SMALL WARS JOURNAL

    

www.smallwarsjournal.com

Google

Web SWJ

Small Wars Journal
Home
SWJ Blog
Discussion Board
Daily News Links
SWJ Magazine

Reference
Library
Research Links
Events Calendar
Reading Lists

Site Info
About
Support
Advertise
Submit Content
Contact
The material reproduced in its entirety below is the work of the author(s) listed.  Its terms of use at publication or specific grant of permission allow for this reproduction.  SWJ is pleased to be able to present this relevant material in this forum, and reminds all readers that full credit for the work is due to its author(s).

Lessons Unlearned - Ignoring the Past

Major Adam Strickland

20 February 2005


As a Marine who has served in Iraq and now conducts Small Wars research for the USMC, I am repeatedly asked about documents or studies outlining lessons learned.  While there are literally hundreds of documents to be reviewed, I am not convinced they are titled correctly.  Like many Marines; Colonel T.X. Hammes to name one; I am of the opinion that most of these works are more correctly titled “lessons observed” or “lessons to be learned,” for surely we have not done a good job at learning from either these studies or from our past experiences as a military or nation. Unfortunately, after reading through this morning’s paper, it became clear that both the Iranians and North Koreans have. 

Sources are reporting the Iranians are increasing the size of their Basiji Corps in order to engage in irregular and protracted warfare if invaded by a U.S.-led coalition. Many might argue that they have simply learned from the Iraq example, but they would be ignoring the true root of this strategy as outlined and practiced by Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. While many hesitate to compare current and potential operations with our Vietnam experience, there are several valuable lessons.  They include: the perils associated with supporting an unpopular regime, counterinsurgency operations, irregular warfare and influence operations (Phoenix), protracted warfare, interagency operations (CORDS), targeting difficulties, and the Combined Action Program (CAP). While we may have failed to appreciate the wealth of knowledge produced from Vietnam; the Afghani rebels who fought the Soviets from 1979-1989 did not, nor do those that continue the insurgency in Afghanistan today.

Prior to deploying to Iraq, I was told that several copies of Mark Bowden’s book Blackhawk Down had been found amongst the property of Saddam loyalists. It was further reported by several sources that Saddam himself was a huge fan of both the movie and book. Should this be a surprise to anyone?  Saddam had simply learned that in a counterinsurgency, less capable and equipped forces could negate the technological advances of the world’s only superpower by engaging in irregular warfare in densely populated areas where it would be difficult for the U.S. to properly identify and target enemy forces. Many could safely argue that the April 2004 attack on U.S. contractors and subsequent desecration of their bodies was simply an imitation of that suffered by Task Force Ranger personnel at the hands of Somali irregulars in 1993. While U.S. forces quickly took the offensive into Fallujah in response, within a week they had been pulled back. Did this not validate the idea of “death by a 1000 paper cuts” to Saddam loyalists, and further reinforce the lessons learned from Somalia?

Much is made over the potential of a nuclear capable Iran; however, should this be of such concern as to create discussion over preemptive strikes and war?  Who is the bigger nuclear threat  -  Iran or Pakistan?  Which nation’s intelligence services support the world's largest foreign fighter force, in Kashmir, and provided the material support necessary for the Taliban to come to power in Afghanistan? Yes - our ally - Pakistan. While we continue our efforts in support of world democracy and self-determination, our most critical allies in the Global War on Terror remain in states incongruous with this end. Saudi Arabia continues to maintain an autocratic and repressive regime, Egypt holds elections that are about as fair as those that Saddam conducted, and let us not forget that President Musharref came to power as the result of a coup.  Is there some degree of hypocrisy here? Is this not an example of “do as I say, not as I do?”  Again, what does history show us?  The U.S. pressed for change and democracy in South Vietnam and in the end supported a coup that overthrew a staunch anti-communist, ally, and popular Diem; in favor of a succession of ineffectual military juntas. We have misjudged the intent or public support for leaders in Chile, Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, Haiti, Cambodia, and Iraq. Our insistence on democratic elections in Iraq has led to an overwhelming Shi’a victory, and most likely a Shi’a dominated State with close ties to Iran. Is this what we wanted or intended?

As for nuclear weapons, I seem to recall a Small War known as the Cold War in which the U.S. successfully prosecuted a campaign based off of Mutually Assured Destruction. If MAD worked against the Soviet Bear, shouldn’t we give it a try against the North Koreans and Iranians? Maybe if it was made clear to the Iranians, that regardless if the attack came from Tehran or from one of their proxy forces such as Hezbollah or Islamic Jihaad, the result would be the same, we would not need to speak of preemptive war.  Again, why not stick with something that worked in the past?

As for sanctions, I agree with former Ambassador David Passage, they simply do not work. As anyone who has served in Iraq can verify, sanctions only further impoverished the Iraqi people, while not affecting Saddam. In Libya, soon after sanctions were lifted, Gaddafi announced that the Libyan’s had a tremendous surplus of money and, as a result, would purchase weapons worth billions of dollars from the French. Is this what sanctions truly do, force despots to save money for a better days? Truth be told - radical Muslims that seek a Salafist State - want to revert to simpler times; unencumbered by modern items and technological advances, thus sanctions support their end-state aspirations.

In the end, we must continue to collect information in an attempt to ensure that lessons observed become lessons learned; however, based off the assumption that we fail to recognize and incorporate lessons from 1965, it will most likely be some time before we get around to those from 2005.

All original content is © 2005-2007 Small Wars Journal, LLC and subject to our Terms of Use.

About     Privacy Policy     Site Help     Contact