but had been marginalized across the province. And last year's Sunni-Arab enemies were busily scheming how to profit from the American presence.
Although a few portions of Anbar remain dangerous — not least, for Iraqis — the turnaround during the last six months has been remarkable, an illustration of the nonlinear developments in warfare that confound academic theorists. Numerous factors influenced the Sunni-Arab "flip," but, on the whole, it remains one of those events that analysts could not foresee and which was by no means inevitable. At a certain point, the chemistry was simply there and a few alert commanders recognized it and acted...
Culture Battle by Colonel Henry Foresman Jr. (USA)
The Army, like all military organizations, is defined by its culture, and the culture is defined by the history. Its culture has been defined by its overwhelming success in World War II and shaped by a perceived history of fighting grand wars. Although the culture is consistent with the perceived history, the reality is the Army has been involved in stability and support operations, not grand wars, for almost 80 percent of its existence.
Grand wars, as I define them, are those military engagements that pit army against army. I define stability and support operations as those in which the military is not fighting an army but is opposed either by those resistant to its occupation, passively or aggressively, or is opposed by an organized force executing disperse, nonconnected and localized operations designed to defeat the will of the occupiers to achieve victory...
Comments
Agree with Ken on the MacGregor piece. A good essay that provides thought on the judicious use of our military, however the essay is founded too much on belief that we operate in rational world that consitently produces rational actors and allows for rational decisions that conform to our expectations. The world is simply not ordered up as we'd like.
I echo Ken's need for balance and flexibility both in terms of organization and doctrine and the other DOTLMPF aspects. The numbers increase reflects the need to meet the requirements of policy while at the same time being able to educate leaders to meet PME (primary military education) goals in time for it to prepare them for the next level of responsibility, man TRADOC (or its equivalent) so we can incorporate the most recent experience and apply it to future requirements, keep our edge on the many tasks that require home station training and trips to the CTCs, balance our responsibilities between our commitment to our profession and to our families, and the need to just physically, mentally and spiritually recuperate from deployments. All of this to ensure we retain the most capable military to meet the goals of the nation.
The real world offers up a host of uncertain futures to which the United States will have to respond. While it would seem good advice to tell policy makers to budget their appetite and expect that to solve the problem, history would indicate that the more involved a nation or state is in foreign affairs - to include commercial and economic pursuits - the more likely it is to find itself committed politically - which potentially could result in its extenuation by other means, to include war.
The best we can do is probably to pursue balance in terms of the tools available to respond. This is not only sound for exploring options across the other instruments of power, but with regard to military power, and the individual services. Just because we may not have a capability does not negate military requirement to resource an alternative to at least suffice until we can adjust, but preferably to get it more right then wrong - I'd prefer the compromise of balance and flexibility vs. relying on the world to conform to our limitations.
Best Regards, Rob
"The Army, like all military organizations, is defined by its culture, and the culture is defined by the history. Its culture has been defined by its overwhelming success in World War II and shaped by a perceived history of fighting grand wars. Although the culture is consistent with the perceived history, the reality is the Army has been involved in stability and support operations, not grand wars, for almost 80 percent of its existence."
I liked the introduction - it sets the tone for introspection and puts us on the path to ask "why" we are who we are. Interesting point about the 80/20 ratio - this in itself is a question - if the ratio tells us otherwise - why is the culture the way it is? What is it about that 20% that fixes the culture within it? There is something to perceived consequences being easier to articulate, existential threats and maybe even the time spent training which fills in the cracks surrounding the times weve gone to war. There are probably more reasons (some of them external for sure), but if we want to understand why our default position is the 20% we have to consider them all.
"ÃÂ¥ Our junior leaders must understand We are fighting an enemy who has the advantage of interior and exterior lines -- "the enemy of my enemy is also my enemy." the nations goals, the environment in which they operate and how they are linked.
ÃÂ¥ The conflict requires the application of diplomatic (political), military, economic and informational elements of power by leaders at all levels.
ÃÂ¥ Whether we have it right is not immediately apparent; it is determined over time."
From his list of points I pulled three. The first was one Id not heard expressed this way -with the linkage to the axiom. This does not only offer an understanding of how the enemy often sees his lines of operation, but provides insight on how to deny the enemy that line of operation by establishing our own.
The second reminds me of what DR. Kilcullen said about linking the narrative with our actions - also brought up in the recent piece on Strategic communications. That is - if possible - think before you act, and when possible link the action with the narrative vs. trying to invent a narrative to explain the option.
The third has to with willingness to accept risk, but with the caveat of understanding what is at risk and being able to adjust course to fulfill the objective
-All three very useful points.
"Whether transformation succeeds or fails will not be determined by how the Army is organized but, rather, how the leaders employ their forces and whether they are successful. That is the unanswered question -- whether the Army can make a break with its past and the legacies of World War II to fight the wars of the 21st century."
I dont know if I agree with breaking from the past in general (and I may have read his point wrong)- there is a great deal to learn from it. I will sign up for understanding the past so when its bias exerts influence on me that steers me off course - I can correct for it. What I want to see are leaders who can make the best possible transition from one type of war to another so that when the nation calls we can answer. I like what the CSA said recently about looking for balance - well achieve that through leaders who can function well wherever they are at, and with the means at hand - well succeed where our enemies fail if we can do that faster and better then they can - that I believe is what wars call for - and it may be even more critical in the future, but perhaps only because the past is more certain.
COL Foresman has again provided us with much to consider as we make difficult choices where often there are no clear winners - but his advice about investing in leadership is without a doubt one which enables us to make the most of our choices no matter if they are particularly right, or particularly wrong - leadership will provide a way forward.
Douglas MacGregor has written an outstanding essay that deserves thought.
He argues that occupation by any western force elsewhere in the world is likely to produce more problems than solutions -- and he is correct. That, as he says, has been obvious throughout the the world since the end of World War II and yet has been studiously ignored by the politicians of the west. To their own detriment...
The argument for economy of force missions is an obvious imperative in a volunteer force that must compete with a flourishing civilian sector for people. We do not now have and are not likely to have, short of a major war and a Draft -- which should be avoided unless there is no alternative -- enough people to continue to use 1945 methodologies and organizations these 60 plus years later.
Some of his claims are, I think, arguable. I do not agree with the politicization both domestically and internationally of some passages but his military point is well made -- we need to sort out what we want to do, bounce that against what we can do and get on with organizing to do that.
Nor do I agree with his position on the cancellation of some big ticket items. The FCS and EEV can and should probably be scrubbed, the F22 offers a quantum jump and is far enough along in production to merit retention and the DD 1000 offers a a major technological leap and should be pursued. MacGregor mentioned the Air and Naval assets of the US as strategic dominators. Just so -- and we should retain that.
We must know how to occupy, to nation build and to execute COIN, no question. That does not mean we need to do any of those things, we simply must have the doctrine and training in place to be able to do them if no other alternative is available. We must also be able to fight in a massive conventional war. That does not mean we need to do that, we simply must have the doctrine and training in place to be able to do that if no other alternative is available.
Balance...
That's all that's required, balance. That balance will enable most future actions to be somewhere on the spectrum between those two poles. If we are capable of doing both ends of the spectrum, the center should fall into place easily.
MacGregor posits four points for the future and all are valid and important with the fourth being critical -- we need to change the way we organize, operate and fight. Playing to the oppositions strengths is simply not smart.
He then proceeds to excoriate most of the current crop of Flag Officers -- and most Power Point shows -- with some merit. Next, he appears to be advocating a standard American mantra -- technology will fix the problem. He says <i>"...the level of armor protection, firepower and off-road mobility for soldiers and Marines continues to fall based on a warfare mentality that is delusional -- a mind-set that exalts the dismounted rifleman inside communication networks based on the false promise of perfect information."</i>
<i>"As repeatedly demonstrated in the towns and cities of Iraq, dismounted riflemen sent against insurgents, rebels or terrorists who use improvised explosives, mines and anti-armor weapons are doomed to fight the enemys war on the enemys terms. They are effectively denied surprise and security, their tactical intelligence is extremely limited, and they have no significant edge in armored protection, mobility or firepower. In the 21st century, the goal is to destroy the enemy, not hold ground. Attrition battles that pit Americans with rifles against enemies with rifles favor the enemy, not us."</i>
I think he misrepresents the dismounted rifleman's capability and effect and thus perhaps misses that few firefights in Afghanistan and Iraq have favored the enemy. I realize that in his ideal world, we would not be committed to such operations in the future but it's been my observation the world is not ideal and thus some balance is required to cope with less than ideal situations.
His solution:
<i>"These reorganized ground forces would be mobile, armored forces with significant organic firepower and integrated infantry, not light infantry-based forces. How fast ground forces deploy is less important than what they do after they arrive and the tactical skill with which they are employed."</i>
While I agree with the last sentence, I think the first is predicated on an ideal world that assumes we will always be able to pick our battles. History shows that is not the case. Thus, again, I think he tends to elide the critical balance that we must have.
We have a national tendency to over react to problems; thus we swing too far in each direction before striking equilibrium. Post Viet Nam, we denied the counterinsurgency aspect of national power.
It would be nice if in correcting that rather grievous error we did not overdo the corrective action and forget that big war is always a possibility. We must be able to cope with both while trying to find a less costly -- an economy of force -- effort to solve our military problems.
Finally he concludes with "Circling the wagons," seven good thoughtful paragraphs.
Shame about the lack of balance