This article was published in the
July 2005 volume of the
Just as early philosophers sought answers to questions concerning
the essence of life, for over two thousand years military strategists
and theorists have sought answers to the most basic questions on
warfare. To this end, men such as Sun Tzu in the 4th Century
B.C.E. with The Art of War, and General Carl Von Clausewitz in
the 19th Century A.C.E. with On War completed works
that remain the standards by which all military thought emanates and is
compared, and from which nearly every soldier, sailor, airman, and
Marine are taught. Similarly, men such as General Sir Frank Kitson,
Sir Robert Thompson,
and Chairman Mao Zedong
each completed seminal works on insurgency and counterinsurgency in the
1930s, 60s and 70s that should be utilized in the same manner and with
the same respect as Clausewitz; however, receive little attention from
military theorists and concept writers today. As the military struggles
with the application of limited resources against a seemingly endless
demand for troops and leaders prepared for the rigors of
counterinsurgency operations, countless persons have been tasked to
investigate the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN)
as the military services struggle to produce new COIN doctrine
for our troops engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as no one would
dare assert that they could articulate conventional military theory
better than Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, no one should assume that any
document produced will be more helpful or well-articulated than those
already available by Thompson, Kitson, etc. on insurgency and
counterinsurgency, and thus cease all efforts to reinvent the wheel and
needlessly expend limited resources.
As one whom
has regular contact with foreign officers representing nations with
force contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan, I often get the opportunity
to question my foreign peers as to their perceptions of ongoing
operations in Iraq and US military doctrine/theory as a whole.
Inevitably, I receive comments on how well read and well-educated the US
officer corps is in comparison with our allied peers, and how envious
others are on the premium we place on Professional Military Education (PME).
What is remarkable about this is that the books and experiences
that we as Americans study/review the most are those written by and
about Europeans in counterinsurgency operations. While imitation remains
the highest form of flattery, do we borrow liberally from our allies and
there experience when writing doctrine? Of course not, we choose to
start fresh, and attempt to write something “new” in hope that these
“new” thoughts will somehow “fix” the “new” problems and challenges that
face us in Iraq and elsewhere in the GWOT. The knowledge necessary for
our leaders to successfully operate in the Iraqi insurgency is not as
elusive as the media or others want you to believe. What our troops
require is a simple understanding of Guevara’s FOCO insurgency, and
review of documents written by Thompson and others nearly 40 years ago.
Insurgency and “The Cause.” At the risk of
insulting the most knowledgeable insurgency theorists reading this
article, let us review the situation in Iraq, and apply Thompson and
Kitson’s counterinsurgency fundamentals in order to review their
continued validity. For the purpose of this article, we will utilize Dr.
Thomas Mark’s definition of insurgency as an armed political movement
aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from
it, through the use of subversion and armed conflict.
First, yes, Iraq is an insurgency, but not for the reasons you may
think, nor for very much longer by conventional standards. Iraq is a
matrix of insurgent groups, the most prominent of which represents a
FOCO insurgency, or one that forgoes the Maoist political indoctrination
of the population in favor of small bands of guerrillas that attempt to
achieve military success against State forces.
Because of this, they do not need to clearly articulate an alternative
political vision, and in fact, will be more successful if they do not.
Always remember what Chairman Mao said, “political power grows out of
the barrel of a gun,” thus a clearly defined political program is not
necessary from the outset. Violence and confrontation become the cause.
Wounding the pride, power, and prestige of a nation and people that you
believe have undervalued your personal and cultural worth, and
emasculated your religion becomes the cause. Thompson warns there is
always some issue, which has an appeal to each section of the community,
and, even if dormant, an inspired incident may easily revive it in acute
Have we not witnessed this as a result of the Abu Ghurayb incident,
fighting around the Shrine of Ali, failure to fulfill promises, or with
reports of the desecration of the Koran? Kitson said it best in 1971,
when he wrote, insurgents start with nothing but a cause and grow to
strength, while the counter-insurgents start with everything but a cause
and gradually decline in strength to a point of weakness.
Has this held true in Iraq or Afghanistan?
In Iraq, what may tip this FOCO insurgency into
a semi-failed State scenario is the continued and unhindered flow of
foreign fighters into the country. Once these 3rd country
nationals become a majority, this will no longer be an insurgency. To
counter this “jihaadist cause” or movement, one must ask as Thompson
instructed in 1965, what is the appeal of the insurgency, and why are
young men in particular attracted to its cause?
Thompson further asked, how do guerrilla forces survive, and even
threaten to prevail over, large-scale conventional forces supported by
countries whose power, wealth and good intentions are seemingly
Though written in 1965, are these questions no longer valid as
applied to the Iraqi Insurgency? If your answer is yes, they are
still valid, then ask yourself, why have you not heard these articulated
Thompson asserts that there are three main forces
that influence the people of a country: nationalism and national
policies, religion and customs, and material well-being and progress.
If we accept these as the factors we must influence in order to be
successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, what does this mean? What this means
is that in Iraq, the Coalition must convince 99% of Iraqis to forego any
differences they may feel as Kurds, Shia, and Sunni in order to pursue
the common good of being Iraqis first. It means that we must convince
millions of Sunni that there best option is to submit to the majority
rule of two disparate groups that they have collectively raped,
murdered, and subjugated since 1979. What it means is that we must now
convince a people that was artificially slammed together into a nation
called Iraq after WWI, and thus never had the opportunity of self
determination, that their best option remains with the other groups in a
nation called Iraq. Iraq is NO different than the former Yugoslavia,
Trans-Jordan, Palestinian Mandate, or Czechoslovakia in this manner.
Next, it means that we must convince them that not only do we (the
coalition) respect Iraqi and Islamic society, but that they should
respect each other’s cultures as well. I cannot imagine that it could be
so difficult rectifying the 1300+-year-old split between the Sunni and
Shi’a, or demonstrating our heart-felt concern from behind the walls or
inside many of Saddam’s old palaces, natural symbols of democracy.
Finally, we must convince them that whatever perception they might have,
our first priority is to ensure their material well-being, thus ensuring
that they are as safe in person and property as Americans. This
continues to be the most difficult of all the difficult tasks listed
above. First, the infrastructure in Iraq is primitive bordering on
non-existent. Thus turning on sewage plants, drinking water treatment
stations, and electrical production facilities has proven difficult.
Violence remains an issue; however when put in the context of the number
of homicides or attempted homicides in the US, the figures in Iraq are
Now that we know what to focus, we must determine
on whom to focus? While an admitted fan of Gladwell’s idea of
connectors, mavens, and salesmen,
I will stick with Kitson and Thompson, and refer to the groups they call
naturals, the converted, and the deceived.
Has anyone ever heard of insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan referred to
in these terms? Probably not, but you have most likely heard the terms
extremists, radicals, Jihaadists, or terrorists. Extremists and
terrorists are most likely naturals, or individuals that have been
indoctrinated with a level of hate and violence that makes them
impervious to new ideas or to question the validity or merit of their
actions. To these individuals, terror is acceptable to achieve their
desired end state. Jihaadists are individuals that have been converted
or convinced that they should put down their plow or pen in order to
pick up a weapon and join the crusade against the West. These include
those who convert because of abuse or perceived abuse of power such as
that which occurred at Abu Ghurayb Prison, or that was reported to have
occurred at the detention facility board Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba.
The deceived are comprised of folks from the above categories, but also
from those that fall victim to propaganda or are misled into action.
These folks usually contain a disproportionately high number of young
people, the less educated, and those who wish to fight authority.
Included within the ranks of the deceived are those that have committed
one act of subversion or a single act of hostility, and have now been
convinced that there is no turning back and that they are wanted men by
the naturals and converted. Once this happens, the deceived become
Principles of COIN. Thompson clearly
articulates his COIN theory with the following five principles:
The government must have a clear political aim: to establish
and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically
and economically stable and viable.
Ask yourself, what is our aim in Iraq? Is it a free-democratic Iraq from
which we have unconditional access to hydrocarbons, or is it a free-Iraq
congruent with the present free-Saudi Arabia and free-Pakistan? How do
we expect to unite a country that has only been united since the end of
World War I, and was only done so by the British for greater access to
hydrocarbons? Keep in mind that through Operation Southern Watch and
Operation Northern Watch, we encouraged the cultural and societal
division we now witness in Iraq by establishing three Iraqs within one.
The government must function in accordance with the law.
When defining rule of law, we must ask ourselves, whose law and what
law? Furthermore, how does one adhere to the rule of law with no
functioning judiciary? How does one expect to convince the majority of
the citizens in Iraq, the Shi’a to accept a secular system of law that
is alien to them, regardless of the amount of say-so they have in the
process now versus under Saddam? In Afghanistan, should we have an
expectation that farmers will not grow heroin in order to feed their
families simply because we cannot control the demand for it internally?
How has this expectation or course of action worked in Latin America?
Well, one only needs to ask the ex-Presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador, or
the soon to be ex-President of Peru. Should we expect warlords that
maintain larger forces than the national forces of Afghanistan to submit
to the will of individuals who have neither the will nor muscle to make
them comply? Here in the US, does the average citizen believe that the
detention facility is in accordance with the rule of law?
The government must have an overall plan.
Though we have been engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, and
spent hundreds of billions of dollars, could the average American
clearly articulate what our plan is in these countries? Could the
average soldier tell you more than that our plan is Iraqification? If
you can’t tell what the plan is, can you assess how it is progressing?
Could the average American tell you what the plan was in Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, Guatemala, or El Salvador? If not, why not? Is it because you
lack the appropriate information to formulate an answer? If so, does
this not violate principle number one, the government must have a clear
political aim that surely has been clearly articulated? How does this
overall plan account for the influx of foreign fighters or general
border control? If it is not reasonable for us to secure our own borders
from illegal immigrants, should we expect it to be reasonable in Iraq?
The government must give priority to defeating the political
subversion, not the guerrillas.
What is our priority in Iraq, is it not to defeat the insurgents by
kill/capture missions and large decisive operations such as Operation
Phantom Fury and Operation Matador? Does this not violate this
principle? Are these missions consistent with Thompson’s four phases or
clearing, holding, winning, won operations? If Iraq is truly a FOCO
insurgency with no real political aim, then the key becomes defeating
the subversion period, and not the guerrillas. How do you defeat the
subversion, you remain in a perpetual state of offensive operations that
creates the dilemma in which the guerrillas expend resources simply
trying to survive. You create an environment where survival becomes the
insurgents’ main goal.
In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must
secure its base areas first.
Ask yourself do you think Baghdad is secure? Next, if we define the home
base as the entity known as Iraq, how secure are the borders? Again, we
find ourselves in violation of the most basic principles of COIN. If we
utilize the Afghanistan example, ask yourself, how much of the country
do we actually have physical control over? If one can only secure 75% of
a country, should we not expect the insurgency to continue without end?
In Colombia, the insurgents maintain entire sections of the country
under their control. Is this the “success story” we want to utilize for
an example of how to do things in Afghanistan and Iraq? How safe are our
national borders from physical and psychological attack?
Conclusion. There is a growing perception
among US and foreign officers that due to the fact that we have not
achieved a total success in restoring civil order, rule of law, and
absolute security in Iraq, that many theorists have begun asserting that
this is due to the new threat, new challenge, newness, etc. that now
confronts us. It is inconceivable to these people that what we are
seeing in Iraq has happened countless times throughout history to other
dominant nations. This is of course senseless, as we face nothing “new”
in Iraq in regards to COIN, and therefore, continue to try to develop
the wrong cure for the wrong diagnosis. Based off this assumption, we
need to search for answers in documents published by the USMC such as
FMFRP 12-18 Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla War and FMFRP 12-25 The
Guerrilla and How to Fight Him as well as documents listed above.
For all those that believe Thompson is outdated, I ask only for you to
review this one fact. Before deploying to Iraq in January of 2004, I
purchased a used copy of Defeating Communist Insurgency for $30.
A colleague of mine tried to purchase the same book this past week, or
18 months later, and copies, if you can find one, are now selling for
close to $100. You draw your own conclusions.
Maj Adam Strickland is a US Marine Corps
infantry officer recently returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom where he
served as a company commander in 1st Marine Division. He is
currently serving as a senior analyst with the Marine Corps Warfighting
Lab researching Small Wars and urban operations issues.