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This article was published in the July 2005 volume of the SWJ Magazine.

Quicklooks Book Reviews

Republished with Permission from The Warfighter Review.

Counterinsurgency in Africa

Author: Dr. John P. Cann

ISBN: 0313301891

Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Publication Date: 2/28/1997

 

The first comprehensive account in English of how Portugal prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success.

 

 “Cann, who served in the Pentagon, lays out the story with an eye to contrasts with U.S. policy. His study...is concise and useful.” –Choice

“The book will be embraced in Portugal, where the parade of celebrations marking the five-century anniversary of Portugal's maritime expansion prepared audiences for Cann's reinterpretation of the colonial war experience in a more positive light.” -African History

 

The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous wars.

 

Book Review

 

The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America

Author: Kenneth M. Pollack

ISBN: 1400063159

Random House

Publication Date: 12/3/2004

 

Kenneth Pollack, who also wrote “The Threatening Storm – the Case for Invading Iraq”, has produced a rich history of Iran’s internal development and relations with the world.

 

Reviewed by LTC Bill Bennett

Kenneth Pollack, who also wrote “The Threatening Storm – the Case for Invading Iraq”, has produced a rich history of Iran’s internal development and relations with the world. Readers will find it useful in understanding the complex roots (historical, economic, psychological, etc) of the conflict between the US and Iran. Beyond Iran’s history – which is necessary background to frame the issues - the book’s strength is the final chapter where Pollack lays out several options for US policymakers. As he convincingly states, Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons may be “the problem from Hell”, but we cannot take the approach of “minimizing our involvement with Tehran while trying to minimize Iran’s ability to cause problems for us.” Pollock points out that while this tactic has appealed to nearly every US administration since 1979, it has always failed…..usually with negative consequences for both sides. Simply put, the US must engage proactively with an Iran that is aggressively seeking nuclear weapons.
Pollack lays out a number of strategic options, including: invasion (which he completely rejects), covert action to effect regime change (also unsupportable), a counterproliferation strike against nuclear facilities (an option, but with many serious complications), and a “Grand Bargain”, whereby both sides would make significant concessions to reach a comprehensive settlement of their differences. While the last option is attractive in theory, there is little to suggest it will be successful with the hardliners in charge in Tehran. After discussing these and other options, Pollack ends the book with three policy “tracks” which are informed by these strategic choices.
Pollack’s interesting book is a great source for the warfighter trying to put Persian Gulf issues into perspective. Without a doubt, US diplomacy with Iran will affect (either positively or negatively) heavily engaged US warfighters in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, Iran is the textbook example of a problem that warfighters usually hope diplomats will solve. After reading Ken Pollack’s book, most will find their expectations subdued.

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