This article was published in the
July 2005 volume of the
SWJ Magazine.
Author: Dr. John P. Cann
ISBN: 0313301891
Greenwood
Publishing Group, Inc.
Publication Date: 2/28/1997
The first comprehensive
account in English of how Portugal prepared for and conducted a
distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with
very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small
odds for success.
“Cann, who served in the Pentagon, lays out
the story with an eye to contrasts with U.S. policy. His study...is
concise and useful.” –Choice
“The book will be embraced in Portugal, where
the parade of celebrations marking the five-century anniversary of
Portugal's maritime expansion prepared audiences for Cann's
reinterpretation of the colonial war experience in a more positive
light.” -African History
The first comprehensive account in English of
how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant
counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very
limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds
for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and
implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war,
and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and
French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the
conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged
national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading
the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It
describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem
in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it
developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and
how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The
uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic
military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the
experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous
wars.
Book Review
Author: Kenneth M. Pollack
ISBN: 1400063159
Random House
Publication Date: 12/3/2004
Kenneth Pollack, who also wrote
“The Threatening Storm – the Case for Invading Iraq”, has produced a
rich history of Iran’s internal development and relations with the
world.
Reviewed by LTC Bill Bennett
Kenneth Pollack, who also wrote “The Threatening
Storm – the Case for Invading Iraq”, has produced a rich history of
Iran’s internal development and relations with the world. Readers will
find it useful in understanding the complex roots (historical, economic,
psychological, etc) of the conflict between the US and Iran. Beyond
Iran’s history – which is necessary background to frame the issues - the
book’s strength is the final chapter where Pollack lays out several
options for US policymakers. As he convincingly states, Iran and its
pursuit of nuclear weapons may be “the problem from Hell”, but we cannot
take the approach of “minimizing our involvement with Tehran while
trying to minimize Iran’s ability to cause problems for us.” Pollock
points out that while this tactic has appealed to nearly every US
administration since 1979, it has always failed…..usually with negative
consequences for both sides. Simply put, the US must engage proactively
with an Iran that is aggressively seeking nuclear weapons.
Pollack lays out a number of strategic options, including: invasion
(which he completely rejects), covert action to effect regime change
(also unsupportable), a counterproliferation strike against nuclear
facilities (an option, but with many serious complications), and a
“Grand Bargain”, whereby both sides would make significant concessions
to reach a comprehensive settlement of their differences. While the last
option is attractive in theory, there is little to suggest it will be
successful with the hardliners in charge in Tehran. After discussing
these and other options, Pollack ends the book with three policy
“tracks” which are informed by these strategic choices.
Pollack’s interesting book is a great source for the warfighter trying
to put Persian Gulf issues into perspective. Without a doubt, US
diplomacy with Iran will affect (either positively or negatively)
heavily engaged US warfighters in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan.
Indeed, Iran is the textbook example of a problem that warfighters
usually hope diplomats will solve. After reading Ken Pollack’s book,
most will find their expectations subdued. |