“Do not try to do too much with your own
hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.
It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.
Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical
work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. It may take them
longer and it may not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs, it
will be better.”
-
T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven
Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917
Training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to be capable of providing security
for Iraq is a central campaign objective of the Multinational
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). One of the essential tasks assigned to Task Force
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (TF 2/7) during Operation Iraqi
Freedom-II was to, “train and conduct operations with the Iraqi Security
Forces.” This article presents insights and lessons learned by TF 2/7
while partnering with the ISF. Cultural keys to success, understanding
how to train an Arab military force, and the internal unit costs
associated with training the ISF are discussed.
T. E. Lawrence
TF
2/7 used the advice offered by T.E. Lawrence as a salient compass to
navigate the challenges of partnering with the Iraqis.
Lawrence summarized
key tenets of a successful approach of working with Arab armies in his
Twenty Seven Articles in 1917. Here, he outlined principles to
assist other British officers to work effectively as he had.[1]
Many of these articles can be adopted as a doctrinal
foundation for the thrust of a unit’s ISF training effort. His advice
proved beneficial towards understanding the behavior of many ISF
soldiers from areas in the west-central Al Anbar province, along the
Euphrates River between Ramadi and the Syrian border. This is the area
where TF 2/7 operated for the majority of the Iraq deployment.
Of
the pre-deployment training TF 2/7 would change, or wish there had been
more of, it would be to read, understand, and adopt more of Lawrence’s
observations. The more the battalion implemented his principles, the
more successes the Iraqis achieved.
The
battalion accomplished the task of training and conducting operations
with the ISF by teaming with the Iraqi National Guard (ING) 503d
Battalion and several local area police departments. This article cites
examples of one ING unit. Similarities existed with local police
forces, but the ING experience was much more constructive.
The
503d was able to achieve an initial Iraqi-only capability for providing
some aspects of local security within a four month period. In addition
to daily security duties within the local area of operations, elements
of the 503d Battalion conducted limited offensive operations as well.
For example, the 503d conducted several successful cordon and searches
of local villages independent of TF 2/7. Another prominent example is
the 503d being designated as the Regimental Combat Team-7 (RCT-7) main
effort during an RCT attack to destroy insurgents in west-central Al
Anbar in mid-October 2004.[2]
Keys to Unlocking
Success: Trust, Start Off Slow, and Personal Relationships
First,
establish trust. The pre-eminent factor in accomplishing successful
training and operations with the ISF is the establishment of mutual
trust between individuals and units. Trust establishment was
accomplished by sharing simple staples of everyday life in Iraq that
mattered to the ISF soldiers—drinking tea, smoking cigarettes, eating,
talking about tribe, family, and at times religion, for instance. It
was only after trust was established between TF 2/7 and 503d leadership
that the two partners were able to hire and fire over 300 ING soldiers
that were either unfit for duty or sympathetic to the insurgency (to
include arresting the 503d battalion commander). Trust establishment
also led to Iraqi-only operations in a relatively short time period.
This mutual sharing of trust opened a window to one another’s worlds,
which both the Iraqis and Marines generally enjoyed.
Simple things between individuals matter in Iraqi culture. Once
individual trust is established, a foundation is formed from which more
mature relationships can evolve. Young Marines were able to use U.S.
popular culture in the same way Iraqis used their lives to open doors to
relationships—everything from magazines, to music, to family were used
to develop trust and relationships. As a consequence the Iraqis
responded much more candidly and energetically towards TF 2/7 presence.
Subsequently, Marines continued to build on the foundation of mutual
respect as soldiers. During combat with insurgents, trust provided the
necessary cohesion between TF 2/7 embeds and 503d Battalion units.
Personal
relationships. Another essential aspect of making the partnership work
at the lowest levels was to develop and maintain personal
relationships. As with trust, personal relationships are paramount.
Focusing on relationships at all levels—commanding officer-to-commanding
officer, NCO-to-NCO was essential for successful outcomes. Shared
hardship and successful outcomes from encounters with insurgents were
the most critical in gaining trust, respect, and cementing personal
relationships. Without personal relationships and trust, nothing seemed
to move forward. Developing meaningful personal relationships were
catalytic to making operations successful. At the same time, however,
reliance on personal relationships is something the ISF must eventually
move away from. Professional character and performance—separated from
personal relationships must eventually develop.
Start
off slow. Lawrence says, “Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start
is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on
externals that we ignore.” How true. It was beneficial for the
battalion to take a ‘crawl, walk, run” approach to training and
operating with the ISF. Especially if there is a lack of trust, and
underdeveloped personal relationships, the Iraqis would be hesitant to
adopt U.S. processes. This was not because the Iraqis had a negative
view of U.S. military techniques, quiet the contrary; it was because
they maintained Arab and Iraqi pride.
TF
2/7’s Combined Action Program (CAP) platoon followed the “crawl, walk,
run” approach towards training to relative success. The Iraqis usually
simply wanted to show pride in their culture by doing things in a
uniquely Arab way. Early on, it was discovered that allowing them to
demonstrate how they would like to perform a task was much more
important in the long run if the Iraqi method accomplished the mission.
A
common misstep is to consider the Iraqi way of establishing trust,
desire to start off slow, and establish personal relationships as a
laborious method, which some would label as lazy or complacent. This
turned out to be quite the opposite of reality, however. The more the
battalion (especially the CAP) adopted local customs the more the 503d
responded. The investment in time and patience is well worth the
eventual gain.
Training and Operations --“If it is
theirs, it is better…”
Let the
Iraqis train themselves, especially if the ISF unit has Iraqi Army
veterans. Finding veterans is essential, but take time. TF 2/7
identified and recruited veterans early in the effort to stand-up the
503d Battalion. TF 2/7 also adopted a “Train the Trainer” approach.
Initially the battalion trained a cadre of some two-dozen 503d
non-commissioned officers that would eventually conduct individual and
unit level training.
TF
2/7’s military police platoon[3]
conducted the initial training of the 503d non-commissioned officer
cadre, using a Mission Essential Task List (METL) “Battle Focused”
approach. The training goal was to immediately gain an initial
capability for the skills the 503d would require daily while confronting
a complex domestic insurgency: weapons handling and marksmanship,
patrolling, cordon and searches, vehicle checkpoints, and command and
control. Battalion staff planning instruction was even included.
In
the following article the TF 2/7 CAP platoon discusses “Red Sleeves” and
their effectiveness. One careful piece of advice—do not ever take a
“drill instructor” approach. This approach only serves to widen the
chasm between cultures; yelling at an Iraqi or losing one’s temper is
counter productive. Rather, use the ISF chain of command. Teaching a
cadre of trainers was beneficial. Using the chain of command is
indispensable.
Internal Unit Costs –
Battalion/Company Staff, Training, Logistics, and Communications
The
“costs”—in terms of patrol presence in the AO, additional duties
assigned to battalion staff members, and logistics—are significant for a
battalion size unit supporting a CAP or other type of ISF training
mission. TF 2/7 had to make a simple, yet extremely difficult decision,
for instance. If the battalion dedicated a CAP to training the ING, an
associated cost was to commit one company’s worth of combat power (the
battalion was already minus one company to 1st LAR Battalion)
to security of the 503d headquarters building, training the 503d, and
operations against insurgents. U.S.-only operations were favored at the
time but eventually the Iraqis must be responsible for security.
In
effect, this meant that the ability of TF 2/7 to patrol the AO would
become limited. This risk was accepted only after gains were observed
in 503d capability during training and operations. Local Iraqis were
also more accepting of competent ING presence, for example. The ING
themselves were eventually able to have lieutenants and captains lead
patrols instead of field grade officers who were initially tasked to
conduct the patrols. As more and more training and operations were
turned over to the ING, following the, “…if it is theirs, it will be
better…” approach, the more dedication, motivation, and adherence to
standards on the part of the 503d that were observed. The more Iraqi
cognizance of tactical advice in the Joint Coordination Center (JCC),
where ING officers directed actions of their respective units over the
radio, the more gains were noted in 503d ability to operate
independently.
The decision to place TF 2/7 battalion staff with the 503d
to organize and begin operations from the JCC proved costly in terms of
human resources. Valuable expertise moved from the battalion main HQ to
the ING HQ and JCC. TF 2/7 transferred 15-20 personnel from the
battalion main COC to the JCC for a period of almost four months. The
503d staff badly needed a functional capability. TF 2/7’s S3L and
operations chief initially led the effort to train and establish the ING
staff at the JCC. Subsequently, this meant that junior Marines were
required to perform above their pay grade in many functional areas. The
“cost” in this case was more supervision, time, and hours awake for
senior staff required to supervise junior Marines performing new
duties. The JCC effort also severely strained TF 2/7’s ability to
perform combat operation center (COC) functions.
Keeping a
portion of the battalion staff at the 503d also meant that the battalion
main COC would be undermanned. Current T/O for infantry battalions
does not account for the demands of 24/7 operations of a battalion COC.
TF 2/7 required three battalion level COCs, one at the 503d
headquarters, one at the TF 2/7 main, and a third at the battalion
forward operating base, to frequently perform battalion-level functions.
Logistics and
communications were also appreciably extended beyond what a battalion
organization normally maintains. Only through creative use of local
contractors facilitated by the 503d staff, stocking almost all classes
of supply for a ten day “emergency period” with both the CAP and 503d,
and dealing with an increase in communications T/E (double the infantry
battalion T/E), were challenges overcome. Having logistics resources
such as vehicles, water bulls, stocked supply rooms, and ammunition
staged to support the 503d, CAP platoon, and TF 2/7 security force
resulted in elements of TF 2/7 becoming fixed.
“The beginning and ending
of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep
always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and
your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is
going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their
tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to
yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas
except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing
only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips
that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be
proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it."
- T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven
Articles,” Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917
Units
deploying to Iraq in the future will most likely face a similar task of
training and conducting operations with the ISF. Cultural keys to
success, unique aspects of training an Arab military force, and internal
unit costs associated with any endeavor to train the ISF are critical
and must be understood. Keeping the training focused on the mission
essential tasks required for success, having the Iraqis train
themselves, and adopting many of the principles T.E. Lawrence discovered
decades ago, will prove beneficial to improving Iraq’s security force
capability.
LtCol P.C. Skuta is the Battalion Commander of
Second Battalion, Seventh Marines
[2]
Tucker, Colonel Craig A. Commanding Officer, RCT-7, October 19, 2004,
excerpt from correspondence: “…TF 1/23, 1/8 and 2d Force Recon Co
performed magnificently in an operation in the city of Hit (pronounced
Heet) that killed 30 or so terrorists without harming an innocent
Iraqi and restored both security and governance to a city taken over
by the insurgents for a 72 hour period. Of greater significance, the
503d Iraqi National Guard Battalion fought as the RCT-7 main effort,
were the first ones into the city, and remain there today (Oct 2004)
providing security for the community.”
[3] TF 2/7’s MP platoon
was sourced from Military Police Company C, United States Marine Corps
Reserve, Dayton, OH.