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The Joint Interagency Coordination Group

The Operationalization of DIME

LtCol Harold Van Opdorp, USMC

Current United States National Security policy documents and future global trends drive the requirement to create and maintain an operational level organization to integrate the four elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). From the policy perspective, one can trace the requirement to operationalize DIME to National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1), released 13 March 2001 and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America. NSPD-1 lays down the organization of the National Security Council System to accomplish this task. The national security policy infrastructure turns to the National Security Strategy of the United States for overall direction. Last published in September, 2002, the NSS describes a world where, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few."[1]

The desire to avoid another attack against the United States like the September 11 attacks serves as the largest catalyst for United States intervention abroad. However, the ever-present crisis related to basic humanitarian failures throughout the world will continue to lead to increased U.S. involvement globally that will require the need to integrate the elements of national power at the operational level. In the 1990s, the United States experienced a three-fold increase in the number of 'complex emergencies'.[2] Future trends identified in the

SPLASH, OVER...

It is our privilege to present the second edition of the SWJ Magazine with the works of these learned and valued contributors. We are very encouraged by the response to the first edition and to the site at www.smallwarsjournal.com. We will be adding content and functionality in the near future to exploit success and better serve the community of interest. We all live in interesting times. Much like the nation, SWJ is still in the early innings of this op.

Dave Dilegge — ***Editor in Chief***

Bill Nagle — ***Publisher***

[1] "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 1.

[2] Thomas S. Blanton, ed., "Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian Humanitarian & Transition Programs, Section I: Overview," (downloaded from National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 30, The George Washington University, The Gellman Library, Washington, DC: January 2000, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB30/index.html#doc) 6.

National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project indicate that the number of complex emergencies will continue to increase, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa region and significant parts of Southeast Asia. These trends lead one to believe that the United States will become more involved in regional crises around the world in the interests of its national security. Critical to the success of the United States in this regard will be its ability to operationalize the elements of its national power in order to meet its national security needs? ***By establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group focused on integrating the elements of national power at the operational level, the United States can better prepare itself for successful execution of complex emergencies and stabilization and reconstruction operations in the coming decades.***

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group.

At the operational level of war, the goal of military planners is to adopt a plan that accomplishes strategic objectives within the theater or area of operation. "Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events."[3] As a whole, the Department of Defense is well practiced and effective at planning at the operational level. The same can not be said about the national interagency community. Often seen as a dysfunctional organization or effort, the interagency community typically lacks the unity and focus to provide long term solutions to the problems often confronting it. The reasons for this are many but a significant factor contributing to this deficiency is the lack of an organization and the accompanying doctrine devoted to an operational level focus of interagency activities designed to provide lasting effects on the post-conflict landscape.

What the operational level of interagency activities includes are those activities where major humanitarian relief, civic assistance, and infrastructure rebuilding efforts are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operation. The basic activities at this level of crisis resolution involve linking the services and capabilities of interagency organizations to the strategic goals of the United States by establishing operational objectives, coordinating capabilities, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about

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[3] Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs Of Staff, 10 June 1998), 326.

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and sustain these events. Similar to the way Joint Pub 1-02 describes the activities that take place at the operational level of war, the activities that take place at the operational level of crisis, "imply a broader dimension of time or space than do *tactics*; they ensure the logistics and administrative support of *tactical forces* and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."[4] [Emphasis added] Tactical forces in this case may include an engineer battalion providing vertical construction support, a relief agency providing basic human services or a civilian police team providing training to perspective new police forces, while tactics in this case encompass the menagerie of specific actions that interagency groups take when applying resources to and fixing problems.

The disparate entities that could potentially make up the interagency body that would respond to current and future crises

[4] Joint Publication 1-02, 326.

need an organization to facilitate the planning and coordination efforts of interagency activities at the operational level of crisis. Creating an effective Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is the first step.

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has looked at the development of a JIACG for some time according to an article that appeared in the Autumn 2002 issue of *Joint Forces Quarterly*. "The enhanced integration of civilian and military agencies on the operational level was under consideration at JFCOM before September 11, 2001. Both the organizers and participants in Universal Vision '01 grappled with the issue of coordination. By the end of the exercise, the concept for an interagency staff directorate on the regional command level had emerged."[5] The directorate became known as the JIACG.

Subsequent to 9/11, the JIACG has mostly taken on a counter-terrorism flavor, expanding on the Joint Interagency Task Force-Counterterrorism Asia Pacific that was already in existence in PACOM at the time. Admiral Blair, then the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, expanded the task force by, "…granting it a broad interagency mandate as well as coordinating authority."[6] In February 2002, the National Security Council deputies committee approved the JIACG concept and instructed the regional combatant commanders to implement the concept. However, in their guidance, the deputies committee limited the JIACGs to coordinating counter terrorism plans and objectives only.[7]

Limiting the JIACG to counter terrorism fails to meet the full needs of the strategic objectives of the United States. To achieve the goals that the president has laid out in the NSS, the JIACG should take on a much greater role, particularly because meeting the United States' strategic goals requires the coordination of all the elements of national power at the operational level. Keeping the focus of the JIACG on counter-terrorism would be like having a Marine Expeditionary Force operational planning team focus on ground operations only. Such a singular focus limits the overall breadth of potential that the elements of national power encompassed in the interagency community can bring to bear to crisis situations. The JIACG should go beyond the PACOM model and should be organized and focused on providing operational level interagency plans, asset allocation guidance, execution over-site and responsibility, and sustainment expertise designed to meet the operational objectives of interagency activities. However, if the PACOM model serves a valuable long-term capability for countering terrorism and should remain, a similar but more broadly focused organization should be established that accomplishes the operational level integration of interagency activities and focuses on the full spectrum of planning from the first engagement to the final victory. Currently, the JFCOM J-9 continues to work the development of the JIACG Prototype, conducting numerous workshops and other events in an effort to

[5] Charles N. Cardinal, Timber Pagonas, and Edward Marks, "The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination," (downloaded from the Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review website at http://www.theinteragency.org/index.cfm?state=resource.2) 50.

[6] Cardinal et al, 50.

[7] Cardinal et al, 50.

develop further the full spectrum JIACG concept.[8]

The foundation of JIACG operations should be guided by several enduring general considerations that include unity of effort, centralized planning, decentralized execution, common terminology, and responsiveness. Joint Publication 0-2 explains that unity of effort at the strategic level "requires coordination among government departments, between the executive and legislative branches, nongovernmental organizations, and among nations in any alliance or coalition."[9] Unity of effort at the JIACG level will be the critical element that makes or breaks the operational success of an overall mission. The myriad of stereotypes, agendas, biases, and other influences that the interagency participants will bring to the JIAGC organization can exert tremendous pressure on the overall direction and effectiveness of the organization. This, in turn, can jeopardize the attainment of the operational and subsequently the strategic objectives of United States intervention abroad. More difficult to overcome than the conflicting pressures listed above will be the chaotic situations that interagency actors will find themselves working in overseas. Mitigation of this chaos requires a unified effort that has all players working towards the same common goal. Critical to this unity of effort is centralized planning.

The planning effort of the JIACG, or something comparable, must be centralized in order to synergize effectively the capabilities represented and to allocate the resources and assets available to the JIACG. Resources (particularly funding) and special skills are the two elements the interagency community brings to a crisis situation. If the planned application of those resources is not centrally planned, the organization runs the risk of duplicating efforts or of over committing assets in one area while another area is overlooked.

However, once the JIACG has developed the plan, its execution must maintain a decentralized character. Because of the tremendous scope of activities that the JIACG will be responsible for, it is impossible to maintain centralized control over plan execution. To do so would require such a large headquarters organization to be able to track all the activities under the JIACG, that the decision making process would overwhelm the actual execution cycle. The time required to make and pass on decisions from a central point would take such a long time that the issue requiring the decision in the first place would become moot. The more effective way to execute plans in the stability and reconstruction environment is to establish a framework for decision making in a well thought out detailed plan that is thoroughly briefed to decentralized teams empowered to take appropriate actions they deem necessary. To further enhance the plan for the interagency community, the JIACG must incorporate common terminology to the planning and execution of stability and reconstruction operations. The JIACG must make every effort

[8] Joint Experimentation Interagency E'Newsletter, downloaded from http://www.theinteragency.org/ on 14 April 2004. The newsletter provides an update regarding the development of a JIACG prototype for DOD. Currently, each regional combatant command maintains some type of JIACG organization within the headquarters, with each JIACG reflecting the particular characteristics of that combatant command. Additionally, each JIACG varies in its development within the command.

[9] Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs Of Staff, 10 July 2001), I-3

to explain the tasks, requirements, and issues of a general nature in common terms that everyone understands in order to mitigate any unnecessary confusion or misunderstanding that could delay action by the JIACG.

The greatest initial pressure the JIACG will experience will be the requirement to provide an immediate response to save lives, protect property and meet the basic human needs of food, water, and shelter. Any initial delay in securing these basic needs will have lasting effect to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the JIACG effort. Two factors will provide the biggest challenges to the JIACG in this effort: lack of experience of the organizations involved, and access to the target population. As the JIACG begins to take action, the organization will experience problems associated with the start-up of any organization. Like the first game of the football season, the JIACG's timing and effectiveness will be off because of unforeseen friction points that only are discovered once a plan is put into action. The JIACG may have difficulty getting to the target population at times because the security environment makes it prohibitive to reach the target area. In either case, the JIACG has to work through the challenges to provide relief to the target population in an effort to establish itself as a legitimate effort in restoring stability to the crisis region.

The general structure of the JIACG should incorporate the fundamental capabilities that are commonly required in stability and sustainment operations. These capabilities include, but are not limited to: transportation, communications, public works and engineering, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, hazardous materials, food distribution, and energy. These ten functional areas serve as the skeletal framework that a JIACG planning staff should use as a departure point when it begins to identify what capabilities it should be able to provide as the JIACG plans a response for a crisis. Planners should then identify the required capabilities for a specific situation identified by an initial assessment and mission analysis.

The Regional JIACG Headquarters.[10] The highest level JIACG organization should exist at the regional level, similar in scope to a regional combatant commander within the Department of Defense structure. Each Regional JIACG Headquarters should maintain a long-term focus within its assigned region. Strategic guidance for the JIACG Regional Headquarters should emanate from the National Security Council and should provide direction to the JIACG in regard to achieving long-term stability in the region. As crises emerge, the regional JIACG HQ, upon receiving specific guidance appropriate for the crisis, should then turn that strategic guidance into a campaign plan, identifying campaign objectives designed to meet the overall strategic goals of the United States.

[10] The initial idea for the structure of both the Regional JIACG and the Deployable JIACG came from a review of the United States Federal Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan (FRP) lays out a comprehensive plan for how the United States would react to a natural disaster or emergency within the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S. Code (U,S,C,) 5121, *et seq.*). The Regional JIACG is similar to the Regional Support Team while the Deployable JIACG is similar to the Emergency Response Team. The obvious differences in the two types of organizations, the JIACGs and the FRP organizations, is the additional requirement for the JIACGs to directly coordinate with, serve under, or serve over military units and the fact that the JIACGs will deploy overseas in response to global crises.

FIGURE 1. PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR JIACG REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS



The proposed organization of the regional JIACG includes four primary staff sections, an administrative section and a liaison section and is depicted in Figure 1. The National Security Council would appoint the head of the regional JIACG Headquarters in accordance with guidance passed in NSPD-1, keeping in mind that because of the longer-term view of this headquarters, and the significant involvement with diplomatic issues relating to foreign aid, the Department of State would be best suited to handle the responsibilities of the Regional JIACG Directorship. The relationship between the JIACG and the Regional Combatant Commander would be one of coordination with the National Security Council maintaining coordinating authority to require consultation between the two bodies.

To coordinate efforts at the operational level, the JIACG Regional Headquarters would form a sub-staff or deployable JIACG. Similar to the formation of a JTF for a military operation, the deployable JIACG would shape its deploying capabilities according to the identified requirements needed to address the crisis situation. This JIACG should look similar to the Regional JIACG Headquarters in general organization, only to be amended to suit the specific situation. Figure 2 depicts the proposed organization of the deployable JIACG.

The deployable JIACG would be the primary forward deployed headquarters to run

FIGURE 2. PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPLOYABLE JIACG



interagency operations. The National Security Council would specify the relationship between the deployable JIACG and the military operations of the JTF deployed in the area to ensure unity of effort and unity of command. Possible command arrangements could include a supported and supporting relationship where the National Security Council had determined which effort should have the lead in the crisis situation. In responses viewed as primarily humanitarian in nature, the deployable JIACG should be the supported effort, while the JTF should be the supporting effort. If the situation was such that military related issues composed the most significant factors, the JTF should be designated as the supported effort while the deployable JIACG should serve as the supporting effort. Many operations would include plans that incorporated phases where the supported and supporting efforts shift as the campaign unfolded. These shifts should be mutually agreed upon between the military commander and the JIACG Director and approved by the National Security Council.

Critical to the early establishment of the command relationship of the two organizations is the requirement to establish the planning relationship between the two efforts. Integrating the overall planning effort is one of the primary reasons for creating and deploying the JIACG early, allowing the interagency and the military efforts to develop mutually supporting plans that set the stage for early success in the stabilization and reconstruction effort.

The section within the JIACG structure that would incorporate the specialized capabilities of the interagency effort is the

Operations Section. This section would coordinate the delivery of American assistance and oversee the activities of response teams. The Operations Section in this proposal contains four branches; the Operations Support Branch, the Human Services Branch, the Infrastructure Support Branch, and the Emergency Services Branch. The breakdown of specialized tasks within the branches is listed in Figure 3. As the diagram suggests, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) would head the operations section of the deployed JIACG. Traditionally, OFDA has been the lead United States organization for coordination and delivery of international relief making OFDA the best qualified and obvious choice to head the operations section. To meet these new requirements, OFDA would require a significant increase in personnel as current USAID requirements fully incorporate the lean OFDA staff.

Also included in the diagram are recommended departments and agencies that should serve as the leads for those particular capabilities or stability and reconstruction functions. In regard to synchronizing its efforts with the military forces in the operating area, the Operations Section should be tied into the JTF operations directorate and the current operations section through liaison cells or even by co-locating the two sections, in order to maintain the same situational understanding of the current situation on the ground.

FIGURE 3. PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONS SECTION OF THE DEPLOYABLE JIACG



The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004

The above discussion speaks to the establishment of a two significant headquarters to direct interagency efforts during international crises. Manning these headquarters with the right mix of capable and experienced personnel could prove difficult mainly the result of a lack of qualified personnel available to deploy as part of a JIACG. One solution potentially rests in a bill recently introduced in the United States Senate by co-sponsors Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 addresses the deficiency of qualified and prepared civilian personnel able to respond to overseas crises and that the United States has placed an over-reliance on the military for executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. In his remarks introducing the bill, Senator Lugar stated:

> Our post-conflict efforts frequently have had a higher than necessary military profile. This is not the result of a Pentagon power grab or institutional fights. Rather, the military has led post-conflict operations primarily because it is the only agency capable of mobilizing large amounts of people and resources for these tasks.[11]

The inference in Senator Lugar's comments is that the civilian agencies within the government are not positioned to respond in sufficient numbers to overseas crises. The Senator continues:

> There should be improved standing capacity within the civilian agencies to respond to complex emergencies and to work in potentially hostile environments. The agencies must be capable and flexible enough to provide a robust partner to the military when necessary or to lead a crisis response effort when appropriate. The rapid mobilization of resources must be shared by the civilian agencies and the military.[12]

Combining the expeditionary qualities that Senator Lugar has identified with the professional expertise that resides in the various civilian departments and agencies in the United States Government would go a long way to solving the manning issues of the proposed JIACG organizations discussed above.

The Stability and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act specifically would address three areas of interest: the creation of the Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction, the establishment of a Response Readiness Force, and the establishment of an education program for personnel involved with stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction would fall under the State Department and would primarily be responsible for, "Monitoring, in coordination with relevant bureaus within the Department of State, political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international

[11] Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Joseph Biden, Remarks introducing the "Stabilizations and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act 0f 2004, Congressional Record – Senate," (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, February 25, 2004) S. 2127.

[12] Senator Lugar, S 2127.

assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction of countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife."[13] The new office would also have responsibilities that included the assessment of capabilities within the executive agencies available for stabilization and reconstruction operations, planning for the full spectrum of activities involved in conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations, and coordinating with appropriate Executive agencies when developing mobilization and deployment plans for interagency contingency plans. The Office for International Stabilization and Reconstruction would become the focal point for planning, mobilizing, deploying, and assessing United States efforts during stability and reconstruction operations.[14]

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 requires the creation of a Response Readiness Force (RRF). The RRF would have two components, the first of which, the Response Readiness Corps, would consist of up to two hundred fifty additional personnel from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State to "provide assistance in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations,"[15] in overseas crises. The Secretary of State and the Administrator for USAID would be responsible for the recruitment, hiring, and training of these personnel. The second component of the RRF, the Response Readiness Reserve, would maintain a roster of capable and qualified federal employees from throughout the government that would volunteer to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Readiness Response Reserve would also maintain a minimum of 500 additional non-federal employees that would volunteer to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations, provided they had the training and skills required to support these operations.[16]

The third critical element that the new bill addresses is the establishment of a "stabilization and reconstruction curriculum for use in programs of the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, and the United States Army War College."[17] The curriculum would include topics regarding the global security environment, lessons from previous international experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations, an overview of the responsibilities of the various executive agencies and the international resources available to support stabilization and reconstruction operations, foreign language training, and training exercises dealing with simulated stabilization and reconstruction operations.

According to Senator Lugar, the curriculum serves two purposes: "to bring together civilian and military personnel to enhance their stabilization and reconstruction skills and increase their ability to work together in the field."[18] The latter purpose is the more important of the two, as it attempts to take the military's view of jointness and joint education to a national level by bringing together in a

[13] Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004, Congressional Record – Senate (Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004) Sec. 59.(a)(3)(A).

[14] "Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004," Sec. 59.(a)(3).

[15] "Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004," Sec. 7.(c)(1).

[16] "Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004," Sec. 7.(c)(2).

[17] "Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004," Sec. 8.(g)(1).

[18] Senator Lugar, S 2127.

training environment the various military, federal civilian, and non-federal civilian leaders of efforts that may find themselves working side by side during stabilization and reconstruction operations. In addition to providing a common understanding of the national effort required and possible during stabilization and reconstruction operations, this educational setting will provide a unique forum for the various individuals and communities involved to 'cross-pollinate' with civil servants, members of the armed forces, or civilian professionals that they may never have had to work closely with in the past.

If passed by the Congress and placed into law by the President, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 would provide a larger pool than currently exists to fill the critical positions on a deployable JIACG headquarters and effectively accomplish the mission of the JIACG. More significant than that; however, is that this bill recognized that the United States currently maintains a deficit of quality individuals trained to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations and takes steps to address this deficit.

Conclusion

The United States' effectiveness in stability and reconstructions operations will serve as the true measure of success in overseas engagement for the United States in current and future operations throughout the world. Because of its standing National Security Strategy, its desire to win the war against global terrorism, and the fact that certain regions in the world are saddled with an ever present humanitarian tragedy, the United States will be tied to an increasing requirement to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future. To meet this increasing requirement, the United States will need to do more than employ the might of its military forces. The United States Senate has already taken the first step by proposing the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act, but to maximum the potential of its elements of national power, the Unites States must establish a framework for coordinating and employing its strengths as a nation. The creation of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group with a deployable capability designed to operationalize the elements of United States national power is the next step in this effort.

LtCol Van Opdorp is an infantry officer currently serving as the Inspector-Instructor of 2nd Bn 25th Marines. This article was written as a student at the US Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting.

Reinventing the Counterinsurgency Wheel

Maj Adam Strickland, USMCR

Just as early philosophers sought answers to questions concerning the essence of life, for over two thousand years military strategists and theorists have sought answers to the most basic questions on warfare. To this end, men such as Sun Tzu in the 4th Century B.C.E. with *The Art of War*, and General Carl Von Clausewitz in the 19th Century A.C.E. with *On War* completed works that remain the standards by which all military thought emanates and is compared, and from which nearly every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine are taught. Similarly, men such as General Sir Frank Kitson[1], Sir Robert Thompson[2], Ernesto Guevara[3], and Chairman Mao Zedong[4] each completed seminal works on insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 1930s, 60s and 70s that should be utilized in the same manner and with the same respect as Clausewitz; however, receive little attention from military theorists and concept writers today. As the military struggles with the application of limited resources against a seemingly endless demand for troops and leaders prepared for the rigors of counterinsurgency operations, countless persons have been tasked to investigate the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) as the military services struggle to produce new COIN doctrine[5] for our troops engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as no one would dare assert that they could articulate conventional military theory better than Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, no one should assume that any document produced will be more helpful or well-articulated than those already available by Thompson, Kitson, etc. on insurgency and counterinsurgency, and thus cease all efforts to reinvent the wheel and needlessly expend limited resources.

As one whom has regular contact with foreign officers representing nations with force contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan, I often get the opportunity to question my foreign peers as to their perceptions of ongoing operations in Iraq and US military doctrine/theory as a whole. Inevitably, I receive comments on how well read and well-educated the US officer corps is in comparison with our allied peers, and how envious others are on the premium we place on Professional Military Education (PME). What is remarkable *about* this is that the books and experiences that we as Americans study/review the most are those written by and about Europeans in counterinsurgency operations. While imitation remains the highest form of flattery, do we borrow liberally from our allies and there experience when writing doctrine? Of course not, we choose to start fresh, and attempt to write something "new" in hope that these "new" thoughts will somehow "fix" the "new" problems and challenges that face us in Iraq and elsewhere in the GWOT. The knowledge necessary for our leaders to

[1] Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* – 1971 and *Bunch of Five* - 1977

[2] Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons Learned from Malaya and Vietnam* - 1965

[3] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* – 1960

[4] Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare* - 1937

[5] Currently the US Army is working on FM 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations, United States Joint Forces Command on the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, and the USMC on developing a Counterinsurgency Concept.

successfully operate in the Iraqi insurgency is not as elusive as the media or others want you to believe. What our troops require is a simple understanding of Guevara's FOCO insurgency, and review of documents written by Thompson and others nearly 40 years ago.

Insurgency and "The Cause." At the risk of insulting the most knowledgeable insurgency theorists reading this article, let us review the situation in Iraq, and apply Thompson and Kitson's counterinsurgency fundamentals in order to review their continued validity. For the purpose of this article, we will utilize Dr. Thomas Mark's definition of insurgency as *an armed political movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from it, through the use of subversion and armed conflict.*[6] First, yes, Iraq is an insurgency, but not for the reasons you may think, nor for very much longer by conventional standards. Iraq is a matrix of insurgent groups, the most prominent of which represents a FOCO insurgency or one that forgoes the Maoist political indoctrination of the population in favor of small bands of guerrillas that attempt to achieve military success against State forces.[7] Because of this, they do not need to clearly articulate an alternative political vision, and in fact, will be more successful if they do not. Always remember what Chairman Mao said, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," thus a clearly defined political program is not necessary from the outset. Violence and confrontation become the cause. Wounding the pride, power, and prestige of a nation and people that you believe have undervalued your personal and cultural worth, and emasculated your religion becomes the cause. Thompson warns *there is always some issue, which has an appeal to each section of the community, and, even if dormant, an inspired incident may easily revive it in acute form.*[8] Have we not witnessed this as a result of the Abu Ghurayb incident, fighting around the Shrine of Ali, failure to fulfill promises, or with reports of the desecration of the Koran? Kitson said it best in 1971, when he wrote; *insurgents start with nothing but a cause and grow to strength, while the counter-insurgents start with everything but a cause and gradually decline in strength to a point of weakness.*[9] Has this held true in Iraq or Afghanistan?

In Iraq, what may tip this FOCO insurgency into a semi-failed State scenario is the continued and unhindered flow of foreign fighters into the country. Once these 3rd country nationals become a majority, this will no longer be an insurgency. To counter this "jihaadist cause" or movement, one must ask as Thompson instructed in 1965, *what is the appeal of the insurgency, and why are young men in particular attracted to its cause?*[10] Thompson further asked, *how do guerrilla forces survive, and even threaten to prevail over, large-scale conventional forces supported by countries whose power, wealth and good intentions are seemingly invincible?*[11] Though written in 1965, are these questions no longer valid as *applied* to the Iraqi Insurgency? If your answer is yes, they are still valid, then ask

[6] Dr. Thomas Marks, "Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism," *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International*, Volume 11, No. 2,2004, page 47.
[7] *Note to the Reader*: When Castro and Guevara headed for the Sierra Maestra Mountains to begin launching attacks against Bautista's Cuban forces, their group consisted of only 16 insurgents.
[8] Thompson, page 21.
[9] Kitson, page 29.
[10] Thompson, page 13.
[11] Thompson, page 13.

yourself, why have you not heard these articulated before now?

Thompson asserts that there are three main forces that influence the people of a country: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, and material well-being and progress.[12] If we accept these as the factors we must influence in order to be successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, what does this mean? What this means is that in Iraq, the Coalition must convince 99% of Iraqis to forego any differences they may feel as Kurds, Shia, and Sunni in order to pursue the common good of being Iraqis first. It means that we must convince millions of Sunni that there best option is to submit to the majority rule of two disparate groups that they have collectively raped, murdered, and subjugated since 1979. What it means is that we must now convince a people that were artificially slammed together into a nation called Iraq after WWI, and thus never had the opportunity of self determination, that their best option remains with the other groups in a nation called Iraq. Iraq is NO different than the former Yugoslavia, Trans-Jordan, Palestinian Mandate, or Czechoslovakia in this manner. Next, it means that we must convince them that not only do we (the coalition) respect Iraqi and Islamic society, but that they should respect each other's cultures as well. I cannot imagine that it could be so difficult rectifying the 1300+-year-old split between the Sunni and Shi'a, or demonstrating our heart-felt concern from behind the walls or inside many of Saddam's old palaces, natural symbols of democracy. Finally, we must convince them that whatever perception they might have, our first priority is to ensure their material well-being, thus ensuring that they are as safe in person and property as Americans. This continues to be the most difficult of all the difficult tasks listed above. First, the infrastructure in Iraq is primitive bordering on non-existent. Thus turning on sewage plants, drinking water treatment stations, and electrical production facilities has proven difficult. Violence remains an issue; however when put in the context of the number of homicides or attempted homicides in the US, the figures in Iraq are not unacceptable.

Now that we know what to focus, we must determine on whom to focus? While an admitted *f*an of Gladwell's idea of connectors, mavens, and *salesmen*,[13] I will stick with Kitson and Thompson, and refer to the groups they call naturals, the converted, and the deceived.[14] Has anyone ever heard of insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan referred to in these terms? Probably not, but you have most likely heard the terms extremists, radicals, Jihaadists, or terrorists. Extremists and terrorists are most likely naturals, or individuals that have been indoctrinated with a level of hate and violence that makes them impervious to new ideas or to question the validity or merit of their actions. To these individuals, terror is acceptable to achieve their desired end state. Jihaadists are individuals that have been converted or convinced that they should put down their plow or pen in order to pick up a weapon and join the crusade against the West. These include those who convert because of abuse or perceived abuse of power such as that which occurred at Abu Ghurayb Prison, or that was reported to have occurred at the detention facility board Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba.

[12] Thompson, page 63.

[13] Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point*, 2003.
[14] Thompson, page 35.

The deceived are comprised of folks from the above categories, but also from those that fall victim to propaganda or are misled into action. These folks usually contain a disproportionately high number of young people, the less educated, and those who wish to fight authority. Included within the ranks of the deceived are those that have committed one act of subversion or a single act of hostility, and have now been convinced that there is no turning back and that they are wanted men by the naturals and converted. Once this happens, the deceived become converts.

Principles of COIN. Thompson clearly articulates his COIN theory with the following five principles:

1. *The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.*[15] Ask yourself, what is our aim in Iraq? Is it a free-democratic Iraq from which we have unconditional access to hydrocarbons, or is it a free-Iraq congruent with the present free-Saudi Arabia and free-Pakistan? How do we expect to unite a country that has only been united since the end of World War I, and was only done so by the British for greater access to hydrocarbons? Keep in mind that through Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch, we encouraged the cultural and societal division we now witness in Iraq by establishing three Iraqs within one.
2. *The government must function in accordance with the law.*[16] When defining rule of law, we must ask ourselves, whose law and what law? Furthermore, how does one adhere to the rule of law with no functioning judiciary? How does one expect to convince the majority of the citizens in Iraq, the Shi'a to accept a secular system of law that is alien to them, regardless of the amount of say-so they have in the process now versus under Saddam? In Afghanistan, should we have an expectation that farmers will not grow heroin in order to feed their families simply because we cannot control the demand for it internally? How has this expectation or course of action worked in Latin America? Well, one only needs to ask the ex-Presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador, or the soon to be ex-President of Peru. Should we expect warlords that maintain larger forces than the national forces of Afghanistan to submit to the will of individuals who have neither the will nor muscle to make them comply? Here in the US, does the average citizen believe that the detention facility is in accordance with the rule of law?
3. *The government must have an overall plan.*[17] Though we have been engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, and spent hundreds of billions of dollars, could the average American clearly articulate what our plan is in these countries? Could the average soldier tell you more than that our plan is Iraqification? If you can't tell what the plan is, can you assess how it is progressing? Could the average American tell you what the plan was in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Guatemala, or El Salvador? If not, why not? Is it because you lack the appropriate information to formulate an answer? If so, does this not violate principle number one, the government must have a clear political aim that surely has been clearly articulated? How does this overall

[15] Thompson, page 50.
[16] Thompson, page 52.
[17] Thompson, page 55.

plan account for the influx of foreign fighters or general border control? If it is not reasonable for us to secure our own borders from illegal immigrants, should we expect it to be reasonable in Iraq?

4. *The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.*[18] What is our priority in Iraq, is it not to defeat the insurgents by kill/capture missions and large decisive operations such as Operation Phantom Fury and Operation Matador? Does this not violate this principle? Are these missions consistent with Thompson's four phases or clearing, holding, winning, won operations? If Iraq is truly a FOCO insurgency with no real political aim, then the key becomes defeating the subversion period, and not the guerrillas. How do you defeat the subversion, you remain in a perpetual state of offensive operations that creates the dilemma in which the guerrillas expend resources simply trying to survive. You create an environment where survival becomes the insurgents' main goal.

5. *In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.*[19] Ask yourself do you think Baghdad is secure? Next, if we define the home base as the entity known as Iraq, how secure are the borders? Again, we find ourselves in violation of the most basic principles of COIN. If we utilize the Afghanistan example, ask yourself, how much of the country do we actually have physical control over? If one can only secure 75% of a country, should we not expect the insurgency to continue without end? In Colombia, the insurgents maintain entire sections of the country under their control. Is this the "success story" we want to utilize for an example of how to do things in Afghanistan and Iraq? How safe are our national borders from physical and psychological attack?

Conclusion. There is a growing perception among US and foreign officers that due to the fact that we have not achieved a total success in restoring civil order, rule of law, and absolute security in Iraq, that many theorists have begun asserting that this is due to the new threat, new challenge, newness, etc. that now confronts us. It is inconceivable to these people that what we are seeing in Iraq has happened countless times throughout history to other dominant nations. This is of course senseless, as we face nothing "new" in Iraq in regards to COIN, and therefore, continue to try to develop the wrong cure for the wrong diagnosis. Based off this assumption, we need to search for answers in documents published by the USMC such as FMFRP 12-18 *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla War* and FMFRP 12-25 *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him* as well as documents listed above. For all those that believe Thompson is outdated, I ask only for you to review this one fact. Before deploying to Iraq in January of 2004, I purchased a used copy of *Defeating Communist Insurgency* for $30. A colleague of mine tried to purchase the same book this past week, or 18 months later, and copies, if you can find one, are now selling for close to $100. You draw your own conclusions.

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[18] Thompson, page 55.
[19] Thompson, page 57.

Law of Occupation and Democracy

By LCDR James Kraska

INTRODUCTION

Lost amid the international politics that defined the Iraq war, the preceding diplomatic maneuvering in the United Nations (UN) and the lingering legal debate over *jus ad bellum*, is the maturation and globalization of an Anglo-American doctrine of democratic occupation. A century in construction, the principle that occupying powers have a duty to introduce democracy into an occupied non-democratic state was once quite unsettled; today it has achieved the status of a new global norm. In Part II, this manuscript briefly traces the law of occupation regarding activities that may be taken by the occupying power to impose regime change in non-democratic occupied states. Part III relates some of the milestones in Anglo-American occupation of foreign territories, particularly in regard to early American occupation experiences. These practices coalesced into a doctrine of democratic occupation that has achieved global acceptance; the emergence of this norm is discussed in Part IV. The Anglo-American experience transposes the rather conservative state of the law of occupation with the emergence of the new expectations of democratic governance. The fact that state practice has departed from the traditionalist Hague law has been identified previously.[1] The contribution of this piece is to suggest that the source of the new norm of democratic occupation unfolded from British and American state practice. With the UN's Chapter VII actions in Somalia and Haiti in the early-1990s, the doctrine of democratic occupation reached global recognition and approval.

THE LAW OF OCCUPATION AND REGIME CHANGE

Occupation may be defined as effective control of a state or international organization over the territory to which that power has no sovereign title, and without the volition of the sovereign of that territory.[2] The law of occupation, which attained maturation at the end of the 19th century, was codified in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV. Article 43 of the text operates as a mini-constitution for occupation administration;[3] it says occupying powers are to "take all measures... to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."[4] In the authentic The French text, "public order and safety," is broader, "*l'ordre et la vie publics*," referring to the entire social and commercial life of the occupied community.[5] In most modern cases, the political regime resident in the occupied state is responsible for the underlying cause of regional instability that lead to occupation in the first place, and radical

[1] Eyal Benvinisti, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 6 (*Reprinted* 2004) (1993).

[2] Benvinisti at 4.

[3] Benvinisti at 9.

[4] Article 43, Annex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague Convention No. IV, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295, T.S. No. 539, reprinted in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 80-81 (3rd ed. 2000).

[5] Henry Wheaton, WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 783 (Arthur Barriedale Keith ed., 6th Eng. ed. 1929).

change in governance is needed. Writing in 1953, Quincy Wright presciently observed that absolutism has an undeniable historic association with international tensions, military destruction, the impoverishment of peoples, and the persecution of minorities.[6] Empirical research over the last decade strongly supports the phenomenon of the "democratic peace," the theory that democracies rarely initiate aggressive war and generally are more peaceful and cooperative.[7] By generating humanitarian crises at home and destabilizing regional security, non-democratic regimes create conditions for war and subsequent invasion and occupation. Stabilizing these states is only possible if the architecture of existing law and authority is transformed.

The experience of military occupations in the aftermath of World War II ignited an effort to amend the law of occupation. The post-war leaders of the major powers, confronted with restructuring the odious German and Japanese regimes, sought to use the negotiations at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva to expand the latitude of the occupying power to effect political change in the occupied state.[8] The second paragraph of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention introduced a new innovation into the law of occupation by recognizing that the occupying power may impose provisions which are "essential" to fulfilling the humanitarian obligations of the Convention, such as maintaining orderly government in the occupied territory and ensuring the security of the occupied force. The preceding paragraph in Article 64 focuses on the occupying power's ability to repeal or suspend the penal laws in the occupied state and suggests that the sweeping changes afforded in the second paragraph are to be read narrowly, to include only penal laws. A broader interpretation is that the adjective "penal" is absent form the second paragraph of Article 64, and that Article 64 emerged as a new grant of expansive authority for the occupying power to change the laws.[9] This broader reading of Article 64 is consistent with the rest of the Convention, which imposes a duty on the occupying power to fulfill an extensive range of liberal humanitarian obligations.[10] In light of subsequent state practice over the last fifty years, the broader interpretation is authoritative, representing a sharp departure from the axiom contained in the Hague Regulations to respect the laws in force at the time of occupation.[11] This change in state practice emerged from the experiences of British and American occupation, and is discussed in Part III, below.

[6] Quincy Wright, *Economic and Political Conditions of World Stability*, 13 J. ECON. HIST. 363, 366 (autumn 1953).
[7] Bruce Russett, the Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations at Yale University, is the founder of modern "democratic peace" theory. See, e.g., Bruce Russett, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993).
[8] Benvinisti at 98.
[9] Benvinisti at 101.
[10] The people in the occupied territory are protected by a "bill of rights" in GC IV, including, *inter alia*, protection from having their rights stripped through changes in government or sovereignty (Article 47). Roberts and Guelff at 317-322.
[11] This is so, even though Article 154 of GC IV provides that the treaty merely supplements, rather than supplants, the Hague Regulations. This "back door" to the Hague Regulations was promoted by the smaller powers, Belgium and the Netherlands in particular, as presumptive occupied states, in order to preserve the authority of their existing regimes should they be occupied. Benvinisti at 98. None the less, state practice has tended to support a liberal reading of Article 64, diminishing the impact of the Hague Regulations.

Anglo-American Occupation and Democracy

English Freemen provided fidelity to the rather ambiguous Greek concept of *demokratia* when they signed the Magna Carta in 1215, demanding rights as against the government and secured to them by laws binding on the king.[12] In the early United States, the Declaration of Independence memorialized the principle that government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed. Democracy was a central feature of American foreign policy in the twentieth-century, providing the basis for entering World War I—"to make the world safe for democracy"[13]—and creating a template for restructuring Germany and Japan in 1945. For its part, Britain contributed to the democratic project in Germany, and was remarkably successful in instilling democratic governance in its colonies prior to granting them independence.[14]

Over the last century, the great powers occupied other states for a variety of reasons, including conversion of their neighbor's land and seizure of selected strategic and economic territories. The United States has occupied more than 20 countries during this time,[15] beginning with its occupation of the Philippines in 1898. From the vantage of this first American occupation, spreading democracy became a goal—and gradually the central goal—of American warfare. Even U.S. participation with European powers in occupying port areas in China in the wake of the crumbling of the Manchu Dynasty was marked by a sincere, if entirely naïve, expectation that China's mostly illiterate four hundred million people were on the cusp of democracy.[16] The United States is singularly unique in that in every case of military occupation, U.S. forces attempted to leave behind functioning democratic institutions.

For Spain, the Philippines were colonial possessions, and occupation meant a strategic window on the Pacific, as well as an opportunity to extend ecclesiastical authority to an unconverted population. The U.S. approach to administration in Manila was radically different, opening the government to Filipino popular rule almost immediately.[17] By 1907, the United States had established a Philippine Assembly. The progressive style of American administration drew opposition from European states that thought it undercut their authority to rule colonial possessions in the Far East,[18]

[12] William D. Guthrie, MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER ADDRESSES 6-7 (Columbia University Press, 1916).
[13] Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler, THE WORLD IN THE CRUCIBLE: 1914-1919 256 (1984).
[14] Samuel P. Huntington, *Will Countries Become More Democratic?* 99 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 206 (Summer 1984).
[15] These countries include Afghanistan, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Grenada, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, South Korea, and South Vietnam.

[16] When Dr. Sun Yat-Sen was elected President of the provisional Republic established at Nanking in 1912, he was welcomed into power by a Joint Resolution of Congress: "Whereas the Chinese Nation has successfully asserted that sovereignty resides in the people…[the United States therefore] congratulates the people of China on their assumption of … self-government." Barbara W. Tuchman, STILLWELL AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1911-1945 40-41 (1970).
[17] James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippines Since the Inauguration of the Philippine Assembly*, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 811, 817 (July 1917).
[18] One of the primary concerns about Filipino self-government was whether another European power would step into the vacuum if the United States left too early. One of the American goals was to make the Philippines a permanently neutral state in Asian politics, analogous to Switzerland's position in Europe. James H. Blount, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES 647-655 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons 1912).

and from American critics who argued the Filipinos, who only recently were in armed revolt against the United States, were being given too free a hand in their own affairs.[19] Some wondered whether the Filipinos could ever rule themselves, having no experience in democracy. This reflected the historian Arnold Toynbee's assessment of the prospects for Italian democracy in 1922, when he sniffed, "the vague and abstract Greek word democracy, by which this peculiar institution of the medieval kingdom of England … has come to be known, slurred over the fact that parliamentarianism was a special local growth which could not be guaranteed to acclimatize itself in alien soil."[20] This theme would be repeated by detractors of democratizing occupations in nearly every quarter of the world, from the Far East to the Middle East—most recently regarding Iraq.

The Philippines would serve as the model for other U.S. occupations. Unlike the Europeans, American occupation was viewed as temporary, and a distraction from developing the vast reaches of the contiguous United States. American occupations were imperfect, often imperial affairs, but even the most neglectful had the goal of producing democratic change and promoted some advance in political development. In early August of 1915, for example, two thousand U.S. Marines strode ashore in Haiti, occupying Port –au–Prince for nearly twenty years. They were sent to fulfill President Wilson's mandate to "terminate the appalling condition of anarchy, savagery, and oppression" which had been prevalent in Haiti for decades.[21] When they arrived, 95–97% of the country was illiterate; by the time they left, the Marines had expanded the right to vote to include women, and presided over a series of progressively improving free elections.[22] Similarly, when the United States landed 20,000 troops in the Dominican Republic in 1965, one of the primary aims was to prevent a take–over of the government by revolutionary communists. But geo–strategic considerations were mixed with another key objective, which was to salvage the democratic process.[23] For the Anglo–American condominium, the spread of democracy is in the national interest, infusing realpolitik with a zealous righteousness.[24]

In a later Caribbean action, the replacement of an autocratic regime with a freely elected government was a key objective of Operation Urgent Fury, the occupation of Grenada by military forces of the United States and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The formal request from the OECS for American assistance sought to revive the nascent democratic process on the island,[25] and President Reagan[26] and UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick[27] each declared that a principle goal

[19] Id.
[20] As cited in, Joshua Muravchik, *Bringing Democracy to the Arab World*, 103 J. CURR. HIST. (January 2004) (2004 WL 67880094).

[21] Max Boot, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER (2002) 160-67.
[22] Hans Schmidt, THE UNITED STATES AND THE OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915-1934 191-94 (1971).
[23] A. J. Thomas, Jr. & Ann Van Wyen Thomas, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISES 1965 27-31 (John Carey, ed., Oceana Pub. 1967).
[24] Charles Krauthammer, DEMOCRATIC REALISM 16 (AEI Press, 2004).
[25] Thomas J. Romig, *The Legal Basis for United States Military Action in Grenada*, ARMY LAWYER (April 1985) 1, 13.
[26] *Invasion of Grenada*, N.Y. TIMES, October 26, 1983, A16 and A18.
[27] Richard Bernstein, *Grenada Debate Continues in UN*, N.Y. TIMES, October 27, 1983, A19.

of the invasion was a restoration of democracy. Similarly, the United States invaded Panama in December, 1989 after the corrupt leader Noriega nullified democratic elections in the country and Panamanian Defense Forces murdered a U.S. Marine. The goals for the invasion were to protect U.S. citizens, bring Noriega to justice for narcotics trafficking, maintain free navigation in the Panama Canal and to restore democracy. Each of these objectives was achieved.[28] Well before the end of the Second World War and persisting through the end of the Cold War, the United States was embarked on a project of democratic globalization. Military occupation was a primary means of achieving American grand strategy.

The British had fewer modern military occupations, but their imperial hubris steeped democratic norms throughout the commonwealth. Among the imperial powers, by far the most effective colonial administration was run from London, benefiting from the peculiarly British approach to governance. Although the liberal tradition emerged from a fusion of both English and French political theory in the 19th century,[29] the two traditions demarcate separate philosophical space. French revolutionary thinkers were optimistic about human nature, believing in the power of intellectuals to rearrange society. Paris built its colonial administrations to reflect that view. The English were more pessimistic, seeking to design institutions that would control human nature, and their style of colonial administration adopted checks and balances. The English view, derived from a group of Scottish moral philosophers including David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke, is essentially empiricist. The French approach is informed by Cartesian rationalism and the Enlightenment. Its most notable progenitor is Rousseau.[30]

English colonial administration found the essence of freedom in spontaneity, organic growth in society and the absence of coercion. The soul of the French approach lay in the pursuit and enforcement of an absolute and collective purpose defined by doctrinaire deliberateness, which met with disastrous consequences. By the early 1980s, no former French (or Dutch or Belgian) colony was rated "free" by Freedom House, yet several former British colonies were. "[E]very single country in the Third World that emerged since the Second World War with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience [was] a former British colony."[31]

The Anglo-American experience of democratic occupation was imperfect, and it was not the sole basis for any occupation, including Afghanistan and Iraq. Democracy, however, was a central and undeniable goal, and this made Anglo-American occupations unique. The moral and diplomatic force of this approach, and the example set by Washington and London, would earn acceptance as a global norm. The elevation of the principle of democratic occupation was first displayed in the UN-sanctioned occupations of Somalia and Haiti after the Cold War, which are discussed in Part IV.

[28] John T. Fishel, THE FOG OF PEACE: PLANNING AND EXECUTING THE RESTORATION OF PANAMA 2 (1992).
[29] F. A. Hayek, *Freedom, Reason and Tradition*, LXVIII ETHICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 229, 229-230 (July 1958).
[30] Id.
[31] Myron Weiner, *Empirical Democratic Theory*, in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., COMPARATIVE ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 26 (1983).

Democratic Occupation as a Global Norm

While native and tribal forms of community dialogue and decision-making have local importance, such as the *jirga* in Afghanistan, the *panchaya*t in India, or the *shoora* in Islamic societies,[32] the transcendence of democracy into a normative principle of the law of occupation is a product of Anglo-American state practice. The rise of democratic occupation as a global norm was accomplished through a relentless campaign of Anglo-American public diplomacy and foreign policy. By 1991, the National Security Strategy of the United States had shifted from its Cold War foundation to clearly articulate the nurturing of democracy as a one of the key American security goals abroad.[33] Only a few years later, President Clinton's National Security Strategy in 1996 placed democracy at the center of national security—mentioning the word "democracy" more than 70 times.[34]

Throughout the early-1990s, the UN remained rather ambivalent about democracy, and only in the last few years has it gravitated away from agnosticism, or even outright hostility. The word "democracy" does not appear in the Charter of the United Nations. Neither is it mentioned in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[35] nor in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[36] although the latter document refers to human freedom, including freedom of religion and assembly. Like the charter of the International Monetary Fund, the Articles of Agreement for each of the five organizations comprising the World Bank do not mention of democracy. It was only in December, 1988, that the UN General Assembly finally declared that political legitimacy requires democracy; authority to govern is based on the will of the people, expressed in periodic and genuine free elections.[37]

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy began to acquire the status of a global norm of political governance.[38] Prior to the end of the Cold War, UN administrative and peacekeeping missions often included perfunctory language encouraging representative government, but the efforts were still captive to the struggle for national liberation. In addition to the East-West division of the Cold War, effective UN action was impeded by the prevailing de-colonization paradigm that had dominated the world body since the early-1960s.[39] The archetype of the new democratic occupation was Somalia. The humanitarian intervention saved perhaps a million lives that would have been lost to famine, but because it failed in all of its state-

[32] UN Development Program, Human Development Report 1992: Global Dimensions of Human Development 26 (Oxford University Press 1992).
[33] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August 1991).
[34] The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 1996).
[35] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
[36] Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, December 19, 1948, U.N. GAOR, Part I, Resolutions (Doc A/810) at 72-76 (1948).
[37] Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, UN G.A. Res. A/RES/43/157, December 8, 1988 (1988).
[38] Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve 40 (1999).
[39] For example, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX) of December 12, 1974, identified the rights of states to eliminate "colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination … ." See also, Benvinisti, 184-187.

building objectives, it might easily be overlooked. The initial UN efforts proved incapable of providing adequate security for humanitarian activities, and the Security Council subsequently authorized a U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF).[40] At the urging of the United States,[41] the UN mission was expanded in UNOSOM II to include an expression of readiness to assist the people of Somalia in taking, "steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions… ."[42] This was a dramatic development, marking the first time the United Nations began to suggest democracy was a goal of a UN operation under Chapter VII; it would serve as a legal template for future operations, and the language would become even stronger and more insistent.

The next UN peacekeeping operation got underway even before the last troops were out of Somalia. In Haiti, several factors coalesced to strengthen and promote the democracy doctrine. First, the intervention was precipitated by the ousting of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a military coup, generating the imprimatur of saving a nascent democracy from the outset. Second, President Clinton made the restoration of democracy the principle American objective.[43] Third, Haiti was a relatively permissive environment, so there were likely to be few casualties among the Americans, who made up the largest contingent of the international force. Because the country is in close proximity to the United States, the logistical operation was guaranteed to be fairly easy, and inaction raised the potential for large numbers of refugees flooding the Bahamas or the U.S. naval station in Cuba. Immediate action was essential. On July 31st, 1994, the Security Council called on Haiti to restore "free and fair legislative elections"[44] The democracy-forcing aspect of the Haiti intervention solidified and expanded the progress made in the Security Council's work on Somalia.

V. Conclusion

The British Liberal conscience that convinced London to interrupt the slave trade in the 19th century migrated to the administration of her colonies. This liberalism ignited the Wilsonian strand of American foreign policy, which actually pre-dated its presidential namesake—emerging as a powerful influence on American foreign policy at the dawn of the 20th century.[45] Anglo-American occupations tended to be democratizing; the force of their morality and authority shaped globally accepted norms of occupation, including the construction of Geneva Convention IV. By the time of the UN actions in Somalia and Haiti in the early 1990s, the doctrine of democratic occupation had quietly but firmly become ensconced as a global normative value.

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[40] UN SC Resolution S/RES/794 of December 3, 1992 (1992).
[41] James Dobbins, et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq 66-67 (2003).
[42] UNSC Resolution 814 S/RES/814, March 26, 1993 (1993).
[43] Dobbins, et al, at 72.
[44] UNSC Resolution 940, S/RES/940, July 31, 1994 (1994).
[45] Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World 137 (2001).

The Rule of Law and Expeditionary Operations

By Maj Karl Rohr

The purpose of this essay is to examine the legal requirements for establishing the Rule of Law (ROL) during United States Marine Corps expeditionary operations. The focus is on the role of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as an enabling force, establishing a stable security situation for follow-on force deployment. The discussion will center on stability and support actions that could be taken during the first 3 to 9 months in the immediate and temporary rear area created by Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) operations. Specifically, how can the MAGTF operate as an occupation force or as a civil affairs administration to implement a temporary military government?

OCCUPATION AND CIVIL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION

According to the Law of Armed Conflict the rules and regulations of occupation apply only to belligerently occupied areas. But as a matter of policy, U.S. forces will observe these as far as possible in all foreign districts under military control. This section discusses how the Marine Corps applies these rules and regulations of occupation in various situations.

The Marine Corps has many options for how to intervene. Each may have a different requirement according to the Geneva Conventions. If the goal of invasion is to insert a flying column or raiding party to destroy or disrupt the enemy's warfighting capability, without the intent to seize key terrain, then the rules and obligations of occupation do not apply because the force cannot be said to be occupying.[1] If the goal of a landing is to seize and hold key terrain for use by follow on forces, then occupation has occurred and the rules and regulations apply.[2]

When the U.S. has been invited to intervene in regions that are ungovernable by the host nation or the United Nations, pursuant to an agreement or resolution, that district can be placed under Civil Affairs Administration. Civil Affairs Administration is not occupation. However, the MAGTF would utilize occupation rules as a guide until such an agreement was implemented.[3]

If a U.N. mandate for intervention under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter exists, then the rules of occupation would not apply.[4] If the intervention falls under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the MAGTF would be obligated to apply the rules of occupation as these operations fall under the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).[5] There is some ambiguity in this realm; particularly in operations considered Chapter VI and a half, or operations that fall somewhere between peacekeeping and enforcement operations. What the British call wider peacekeeping.[6] If the MAGTF were to engage in combat operations where terrain was seized and held it would not technically be an occupation.[7] However, MAGTF forces would be obligated to enforce the rules of occupation in

[1] MCRP 5-12.1A, Chpt 6
[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] UN DPKO, Art 2.
[5] UN DPKO, Art 2.
[6] Bellamy, pg. 129
[7] Park, pg. 6

the seized territory until such time as the U.N. or indigenous government would take control.[8] Including the requirement to establish the ROL over the region if the host nation is incapable of providing direct governance.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

A military government is a government imposed by force, where the law of war determines the legality of its acts. [9] Occupation does not transfer Sovereignty; the occupying power gains the authority to exercise limited sovereign like rights through the use of power in accordance to the law of war.[10] The establishment of a military government becomes necessary in both an invasion-based occupation and civil affairs based occupation when the legitimate government fails, or ceases to exist.

A military government is intended to administer areas occupied by force where the legitimate government no longer exercises its functions.[11] A military government is responsible as the representative of the occupying power to restore and maintain public order, ensure human rights and provide the rule of law to the occupied territory.[12] The military government has the legal capacity to exercise limited sovereign like rights in order to accomplish the requirements of the ROL.

The MAGTF as an enabling force is responsible for setting the initial foundation. As such, the MAGTF must provide for the ROL in anticipation of follow on assets that will require time to organize and deploy to the theater. Therefore, the MAGTF is the most logical organization to establish the initial framework of a military government. Generically, the initial shock of the intervention will last two to three months. If the MAGTF doesn't use this period of time to solidify control of rear areas and allows even tacitly the disobedience of law, the momentum will be lost and criminal gangs will become established.[13] The MAGTF will have failed as an enabling force if criminals are allowed to establish lawless zones while the international community organizes. To forestall this the MAGTF must have an organic capacity to manage a military government for up to 9 months. A deployable, temporary military governmental structure embedded in the MAGTF would better address the initial governance vacuum.

EXERCISE OF LIMITED SOVEREIGN LIKE RIGHTS

The Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) Order Number 2, Dissolution *of Entities,* is a recent exercise of sovereign like rights. With it Ambassador Bremer officially dissolved most of the former Iraqi regime entities. These organizations where in violation of international human rights laws; and posed a significant threat to the security of coalition forces and the non-combatant population. Thus, they could be dissolved as an exercise of limited sovereign like rights.

This exercise of limited sovereign like rights is a distinct change from historical occupations. Prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the U.S. saw military government as "***superseding*** as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law... ***Its exercise is***

[8] MCRP 5-12.1A Chpt 1, Sec I, Art. 8.
[9] MCRP 5-12.1A Chpt 6, Sec I. General, Art. 358, Nature of Government.
[10] ibid
[11] Geneva Conventions 1949, Art 6. & Art 45.
[12] Geneva Conventions 1949, Art 47 & Hague Regulations 1907 Art 43

[13] Stedman, pg. 303

sanctioned because the powers of sovereignty have passed into the hands of the commander of the occupying forces..."[14] The major differences between pre and post Geneva are that the state laws are not superseded and more importantly the sovereignty of the state remains inviolate.

An occupier may legally amend or repeal some laws and remove some officials when deemed a necessity for the public order and security. An occupier may not deprive the state of its sovereignty. In a Civil Affairs Administration, the host nation with possible U.N. assistance would retain all sovereign rights and the Commander of the MAGTF, Civilian Administrator or Military Governor could not make any changes without express permission.

A STABILE SECURITY SITUATION

The Marine Corps provided the lead elements for interventions in both Somalia and Haiti in the 1990's. After the Marines departed, for a host of reasons, these interventions failed. It is arguable however, that had the MAGTF been authorized and equipped to conduct ROL operations with the goal of establishing a stabile security environment from the start, the initial insertion of follow-on forces would have had a better chance for success.

The measures of effectiveness for a stabile security situation are the establishment of the ROL through a competent police, corrections and judicial system; the emplacement of an efficient civil service and professional bureaucracy; and the establishment of a professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian authority.[15] The intent is to provide temporary ROL for the affected region allowing the host nation and multi-national forces to develop and deploy the organizations necessary for long-term security and stability.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Transition is the critical time in a post conflict scenario where the legitimate state is weak and criminal gangs are able to capitalize on this.[16] Scratch made police and judiciaries are ineffective. Reusing pre-existing forces without retraining and vetting to remove the criminal and corrupt is problematic. Organizing and deploying international civilian police volunteers takes time.

The MAGTF will be the first military force on scene in both combat and humanitarian interventions. Its mission is to stabilize the situation prior to the arrival of coalition forces. This transition period begins immediately once terrain has been secured and continues until the MAGTF is relieved.

The responsibility generally falls to the Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC).[17] The mission of the JRAC is to protect the rear area and maintain sustained support to the joint force.[18] With this mission and under the auspices of the authority granted by the U.N., a Civil Affairs Treaty, and in accordance with the authority of sovereign like rights the MAGTF and the JRAC can implement ROL operations. This includes the establishment of a temporary

[14] USMC, Sec 13-2, pg. 1

[15] Bellamy pg 7
[16] Stedman, pg. 312
[17] JPUB 3-10 pp I5 – I7.
[18] JPUB 3-10, introduction, pg X

military government, with its attendant police and judiciary functions.[19]

In the initial response phase a review of the existing judicial system is critical. This review should identify the "indigenous legal professionals; select individuals for judicial positions; [&] establish a professional code of conduct for the judicial system."[20] It also includes a review of the systems infrastructure the physical courts, schools and libraries needed to run a judiciary. The next phase would be transformation that includes vetting, hiring and establishing legitimate legal professionals. In an invasion or intervention where the system has collapsed this would take some time.

In the Iraqi case, there were an estimated twenty thousand lawyers and one thousand judges operating under the Saddam Regime.[21] This organization was considered to be fairly impartial and devoid of undue governmental influence. There was a strong reservoir of candidates to re-initiate the legal profession even with CPA Order Number 1, *De-Ba'athification*. However, the process of getting even a skeleton system in place took ninety days and did not take full effect until six months after the invasion. Not until 13 September 2003, did the CPA re-establish the Iraqi Council of Judges. Until then no true centralized legal system existed in Iraq.[22] As a default, the coalition military had to take over this role—a role for which it was ill prepared.

Because the ROL is vital to security an enabling force should have a capability that can, in the extreme, act as the legitimate legal system or act somewhere in between as a monitoring, vetting and training organization. This system could follow the design of the U.S. Federal Court system. A judicial team could be deployed in each region seized. The team would comprise police, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and corrections, court administrators, codes and procedures for running a district office.[23] A regional appeals court would be established at the higher more centralized level to oversee a group of districts.[24] With this structure the JRAC would have the proper tools to accomplish his dual mission of security and support for the joint force and the MAGTF would accomplish its mission of enabling a stabile security situation for all follow on forces.

BALANCING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND SOVEREIGNTY

"A commanding general of occupied territory is charged with the duty of maintaining peace and order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property within the area of his command. His responsibility is coexistent with his area of command. He is charged with notice of occurrences taking place within that territory…dereliction of his duty rests upon him…" –The Nuremburg Tribunal

An invading force has to enforce the ROL in occupied territory, and can do so as an exercise of limited sovereign like rights. In order for the JRAC or a frontline commander to enforce the ROL, he must have the backing of a system of justice to deal with criminal non-combatants. The laws to be followed are those of the occupied or administered state that do

[19] MCWP 3-41.1, pg 2-17.
[20] Orr, pg. 325.
[21] Gordon
[22] CPA Order #35
[23] Orr, pg 323.
[24] Federal Judicial Center

not contradict international human rights laws and that do not prevent or interfere with the conduct of military actions. Law enforcement must be a priority in any intervention.

CONCLUSION

The MAGTF in the future will be called upon to intervene in states whose governments have collapsed.[25] In these lawless areas, regardless of the reason for intervention, the Marine Corps must be prepared to install temporarily aspects of government to establish a stabile security environment. This requires an impartial judicial system.[26] Having stand-by, rapidly deployable, expeditionary, transitional justice teams available is a necessity of 21st Century warfare. It would give the host nation and multinational support forces the opportunity to select, train and integrate a police and legal system deliberately over time not rushed and ad hoc.[27] If the judicial system is stood up too quickly, it risks collapse from corruption. If stood up too slowly the damage done may be irreparable. The MAGTF can enable the temporary relief necessary for the host nation to recover.

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[25] Norton
[26] Stedman pg. 311.
[27] Stedman pg. 321

Can the "War on Terror" Be Won?

Mr. Anthony Cormack

'The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.'

- Carl von Clausewitz

'While opinions are arguable, convictions need shooting to be cured.'

- T.E. Lawrence

The 'War on Terror' can and must be won. However, in order to do so the West – and, as keystone to the West's defences, the United States most of all – must undertake a fundamental and wide ranging re-assessment of the conflict in light of Clausewitz's timeless advice. Once the nature of the conflict is discerned, the means and ways to achieve victory will become more readily grasped. When seen in this light, it becomes self-evident that the 'war on terror' is not a war on terror – there can be no such thing – but a war against a distinct terrorist group, al Qaeda, and its affiliates, which is conducting a global insurgency campaign against the West. Although this Global Salafist Insurgency exhibits various distinctive characteristics, time-tested principles of counterinsurgency will provide the bedrock upon which a successful campaign can be formulated.

Al Qaeda's Islamic ideology is Salafism, a reactionary, fundamentalist doctrine that includes, but is not analogous with, Wahabbism.[1] Al Qaeda's aims include a thirst for the destruction of the West combined with the reunification of the Islamic Caliphate.[2] Below this level of ambition the group harbours several other goals, notably the expulsion of Western influence from Muslim lands in general and the Arabian Peninsula in specific.[3] However, their limited ability to deploy conventional force in pursuit of these ends has led them to adopt a strategy that resembles an insurgency, defined by David Galula as "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order".[4] They draw on the broad Muslim population for sanctuary and the ability to disappear from view, while building political support by propaganda and by deed – the 9/11 attacks could be viewed instructively through the lens of Che Guevara's *foco* theory (which posited the notion that spectacular deeds by

[1] Sageman (2004), pg. Vii and 1

[2] The precise extent of al Qaeda's aims are still being debated. However, whether the "near" or "far" enemy represents the main focus of al Qaeda's campaign does not alter the geostrategic reality.

[3] Gunaratna (2002), pp. 118-120.

[4] Galula (1964), p.4, Metz and Millen (2004), p.24, Mockaitis and Rich, eds. (2003), pp. 21-23

insurgent groups could generate support where none existed before and create the conditions for success).[5]

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen posit the existence of two varieties of insurgency, national and liberation.[6] The national insurgency is largely self-contained and involves domestic actors, drawing on domestic discontents. The liberation insurgency involves activity against the depredations of alien powers or occupiers, real or perceived. There is no single applicable model for either insurgency or counterinsurgency that guarantees success in all situations,[7] but the Global Salafist Insurgency most obviously fits the second mould, while incorporating aspects of both at different levels. All insurgencies display common factors, however. They are by their very nature protracted conflicts, in which insurgents will seek to erode the will, legitimacy and credibility of the counterinsurgent forces arranged against them. Barry Posen is correct in noting that the current conflict will be attritional in nature – the race will not be to the swift.[8] However, this should not lure the counterinsurgent to assume that there exists a finite number of insurgents who must simply be killed or captured to grasp victory. Adopting this mindset leads to a Sysiphean effort, in which insurgents are created faster than they can be killed.[9]

The search for a geographic centre of gravity for the conflict reveals an enormous potential zone of insurgent infiltration. See Figure 1. The broad "Arc of Turmoil"[10] that stretches from the Maghreb to Indonesia is likely to provide the key focus, due to the density of Islamic population, entrenched anti-Western sentiment and widespread presence of indigenous insurgent groups that al Qaeda could seek to co-opt. Al Qaeda views the West as the "far enemy" and corrupt, supposedly apostate Arab regimes as the "near enemy" – the two nurturing a symbiotic, mutually self sustaining relationship. The destruction of the "far enemy" is seen as a route to the destruction

FIGURE 1: MUSLIM DISTRIBUTION

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/muslim_distribution.jpg

[5] On *foco*, see Beckett (2001), pp.164-171. Freedman (2001-02), p.67 makes a fundamentally similar point, couched in different terms.
[6] Metz and Millen (2004), pp.2-3
[7] Failing to recognise this can result in involuntary retirement from both insurgency and breathing, as Che Guevara found out in trying to transfer Cuban *foco* to Bolivia.
[8] Posen (2001/2002), pp.42-43
[9] Galula (1964), pp.171-173
[10] Thanks to Michael P. Noonan for this provocative characterisation (personal correspondence with the author)

of the "near enemy" and vice versa. It is unlikely that al Qaeda could ever hope to develop to the extent of achieving a Maoist-style "equilibrium" and challenging the USA and her allies in the conventional forum.[11] However, the collapse of Arab oil regimes and Pakistan to Salafist forces would effectively grant the insurgents access to unlimited oil revenues (which could also be employed to coerce and compel the West) and Pakistani nuclear tipped rocketry.[12] Saudi Arabia and Pakistan should therefore be viewed as "geopolitically catalytic",[13] the collapse of either state having the potential to drastically alter the geostrategic landscape in the insurgents' favour. In addition to the Arc of Turmoil, there exist a number of other regions where insurgent infiltration is a possibility, especially if existing havens become untenable and they are forced to trade space for time. These include a broad belt of African territory – stretching from Mauritania to Somalia – that features thousand miles of largely unsecure border with the Maghreb, in combination with weak central governments, large and often restive Muslim populations and failing public education systems which provide ripe territory for the expansion of privately subsidised Salafist *madrasas;* much of South East Asia;[14] and Europe, where Muslim minorities can facilitate the covert existence of terrorist cells and provide a logistical support base. As zones of operation are gradually denied to the insurgents they can be expected to relocate to various parts of this geographical chessboard. The challenge for the West is to correctly discern regions of vulnerability and undertake preventive action to undermine the establishment of insurgent activities before they take root. The sheer size of the Arc of Turmoil alone indicates that the USA cannot go it alone – for practical, rather than ideological reasons. In order for the campaign to enjoy any chance of sustainability, regional governments must be co-opted and brought on board as often as possible and should do most of the heavy lifting. The US government's ongoing Pan Sahel Initiative provides a good working example of the sort of programme that should be expanded to help shore up friendly governments.[15] In the absence of a serious military contribution, the EU should be encouraged to provide funding for similar projects.

In reality, the centre of gravity for the successful prosecution of the conflict is not physical (eg. an opposing conventional army) but moral.[16] The West must deal with two moral centres of gravity – the Islamic world and the domestic population of the West itself. The former must be induced to move from a stance of neutralism or tacit support of the insurgents to support of the counterinsurgency effort. The latter's support for the conflict must be sustained, for the collapse of domestic opinion is fatal to the continuation of operations.[17] Al Qaeda's "liberation" insurgency, drawing on widespread resentment against the West, presents numerous grave problems in formulating a response. A key task for the West must be to alter the perception of the conflict by the Islamic world at large from a liberation insurgency to a national insurgency (in effect, a Muslim civil war). This will be difficult, as the West is at a natural disadvantage in the

[11] On "equilibrium", see Hamilton (1998), pp.77-79
[12] Ullman (2004), p.108
[13] Brzezinski (1997), p.40
[14] Abuza (2003)

[15] Details can be found at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm (accessed March 1st 2005)
[16] On moral centres of gravity, see Iron (2003), pp.114-118 and, tangentially, Hammes (2004).
[17] Merom (2003) and Inbar, ed. (2003), pp.3-20

propaganda war, both as an alien force and as the counterinsurgent.[18] Active Western interventions in the critical geostrategic spheres – most notably the band stretching from the Maghreb to Pakistan (Unfortunately, as Metz and Millen point out, insurgencies thrive best in societies with a large proportion of disaffected male youth and a conspiracy-friendly culture – both of which the Islamic – and particularly Arab – world features in spades[19]) – can be portrayed as imperialist occupation and the USA must juggle the inherent operational benefits of a large number of boots on the ground with the political desirability of presenting the smallest, most unobtrusive footprint possible.

There is nothing to say that the current conflict cannot be won. It will require the careful and prudent calibration of military, policing, intelligence and economic assets in a co-ordinated manner, with an eye to sustainability. The keys to successful counterinsurgency, as set out by three of the greatest theorist-practitioners[20], include, but are not limited to:

- Coordination between civil and military agencies – unity of purpose.
- Intelligence-led operations
- Sustained "hearts and minds" campaigns
- Defeating political subversion is more important than defeating insurgents themselves
- Support from the population is necessary but conditional
- Counterinsurgency is resource and effort intensive and requires economy of force

Whether the current approach adopted by the Bush administration meets these requirements is open to debate.[21] However, nothing – including the Iraq campaign – that has taken place since September 2001 need be fatal to the West's ultimately successful prosecution of the war. But the first step to victory is for the West to recognise the nature of the conflict in which it is embroiled – quite literally the biggest Small War in history.

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[18] Galula (1964), pp.14-15 Metz and Millen (2004), p.28
[19] Metz and Millen (2004), pp. 4-6. On Muslim demographics, see Simon and Benjamin (2001/2002), pp.13-14. On Islamic conspiracy paranoia, see Pipes (1998)
[20] Galula (1964), Kitson (1991) and Thompson (1966)
[21] Record (2003), pp. v-vi. For a more sanguine view, see Colin Gray in Booth and Dunne, eds. (2002), pp.226-234

Book Review

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Counterinsurgency in Africa

Author: **Dr. John P. Cann**
ISBN: 0313301891
Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
Publication Date: 2/28/1997

The first comprehensive account in English of how Portugal prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success.

"Cann, who served in the Pentagon, lays out the story with an eye to contrasts with U.S. policy. His study...is concise and useful." – Choice

"The book will be embraced in Portugal, where the parade of celebrations marking the five-century anniversary of Portugal's maritime expansion prepared audiences for Cann's reinterpretation of the colonial war experience in a more positive light." –African History

The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous wars.

Book Review

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The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America

Author: **Kenneth M. Pollack**
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Random House
Publication Date: 12/3/2004

Kenneth Pollack, who also wrote "The Threatening Storm – the Case for Invading Iraq", has produced a rich history of Iran's internal development and relations with the world.

Reviewed by LTC Bill Bennett

Kenneth Pollack, who also wrote "The Threatening Storm – the Case for Invading Iraq", has produced a rich history of Iran's internal development and relations with the world. Readers will find it useful in understanding the complex roots (historical, economic, psychological, etc) of the conflict between the US and Iran. Beyond Iran's history – which is necessary background to frame the issues – the book's strength is the final chapter where Pollack lays out several options for US policymakers. As he convincingly states, Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons may be "the problem from Hell", but we cannot take the approach of "minimizing our involvement with Tehran while trying to minimize Iran's ability to cause problems for us." Pollock points out that while this tactic has appealed to nearly every US administration since 1979, it has always failed…..usually with negative consequences for both sides. Simply put, the US must engage proactively with an Iran that is aggressively seeking nuclear weapons.

Pollack lays out a number of strategic options, including: invasion (which he completely rejects), covert action to effect regime change (also unsupportable), a counterproliferation strike against nuclear facilities (an option, but with many serious complications), and a "Grand Bargain", whereby both sides would make significant concessions to reach a comprehensive settlement of their differences. While the last option is attractive in theory, there is little to suggest it will be successful with the hardliners in charge in Tehran. After discussing these and other options, Pollack ends the book with three policy "tracks" which are informed by these strategic choices.

Pollack's interesting book is a great source for the warfighter trying to put Persian Gulf issues into perspective. Without a doubt, US diplomacy with Iran will affect (either positively or negatively) heavily engaged US warfighters in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, Iran is the textbook example of a problem that warfighters usually hope diplomats will solve. After reading Ken Pollack's book, most will find their expectations subdued.

Child Soldiers: Warriors of Despair

By John P. Sullivan

A book review and commentary on:

Children at War

By: P.W. Singer
New York: Pantheon Books, 2005, hardback, US $25.00, 288pp.
ISBN: 0-375-42349-4

Modern warfare is changing. No longer the sole domain of state forces, contemporary conflict increasingly involves a range of non-state actors: terrorists, *jihadi* bands, gangs, criminals and warlords. These actors fight among themselves and against states for profit, plunder and turf. Failed states and "lawless zones" provide their base but they increasingly threaten stable regions. These groups contribute to the barbarization of warfare, frequently operating outside the norms of war and the rule of law, abandoning the long-held prohibitions against terrorism, attacks on non-combatants, torture, reprisal, and slavery, and the use of child soldiers.

"Double Trouble," a nine-year old boy soldier, exemplifies this reality. After being observed participating in an orgy of violence directed against a Khran militiaman in a 1996 battle in Monrovia, "Double Trouble," a member of Charles Taylor's NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), is asked by a journalist how old he is. His response, "old enough to kill a man."[1] He is representative of the changing demographics and patterns of conflict; his militia replaced his family, while violence replaced school. Political instability and access to lightweight, easy to fire weapons have made war accessible to children.

The Situation

Worldwide, over a half million children (under 18)2 participate in armed forces, paramilitary and non-state forces. An estimated 300,000 of these child soldiers,3 some younger than 10 years old, are involved in over 30 conflicts. In fact separate studies in Southeast Asia and Central Africa have placed the average age of child soldiers at just under 13.4 They are often "recruited" or abducted and then manipulated to participate in brutal violence directed at times against their own communities and families. Both girls and boys are exploited to participate in acts they frequently are unable to comprehend. The girls often are required to provide sexual as well as combat services.

[1] Corinne Dufka, "Children as Killers," Roy Gutman and David Rieff (Eds.), *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999, pp. 78-79.

[2] Article 1 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) states "…a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."

[3] For the purposes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, UNICEF defines a "child soldier" as any child—boy or girl—under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity. This includes but is not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members. It includes girls and boys recruited for forced sexual services and/or forced marriage. The definition, based on the 1997 "Cape Town Principles," is not limited to a child who is carrying, or has carried weapons.

[4] P.W. Singer, "Western militaries confront child soldiers threat, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 01 January 2005.

While juveniles have been features in past conflict, notably the Hitler Jugend at the end of World War II, they were never primary actors. This is changing radically. Global instability, broad pools of children available for recruitment, continuing, often multigenerational conflict, the proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use weapons, and weakened state structures fuel the trend of child military labor. Warlordism and "lawless zones" that fuel conflict allow warlords and terrorists to exploit disaffiliated children as low-cost, expendable troops. As a result, endless supplies of hungry, gullible and malleable child warriors as a result replace ideology and traditional military leadership.

Ten-year-old troops wield AK-47s; teenagers become suicide bombs in this global juvenile jungle. Abducted, purchased, and even handed over by their own families, child fighters have been used as suicide bombers in Sri Lanka and Palestine, guerillas in Colombia and Afghanistan. Singer recounts an interview with a West African child, setting the stage for his inquiry: "I was attending primary school. The rebels came and attacked us. They killed my mother and father in front of my eyes. I was ten years old. They took me with them. They trained us to fight. The first time I killed someone, I got so sick I thought I was going to die. But I got better. My fighting name was Blood Never Dry."5 This account is emblematic of the changing nature of war.

P.W. Singer investigates this change in his book Children at War. Building upon his prior works on child soldiers and evolving conflict, Singer provides an essential primer on the escalating global phenomenon. Singer's book is divided into three parts: Children at War, The Process and Results of Child Soldiers, and Responding to the Child Soldier Problem. In addition, the text contains an appendix: the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and endnotes. Much of his narrative finds its foundation in interviews with former child soldiers (from Colombia, Lebanon, Liberia, Kashmir, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan), humanitarian aid workers, and current and ex-soldiers.

Children at War

In the first segment, Singer demonstrates the widespread scope of child soldiering. He illustrates this new warrior cohort through research, first-hand accounts, and testimony.

> We were frightened because we were young children and we didn't know anything of the army. Even on the shooting range, when they tell you to fire, you're always very scared. For me to overcome that fear, I had to kill someone at the training camp. They brought someone to me one night when I was on duty guarding an entrance. It was a child, whose face they covered, and they told me he was a rebel, an enemy, and I had to kill him. That's exactly what I did…**G. age ten**[6]

[5] P.W. Singer, "Children at War," Edited transcript of remarks, *Carnegie Council Author in the Afternoon* (Merrill House, New York City), Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 09 February 2005. Found at http://www.carneigecouncil.org.

[6] P.W. Singer, *Children at War*, New York: Pantheon Books, 2005, p. 6.

He uses the case study of Charles Taylor in Liberia as an exemplar. Notably, in the Liberian conflicts up to 70 percent of the forces used by Taylor and his adversaries were children, amounting to nearly 20,000 child combatants. An escaped convict from Massachusetts, Taylor fled to Liberia and became a warlord through the exploitation of thousands of child soldiers, running a criminal enclave known as Taylor Land sustained by $300 million a year's worth of illegal trade. Eventually, his child army became the center of gravity of a force that took over the government of Liberia. Taylor demonstrated that child warriors can enable gangs to become low-cost, combat effective forces—forces that are able to regenerate despite a lack of popular support and devaluation of ideology. Personal profit and plunder can become the fuel for on-going conflict.

A similar outcome is found in Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA operates in northern Uganda. With about 200 adult followers, the cult-like gang has assembled a force that at its height consisted of 14,000 fighters, many of them children. The LRA uses all the tools of exploitation found in child armies: abduction, enslavement, beatings, rape and sexual assault to make escape and reintegration into society difficult if not impossible. The LRA has been able to stay in the field for over a decade.

In this section, Singer also recounts US encounters with child soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first US serviceman killed in the Afghan conflict, Sergeant First Class Nathan R. Chapman, a green beret, was killed by an Afghan child on 4 January 2002; the child warrior threat continued when Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer was killed by a fifteen year old al-Qaeda fighter from Canada. Later on in Iraq US forces encountered child soldiers in Saddam Hussein's forces, some as young as ten years old. In addition, at least five underage fighters suspected to be members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban have been imprisoned in the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay.7

The spill-over effects of children in conflict are great. Frequently, the children are enculturated into violence and continue to fight in one conflict or another until dead or incapacitated. Consider the case of Burma's (Myanmar) Karen National Liberation Army which fractured into a number of groups including "God's Army," led by a pair of notorious 12 year-old twins, Luthur and Johnny Htoo. The threat is not limited to boys; girls are also increasingly deployed as child soldiers, with 30% of child-using forces deploying girls under 15. These girls with guns are found in 55 countries. In 27 of these they were abducted, in 34 they saw combat, in virtually all they are subject to sexual abuse, rape, and enslavement serving as "soldiers' wives" and providing sexual services to their "leaders" and fellow fighters.

The Process and Results of Child Soldiers

In the second part of Singer's text, he recounts the causes of this child exploitation. He describes the children employed as war labor as a "lost generation," occupying a global security situation where conflict, economic pressures, extreme poverty and hunger, failed states, and "lawless zones" prevail. The impact

[7] In addition to coverage in *Children at War*, these are recounted in P.W. Singer, "Talk is Cheap: Getting Serious About Preventing Child Soldiers, " 37 *Cornell Int'l L.J.* 561 (2004)

of the AIDS pandemic and the surplus population of orphans, at risk of disease, hunger and crime, provide fodder for the recruitment—forced or otherwise—of child soldiers. The result: children can make the fiercest soldiers, emerging as the new warriors in the 21st century wherever wars rage.8

As Singer notes, a desperate global security situation fuels the use of child soldiers, "[D]esperate and excluded children constitute a huge pool of labor for the illegal economy, organized crime and armed conflicts."9 Warlords, gangsters and terrorists recruit from this listless mass. In Africa alone a third of all children are malnourished and by 2010 this will rise to one-half. This emerging generation of disconnected children is the ranks from which child soldiers are borne. Abduction and forced recruitment are standard, as recounted by Singer.

> I was abducted during "Operation Pay Yourself, " in 1988. I was 9 years old. Six rebels came through our yard. They went to loot for food. It's called "jaja"—"get food." They said, "we want to bring a boy like you—we like you," My mother didn't comment; she just cried. My father objected. They threatened to kill him. They argued with him at the back of the house. I heard a gunshot. One of them told me, "let's go, they've killed your father." A woman rebel grabbed my hand roughly and took me along. I saw my father lying dead as we passed… **A, age fourteen.**[10]

Such abduction is often followed up with killing, rape, and beatings. The "inductee" complies or dies. Even voluntary recruitment (roughly two-thirds of child soldiers volunteer or are enticed to join with some kind of "inducement") is colored by poverty, hunger, displacement, the need for a sense of belonging or revenge. Indoctrination follows. This includes coercion of various types, "brainwashing" or psychological conditioning, including forced participation in ritualized killing, or participation in atrocity, and occasionally "branding" like slaves to provide a disincentive for escape. Typically this results in dissociation, where for example in the case of a child formation in Sierra Leone, the child fighters called themselves "cyborgs" to denote their status as killing machines with no feelings.

Training follows. Singer gives the example of the Tamil Tigers (i.e. LTTE who also use child suicide bombers) who break the links with families, regulate sleep and food, emphasize drill, indoctrination and weapons training, all the while extolling the virtues of risk-taking. This results in more capable and daring warfighters than typical adult recruits. When action emerges, the result is effective combatants that operate with audacity and impunity. Higher casualties, enhanced confusion, and the presence of fighters that conventional forces are conditioned not to harm result in serious threats to civilians and conventional forces when child fighters are present.

[8] Michael B. Farrell, "Children make deadly soldiers in the world's rebel groups: Poverty and AIDS provide thousands of young recruits," *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 January 2005, p.15.

[9] Peter W. Singer, "Children at War: The Lost Generation," *theGlobalist*, Globalist Bookshelf, 16 March 2005. Found at http://www.theglobalist.com.

[10] *Children at War*, p. 59.

Child fighters deploy with a sense of fearlessness, take undue risks, have a diminished sense of mortality and are unable to fully weigh the consequences of their actions. Frequently, these factors are reinforced by the use of alcohol and drugs. Children fighters can become the fiercest of fighters, in essence becoming audacious killing machines operating in small units under the command of a small number of adults. Their numbers and firepower are often directed into mass charges of human-wave attacks with the children viewed as expendable.

Part three also includes a brief section on "Children of Terror" where Singer recounts the use of child terrorists by al-Qaeda, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the ELN and FARC, and the LTTE. In a supporting op-ed piece, Singer notes that "Groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have pulled children into the terrorism game. More than 30 suicide bombings since 2000, according to Time magazine, have been carried out by children, and multiple juvenile al-Qaeda terrorists have been detained at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay in the special "Camp Iguana" facility."11 In an earlier, yet related essay, Singer notes that children as young as 13 have been deployed as suicide bombers in the Palestinian conflict, while child suicide bombers have been used in Sri Lanka, and Colombian guerillas used a nine-year-old boy to bomb a polling place in 1997.12 Child terrorism has also crossed the gender gap where women and girls are employed by the LTTE to circumvent the scrutiny and body searches of male security personnel.

Children serve in a variety of roles in these fourth generation armies: infantry shock troops, raiders, sentries, spies, sappers, and porters.13 They are able to man "child-portable," easy to handle weapons systems in an extremely effective manner, even when poised against adult troops. For example in 1997 the LTTE's Leopard Brigade—an elite child formation primarily comprised of orphans—surrounded and killed about 2000 Sri Lankan army commandos, a loss that demoralized the whole army since children routed their elite vanguard.14

Responding to the Child Soldier Problem

The use of child soldiers violates international law and is the result of the willful, systematic erosion of the ethical injunctions against the use of child fighters. The two Additional Protocols of 1977 regarding international and internal armed conflicts, respectively, impose the obligation on parties to conflict to "take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in the hostilities."[15] The Additional Protocols also call upon parties to refrain from child recruitment. In addition, the 1988 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court makes using child soldiers a war crime. Human Rights Law also weighs in. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child

[11] Peter W. Singer, "Tragic Challenge of Child Soldiers," *USA Today*, 30 March 2005.
[12] Peter W. Singer, "Terrorists Must Be Denied Child Recruits," *Financial Times*, 20 January 2005.

[13] P.W. Singer, "Caution: Children at War, *Parameters*, Winter 2001-02, pp. 40-56. Found at http://carlise-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01winter/singer.htm.
[14] Ibid.
[15] 1977 Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol I, Art. 77[2] is applicable to international armed conflict, Additional Protocol II, Art. 4 [3c] is applicable in non-international armed conflicts.

(UNCRC)[16] sets 15 as the minimum age for going to war. Yet in many African nations beset by internal conflict, for example, typically one-half the population is under the age of 15, making child participation in warfighting likely.[17] In 2000, The General Assembly adopted the "Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child," raising the age of legal participation in war to 18.

In the third segment of his book, Singer explores prevention and responses to child soldiers. He observes, unfortunately quite rightly, that the use of child fighters results from deliberate choices by actors ready to thwart the rule of law in the pursuit of raw power, plunder and personal profit. The loss of these norms turns the practice of the last four millennia of warfare on its head. Despite a strong customary and codified objection in International Humanitarian Law to proscribe the use of children in combat, the practice is on the rise.

Singer closes his discussion by recounting the dilemmas found in fighting children, reviewing the various types of political action available to counter the threat, and the challenges of demobilizing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating former child soldiers back into society.

While active child soldiering was normally outside the scope of war, child soldiers are a current threat to conventional forces. Facing child soldiers can demoralize troops, expose them to great danger and have negative results on public perception. New, area-specific rules of engagement (ROE) that factor in the presence of child fighters, when their action is likely, must be crafted. These ROE must be supported by intelligence assessments that factor in the cultural situation and potential for facing child soldiers. Failure to do so could have severe tactical consequences. The reluctance to face child soldiers is a cultural artifact that must be tempered to ensure both force protection and mission success. A child bearing an AK-47 or suicide bomb poses a threat regardless of age—a reality police have long faced with gang members and violent juvenile offenders.

Singer observes that effects-based operations at the tactical level may assist. Often adult leaders are the center of gravity for child soldiers. Eliminating the adult leadership and countering child swarms by holding them at a distance and applying indirect fire in an effort to shock and disperse may be effective. He also rightly notes that non-lethal weapons options may provide an additional choice for neutralizing and disrupting the threat in an effective and humane fashion. Additionally, force protection efforts should require children to be scrutinized to the same degree as adults (not all children are threats, but all require scrutiny). Finally, Singer notes that the aim should be to convince child soldiers to stop fighting and seek rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Thus, Singer's triad for military operations against child soldiers can be summarized as Intelligence, Force Protection, and Effects-Based Engagement (including non-lethal weapons, shaping the opposition). In all cases post-conflict debriefing and treatment opportunities should be made available to units exposed to child warriors.

[16] The UNCRC has not been ratified by the United States.
[17] Anna Cataldi, "Child Soldiers," Roy Gutman and David Rieff (Eds.), *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999, pp. 76-78

Conclusion: Assessing Singer's Contribution and the Future

Singer adeptly documents and assesses a significant facet of current and future warfare. Child soldiers today are a reality, and they are likely to continue to plague future battle and opspace. Child soldiering is no longer the exception seen at Newmarket, with powder monkeys and drummer boys. Child warriors are on the front line and can be expected to remain a major factor in future warfare and terrorism. Fighters as young as 10 years old can deploy "child portable weapons" yielding firepower equivalent to a Napoleonic era regiment. While that may have little effect on modern mechanized forces, the impact on peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and constabulary operation—not to mention civilians—could be devastating.

Failed states and "lawless zones" fuel a bazaar of violence where warlords and martial entrepreneurs fuel the convergence of war and crime. Some call this post-modern situation fourth generation warfare (4GW). It is the realm of the non-state (criminal) soldier, where predatory actors target civilians to steal, rape, and pillage for a range of cause—political or otherwise. This endless conflict that Singer calls a "merry-go-round" of violence is fueled by and exploits child soldiers.

Children at War effectively describes this environment. Peter Singer's book is essential reading for both military and counterterrorism practitioners. Military officers and senior NCOs engaged in peace enforcement and peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation, constabulary and counterinsurgency operations should consider Singer's book a primer for the threats they will face. Others engaged in small wars, military police, intelligence, civilian police deployed to constabulary operations (CIVPOL), and humanitarian aide workers and diplomats will find this useful, as will members of the police and security services responsible for counterterrorism duties. Reading this text should be a required element of "intelligence preparation for operations" in all failed states and "lawless zones."

Singer's Children at War is compelling, if not disturbing. I found the exploitation of children as warriors and terrorists strikingly similar to the dynamics of street gang violence in Los Angeles, where bands of youths seeking turf, belonging and power use violence as a salve for their powerlessness to intimidate and dominate "failed communities." As gangs morph and migrate into transnational criminal bands, I see the potential for a deadly convergence between third generation gangs[18] with child soldiers. Thus, Singer provides us a warning about what is, as well as the potential for a more violent future that may come to be.

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[18] In many ways street gang members are actually child soldiers already. For a discussion of gang evolution and third generation gangs, see John P. Sullivan, "Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net Warriors," *Transnational Organized Crime*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn1997, pp. 95-108, John P. Sullivan, "Urban Gangs Evolving as Criminal Netwar Actors, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 200, pp. 82-96, and Max G. Manwaring, *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Us Army War College, March 2005.

Economic Terrorism:

The Radical Muslim War Against the Western Tax Base

Dr. Shawn O'Connell

INTRODUCTION: This paper outlines a theory concerning why Muslim terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers on Sept. 11, 2001, bombed London's subway during the G-8 economic summit on July 7th, and detonated blasts in an Egyptian resort on 23rd July. The reason for these attacks was to create 'Economic Terrorism.' Economic Terrorism is defined here as the attempt to assault and destroy a foe through decimation of the enemy's tax base via rank economic sabotage. Such attacks on economic infrastructures lower net tax yield, thereby shrinking the capital pool for military spending. There is historical warrant for the belligerent use of strategic economic destruction. This is detailed in an iconoclastic book on the Roman Empire's demise, by peerless Orientalist Henri Pirenne, called 'Charlemagne and Muhammad' (1943). This work challenged Gibbon's thesis that Germanic barbarian assaults doomed Rome, posited in the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). As we shall see, 'Economic Terrorism' is the most potent weapon for Muslim radicals can deploy in their siege against the West. There is hard evidence Islamicists employed Economic Terrorism on Sept. 11 to mangle the US economy, which vicariously damaged the tax base. By extension, this was meant to prune U.S ability to pursue aggressive foreign policy, mount defense and wage war. Radical Islam has long reacted with ambivalence and rage towards capitalism.[1]

Framing this debate is a larger ideological struggle, pitting 'atheistic' Western capitalistic economics against the Islamic *idee fixe* – the formulaic Muslim theocracy. Accordingly, a famous radical Muslim intellectual felt that, "…democracy is a form of idol worship. So, too…capitalism, which is…is a form of idolatry."[2] We now know Al Qaeda was fixated on casing New York financial institutions for years before they attacked. If Islamic terrorists further pursue Economic Terrorism without an organized Western response, the impact upon economy and tax-derived defense will be massive. Also, such attacks won't be isolated,[3] but recurrent -- given the small cost of assaults and massive potential reward. Therefore, we must study Economic Terrorism and prepare an answer. Ultimately, as the poor and overmatched Islamic terrorists pursue their struggle against the West, they realize this is the best 'small war' strategy of all.

[1] For example, the website Islamic Invitation Centre, a British Muslim reference site had this, "Q: Is Islam against Capitalism? A: Yes. Capitalism is based on the concept that economics is that which examines man's needs, which are unlimited and how to satisfy these unlimited needs. The system depends upon the separation of church and state or in other words, the separation of the Creator from life's affairs. The concept of freedom plays a major role in the Capitalist ideology." Found at: http://www.islamicinvitationcentre.com/FAQ/Economic/FAQ_Economic.html.

[2] Land of the Free, National Review Online, by Dinesh D'Souza, published on July 02, 2004, 12:30 a.m. , found at: http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/dsouza200407020030.asp; and alternatively at: http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/landof.htm .

[3] This article was originally penned before the London transportation massacre.

WHAT IS ECONOMIC TERRORISM: Let's here better define 'economic terrorism.' First, according to Webster's, terrorism is: "The state of being terrorized or the act of terrorizing; the use of intimidation to attain one's goals, or to advance one's causes."[4] So, 'Economic Terrorism' is the act by any group or state for the sole and illegal purpose of creating economic chaos and collapse as a means of destroying the attendant society, for military, social, political, or religious purposes. This definition is meant to ameliorate certain potential problems in definition. Certainly, Economic Terrorism goes well beyond any simple boycott, embargo, tariff, or trade war between two countries. This would not merely be a case where one country cried 'foul' over another's unfair or even illegal commercial activities. Such actions would have to be shown to be the result of an outright attempt through some malign person or group to create economic chaos meant to undermine the ability of a country to mount a defense or even exist. Some might ask if, for example, perhaps the U.S. could be guilty of Economic Terrorism in its embargo and boycott of Cuba because, after all, our activities badly damaged Cuba's ability to exist. The simple answer to this is -- No, because America had principled and arguably just reasons for embargoing Cuba that are based upon respect for human rights found nowhere in Marxist countries.

CLASH OF WORLDVIEWS: But, *arguendo* -- who decides the standard should a dispute erupt between two countries, at say – the United Nations? Radical Islam and the West diverge upon the Western doctrines of freedom and human rights that form the foundation for international law. Therefore, in the name of human rights and freedom, we must insist that whatever country is trying to practice those humanistic doctrines must be favored versus those in opposition, because to not follow this logic is to buy into the terrorist's insistence to reject human rights, dignity and freedom. The goals of Economic Terrorism are therefore summed as threefold: First, actual attacks upon capitalist citadels meant to inflict maximum real damage. Second, to produce a shockwave of hopelessness and fear meant to remove from businessmen and consumers ease and confidence while conducting or contemplating trade. Third, to inflict such damage upon the money holding and capitalistic organs of society that tax receipts no longer cover any but the most basic expenditures. After this point such a society will become from a practical military sense – de-clawed and toothless.

STRIKE AGAINST CAPITALISM: So, the Sept. 11 terrorists specifically targeted American, and now European capitalism. But, let's ask specifically -- Why? For several reasons, the first being pragmatic, the second ideological. First, as a doctrine of war, damaging the industrial and economic infrastructure of your opponent means limiting their ability to attack and defend. Hence, such was executed during U.S. General Sherman's 'March to the Sea' in the Civil War, and also employed in the strategic bombing of Dresden, Germany during WW II. Both came as classic examples of economic destruction as a component of 'Total War.' But there is also an ideological component of Islamicists opposing capitalism that must be reckoned. The free market philosophy of capitalism generally opposes the theocratic Muslim concept of the perfect Islamic state, where all human decisions are pre-formatted. It is unsurprising then that

[4] Webster's Dictionary 400 (1987).

Sayyid Qutb, a highly influential modern Islamic Intellectual referred to as "the brains behind bin Laden[5]" wrote a book called The Battle between Islam and Capitalism. [6] Of course, a preemptive act of sabotage would appeal to terrorists for predictable reasons. For one, it would be an audacious way to land an unguarded strategic blow. Therefore, the impact would be magnified, both psychologically and in fact. It was also an inexpensive way to hurt a rich country, and perhaps the best way for poor, unarmed terrorists to take on a superpower. Further, we know the Sept. 11 terrorists specifically concentrated on economic targets. This news was announced when the Washington Post wrote of an intelligence coup gleaned from a captured computer in the aftermath of a failed assassination against Pakistani President Musharraf. The captured materials tell of Al Qaeda's American, pre-9-11 surveillance, the Post remarking, "Perhaps the most important break from Khan's arrest was the discovery of a laptop and computer disks containing scouting reports and hundreds of photographs of financial institutions in the United States -- targets that officials said were exhaustively surveilled by al Qaeda in 2000 and 2001."[7]

RADICAL MUSLIM GOAL: The current U.S. administration's claim that the Islamicist attack upon America are a 'rejection of Western values' finds merit here. On September 20, 2001, President Bush asked rhetorically -- ""Why do they hate us?"…They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote…," etc. This approach sagely sidesteps tendentious (and to Westerners -- inexplicable) terrorist religious motivations, instead focusing upon the main Muslim terrorist goal. This goal is the economic ruination of Western economies, and thereby their military and societal expressions. It was the Islamic terrorist's studied intent to cripple America via a brutal attack on the heart of American economic infrastructure and international capitalism. This was symbolically raised against the World Trade Towers. The notion of the military value of such attacks was foreshadowed by Professor Henri Pirenne's description of the terminal collapse of the Roman Empire being precipitated not, as commonly claimed, by the inexorable onslaught of Germanic tribes. Instead, Pirenne believed it was the asphyxiating impact of the Muslim Saracens in the guise of insatiable pirates driving a stake into the heart of Christendom, thereby precipitating the "Middle Ages" period of European decline. Pirenne believed Muslim pirates attacked so many ships, trading posts and caravans around the Mediterranean that commerce around that body of water literally evaporated, as traders and caravan organizers found the risks of continuing too great. So literally, Rome collapsed as she lost her trading centers and routes, then the attendant tax base.

[5] Land of the Free, National Review Online, by Dinesh D'Souza, published on July 02, 2004, 12:30 a.m. , found at: http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/dsouza200407020030.asp; and alternatively at: http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/landof.htm .

[6] See the interview 'Sayyid Qutb and His Influence, Interview with Professor Ibraham Abu-Rabi,' from the Religioscope.com website, interview occurring on November 8, 2001; and found at: http://www.religioscope.com/info/dossiers/textislamism/qutb_aburab . This book has never been translated into English. Qutb lived from 1906-1966, and died by government execution.

[7] 'Al Qaeda Showing New Life, U.S. Surprised by Signs of Regrouping,' By Dan Eggen and John Lancaster, Washington Post Staff Writers; Saturday, August 14, 2004; Page A01; found at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A63897-2004Aug13?language=printer

ATTACK UPON TAXES: One key goal of the terrorists in their Sept. 11 attack upon the World Trade Towers was to reduce tax collection. In fact, this could be argued their main goal. While this may not seem obvious at first, it almost goes without saying upon further reflection. America's ability to be the preeminent world military power is based first upon its status as being and remaining the preeminent world economic power. It is only by maintaining this that the U.S. can afford all the many expenditures associated with a high-powered, state of the art, rapid response military. Hurting the American economy would not achieve the goals of the terrorists Muslims unless it also reduced our tax base. These fanatics were also interested in destroying the American way of life, thrilled at the idea of proving America a flaccid entity run by infidels. Yet the destruction of the tax base was their real goal. Reduced taxes means an overall trimmed budget, which yields smaller military expenditures, and in the long term it would mean a decline in American ability to put their convictions into concrete actions. Henri Pirenne claims a similar thing happened to the Roman Empire.

THE WEST, ISLAM, ECONOMICS & PIRENNE: Modern Islamic terrorists are not nearly as unschooled in Western liberal arts traditions as popular culture claims, especially in world history. In fact, many 9-11 terrorists were university educated. It is a conflict truism that the worst mistake participants make is underestimating their opponent's abilities. Yet, in reducing the profile of terrorists Muslims to those of illiterate, fanatically religious peasants, we overlook an opportunity to understand the ideas and motives which animate them. Accordingly, this paper's theory of the Muslim terrorist's mindset goes like this. Given the terrorist's Muslim pride in their great historic moments, and how famed Pirenne's thesis became, it's highly unlikely they didn't know of his theory. Especially that he posited Muslim aggressions and piracy precipitated Rome's fall. Further, it's not relevant whether Pirenne's Roman decline thesis is entirely correct. Instead, it's merely helpful to explain the terrorist's actions. This is almost certain, especially considering the last thousand years of Islamic frustration, which naturally encouraged their emphasizing Islam's great 'Golden Age.' This recounting covers a period of Islamic genius fostering an Augustan epoch of unparalleled achievement in science, arts, literature, and military prowess – and lionizes figures like Saladin, who bested the Crusaders.[8] Beyond this, granting how the wide array of possible targets they had in New York alone, it is more than coincidence that the eponymously named World Trade Towers were chosen. But, for skeptic's sake, it's possible that the terrorists were wholly ignorant of Pirenne's "Mohammed and Charlemagne." Yet, even if historically ignorant, they clearly were still motivated by Economic Terrorism to attack the World Trade Towers, bomb London's 'Tube' during the G-8 summit, and shatter the Egyptian Sharm el-Sheikh resort.

EFFECTS OF THE SEPTEMBER-ELEVEN TERRORIST ATTACKS: The impact upon the American economy, and by osmosis, the rest of the Western economies from the 9-11 attacks has been staggering. Entire market areas, like the airline industry, were destabilized overnight. The industries affected by the terrorist attack have been many, including travel, banking, stocks, national and

[8] Edward Gibbon, The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire 2081 (1946).

international trade, and many others. The impact on the U.S. economy was certainly in the billions of dollars, and around the world many times this. This was exactly the intent of the terrorists. They knew with very limited means (and strictly speaking -- no military resources) they wouldn't be able to do much damage to the U.S. So they decided to maximize the impact of their efforts. Had they attacked a military facility alone, even the Pentagon; or simply a symbolic target, like blowing up the Golden Gate Bridge, or leveling the Statue of Liberty, they wouldn't have created nearly the damage they did going after the added capitalist infrastructures. To begin, they were able to make the key emotional point of terrorism, the infliction of overwhelming fear, by letting Americans know that the terrorists would make no distinction between military and non-combatants. So public or private sites, secular or religious targets, or even the most well established non-players -- killed at the terror sites -- women, children, including even other Muslims, were targets. But beyond this symbolic terrorism, the Islamic terrorists did major damage to the American economy, and by doing so, shrank our tax base. And to state the obvious, our military and defense are wholly derived from taxes.

PIRENNE'S THESIS ON THE FALL OF ROME; BACKGROUND: In 1922 the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne published a short paper, *Mohomet et Charlemagne,* briefly detailing his thesis that Muslim pirate activities inadvertently starved to ruin the Roman Empire by decimating trade. He followed this by writing a book, the rough draft finished on the eve of his sudden death. His son then published the book, using the same title, which appeared in 1939. The impact of this work upon the academy and larger world were nothing short of sensational. His thesis is as follows. The celebrated Roman Empire was Mediterranean in character, a *mare nostrum,* or for all purposes, an inland lake.[9] Trade was the lifeblood of the Empire, and it made their greatness possible.[10] Roman commerce had declined since Diocletian, but was making a comeback in the 4th century.[11] This was despite the fact the *Germania* was testing the strength of Rome.[12] The Germans did not hate the Romans, but actually admired and wanted to mimic them.[13] They only desired peaceful lives within the Empire, enjoying all the benefits, and their main motivation for moving inside Roman borders appears to have been the encroachment of the loathed Huns.[14] The Hun's utter lack of civilization and even their appearance seem to have rendered their opponents spellbound in their impending charge, making them seem an encroaching invincible plague.[15] The Germans did war with the Romans, and made many sizeable conquests, but their successes were mitigated, as they were always eventually metabolized back into *Romania*.[16] As a whole, three preeminent aspects of the Barbarian kingdoms established within Roman territory were noticeable: absolutist kingdoms, secular government, and the instrumentality of the government appearing as *fisc* and treasury. These three were also the defining aspects of the Roman Empire.[17] What the Barbarians destroyed in their invasions was not Rome, but simply the absolute hegemony Rome once

[9] Henri Pirenne, Mohammed And Charlemagne 17 (trans. Bernard Miall 1939).
[10] 17.
[11] Ibid, 19.
[12] Ibid, 20.
[13] Ibid, 21-22.
[14] Ibid, 22-23.
[15] Ibid, 23.
[16] Ibid, 34-36.
[17] Ibid, 58.

enjoyed. The invaders became established, but developed no innovations, being content to exist as a kind of incorporated *foederati.*[18] Most strikingly, Mediterranean unity was sustained, making continuing trade along the *mare nostrum* easy, nourishing the great mother Rome, allowing her to continue in unabated, if not somewhat modified splendor.[19]

ISLAM, THE MEDITERRANEAN & EARLY REJECTION OF THE WEST: The Germanic versus Islamic invasions into the Mediterranean are studies in opposites. The German attacks were a long developing, pragmatically driven incremental flow into Roman territory, whereas the Muslim invaders hit like an enervating firestorm.[20] If the Muslims benefited from anything outside their dogma, it was the gift for timing (which some call 'luck'). Every kingdom they attacked seemed already precipitously on the verge of collapse.[21] But their victories were not simply the result of sheer good fortune. Instead, especially compared to the Germans who had no real dispute with the Romans per religion,[22] the Muslims were vociferously opposed to any creed that denied Mohammed's revelations of Allah.[23] This utter disagreement on religion meant that the Muslims would never assimilate into *Romana* as had the Germans. Pirenne writes, "Islam had shattered the Mediterranean unity which the Germanic invasions had left intact."[24] Instead, they adopted all the arts, sciences, and institutions of the societies they subjugated, merely consecrating them to Allah.[25] It was the ambition of the Muslims, after the death of Mohammed in 637 A.D. to expand their kingdom, especially into the Mediterranean. This was increasingly attempted in the latter half of the 7th century. Rhodes, Crete and Sicily were nabbed.[26] Africa became a battlefield between the Byzantines and Arabs, and around 700 A.D. Muslims achieved supremacy there, establishing a headquarters at Tunis.[27] The Muslims then became enamored of continental Europe and set their sites upon it, taking Spain and Italy, and encroaching into France. While Charles Martel decisively defeated the Saracen Muslims at Tours-Poitier in 732 A.D., his grandson Charlemagne was worn out by constant battles with Muslims. The Islamic Saracens may have been driven from France, but they stayed in Spain for hundreds of years, where Charlemagne ceaselessly engaged them.[28]

ARAB PIRACY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: If the Muslims were unsuccessful in conquering all of Europe, they managed to assert a compelling presence in the Mediterranean Sea that caused a disruption in the Empire, effectively severing its ties to the past. Pirenne calls this change, "The most essential event of European history which had occurred since the Punic Wars. It was the end of the classic tradition. It was the beginning of the Middle Ages."[29] This event did not initially end all trading in the Mediterranean, of course, as items like spices and papyrus were initially still moved.[30] What quickly changed were the actual trade routes themselves, as the immensity of

[18] Ibid, 140.
[19] Ibid, 143-44.
[20] Ibid, 147-49.
[21] Ibid, 149.
[22] Edward Gibbon, The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire 567 (1946).
[23] Henri Pirenne, Mohammed And Charlemagne, 150 (trans. Bernard Miall 1939).
[24] Ibid,164.
[25] Ibid,149-50.
[26] Ibid,152-53.
[27] Ibid,154-55.
[28] Ibid,158-59.
[29] Ibid,164.
[30] Ibid,164.

the Muslim conquests, and the capitalization of Damascus dictated a new direction of trade flow.[31] Travel over the old byways would have simply been too dangerous, given lack of protection, and the presence of many fierce pirate ships.[32] Spain was conquered in 711 A.D., and generally trade had broken down in the whole of the Western Mediterranean by the late 7th century.[33] African commerce became decimated by continual conflict.[34] Pirenne writes, "We may therefore say that after the conquest of Spain, and above all of Africa, the Western Mediterranean became a Musulman (Muslim) Lake."[35] By the beginning of the 8th century, except for the Byzantium coast, trade had ceased in the Mediterranean, and one Arab writer even said, "The Christians could no longer float a plank at sea."[36] Eventually, even such irreplaceable products as spice and papyrus vanished, not returning till the 12th century.[37] But even gold disappeared (returning only when spices reappeared) and loans ceased (although the Church's position on usury also affected this).[38] What caused this loss and eventual cessation of trade? Simply that when the Muslims established Mediterranean hegemony, they focused on plundering instead of capitalism, as the merchants of the Byzantine Levant were irreplaceable compared to Muslim opportunism.[39] It appears that only the Jews continued to trade and we owe to them the continuance of any economic link between Islam and Christendom.[40]

HOLY PIRATES: But were Muslims really pro-piracy, and if so -- Why? According to the Qu'ran, the Muslims lived in warring times, and part of the motivation and reward of risking oneself to fight for Allah was keeping the material goods of the enemy, and even the enemy themselves as slaves. In chapter 8 of the Qu'ran, titled 'The Spoils,' Mohammed wrote "Enjoy, therefore, the good and lawful things which you have gained in war, and fear Allah."[41] A logical reason for the rightness of taking from unbelievers is added in the same chapter when Mohammed writes, "The unbelievers expend their riches in debarring others from the path of Allah. Thus they dissipate their wealth: but they shall rue it, and in the end be overthrown. The unbelievers shall be driven into hell."[42] One must see this from the Muslim worldview, where all people were broken down into either believers or infidels. But we also need to reckon with the Muslim motivations as part of a larger impulse to spread the word of Allah throughout the world. Mohammed writes again in chapter 8, "Make war on them

[31] Ibid,164-65.
[32] Ibid,248-49. Writes Pirenne, "The Carolingians had no fleet, and therefore could not clear the sea of the pirates who infested it." He added, "It will be understood that under these conditions the ports were closed to all traffic." These were not just Muslim pirates, but any ship in the world hearing of the lawlessness promulgated within the Mediterranean could have steamed towards this enclave of theft and attempted to have plied their calling there.
[33] Ibid,165-66 Pirenes states, "The conquest of Spain in 711, and the conditions of insecurity obtaining on the coast of Provence immediately after this conquest, absolutely put an end to any possibility of sea-borne trade in the Western Mediterranean."
[34] Ibid,165.
[35] Ibid,162.
[36] Ibid,166-67.
[37] Ibid,168-72. The Carolingian *tractoriae* mentions all kinds of foodstuffs, but no mention is made of any kind of spice.
[38] Ibid,173.
[39] Ibid,173-74.
[40] Ibid,174. If these newly ensconced Mediterranean Muslims did trade, it was only amongst themselves, as no record of anything else exists, and even theories of internal trading are highly speculative, as no evidence has been discovered to support such a practice.
[41] Mohammed, The Koran, (Chapter 8) 311-312 (trans. N.J. Dawood 1956).
[42] Ibid, (Chapter 8) 309.

(unbelievers) until idolatry is no more and Allah's religion reigns supreme."[43]

IMPACT OF MEDITERRANEAN ISLAM: Trading as a profession eventually ceased around the Mediterranean. Pirenne writes, "One consequence of the suppression of the Oriental trade and maritime traffic was the disappearance of professional merchants in the interior of the country (Italy)."[44] Muslims did not trade with Christians, and as the impact of this set in, the power centers of the Mediterranean shifted North, especially in France.[45] To sum up the next signal events, we can briefly say that as trade centers were abandoned around the Mediterranean, the populace became increasingly impoverished, and the economy suffered, directly shrinking the tax base. The populations became more tied to land for sustenance, and returned to it,[46] abandoning urban centers, while the people eventually evolved into a feudal class, completely beholden to land owners for protection. The royal government itself took a huge hit, as Pirenne writes, "But the treasury, which was the actual basis of the royal power, began to dwindle in the course of the seventh century..."[47] The church was also devastated, Pirenne saying, "It was due, of course, to commerce. And we must agree that as commerce diminished the indirect taxes – that is, the tolls or dues (for the Church) – must have diminished in proportion."[48] When they stopped minting gold coinage we realize that the economy was in freefall.[49] The end result of this was a creep into a human abyss, as education was too expensive for the fragile economy and with the denouement easy to auger – lawlessness reigned as the very glue of society dried and disintegrated.[50]

DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD EMPIRE: When the Mediterranean was turned into a lawless sea, trade dried up to nothing, the government shriveled, and people hunkered down as they headed into a long season of human impoverishment. This article argues that the Muslim terrorists would like to again push the West in this direction, and if they cannot completely collapse Western capitalistic representative democracy, they would like to at least wound us so badly that we can no longer express our political, economic, theological and

[43] Ibid.
[44] Henri Pirenne, Mohammed And Charlemagne 173 (trans. Bernard Miall 1939).
[45] Henri Ibid,187. Pirenne writes, "It was on France that the future depended. But France, as she appeared at this moment, was very different from the France of the Merovingians. Her center of gravity was n o longer "Romania," It had shifted towards the Germanic North, and with this new France there appeared, for the first time…But all the traditional conditions were overthrown by Islam."
[46] Ibid,197. Pirennes says, "The urban life which had been maintained by the influence of commerce was obliterated. The Mediterranean sources of commerce, which the invasions of the 5th century had not seriously affected, were dried up now that the sea was closed."
[47] Ibid,192.
[48] Ibid,193-94.
[49] Ibid,242. Pirenne sums up this sad state of affairs up, writing "If we consider that in the Carolingian epoch the minting of gold had ceased, that lending of money at interest was prohibited, that there was no longer a class of professional merchants, that Oriental products (papyrus, spice, silk) were no longer imported, that the circulation of money was reduced to the minimum, that laymen could no longer read or write, that the taxes were no longer organized, and that the towns were merely fortresses, we can say without hesitation that we are confronted with a civilization which had retrogressed to the purely agricultural stage; which no longer needed commerce credit, and regular exchange for the maintenance of the social fabric. We have already seen that the essential cause for this transformation was the closing of the Western Mediterranean by Islam."
[50] Ibid. Again, Pirenne, "Now, as we have already seen, the decline of commerce must have begun about the year 650, a date which exactly corresponds with the progress of anarchy in the kingdom (France)."

humanistic convictions in concrete terms. In doing this they would certainly employ 'Economic Terrorism' as their main tool. Muslim terror cells could be called upon to assist, like those operating in countries like Afghanistan, Bali, Britain, France, Germany, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Palestine, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United States, and many others.[51]

WAS SEPTEMBER 11 ECONOMIC TERRORISM? Some will undoubtedly dismiss out of hand the notion the Muslim terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Towers were engaging in anything as sophisticated, or historically derivative as Economic Terrorism. To such folks, the terrorists were probably fairly random in choosing targets, and any big building in New York would have worked. But this simplistic analysis must be mistaken, as a careful reading of the facts will prove that they must have been trying to achieve a major economic hit. Let us recall that the terrorists spent years planning these attacks (as noted above) and so nothing about them was either random, or without good strategic reasoning behind it. Specifically: First, every target chosen by the terrorists was picked for a specific reason, combining both symbolic and practical value. Targeting the Pentagon, the titular U.S. military command center, made clear this attack was a preemptive act of war, and was also meant to destabilize the machinery of battle, limiting any response. The plane that crashed in Pennsylvania was thought on its way to the U.S. Capitol Building, or the White House, both symbolic and actual loci of top American government. Hitting either would have caused widespread fear, chaos, and panic, and if accurate enough could have decapitated the government. The third choice of the Trade Towers received the most material attention -- two planes, and so these were the most important targets, at least for use of 'resources'. They were picked for a combination of symbolic and practical importance. As we know, they were ostensibly called the 'World Trade Towers,' and because of their name and location in Manhattan, N.Y., the West's banking and economic center, and they symbolized Western capitalism. But these towers really were also very important to world trade, and many international businesses had offices there, so destroying these really would hurt international business. The terrorists Muslims believed this last fact was most crucial.

ISLAMICIST ATTACKS ON LONDON & EGYPT: The most recent assaults upon Britain and Egypt again richly illustrate Economic Terrorism, and can only be understood through that prism. The initial flurry was launched upon Britain's 'Tube' subway system in an astute, multiplied, and diversely targeted salvo. First, Europe and Britain was hosting the G8 world economic summit in Scotland, a few miles down the road. It was during the day of the meetings that the bombs were detonated. This was a shot across the bow to alert Europe that capitalism itself had been placed in the docket and found wanting. But beyond this, London was wildly celebrating hours after receiving confirmation of their unexpected Olympic bid when the terror struck. This was profound psychological theatre as it deflated England's sense of joy over receipt of the 2012 Games before it could

[51] A place of exquisite opportunity for the Muslim radicals is Nigeria, whose antinomian views of government, peopled by so many shady characters and outright con artists makes it a nirvana of graft and unethical deeds. The mixture of illegal monies collecting in Nigeria to be washed and reused for other illegal (if not terrorist purposes) makes the place a nightmare for regulators, international business people, and strategic planners against the worldwide Muslim terror networks.

be even celebrated. This planted several malign messages. The first was the Islamicists could attack any time they wanted, even upon the heels of the greatest moments of victory. Yet it also telegraphed that the Olympics themselves were not safe, planting 7 long years of psychological anxiety. Beyond this, the terrorists slipped a stiletto into the illusion of safety associated with London -- Europe's banking and commerce center. Here they boldly informed the traders, marketers, business people and all others that the main mass transit thoroughfare was a ticking bomb. Also, London is always a major world destination for tourists, and every would-be traveler around the globe now realizes '*it could have been me!'* sitting next to the bombers. But, can anyone imagine what would happen to London if broad support and trust for the London Tube collapsed? The economic effect would be utter enervation, and no doubt the bombers – if unchallenged would mount and destroy the bus system as well. Likewise, the attack of the Egyptian resort was another savvy broadside against world tourism, coming against arguably the greatest center of archeological antiquities in the world. Those attacked were visitors, and here the message is that no country can safely plan for tourism. Beyond this, one Muslim group lets another know that even they are not safe against the Jihad. Finally, it lets any Muslim country know that conspiring with the enemy West will be punished harshly.

HYPOTHETICAL ECONOMIC TERRORISM: A few theoretical examples of Economic Terrorism follow. Consider a concerted, massive, and totally debilitating Internet attack upon computer servers in a specific country upon a signal industry, like banking. This could destroy any company using that bank, or the entire economic sectors if other related banks began to topple domino-like (similar to a failing power grid). Another case might be planting a dread disease in an important farm animal, such as cattle, the public knowledge of which could plummet the entire industry into bankruptcy after the public loses their taste for beef. Simply such a rumor such as Muslim terrorists claiming to have widely planted 'mad cow' disease might do the trick. Another could be badly poisoning or infecting the water supply to a strategic city, such as New York in a manner so random that everyone in the city felt an overwhelming urge to leave. Or consider the sabotaging of every large car or computer chip factory in the U.S, at once? Again, contemplate a computer virus sent to the IRS that was so destructive all records were wiped out and the government had no idea who owed what? Or, perhaps starting a string of wildfires during the summer season to provide devastating results. Ponder the horror of blowing up a toy store full of kids before a busy holiday, like Christmas. Perhaps even selectively destroying high power electricity towers in remote areas would have an enormous impact. Recently someone suggested the ease of poisoning the milk supply.[52] Of course, it would be hard to improve upon simultaneously collapsing the Trade Towers, given what a nest of international businesses were there.

[52] From the article, Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk, by Lawrence M. Wein and Yifan Liu, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, found at: http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/0408526102v1?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=milk&searchid=1121122452155_8534&stored_search=&FIRSTINDEX=0&journalcode=pnas . This article was roundly condemned by those who felt it gave aid to the enemy.

NEED FOR RECOGNITION & RESPONSE: But beyond all of these individual events, we ought to bear in mind several things. Ultimately, it doesn't really matter whether these terrorists were inspired by the Saracen Muslim pirates to attack their enemies because it is abundantly clear they deployed a textbook case of Economic Terrorism. This was meant to rip the capitalistic viscera out of an unsuspecting and softly naive Western business underbelly. The main point is the Muslims terrorists were unquestionably engaging in Economic Terrorism when they attacked these different targets and will undoubtedly do so repeatedly. Why? Because it is cheap, easy, can have a staggering payback for their efforts, and is a well-established part of their historical military repertoire. And terrorists Muslims are more historically minded and motivated than virtually any other group of people in the world. The most important thing is that we understand what the Muslims tried to do at the World Trade Towers, how they attempted to repeat this during the European G-8 summit, and in Egypt and how we can be prepared for the next strike. We need to develop doctrines and laws to help us survive these coming attacks in a way that the great world empire of the Romans did not.

SUGGESTED REMEDIES: The Bush administration in concert with the U.S. Armed Forces, Justice Department, CIA and FBI, has already made substantial changes meant to detail and confront the clear and immediate danger of continued terrorism. But these need to be broadened, at least doctrinally, and we need to add serious checks to help ward off economic terrorist centered war. What can be done? There should be a national quorum of leaders of all the major business types in the U.S. meeting to discuss biggest dangers and remedies in each field. At a series of national meetings meant to dissect the industries & their typology, an outline of possible responses will be offered for the most trenchant specific possibilities for terrorism. Having done this, the group should then draft a bill outlining general and specific suggested anti-terrorism guidelines for the different industries. Specifically we must map out the exact response to the most damaging types of attacks in each industry, and then the ingenuity, will and industrial might of America must be committed to this project. This ought to include a communitarian aspect where each participant, if called upon during an emergency, agrees to forego any excessive remuneration for their fees much beyond basic costs. This in itself will do much to develop goodwill and foster esprit des corps. Needless to say, it would be wise for tax breaks to be included, also. For an example, American interstate highways are essential to U.S. industry. Yet, many of them have strategic weak areas, such as singular high mountain passes, or other spots of vulnerability, often in remote regions. Should the Islamic terrorists blast such a location in a key spot, it might normally take months to repair. But with a new anti-terrorist industry protection bill, the Army Corps of Engineers, along with construction leaders of every state would agree to unleash a lightning quick response to any such attack. The upshot being that even the worst act of anti-capitalist destruction would have a crack team trained & ready to rebuild within a matter of days, or weeks. Of course, not every attack would have such a speedy recovery, but if we organize the infrastructure already existing into theoretical units, it will be not only literally a response to Economic terrorism, but will help stabilize bond & stock markets all over the world. Ultimately, the captains of each industry will know best

how to frame a responsive outline for their own fields. This is not to suggest that the government hasn't made any plans along these lines, but plans have not been detailed nearly to the pragmatic optimum. While this might seem like more 'red tape' to be avoided, this reaction is extremely naïve, and ultimately horrifically naïve and shortsighted. Currently, we are experiencing a lacuna of terrorism in the United States which is a blessing that may not last. Now is the time to develop deep & infinitely well-considered long-term defensive strategies for the private sector. We need to take this time and use it to seriously examine our response to Economic Terrorism, because it is inevitable that the terrorists will return, or the ones here become active again. They have undoubtedly already hatched many plots and are waiting for them to come to fruition. For instance, imagine the aggravation and expense of having to post guards every mile along a major oil pipeline! But, conversely, how much more expensive would it be to have to repair a blown up and burning pipeline. Examples such as this abound.

WORLD ECONOMIC TERRORISM BILL: A world Economic Terrorism bill would be framed along the same lines as the American, bringing to the table experts on all of the world's important industries, and a similar book of suggested safeguards to shield against Economic Terrorism. As we see how ripples from each attack spread from one country to another -- we must now admit that an assault against one is a battle against all. Therefore our opposition must be unified too. Important truths are waiting acknowledgment. First, we must stop buying into the argument that any of the violence is justified, and strongly oppose craven sympathy for the murderers. This only confuses the issue, aiding and abetting the attackers. Second, in refusing to condemn the terrorists for fear of reprisals we give the killers victory. Instead condemnation against future attacks *must* be voiced loudly. In unity there is safety. In this new, bold environment some wonderful things will occur. The peaceful yet timid will grow brave in their resistance of evil; the formerly silent will become encouraged to stand up and speak out; and the many silent Muslims who fearfully oppose the radicals will be emboldened to plot a different future for Islam.

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Small Wars Events Calendar

To have your Small Wars related event listed with Small Wars Journal online and in SWJ Magazine, see www.smallwarsjournal.com . Listings are free for official government events.

September 2005

12 -14 September – Conflict Reconstruction and Stability Operations (Conference); Washington, DC. Hosted by the International Institute for Defense. Conflict Reconstruction & Stability Operations will focus on Iraq and Afghanistan and the US led effort in these nations, highlighting combat and non-combat lessons learned, as well as industry's experiences in these changing nations. The overall theme will allow for government and NGO concerns to be addressed in a constructive forum in hopes of furthering discourse on conflict reconstruction and stability operations.

13 – 15 September – First Annual PKSOI Education Workshop (Workshop); Carlisle Barracks, PA. Hosted by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The workshop will bring together educators from the military services, the Joint Staff, international and non-government organizations, interagency offices, and selected institutes and centers of higher education to identify the opportunities for synergy and cooperation in peace and stability operations education.

19 – 20 September – Geospatial Intelligence – Security Transformation within Government & Military Applications (Conference); London, UK. Hosted by SMi. Geospatial intelligence, the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and illustrate geographically referenced features and activities on the Earth in support of national security needs. Geospatial intelligence is driving fundamental changes at every level of national and international security: doctrine, infrastructure, training and personnel development, operational planning and execution, and facility management. International intelligence frameworks will be examined, focusing on how geospatial intelligence is being implemented into future operational strategy and force transformation. The importance of developing and establishing standards for GIS will be discussed to provide you with an understanding of what is needed to meet the requirements of geospatial intelligence.

29 – 30 September – Democracy at the Crossroads? – Counterterrorism and the State (Conference); Prato, Italy. Hosted by Monash University. In a few short years since the terrorist attacks in the United States, democratic nations around the world have faced a great challenge – to respond to global terrorism within the bounds of the rule of law and with regard for international human rights principles. This international forum will convene a number of highly distinguished lawyers, academics, public commentators and policy makers in a critical analysis of important issues impacting upon a healthy democracy.

October 2005

26 – 27 October – Combat Casualty Care (Conference); London, UK. Hosted by SMi. SMi's Combat Casualty Care conference will present current and future concepts and knowledge of battlefield casualty management. Reflecting upon experiences from recent operational situations and leading scientific research, Combat Casualty Care will examine how lessons learned from these situations will affect future military medical doctrine, strategy and training. The challenge of combat environment diagnosis will be assessed, evaluating the use of new medical and communications technologies in theatre. The critical matters of aeromedical evacuation, logistical support and military medical training will be discussed in detail, assessing current practice and revealing future force requirements and the direction of national and joint military medicine.

Preparing for Future Joint Urban Operations:

The Role of Simulations and the *Urban Resolve* Experiment

By Peter W. Wielhouwer, Ph.D.

Editor's Note

Dr. Wielhouwer's excellent article is posted in its full length on our website at www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/urbanresolve. *It includes a concise discussion of the "urbanization trend" of future war, and reports thoroughly on the Joint Urban Operations concept and the direction of JFCOM's Urban Resolve. As Dr. Wielhouwer states, "we have seen the future war, and it is urban." Please read his complete article on our site for valuable insights into the future Joint Warfighter.*

Executive Summary

Operations in urban areas have long perplexed military planners, and military analyses predict extensive urban operations for the foreseeable future. Even analyses of the recent urban operations in Iraq recommend significant revision of future training efforts for the conduct of urban operations, emphasizing the need for improved modeling and simulation of urban terrain. While the historic approach has generally been to avoid cities or wage massive campaigns of attrition, it is clear that urban areas can not be avoided and that modern sensibilities chafe at widespread collateral damage.

This paper discusses recent developments in the area of joint urban operations concept development and experimentation, arguing that initiatives under way at U.S. Joint Forces Command have great potential for improving preparation for urban conflict. The paper first discusses the context for new thinking and doctrine on joint urban operations, including analysis of recent data on patterns of global urbanization and U.S. troop deployment and responses. The strategies being used for assessing urban operations concepts are presented, including preliminary detailed results from the ongoing *Urban Resolve* experiment and its application of cutting-edge modeling and simulation technologies.

Briefly, *Urban Resolve's* breakthrough first phase, completed in October, 2004, convinced senior leaders that its experimental approach and tools could be applied across a wider range of venues to assist the Defense Department with current 'real world' problems. *Urban Resolve* has thus been expanded to assess nascent urban capabilities and to immediately address current challenges, such as the unconventional use of mortars in Iraqi cities. *Urban Resolve* and its associated modeling and simulation capabilities are thus important support elements in the current approach to training and preparing U.S. forces for joint urban operations.

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