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Introduction
to 2/7 Combined Action Program (CAP)
Platoon
Actions in Iraq
Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Skuta, USMC
Part of the
1st Marine Division pre-deployment training for Operation Iraqi
Freedom-II (OIF-II) included an orientation of the Combined Action Program
(CAP). The Corps’ successful experience with the CAP in Vietnam covered
some six years, from 1965-1971. Some 33 years later, the contemporary CAP
effort by the 1st Marine Division in Iraq is being adapted to
Iraqi society and Arab culture.
As of this
writing, the CAP effort has been ongoing, in one form or another, within
the I MEF area of operations for ten months. The U.S. Army has also
experimented with a similar concept in Iraq. Since the 1st
Marine Division returned to Iraq for OIF-II in March 2004, platoon size
units have been training and operating alongside Iraqi Security Force (ISF)
units. This effort must continue in order for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
to be capable of providing security independent of the Multinational
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).
Each infantry battalion deploying to OIF-II was required to have a CAP
platoon. The accompanying article about the 2/7 CAP experience discusses
one relatively successful effort at applying the CAP model in Iraq. There
certainly are other examples as well from throughout the 1st
Marine Division. The 2/7 CAP platoon was able to conduct operations with
the ISF—living, sleeping, eating, and fighting with the ISF on a daily
basis from May to September 2004.
Looking back on the 2/7 CAP experience, it is clear that the Marines and
sailors of “Golf 3” (2/7 CAP platoon call sign) performed many similar
tasks as their Vietnam predecessors. In Vietnam CAPs often lived in a
village, surrounded by jungle, terrifying booby-traps, and thousands of
supposedly hostile Vietnamese civilians. The Vietnam CAPs also trained
local security forces. In Iraq, the 2/7 CAP platoon lived close to the
third largest city in Al Anbar province, surrounded by both desert and
thick palm groves lining the Euphrates River “Green Belt,” and had to deal
with insurgent improvised explosive devices (IED) as well. Iraqi CAP
platoons also had to interact with thousands of supposedly hostile local
Iraqis.
The 2/7 CAP platoon mission was focused on preparing the nascent
Iraqi National Guard (ING) to confront the insurgency following the
transfer of sovereignty in June 2004. The ING record across Iraq and
against the insurgency remains mixed at best. Anyone on the ground for
any length of time in Iraq quickly realizes that the complexities of post-Sadaam
Iraq will not be easily overcome soon. Using the CAP to have the ING and
other ISF gain advantage over the insurgency worked in some areas in 2004,
but the effort must continue. It will most likely take years to achieve
lasting stability and security using only Iraqi military forces.
A proud day that all belonged to the Marines and sailors of Golf 3 and the
staff of the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in Hit (pronounced Heet),
Iraq occurred when the unit was awarded with a visit from LtGen Conway,
then CG I MEF in August 2004. During his visit he stated that he needed
to see first hand why this particular CAP was so successful.
LtCol P.C.
Skuta is Commanding Officer of 2nd Battalion, Seventh Marines
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