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Cultural Expertise
and its Importance in Future Marine Corps Operations
Major Stephen R. Kaczmar,
USMC
CSC 1996
Executive Summary
Title: Cultural Expertise and Its Importance
in Future Marine Corps Operations.
Author: Major Stephen R. Kaczmar, United
States Marine Corps
Problem: Since the end of the Cold War and
bi-polar era, the need for cultural experts covering a broader global
scope within the US military has increased dramatically. Unfortunately,
this capability is not keeping pace with the increasing military
requirements being levied by the US Government. If US forces do not fully
understand their enemies or allies, this inadequacy could prove to be
extremely costly in future military operations.
Discussion: Since the time of the ancient
Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, the need for understanding enemy
thought processes was evident. Yet, it is equally important to understand
one's allies. In this age of coalition warfare, no single nation has
sufficient military capability with which to tend to all global needs.
United Nations concurrence and support are necessary for executing most of
today's military efforts.
Cultural expertise when directly available to the
military decision maker allows him to think like the enemy as well as his
coalition partners. It permits a quicker and more decisive military
effort, focusing directly on the enemy's Center of Gravity. The rapid and
accurate identification of Critical Vulnerabilities, the keys that provide
access to the Center of Gravity, results in a swifter and less costly
military campaign. Cultural expertise is therefore a significant force
multiplier.
Cultural expertise involves much more than a
comprehensive knowledge of another language. It involves multiple tightly
interwoven factors weighted differently in each unique culture. This
capability allows commanders to more effectively increase the pressure on
a foe, decrease friction among coalition partners, and makes any military
operation less costly in human and material resources.
Current efforts within the US Marine Corps appear to
be marginally adequate. However, future needs may fall short. In this era
of decreasing defense resources a small investment in developing this
capability can yield geometric results.
Recommendations: Increase US Marine Corps
participation in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program and assign more
Marine officers to the Defense Attaché System where they can become true
cultural experts and return this expertise to the operating forces. This
capability will reap great dividends should Marines become engaged in
these regions. Additionally, efforts to enhance the competitiveness of the
FAO program with other mainstream career paths are necessary to ensure the
"best and the brightest" can compete with their peers.
Preface
This study was born out of a sense of frustration
with the inadequate cultural literacy present within the US Marine Corps.
As an intelligence officer and former Naval and Acting Defense Attaché,
the lack of understanding or even interest in foreign cultures among many
US military servicemen, ranging from flag officers through junior enlisted
personnel, appalled me. Few expressed a desire to learn about other
people, particularly the cultural details, before meeting or working with
them. Rarely did the question arise, "What are some of the cultural taboos
associated with this population with whom I am about to work?" All too
often a US translator or another person aware of the local cultural
nuances would have to intervene to preclude a serious political-military
faux pas, which could have resulted in international repercussions
perhaps with strategic consequences. Too often Americans assume that
foreigners act and think as they do--they do not! If nothing else, this
lack of cultural sensitivity paints the offender as arrogant and ignorant,
losing all credibility with the foreign host.
In this paper I hope to make an argument for an
expanded need of cultural awareness and expertise within the Marine Corps
to prepare us for military operations in the post-Cold War environment. No
longer do we have the luxury of focusing on one enemy or a few known
allies. Tomorrow's military operations may involve a previously unheard-of
group from a lesser known culture. To deal with these new phenomena, we
must expand our understanding of the multitudes of cultures. This will
ensure that we can deal with new threats, in an era where new coalitions
form from the prevailing circumstances. Thus, we must not only be
sophisticated enough to understand our enemies but also our new potential
coalition partners.
In this era of ever decreasing military budgets our
physical resources will drop. Therefore we must continue to expand,
develop, and retain our psychological resources. Without an adequate
capability in cultural expertise we cannot reach into our enemy's and
coalition partner's minds. Throughout history, as nations used their
military force to achieve their desired end state, cultural ignorance
resulted in an unnecessary loss of human and material resources.
CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM
Introduction
“... today we lack the linguistic and cultural
skills and resources fundamental for competing in the new international
environment. We can no longer define our national security interests in
military terms alone. Our ignorance of world cultures and world languages
represents a threat to our ability to remain a world leader.”1
- Senator David
Boren, Chairman Senate Intelligence Committee
Senator Boren very accurately summarizes one of the
most significant problems facing the US in the new Post-Cold War
environment. The collapse of the former bi-polar world that divided the
globe into communist and democratic camps has now resulted in one where
new alliances continue to form. In some cases our former enemies are now
actively seeking to become our allies, while some of our former allies are
beginning to distance themselves from the US.
Samuel P. Huntington states that with the end of the
Cold War international politics is leaving its Western Phase and moving
into an interaction between Western and non-Western civilizations, as they
join the West as movers and shapers of history.2 He suggests
that during the Cold War the world split along political and economic
lines but is now realigning itself along cultural lines.3 This
results from groups of peoples refocusing their orientation from fixed
political systems to a more ancient sense of identity. This older sense of
identity, or cultural affiliation, gives them a more stable sense of
belonging than the political orientation which evolved only over the past
few centuries. The sense of kinship within a culture allows individuals to
consider themselves as part of a cultural group that evolved over
millenniums.
Philip Bagby defines culture, in his work Culture
and History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations, as
an aggregate of behavioral regularities found in a group of local
communities whose size and boundaries are determined in theory by the
presence of a set of basic ideas and values, and in practice by a set of
characteristic institutions.4 Culture is the whole structure of
individual thought and feeling that varies considerably from country to
country and age to age.5 Cultural regularities may or may not
occur in individuals but reoccur in most members of a single society.6
Bagby adds that only a few psychological instincts, the counterparts
of biological necessity, such as hunger, thirst, sex, and self
preservation exist in the whole of mankind.7 Culture is that
entity which defines a people as different from others. It offers one a
sense of belonging to a group. While the environment, seasons, and
geography play a significant role in explaining the economic and technical
sides of a culture, it is up to the humans within it to deal with those
factors.8 Thus, groupings of people living in the same
environmental conditions have some similarities but nevertheless still
have their differences as a result of other influences and the different
weighting of the similar influences.
Huntington defines civilization as the highest
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity
short of separating humans from other species.9 He further
describes civilization as a collection of the following elements:
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective
self-identification of the people. 10
Huntington claims that there are eight major civilizations: Western,
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and
African.11 Interestingly, in some places such as in Eastern
Europe a number of these intersect.
If for military, diplomatic, or business purposes we
only had to develop an understanding and expertise of the eight
civilizations mentioned by Huntington, current efforts within those US
institutions would suffice. However, to effectively engage an individual
nation or region, that may exist within one nation or perhaps spread among
many, we must go deeper than just the superficial understanding of a
civilization. Each culture has its own nuances. It is an understanding of
those peculiarities that makes one successful in military, diplomatic, or
business endeavors in a particular region.
To understand these geographical cultural variances,
a person must study two features. First, one must understand the language
of the nation or region. Without a full and detailed understanding of it,
one cannot communicate with that culture. A more thorough cultural
understanding allows one to sense, the less apparent but significant,
verbal and non-verbal messages that a culturally different person is
conveying consciously or unconciously.
Second, a thorough knowledge of the culture itself is
important. All cultures have certain norms and taboos. An understanding of
them, lets one consciously exploit a situation to his benefit. Falling
into a cultural abyss would certainly have "ramifications." Both language
and cultural traits can be learned and studied. However, until one becomes
immersed within a culture, experiencing it with all five senses, these
skills remain unmastered. While an education about a culture can teach
basic communications skills and cultural norms, it limits the student to
the cultural "black and white" peculiarities. The lack of full cultural
immersion precludes an understanding of the "various shades of gray." It
is this understanding of the cultural gray areas that makes one a cultural
authority who can move about in that culture exploiting it to his
advantage.
The Importance of Cultural Expertise in Military Operations
A war may be looked upon as a test of strength
between two or more ways of life, of the extent to which different
cultures enable those who follow them to mobilize their resources and
impose their will on others. Even resources themselves are largely
cultural factors or a result of culture. This is obvious in the case of
such psychological factors as morale, but the number of members of society
and the territory which it has at its disposal are also very largely a
result of the actions of its members in the past.12
- Philip Bagby
The famous nineteenth century Prussian military
philosopher Carl von Clausewitz stated that "War is an act of force to
compel our enemy to do our will."13 Throughout his work, On
War, Clausewitz stressed the importance of the proper application of
force to defeat the enemy. The Prussian puts little credence in
intelligence which he defines as “…every sort of information about the
enemy and his country…”14 He adds that, "If we consider the
actual basis of the information, how unreliable and transient it is, we
soon realize that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and
bury us in its ruins."15 Finally, Clausewitz concludes that”...
many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false,
and most are uncertain."16
About two thousand years before the Prussian, the
ancient Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, came forth with a different
view. Sun Tzu realized that preparation for battle required an "attack on
the mind of the enemy."17 To attack an enemy's mind one must
understand it. Bagby aptly describes this in the following quote:
"If one man wishes to understand and predict
another's behavior, he does not consider his own preferences; he tries
rather.., to look at things from the other man’s point of view,' to
appreciate and sympathize with his likes and dislikes rather than
project his own."18 Thus to attack the enemy's mind a combatant
must put himself into that frame of reference.
Bagby astutely bridges the key concepts addressed by
both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu in the quotation introducing this chapter.
While war is a test of wills between two belligerents resulting in the use
of force, it certainly has a psychological dimension. Bagby ascribes that
a combatant's culture provides him with resources and psychological
factors such as morale.19 These factors, Bagby claims, are
functions of the combatant culture's past actions.20
The combatant that fully understands the other's way
of thinking will clearly have an advantage, when he applies the
appropriate force at the proper time. An understanding of an enemy's
psyche and its structure is critical in maximizing efforts against him. It
minimizes one's own costs associated with applying of force against the
enemy.
Thus, through knowledge of an enemy's mind it one can
manipulate an opponent and achieve decisive results, eventually
accomplishing the desired policy goals. Extensive knowledge of an enemy's
culture is invaluable in identifying an enemy's Center of Gravity, the
source of all his strength. The goal of any war is the destruction of the
enemy's Center of Gravity, accessed through Critical Vulnerabilities--the
weaknesses that lead to it.
CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING A CULTURE
The ideal understanding of a culture entails a
detailed knowledge of all characteristics that influence the behavior of a
distinct grouping of humans. An individual, attempting to function in a
significantly different culture, may limit his communication to a very
basic level if armed only with language. He does not get the full benefit
of an interpersonal exchange with a culturally different individual.
Subtleties of the interaction are often overlooked unless the other
culture is fully understood.
Language coupled with knowledge of other key societal
factors is critical in gaining insight into a culture's behavior and
perceptions. Without this background, full comprehension of an interchange
may never occur. While each of the below listed characteristics
individually influences specific cultures, it is the combination and
interaction of these factors that provides each unique culture with its
own peculiarities.
The Geography
A region's geography, particularly physical relief
and climate, impacts the development of that culture. This hardship or the
lack thereof, when imposed on a region's human population overtime,
certainly effects its level of adaptation. Harsher physical geography and
climate over long periods of time have offered a population three options:
to adapt and overcome the difficulties, to depart the region for a more
hospitable environment, or perish. Environmental adaptation and dominance
may involve changing the environment using various levels of technological
sophistication or merely working around the difficulty itself. Populations
that have chosen to remain in challenging climates certainly have their
character influenced by it. Behavioral characteristics often found in
these populations include stubbornness, a powerful sense of resolve, and
certainly a strong sense of urgency. Populations that live in either more
geographically friendly or overwhelmingly harsh regions lack these
characteristics. These human groupings have either not been adequately
challenged by the environment, or the difficulties are so great that they
preclude any domination by the population. A comparison of developed and
underdeveloped nations illustrates this point. Most first and second world
nations are located in temperate and mircothermal climates. The bulk of
the third or underdeveloped world's residence remains in the warmer
regions or in those that contain environmental extremes.
Religion
Religion has always been a cultural factor that fused
groups together and divided them from those that differed. In some nations
there are state religions, in others the societies are secular with
freedom of religion, while still others ban any organized religion.
Religion has always been a powerful unifying force for cultures. While
most of the world's religions have similarities such as the belief in a
supreme being and basic human values they differ in their expression and
interaction with their deity. These beliefs have been a very strong
influence throughout history.
From ancient through modern times, differences in
religion were often the primary or underlying causes for the numerous wars
fought. Examples of conflicts associated with religious differences
abound. They include Charlemagne's execution of Saxon prisoners for not
converting to Christianity in the eighth century, the Crusades which
pitted Christians against Moslems from the eleventh through thirteenth
centuries, the Thirty Years War between European Catholics and Protestants
from 1618-1648, and the present where Catholics, Orthodox and Moslems
fight in Bosnia Herzegovina.
Since the fall of the bipolar world, religion is
returning to former communist countries. The previously suppressed
Orthodox and Catholic faiths are returning to Eastern Europe where they
existed for centuries before communism. Islam is returning to the former
Soviet Central Asian states, and all three are colliding in the former
Yugoslavia since the fall of the autocratic Tito regime. History has
proven that religious conflicts are among the most brutal in history. In
these conflicts each side views their foe as an "evil" threat. Combatants
often use religion to justify their actions, regardless of savagery. This
fact stresses that religion is among the strongest cultural forces present
among a population.
Samuel Huntington fittingly summarizes this worldwide
return to religion in the following quote: The process of economic
modernization and social change are separating people from long-standing
local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of
identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap,
often in the form of movements that are labeled 'fundamentalist." Such
movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and
Hinduism, as well as Islam. In most countries and most religions the
people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated,
middle-class technicians, professionals, and business persons. The "unsecularization
of the world.., is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late
twentieth century.”21
This return to a worldwide resurgence of religion
coupled with its impact throughout history reinforces its position as one
of the most powerful cultural forces in the past, present, and future.
Thus, to understand a culture one must understand the role religion plays
in it.
Sometimes an apparent religion is not the only
religious force acting on a specific culture. West Africa provides an
excellent example of some of these multireligious interactions. There
Christianity and Islam dominate. However, before the influx of Christian
missionaries and Moslem conquerors this region had numerous animist
religions. These suppressed animist influences percolated back to the
surface and became readily apparent in Senegal and Liberia during the
Liberian Civil War that began in 1990 and continues. Here many members of
the local population, while professing to be either Christians or Moslems,
have strong underlying animist beliefs in good and evil spirits which at
times preoccupy and frighten these people.22 This type of
foreknowledge can identify this fertile environment in which effective
psychological operations may enhance other military or paramilitary
operations within this region.
History and Traditions
History and traditions are an important part of what
sets a population apart from others. This includes rituals that evolved
within cultures over extended periods. Usually these ceremonies result
from significant historical, religious, or ethnic themes handed down
throughout a population's existence. This concept helps with fostering the
group's identity as well as increasing an individual's sense of belonging.
Cultures carry these rituals from generation to generation. These customs
distinguish themselves from others and help prevent assimilation into
another group. In some groups the presence or participation in these rites
evokes various emotions, altering individual behavior.
These functions are currently becoming more
significant in countries that have recently gained their independence.
Newly formed nations without a significant history or many traditions try
to form them rapidly to reinforce their unique society. Others that had a
previous sense of identity usurped by another, such as the republics of
the former Soviet Union, are now looking into their past to identify,
develop, and expand their sense of distinction. A classic example is
Ukraine. This country is reviewing its history, going back a millennium.
The bulk of television and radio programming within that nation deals with
"cultural" programs to help the population realize its roots as separate
from the Russians that dominated Soviet culture.23 The
importance of such programming today is underscored by contrast to its
paucity under Soviet rule.
Ethnicity
Webster's New World Dictionary defines
ethnicity as a classification or affiliation of a population subgroup
having a common cultural heritage, as distinguished by customs,
characteristics, language or common history.24 Following
religion this is probably the second strongest force acting within a
population. Throughout history this cultural influence has been
responsible for stimulating cohesion within a population as well as
fomenting hatred against those not belonging to the particular group. For
example, Adolf Hitler singled out the Jewish population of Europe during
the Second World War for extermination because the Germans labeled them as
inferior and responsible for many of that nation's social ills. This
factor, coupled with religion, fosters the continuing hatred and killing
in the former Yugoslavia.
Interestingly, since the advent of modern travel very
few nations remain ethnically homogeneous, to include the formerly closed
societies in the communist bloc. Thus, in many cases the ethnic issue is
now more one of a nation's internal stability than one of pitting it
against another state. Numerous current examples exist of countries
suffering from internal conflict along ethnic lines. Some include the
inter-tribal civil war in Liberia between the Krahn and Mandingo fighting
the Gio and Manos, the Neo-Nazis in Germany and other western nations
violently targeting other ethnic groups within the particular nations.25
In many of the new states that sprang from the former
Soviet Union, the Russian minority is undergoing a slow and painful
assimilation into the new evolving nations. While this process lacks
substantial violence in Ukraine, it involves ethnic war in places like
Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.26 Despite years of
forced resettlement of various ethnic groups within the former Soviet
Union an ethnic sense of identity remains strong. It often results in
hostile actions against the Russian minority perceived as the historic
oppressor. This is most apparent in the Baltic republics, where ethnic
Russians do not receive full rights of citizenship.
The Political System
A political system clearly affects the actions and
behavior of its population. An autocratic system suppresses dissent as
those opposed to the government fear negative consequences. Often in
autocratic systems such as in the former Soviet Union members of the
Communist Party were the superior members of a society. However, in theory
all persons within that society were equal. Despite the suppression of
opposing points of view in autocratic governments, discontent often builds
until it breaks through a threshold. Once this level is reached direct
confrontation may occur between different segments of the population. As
this dissent continues to fester an incident often occurs bringing about a
violent clash, sometimes igniting a revolt.
In democratic systems dissenting points of view are
common. An individual's or group's beliefs can either publicly support or
conflict with the government. Individuals in these political systems tend
to be more open in expressing their views and less concerned with evoking
negative consequences as a result of outspokenness.
Social Stratification
If a society is broken down by a caste system there
are limits to where an individual may progress or regress. In these
stratified societies individuals remain in their subgroups. This
segregation occurs as a result of religion, ethnicity, nobility, or
economics. It is usually easier to leave a subgroup based on economic
stratification than one of nobility, ethnicity, or religion.
In India there are four strata: the highest are the
Brahmas, the priestly or learned profession caste; the
Kshatiriyas, the warrior, ruler, and large landowner caste; the
Vaishyas, the merchant and farmer caste; and finally the Shudras,
the artisans and laborers.27 Members of different castes
rarely associate with others, particularly those that are more than one
level above or below the other.28
In other nations nobility or economic status
segregate society. In Great Britain, the society is split into the
nobility and the common people. This is reflected in the bicameral
parliament which is broken down into the House of Lords and the House of
Commons. Here individuals are born into their social status, limiting
interaction between classes. In the United States individuals are usually
stratified into the rich, middle class, and poor. A person moves from
class to class purely as a response of his economic status and normally a
person's past or present status is of little significance.
Another important factor in the analyzing a society's
stratification is the internal perception that a culture has of its own
military. If a society holds its military in high esteem it is very likely
that the armed forces will gamer substantial support from the civilian
sector. If a society does not value its military, a rift between the two
can be enlarged and exploited by an enemy using effective psychological
operations.
Various questions, if raised, can identify the
relationship that a society has with its military. They include the
following. How is a society reflected in its military? Is the military
well led? Do the soldiers have confidence in their civilian and military
leadership without hesitation? How is the unit cohesion?
During the Second World War the Germans inflicted far
greater casualties on their enemies than they suffered.29 This
resulted from superior German training, leadership, and unit cohesion;
however, during the severe attrition of the German army at the Eastern
Front unit cohesion broke down because of the rapid loss of leaders and
experienced troops, so critical to the German success.30 Was
this because German society of that time molded a more rational,
disciplined, and organized soldier?31
The Priority of Human Values
This category is usually broken down into the Eastern
and Western perspectives. Societies in the East normally perceive that the
welfare of the group comes before the individual. In the West, the
individual's welfare is in the forefront while the group's is kept in the
background. A sense of cultural schizophrenia exists in some cultures such
as in the former Soviet Union. Any priority between the individual's
versus the group's welfare vacillates from one to the other.32
In the Soviet past the well being of the group was always more important,
however, as contact with the West increases the importance of the
individual is slowly coming to the forefront and basic human rights are
trounced less.33
In economically backward societies, such as those in
the former Soviet system where the welfare of the group dominates, the
living conditions of military personnel are often lower in priority when
compared to development and acquisition of equipment or new capabilities.
This neglect tends to erode the morale of the individual soldier--the most
important military asset a nation can retain. A degradation of morale
gnaws away at initiative because individuals become more interested in
enhancing their own welfare than that of the group.
Initiative
In some societies initiative is rewarded. Other
populations look down at initiative or punish those that exhibit it. In
societies where initiative in rewarded, it may or may not have limits
placed on it. For example, in the Former Soviet Union the regime publicly
rewarded any initiative that clearly resulted in a benefit to the
Communist Party.34 Any ambiguous initiative was either ignored
or punished if it questioned or portrayed the Party in a negative light.35
Once when this author asked a Ukrainian Colonel why he did not
question what appeared to be an irrational order from his superiors, the
Ukrainian replied, "The nail that sticks up gets the hammer."36
Most people subjected to this environment tended to err on the side of
caution because they feared provoking the system.37 This type
of societal reaction towards displays of initiative stifles it. A military
with stifled initiative is less likely to act boldly in combat, fearing
failure and the negative consequences that it may bring.
Perception of Time and Space
In some societies people live in very high population
densities such as in Singapore. In others such as the United States,
Australia, and Russia the population density is significantly less. Thus
the sense of space may have a significant impact on the psyche of an
individual as he moves from one extreme to the other.
In other societies the concept of time varies. Many
other nationalities accuse Americans of always being in a hurry. Those
from Mediterranean cultures as well as Slays often encourage Americans to
slow down and enjoy life. Long business lunches or dinners are the norm in
those cultures and meals are often the most productive working
environments for meetings and discussions. In other societies the concept
of time varies in different degrees. For example, in the Slavic
world--influenced by the Orthodox religion--holidays follow the Julian
calendar as opposed to the Gregorian calendar used in the remainder of the
world.
Punctuality is another time related function that
varies from culture to culture. Germans and Northern Europeans normally
arrive early to ensure they are on time while Mediterranean and Arab
cultures tend to be more "flexible" with their time and late arrivals are
not frowned upon but considered "fashionably late."38
Arabs do not like to make appointments in advance and
usually make them at the last minute; thus schedules made far in advance
rarely reflect reality upon execution.39 Often Arabs refer to
future events by saying In Sha Allah, meaning "God willing,"
suggesting that it may or may not happen--preferring to remain
noncommittal far into the future.40
Languages and Their Priorities
Some cultures use multiple languages. In those
cultures it is important to know under what circumstances, with what
individuals, and in what locales certain languages are spoken. Use of the
wrong language at the wrong time may prove not only embarrassing but
damaging. In Ukraine, the population speaks both Ukrainian and Russian.
Ukrainian is becoming more prevalent as that nation asserts its
independence and educates its population with its own culture. In Western
Ukraine, which is very nationalistic, use of Russian will only invoke
anger among local inhabitants.41 The same occurs in reverse in
Sevastopol (the Russian transliteration) or Sevastopil (the Ukrainian
transliteration) if one attempts to speak Ukrainian in that Crimean city.42
Economics
A knowledge of a region's economy allows one to
understand what industries are prevalent within it. The industries present
clearly affect the way groups and individuals behave and respond within
the given region. The more technologically advanced a nation the more it
is apparent in individual and group sophistication. Societies that are
predominantly industrial tend to be more progressive and think differently
from those that are primarily agrarian.
Cultural Characteristics: The Holistic Approach
All of the cultural characteristics mentioned above
interact. Rarely, if ever, is there a single predominant characteristic
that excludes all others in cultural development. They all interrelate
with some characteristics impacting more on a specific culture than
others. To know a culture is to understand the integration of these
factors, which ones are the most important, and the subsequent ranking and
influences of all the factors that form that society. A detailed
understanding of the dynamics, as they pertain to a specific culture,
makes one culturally literate and enables that individual to effectively
function within that milieu.
CHAPTER 3: THE MILITARY COSTS OF NOT UNDERSTANDING A CULTURE
The costs of cultural ignorance in military
operations can be extremely high, to include defeat for the uninformed.
History is replete with examples of armies unaware of their enemy's
cultural peculiarities. Today, in the age of coalition warfare, we cannot
limit our cultural focus on the enemy. Military commanders as well as
their governments must also understand the cultural nuances of their
partners. While coalition warfare is nothing new, the arrival of modern
telecommunications has increased the importance of cultural awareness. The
modern media has an unparalleled ability to influence the world's
population. The world media, predisposed towards sensationalization, can
exponentially magnify a cultural misstep should it occur at the wrong
time. This negative spin, on a seemingly innocuous event, could severely
hamper if not stop military operations in their tracks. The following
historical examples illustrate the military importance of understanding
another culture.
Operation Barbarossa
On 22 June 1941, Adolf Hitler launched Operation
Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, in his attempt to subjugate
and exploit it. During the first few months of Barbarossa the Germans had
overwhelming success routing the entire Soviet Army along a 2,000 mile
front. In some Soviet republics such as Ukraine, the population initially
welcomed the Germans as liberators. This unique response resulted from the
inordinate suffering that Ukrainians endured during Stalin's forced
collectivization plan. This 1932-1933 Soviet effort caused a severe
famine, resulting in the deaths of millions. The Germans failed to
recognize this and use it to their advantage. Instead, the arrogant German
attitude of viewing themselves as the "Master Race" and their perceived
need for Lebensraum blinded them to an opportunity to exploit the
majority in that republic for their benefit. This cultural ignorance cost
them the war in the East. Many Ukrainians initially welcomed the invading
Germans; however, most of them as well as the remainder of the Soviet
population eventually turned against Hitler's armies with visceral hatred
when they became aware of the magnitude of the atrocities committed by the
Nazis.43 Instead of gaining an ally, this German ignorance
resulted in Ukrainians joining with the Soviets in a battle of survival
against the western invader.
Vietnam
Since the United States inherited the Vietnam War
from the French, it learned little about the character of the Vietnamese.
One of the major shortcomings of the US approach in Vietnam was the
tendency to do things ourselves rather than training the Vietnamese to
accomplish the tasks.
A Vietnamese instructor at an American intelligence
school in Okinawa told his American student. "You can't help if you're
an American, but you should always remember that very few of our people
are capable of genuinely positive feelings towards you. You must assume
that you are not wholly liked or trusted, and do not be deceived by the
Asian smile."45
The Vietnamese peasants were as a whole more
suspicious of Americans than of their fellow Vietnamese regardless of
political affiliation.46 To sell out a fellow Vietnamese to a
westerner would invoke "revolutionary justice," a brutal form of
punishment meted out by the Vietcong familiar to all living in the
outlying hamlets.47 Virtually every hamlet had at least one
clandestine Vietcong informant who would report any individual giving
information to the Americans or the South Vietnamese government; this
insured the silence of the people sufficiently to frustrate any
anti-communist efforts.48 One captured Vietcong cadre told his
American interrogator the most important form of support the communists
got from the people was not the recruits or financial assistance but the
critical cover of silence--not providing information to the US or its
South Vietnamese ally.49
The corrupt, US supported, South Vietnamese
government drove many Vietnamese into the arms of the Vietcong because
their actions lent credibility to the communist accusations that it was
exploiting the nation first for the French and now the US.50
Hai Chua, a captured Vietcong official, stated that the typical communist
recruit was a poor landless peasant who could more easily accept the
communists' unique description of Vietnamese history.51
Successful and uncorrupted South Vietnamese military officers were hunted
down by the Vietcong and assassinated, because they contradicted their
propaganda that Southern government's officials were corrupt, ineffective,
and self serving--as many were.52
While many Vietcong officials could not fathom the
psychological forces that the Tet Offensive unleashed in the US, they did
notice that their decisive defeat in South Vietnam did cause many
Vietnamese to lose faith in their cause and precipitated a drop in the
"revolutionary morale" of the insurgents themselves.53 Despite
this setback the North Vietnamese soon identified the key US
vulnerability. Following the election of US President Nixon and the troop
withdrawals, the North Vietnamese accurately concluded that there was a
lack of resolve in Washington to win the war.54 They exploited
this vulnerability and successfully defeated the American Center of
Gravity--US popular opinion, thereby winning the war.
While the US and its South Vietnamese allies clearly
had battlefield superiority over the North Vietnamese, they never achieved
a decisive advantage in morale over their less technologically but more
psychologically sophisticated foe. The US focused on the guerrilla war in
the South but never managed to pull together an effective and cohesive
effort that combined decisive and aggressive military action with a
campaign to win the "hearts and minds." A US internal fear of escalation
precluded any decisive military campaigns which would have won the war.
This was a undoubtedly a case where our enemy understood the American
psyche better than we did theirs.
Valiant Blitz 1980
Valiant Blitz was a 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)
training operation which occurred in November 1980. It involved a large
scale amphibious assault on the Philippine island of Mindoro. This took
place during a period of increased tensions between the Philippine
government and Moslem rebels in the southern islands. The author of this
paper experienced the following as a participant in this exercise.55
The local inhabitants were clearly aware of an
upcoming exercise. These poor natives had some sympathies with the Moslems
to the South and spent a large portion of their meager savings to buy
softdrinks and snacks for resale to the Marines. They viewed this as a
means to turn a profit and supplement their very basic subsistence. The
guidance from the 9th MAB Headquarters clearly stated that no interaction
was to take place between the local inhabitants and the Marines.
The local populace on that island suddenly found
themselves with a major loss of capital in their softdrink and snack
investment, something which they could not afford. Additionally, as a
result of faulty information on the locale, LVTP-7 amphibious assault
vehicles crashed through fishing nets and helicopter's destroyed existing
villages with their rotor wash. The helicopter landing zone selection was
based purely on the study of old maps. The economic and social strains on
the local population resulted in the theft of hundreds of weapons and
other equipment from the Marines in the exercise. Some of these thefts
occurred at knife point.
A detailed and heeded foreknowledge of this area
could have prevented these losses. Despite its less than military
appearance, if the Marines had bought some of the products that the
natives invested in, there would have been a lower level of animosity
directed towards them. An understanding of the economic and living
conditions on the island could and should have caused a more detailed
study of landing beaches and helicopter landing zones to preclude the
problems mentioned above. If there was an adequate level of cultural
understanding by some Landing Force personnel, who could effectively
understand and communicate with the local inhabitants, perhaps the damage
could have been minimal or properly mitigated.
Beirut 1983
The terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut, Lebanon, on 23 October 1983 killed 241 US serviceman. This violent
event resulted from not understanding the dynamics of the volatile
religious politics in that country. Six weeks of increasing hostilities
between the US personnel and a number of Moslem factions in the region
preceded the bombing.56 These hostilities resulted from a total
misjudgment of Moslem perceptions regarding the US role in Lebanon.
While the origins of the US military role in Lebanon
were to keep the peace, a neutral mission, the perceptions changed
rapidly. The various Moslem factions perceived the US as a
"Christian-majority" nation interjecting itself into a civil war between
the Moslem majority and the Christian minority.57 From the
beginning all of the Western nations that intervened in Lebanon, the US,
France, Italy, and Great Britain, were perceived as imperialist
interventionalists.58 US actions such as the movement of Marine
heavy weapons ashore, the digging in of positions, fraternization between
Marines and Moslem women, and the training of a Lebanese Army unit at a
garrison next to the Marines exacerbated this perception.59
Eventually, the informal training developed into a formal program for the
Lebanese Army where the US Army established a training mission in Lebanon
providing the Christian Lebanese with weapons.60 These actions
unambiguously reinforced to the Moslems and Druse a perception of US
support for their enemy, the Christian-minority government. 61
US policy errors continued when President Ronald
Reagan stated in an ad-lib speech that the Marines were in Lebanon to
bolster the "legitimate government."62 Additionally, Marines
were the only multinational force in Beirut tied into the Israeli lines,
fostering an impression among the Moslems that the Americans were
assisting with the Israeli occupation.63 Eventually Moslems
initiated fire and killed two Marines on 29 August 1983, an event that
spiraled into a series of engagements lasting until the 23 October
bombing.64 As the number of Moslems killed by Americans
increased, the perfect opportunity developed for Syrian and Iranian agents
of influence to gain support of their agenda which involved the removal of
western influences in Lebanon.65
Colonel Geraghty, the Marine Amphibious Unit's
Commander, had a first hand familiarity with the Middle East. He served
earlier in that region while seconded to the Central Intelligence Agency.66
Geraghty understood the increasing threat to his Marines, as the
engagements with the Moslems became more intense, and requested that they
be withdrawn to the amphibious shipping.67 While Geraghty
received support from the Department of Defense in his withdraw request,
the Department of State overrode it eventually resulting in the deaths of
the 241 American military personnel.68
In this case, there was current cultural expertise on
the ground with the Marines in the form of Colonel Geraghty, however, it
appears that it was lacking in previous Marine Amphibious Units and in
Washington where the fateful decisions took place. Unfortunately, this was
another case where US decision makers were either ignorant or chose not to
see the realities of what was taking place in Beirut. More of this
expertise with previous Marine Amphibious Units and in Washington may have
resulted in a different, perhaps more positive, outcome.
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
The Desert Shield and Desert Storm examples, of
1990-1991, clearly illustrate the positive outcomes associated with a
knowledge of a culture as well as an incomplete military victory because
of differing perceptions of victory and defeat. The US as well as its
Western Allies had superbly adapted to the unique characteristics of a
deployment to Saudi Arabia. Sensitivity towards the Saudi culture
maintained the delicate coalition's cohesion against Iraq. This was
evident in the Middle Eastern expertise resident in the Theater Commander,
General Norman Schwartzkopf. The military services made extensive use of
their own through a predeployment education program for troops,
sensitizing them to the peculiarities of the Saudi culture.
The citizens as well as foreigners living in Saudi
Arabia are subject to Islamic laws known as Shari'a. This very
conservative code of laws segregates men and women in public places,
functions, and at the workplace.69 Because ensuring a favorable
perception of Americans among the Saudi population was critical in
preventing friction between the vastly different Western and Saudi
cultures, officers and noncommissioned officers sensitized to the local
concerns were able to prevent any social faux pas from
becoming major cultural irritants. The cultural awareness education took
place through briefings and pamphlets given to service personnel while in
Saudi Arabia.70 The cultural education effort and ensuing
cultural awareness of all US military personnel were probably unparalleled
in military history. It ensured the cohesion of the sometimes fragile
coalition, composed of vastly different cultures, held together to expel
the Iraqis from Kuwait.
While the cultural awareness was very evident and
successful in dealing with the Saudi sensitivities it was perhaps not as
carefully adhered to in addressing the enemy Iraqis. Despite Saddam
Hussein's decisive defeat in the battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq, he still
remains in power with significant internal support. This continues despite
the extreme oppressive measures used by his security services. This Iraqi
leader continues to confound the West with his open challenges. Allied
ignorance of this foe's culture is superbly portrayed in the following
quote, by the British military historian John Keegan.
In the [Persian] Gulf a… [catastrophic] defeat was
inflicted by the forces of the coalition on those of Saddam Hussein. His
refusal, however, to concede the reality of the catastrophe which had
overtaken him, by recourse to a familiar Islamic rhetoric that denied he
had been defeated in spirit, whatever, material loss he had suffered,
robbed the coalition’s Clausewitzian victory of much of its political
point. Saddam’s continued survival in power, in which the victors appear
to acquiesce, is a striking exemplification of the inutility of the
"Western way of warfare" when confronted by an opponent who refuses to
share its cultural assumptions. The Gulf war may be seen in one light as a
clash of two, quite different military cultures, each with deep historical
roots, neither of which can be understood in the abstractions about the
"nature of war" itself since there is no such thing.71
In our judgment, we clearly defeated Saddam Hussein
on the battlefield, expecting him to suffer an inordinate political cost
among the Iraqi people. However, we underestimated the Machiavellian
nature of Saddam Hussein and his expert exploitation of Iraqi society and
much of the Arab world. Thus, despite the most clear-cut military victory
of modern times, which inflicted an unprecedented defeat on Saddam
Hussein’ s military, he remains in power and challenging the West.
The Denuclearization of Ukraine72
Ukraine and Kazakstan were two former Soviet
republics trusted enough by the largely Russian leadership to have
strategic nuclear weapons based on their territory. Following the 1991
breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia and the US made various efforts to
consolidate these weapons and preclude the formation of new nations with
nuclear weapons. Kazakstan complied rapidly stating that it would return
the weapons to Russia. Ukraine held out stating that the nuclear weapons
belonged to that nation because it invested a large part of its human and
industrial resources in the their development and perceived a need for
them because of the unsettled regional security situation. Without saying
it directly, the Ukrainian government saw Moscow as its primary security
threat and the utility of nuclear weapons as a counter to that peril.
Fearing nuclear proliferation and another new nuclear
nation, the US embarked on a policy of diplomatic pressure with implied
economic threats, labeling Ukraine a nuclear pariah that would not
relinquish its nuclear weapons ambitions. The pressure tactics yielded
little in getting the Ukrainians to accede to a non-nuclear weapons
status. US pressure continued on the Ukrainians up through the end of
President George Bush's administration. The Clinton administration
initially followed the Bush Administration's policies of pressuring
Ukraine but then slowly began to consider recommendations provided by its
embassy in Kiev, which suggested that "more carrot and less stick" be used
against the Ukrainians. The "stick" tended to irritate Ukrainian pride,
making them more obstinate in retaining "their nuclear arsenal." A visit
by then US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, during June 1993, explained the
costs of maintaining the US nuclear arsenal. This coupled with financial
aid incentives finally convinced the Ukrainians that they would be better
off without nuclear weapons. Since that time, Ukrainian-US relations have
continued to improve.
An understanding in Washington of the Ukrainian
psyche, immediately following that nation's independence, would have
helped in establishing an effective US policy in dealing with Ukrainian
nuclear weapons from the beginning. Unfortunately, the US lost substantial
time when it could have influenced Ukraine in other areas such as with its
abysmal economy which has not yet left the survival level. The danger of
regional instability as the result of a Ukrainian economic collapse
continues to loom at the present day. Thus, if the US would have acted
effectively from the onset, our strong influence from the beginning may
have precluded some of the uncertainty which faces that region today.
Perhaps this volatile area could have been more stable today?
The above examples illustrate the need for cultural
experts within all branches of the US government. These cases demonstrate
the costs of not adequately understanding other cultures; how they think,
respond, and what is and what is not important to them. The Department of
Defense focuses on political-military issues and on the conduct of
military operations. The conduct of political-military diplomacy and
military operations requires a detailed knowledge of our allies to
minimize friction as we work towards a common goal. Military operations
will also require a detailed knowledge of our enemy, particularly the way
he thinks, because only then can we stay ahead of him in a conflict. If we
successfully get into the minds of both our allies and foes, it minimizes
the expense of human lives and national treasures in pursuit of our
nation's global policies.
CHAPTER 4: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL EXPERTISE
WITHIN THE US MARINE CORPS
In the height of the Cold War there were numerous
programs within the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps that
focused on developing language capabilities, deemed important at that
time. Cultural awareness training was a far secondary goal, as much of it
still remains today. As stated throughout this paper, language is the key
that opens the door to a culture, but, without a knowledge or experience
of working within a culture any attempts to effectively function inside it
are significantly degraded. Some of the following programs do integrate
cultural training either directly or indirectly.
Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program
The FAO program, as currently established in the
Marine Corps, makes an effort to give participants language and cultural
training. There are two tracks established in the FAO program. The first,
the Study Track, seeks to train Captains through Majors in area-specific
languages, military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics,
politics, and geography.73 Currently, it involves one year at
the Naval Post Graduate School yielding a master's degree, follow on
language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), and a
structured six month in-country training program. This training package
typically requires a three year payback tour. Following the completion of
training, there is a requirement for the Marine to serve m a billet,
normally in the Joint Service arena, utilizing the skills he has learned.74
This is the most in-depth program used by the Marine Corps to
develop area specialists. Following a payback tour in the area studied by
the Marine, that individual becomes an expert on that culture because of
his immersion in it. At the present time the Marine Corps FAO Program
provides training covering the following languages and areas within the
Study Track: Arabic, Chinese, Thai, Korean, Russian, Spanish, and
Portuguese.
The second FAO track seeks to identify those officers
who because of their experience, ethnicity, academic or professional
background already possess a level of linguistic and area expertise
comparable to those completing the Study Track program.75 The
Experience Track, as this FAO option is known, attempts to identify those
officers who are truly area experts as opposed to those who merely speak
the language of a given region.76 An officer in this category
typically receives the FAO designator after he has achieved the requisite
linguistic and area expertise by having lived in or studied about the
region.77 For example, officers having completed an overseas
tour in a non-English speaking country in any of the following billets can
receive FAO designation if they have the requisite language proficiency.
78
1. Military Advisory and Assistance Groups or
Offices of Defense Cooperation (MAAGs and ODCs).
2. US Defense Attaché Office (USDAOs).
3. Marine Corps Foreign Attaché Personnel Exchange
Program.
4. Allied Professional Military Education Courses.
5. Overseas Joint and Combined Staffs.
6. Overseas Marine Barracks.
7. Marine Security Guard Battalion, Overseas.
8. Olmstead Scholarship Program.
9. Cox Scholarship Program.
The goal of the FAO program is to identify and
prepare participants for future assignments to high level Marine Corps and
Joint or Combined Staff operations, planning, intelligence, or Defense
Attaché billets.79 Foreign Area Officers are classified by the
following areas and languages.80
1. Latin America--Spanish, Portuguese, and Haitian
Creole.
2. Former Soviet Union--Russian, Belorussian, and
Ukrainian.
3. People's Republic of China (PRC)--Chinese.
4. Middle East and North Africa--Arabic and Hebrew.
5. Sub-Saharan Africa--Swahili and French.
6. Southwest Asia--Farsi, Afghan, Pushtu, Urdu,
Hindi, and Bengali.
7. Western Europe--Romance, Germanic, Greek, and
Turkish.
8. East Asia (excluding the PRC)--Japanese, Korean,
Thai, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao, Malay, Tagalog, and Indonesian.
9. Eastern European (excluding the former Soviet
Union)--Czech, Polish, Bulgarian, Magyar, Romanian, Serbo-Croatian and
other languages that may be appropriate to the region.
Other Marine Corps Language and Cultural Training
Programs
While the FAO program is the only one in the Marine
Corps which develops and manages officer cultural expertise, there are
other programs that provide mostly language training. These other programs
that focus primarily on language training for intelligence specialists,
predominantly those in the cryptographic, counterintelligence, and
interrogator-translator fields. Of those three fields only the
interrogator-translator specialty has any significant cultural expertise.
Additionally, throughout the Marine Corps, attempts
have been made to build a data base of organic language expertise. In all
units and in boot camp language screening of new arrivals reportedly
occurs. However, many Marines with a language capability continue to fall
through the bureaucracy and a true representative sampling is difficult to
determine. This representation is difficult to determine for various
reasons that are also problematic to the overall Department of Defense
Language Program.
Actions Necessary within the Marine Corps to Meet
Future Operational Needs
The FAO program provides the best "culturally"
qualified officers within the US Armed Forces. The reason for this is the
first hand experience that these officers gain through immersion in their
subject cultures as a result of the training or practical experience. In
addition to learning about these cultures, through immersion, these
officers may establish contacts with foreign counterparts perhaps proving
beneficial in future military operations. These informal personal bonds
developed among individuals can often overcome most other difficulties
between cultures. Thus, consideration must be given to how we formulate
the immersion training plan for these officers to ensure that maximum
benefit is obtained. Unless a FAO interacts with foreign military
counterparts during this immersion phase, he will never become credible in
that culture's military subculture. These specific nuances will not be
mastered until they are experienced first hand. The Defense Attaché System
or Defense Security Assistance Agency, both of which include Marine Corps
participation, require officers to interact with their host nation's
military establishment. This allows them to develop a personal rapport and
understanding of the various military subcultures.
Participation in the FAO program with follow on
assignments in the Defense Attaché System or Defense Security Assistance
Agency develop these needed capabilities. However, the billets are
currently limited because of manpower constraints. If the Marine Corps is
to succeed in the extremely diverse Post Cold War cultural environment it
must make the sacrifices and train more FAOs and assign more officers to
these follow on assignments.
Currently, there are approximately eighty to one
hundred officers involved with learning and working with other cultures on
an annual basis. The US Marine Corps limits the FAO Study Track to eight
to ten officers per year.81Twenty seven Marine Corps officers
serve in the Defense Attaché System and a similar or lesser number are
probably associated with the Defense Security Assistance Agency.82
These training and immersion opportunities do not provide enough
qualified cultural experts to the operating forces, given the new
multi-polar global environment. The Marine Corps must consider doubling
this number, even if at the expense of gapping other billets. This is
particularly important when conducting military operations in this new
world order, where a cultural misstep may spell the difference between
success and failure.
CHAPTER 5: THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE
AND CULTURAL TRAINING PROGRAM
The collapse of the bi-polar world has increased the
interest within the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the
military services in building a cultural expertise structure within their
respective organizations. Efforts within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (OSD/C31)
and from the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS),
Admiral Owens, are actively pushing for a formalized structure and a more
widespread level of cultural expertise within the US Armed Forces.83
While the military services are paying lukewarm attention to their
development of cultural experts, the US Congress is watching the program
very carefully and may preempt the services with legislation to safeguard
these programs, particularly the Foreign Area Officer Program.84
This legislation could conceivably take a form similar to that
associated with acquisition reform where individuals possessing cultural
skills may become fenced, protected against abnormal promotion attrition.85
Within the Department of Defense (DOD) there are two
primary consumers that use cultural and language expertise. They are
primarily the intelligence and operations communities within all the
military services and in the Joint arena. The demand is now increasing to
include the logistics field, as the US becomes more involved in coalition
operations.86
Because of a historical need, the intelligence
community has been the only one to date which has accurately stated its
requirements for cultural experts. The other communities, operations and
logistics, spread throughout the four services have not yet accurately
articulated their need for area specialists, thus an adequate number of
training billets are not requested and positions requiring the expertise
remain unfilled.87 This has become particularly acute since the
US involvement in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.88 In
the past, with the exception of the service intelligence organizations,
language training was an afterthought in the US Armed Forces.
Currently, the Department of Defense recognizes three
categories of language and cultural expertise.89 The first
category consists of those requiring linguistic and cultural skills to
accomplish their mission. These have been the historic cryptographic and
human intelligence requirements levied by the military services and the
DOD agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). Individuals undergoing training in these
programs would serve in alternating billets using their language and
cultural skills. The requirements process accurately portrays the needs in
this area; however, human and financial resources tend to cause the system
to gravitate towards current and future potential adversaries. The second
category involves the preparation of individuals for one or possibly a
second assignment requiring linguistic and cultural skills. These
individuals typically gain their experience by serving in Military
Advisory Assistance Groups or Offices of Defense Cooperation (MAAGs or
ODCs), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), or foreign exchange officer tours.
Inadequate articulation of these requirements continues to preclude
meeting these anticipated future needs, particularly in billets demanding
these skills in the operating forces. These billets provide experience for
area specialists working in operations and logistics positions. The final
and third category involves the maintenance of a data base which provides
a contingency language pool within DOD.
Within the first DOD language training category there
are essentially two separate programs developing specific skills. One
primarily trains cryptographic specialists centering on listening and
reading skills. All four services are active in this program. Due to
current shortages of qualified linguists, these individuals will be
required in the future to also speak their language.90
The FAO program, with more in-depth training, not
only develops the full range of language expertise involving reading,
listening, and speaking but also makes the students culturally literate
through direct exposure to the culture. Historically the Army was the lead
agency in the FAO program and provided the largest quantity of qualified
FAOs for the Joint environment.91 At a distant second, the
Marine Corps follows the Army.92 Both military services run
very similar training programs resulting in highly qualified FAOs.
The Navy has never participated in the FAO program
and has only remotely identified officers as political-military
subspecialists based on their schooling. Those identified as these
subspecialists have rarely completed payback tours that would further
strengthen their credibility in their area specialty.93 Payback
tours would take a Naval officer out of his career track for too long a
time, essentially precluding any chance of promotion beyond Lieutenant
Commander (O-4).94 Currently, the Navy has identified a
shortage of area expertise as a problem and is attempting to resurrect the
political-military specialty by making it more lucrative for officers with
flag potential.95
The Air Force had a seriously flawed program called
the Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) which remained unfunded.96
No other program existed within that service to develop cultural
experts. To rectify some of these deficiencies, the Air Force initiated a
Foreign Language Skills Process Action Team that stated a service
requirement for language and cultural skills as well as the need for a new
doctrine and guidelines to implement such a program.97
Besides the plethora of US military involvement
throughout the world in non-traditional areas, such as Somalia, Rwanda,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Haiti; pressure from the VCJCS through the Joint
Resources Oversight Council (JROC) certainly got the services more
interested in developing and maintaining cultural expertise.98
The VCJCS wanted to develop a "service culture" within the Marine Corps,
Navy, and Air Force that supports manning and resourcing a new military
occupational specialty.99
There is currently a draft DOD Service FAO Directive
being staffed within the Pentagon. This draft directive instructs the
military services to train and retain officers for service on
political-military staffs, such as "within US embassies and diplomatic
posts to carry out military diplomacy."100 This instruction
states that:
... Close and continuous military-diplomatic
interaction with foreign government defense and military establishments is
essential to develop and maintain the capability to engage in
constructive, mutually, supportive bilateral and multilateral military
activities and relationships across the range of operations.101
This directive clearly states that a new mission of
"forward military-diplomacy" will be tasked to all the military services.
To accomplish this new tasking, the services will be required to train and
retain officers possessing all of the following: (1) a graduate level
education focusing on the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and
geographic factors pertinent to specific countries and regions; (2)
foreign language skills at the professional level in the predominant
language used by the population of the countries or regions in which the
officers specialize; and (3) qualification in their principal military
specialties to include satisfactory completion of professional military
education and experience in operational units.102
While problems persist within the services as to what
priority they should place on developing a cadre of cultural experts, it
is evident that the US Congress, OSD, and the VCJCS are pushing the
services to develop these programs. As with any new efforts in the
Pentagon bureaucracy, opponents will try to wait out the change believing
that lip service will suffice until the proponents of the change leave
office. With congressional scrutiny of the program and with the expanding
interest among the services, albeit due to a possible threat of
legislation mandating the changes, the efforts will probably continue with
only the speed and breadth of implementation in question. In short, if the
services do not provide for the adequate addressal of the FAO problem,
congress may do it for them.
CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A
CREDIBLE LEVEL OF CULTURAL EXPERTISE IN THE US MILITARY
FAO Problems
The problems associated with developing and
maintaining sufficient cultural expertise within the US Armed Forces are
primarily bureaucratic in nature. Once again the FAO program is the
primary and most efficient producer of cultural and linguistic expertise
for category one (intelligence) and category two (operations and
logistics) officers in assignments needing these skills. The major
problems of maintaining and retaining qualified individuals are primarily
those of personnel management. Personnel managers, within the Joint Staff
as well as in all the military services, are trying to avoid the
administrative burden of building and keeping this capability.103
The best way to overcome this resistance among the military
personnel managers is to issue a DOD Directive and to make it a high
interest DOD Inspector General (IG) issue, an option under consideration
at this time.104 The active involvement by the military
services in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program with Joint Staff and
DOD oversight should ensure adequate retention of a cultural expertise
capability within the US military. Should this not occur, then
congressionally mandated standards may be implemented through legislation.
Current problems exist with the military services'
perception of the FAO program. Because of the amount of time FAO officers
are out of their military service s mainstream, while they study the
language and culture of their target country, they get labeled as less
competitive than their peers for promotion. For example, military officers
are usually assigned to three year tours of duty which alternate between
service in the operating forces and those outside of them. The Marine
Corps identifies these tours as in the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) and non-FMF
assignments. Currently, officers assigned to the FAO study track program
engage in one year of study at the Naval Post-Graduate School earning a
master's degree; language training at the Defense Language Institute for
approximately another year, depending on the difficulty of the language;
and six months of structured study in their target country.105
This in itself constitutes nearly a three year period when considering the
officer's leave, travel, and course scheduling. FAO training is a non-FMF
or service external tour. While the service-required Professional Military
Education (PME) school assignments are positive exceptions to normal
alternating FMF and non-FMF tour rotation, FAO training and payback
assignments are sometimes looked on less favorably and count as non-FMF
billets.
It is at this time, when an officer becomes a
candidate for PME, that he is most likely to attend FAO training or fill a
billet requiring FAO skills. However, should the officer choose to accept
FAO training and a subsequent utilization assignment he increases the time
out of the mainstream of his service and military occupational specialty.
Most tours requiring FAOs normally are three years in length. Thus, to
train a FAO and use his capabilities in the most efficient manner, it
removes him from his service mainstream for approximately six years.
Additionally, FAO candidates cannot have attended Career Level (CLS) or
Intermediate Level Schools (ILS) in their present grade, which could
hamper the competitiveness of these officers, particularly those in the
larger military occupational specialties.106 An option to keep
FAOs competitive in their military education could involve the
incorporation of the Joint Primary Military Education (JPME) requirements
into the Naval Postgraduate School portion of their training.
To most efficiently use a FAO and to protect him
professionally it will be necessary to spend three years training him
within that program. He must fulfill PME requirements by this training to
remain competitive with his non-FAO peers. Thereafter, the qualified FAO
must return to his primary military occupational specialty to remain
current in his particular warfare discipline. A FAO who does not
understand or is not current in his military occupational skill has little
credibility with the foreigners with whom he may interact as well as his
peers, subordinates, or superiors.107 Following a trained FAO's
reemergence from a recent tour in his service's warfare specialty, the FAO
can attend a short language and culture refresher course before going onto
a payback tour where he provides a return to his service or DOD for the
training invested in him. These payback tours must not necessarily occur
in the same country but within a similar culture. This approach would
further diversify that individual.
The above proposal, while involving substantial
financial, resource, and personnel costs allows for and encourages highly
competitive officers to become FAOs. Once they have completed their
initial payback tour, services can recall these officers for subsequent
FAO related assignments both within their service and in the Joint arena.
However, once again, for these officers to remain credible with their
foreign hosts and their services they must alternate between service tours
and their FAO assignments.
Problems with the Maintenance of Language Data
Bases
As stated earlier in this paper, the third category
in the DOD language criteria involves the maintenance of data bases which
list individuals with their language capabilities. This is essentially a
"come as you are capability" without the additional expenditure of
resources to enhance an individual's language other than the maintenance
of the data base. This data base comes into play when there are
insufficient trained or qualified interpreters within a military service.
Other than testing persons identified with languages, there are no
additional quality control measures associated with this program. While
pure language capability does provide some utility, the crux of this paper
argues that cultural understanding is equally important for an individual
to function within another culture.
The Defense Manpower Data Center (MCDC) maintains the
DOD language data base.108 The military services feed names and
their respective language capabilities into this system. This information
enters the service systems through various means. Initially when
individuals enter a branch of the US Armed Forces, either as an enlisted
or officer, they undergo an interview with their recruiter, a process
poorly executed at the present time.109 Following
arrival at a Marine Corps Recruit Depot or the recruit training centers of
the other services, and after a few days have passed, another interview
occurs at which time individuals are asked if they have any non-English
language capability.110 This interview occurs after the recruit
learns "not to volunteer for anything," degrading the foreign language
screening at this level.111
Other efforts at language screening take place at the
battalion and squadron level when a new Marine joins a unit. However, a
lack of command attention degrades this effort. Too often, because of a
desire to rapidly check-in a new Marine, the unit process bypasses the
unit intelligence office. Even when an individual within a unit possesses
a foreign language, his company or section is unwilling to release him for
testing. It is the testing which gives an accurate assessment of the
individual's foreign language ability and the interview conducted by the
unit's intelligence office that identifies if the person lived within a
foreign culture, be it abroad or perhaps acquired through an immigrant
family. Unfortunately there are currently no DOD or Marine Corps
instructions which mandate the screening of all personnel for foreign
language or cultural expertise. Currently, ad hoc screenings are only
initiated when crises such as Haiti and Somalia develop. These limited and
unstructured efforts usually inaccurately portray the organic language
capabilities of the services.
Unfortunately it is the lack of service interest and
support for a formalized language screening process that allows some
native or near native language speakers and true cultural experts to slip
through the cracks. This precludes their use in fast breaking crisis where
these skills are necessary on very short notice.
This data base effort, just like the FAO program
requires some DOD and service supervision and most importantly interest.
For example, services should require recruiters to conduct accurate
initial language screening and testing.112 Additional screening
and interviews can occur at the recruit depots or perhaps more efficiently
at the first non-training unit at which the new service member arrives.
Should the services not adequately implement this change a DOD Directive
could mandate it with adherence checked through DOD Inspector General
inspection.
Retention of Cultural and Language Skills
Currently, there is a one hundred dollar cap on
language proficiency pay for members of the US Armed Forces. Other US
government agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or the
National Security Agency have either abolished the cap or significantly
increased it. To ensure that military personnel retain adequate
proficiency in the many diverse languages this pay must increase at least
three fold. Often individuals with language and cultural skills must study
on their own time to retain these perishable skills which benefit their
nation at a time of need. These efforts of self sacrifice should be
rewarded and encouraged, particularly for the rarer and more difficult
languages in which we have few experts. This ensures that we have access
to the best linguists and cultural experts possible when we need them
most.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As the globe reorients itself from the former
bi-polar to a newer multi-polar perspective, the instability associated
with these societal upheavals increased by several orders of magnitude.
This new precarious environment is shaped by populations redefining
themselves along the lines of language, ethnicity, and religion. All of
these elements are substantially older than the political ideologies of
the bygone period. Entire global regions are reexamining their political
alliances and interests. Former foes are now friends and friction is
eroding past friendships and trust developed between allies during the
height of the Cold War.
While events during the Cold War were relatively
predictable, between allies and foes alike, the current global situation
changes on an almost daily basis. During the Cold War the opposing
military establishments had a single focus that each side directed against
the other. Today limited and inadequate attempts to focus on a prospective
enemy may result in an invalid assessment, as a potential enemy's internal
and external actions continue to change due to more ancient influences
from within. These societal forces previously suppressed by politics and
the threat of harsh retribution are becoming increasingly active,
significantly changing the behavior of nations by redefining a
population's interests and priorities. This changes their previous threat
perceptions and perhaps even their way of approaching warfare.
In this age of uncertainty we cannot clearly identify
all of our future potential adversaries. However, because of the global
instability, an inaction or an inappropriate action may exacerbate
regional tensions resulting in a heightened level of conflict less rooted
in logic but more in historically deep-seated hatred. Instead of the
previous traditional road to war that centered on toppling or preserving a
political system, current conflicts ignite as a result of religion,
ethnicity, or language. Political boundaries are being replaced with those
of a population's self-identification. While political systems were never
absolute and their definitions always ambiguous--religious, ethnic, and
linguistic ties have withstood the test of time. Any threat to these older
links that people have had to one another suggests a battle for survival
rather than imposition or removal of a vague political system.
A thorough understanding of a culture allows us to
understand our potential enemies. This knowledge permits us to put
ourselves into the mind of the enemy and see how he perceives himself, how
he thinks, what is important to him, what will or will not make him blink,
and how he will fight. To understand a culture means to understand the
interrelationship of its physical, psychological, and sociological forces
that form uniquely different cultures.
Because of the ferocity and lethality of future
warfare, where advanced technology and the survival of cultures come into
play, it is critical to understand a potential enemy so we can defeat him
quickly, decisively, and with minimal costs.
Interestingly, as these new conflicts take on the
survival aspect this nation's military budget is declining. With fewer
financial, material, and human resources at our disposal for future
conflicts we cannot fight wars of attrition, something which we have
become accustomed to in our history. America has traditionally overpowered
all its foes through sheer brute strength rather than through a carefully
chosen strategy to cut out the enemy's Center of Gravity. Domestic
circumstances now dictate that wars must be decisive, short, and as
bloodless as possible. The achievement of this goal is only possible
through a in-depth understanding of our potential foes and the societies
from which they spring.
Language training in itself is insufficient. It fails
to integrate the other societal influences that shape a culture. An
appreciation of a population's social forces, as well as the intricate
interaction between these influences, permits an outsider to exploit it.
Using this approach we can break our foes before we physically destroy
him. This does not imply that psychological manipulation will replace the
application of force in warfare. The two go hand in hand as stated over
two thousand years ago by Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military
philosopher.
This approach, that is becoming increasingly
advocated in the US Armed Forces, allows us to decisively attack our foe
through the indirect approach which avoids our opponent's strength and
goes into his soft under belly or rear to carve out his Center of Gravity.
It avoids his strength that ingests our national treasures of human and
material resources. By fully understanding our enemy, we can selectively
shape and manipulate him by force to do our bidding and achieve the end
state we desire with minimal costs.
Today it is becoming increasingly important to
comprehend one's coalition partners. Its significance may at times exceed
that of understanding one's foe. In this more unstable global environment
we will have to commit our more limited military resources more often. We
cannot afford to become bogged down in any single region of the globe,
because new threats will continue to emerge. The US will need to become
involved in military conflicts through coalitions, which will rarely
remain the same, to execute the ever increasing military requirements. The
cohesion necessary to achieve the desired end state will require us to
have a detailed understanding of our enemy's social and psychological
makeup as well as that of our allies. If the US does not fully understand
its coalition partners during a military effort the cohesiveness can
fracture, perhaps resulting in a military disaster. Both military
philosophers Clausewitz and Sun Tzu stressed the importance of
safeguarding one's own coalition and fracturing the enemy's.
The key weapon in this new uncertain age is clearly
knowledge. We must develop experts within our military establishment who
can fully understand the ways our potential enemies and allies think and
act. This expertise must develop to the point where we can almost begin to
predict their behavioral patterns based on knowledge of the cultures.
Unfortunately this weapon is not cheap and requires a
substantial investment of time, money, human, and material resources. All
of these assets are in competition with weapons procurement, training, and
service end strength. Today's military optempo and reduced resource base
tend to detract from any investment in developing our cultural experts.
This investment, unlike technology is difficult to quantify accurately. As
military resources get cut so do our cultural experts and their training.
Unfortunately, cutting them may have a disproportionate negative impact on
our ability to decisively defeat our enemies in future conflicts. History
abounds with examples where a physically superior force was unable to
defeat a psychologically superior opponent, because they did not
understand the later.
The US Marine Corps currently limits the FAO Study
Track program to eight to ten officers per year.113 The best
near native Experience Track FAOs come from second generation immigrants
that have been assimilated into the US culture. They have no loyalty ties
to their roots unlike the first generation, but retain a knowledge of
their parents' culture and language. Few who have experienced life in the
US want to return to the country of their origin. Third generation
Americans normally lose this capability, because they become fully
assimilated by the American way of life.
Post World War Two immigration patterns have changed
in the US, with fewer immigrants arriving from Central and Eastern Europe
providing us with less expertise from those lands. On the other hand more
immigrants are arriving from Latin America and Asia. Considering that
conflicts in those regions are likely, second generation Americans from
those nations may provide a pool of Experience Track FAOs. Area needs must
be identified and scrubbed against the Study Track quotas and the
availability of Experience Track FAOs. Shortfalls should be addressed on
an annual basis and reflected in an increase of Study Track quotas. This
may require a doubling or perhaps even a tripling of the current quotas.
If military personnel systems were sensitized to a need for cultural
experts perhaps more could be identified and recruited from within the
military ranks. Should these efforts prove inadequate, possibly sectors of
the US second generation immigrant population could be screened and
recruited into this nation's armed forces, providing the individuals meet
all necessary security criteria.
Additionally, true cultural expertise can only be
gained by living in a foreign culture for a prolonged period. The Defense
Attaché System (DAS) places officers in overseas tours for two to three
year periods, depending on the hardship of living in those areas. Marine
participation should increase in this program. Some of these billets are
in countries without international littoral regions such as Azerbaijan,
while none exist in the Baltic Republics. The current Marine and Navy
Doctrine, "Forward… from the Sea," espouses amphibious operations in the
littoral zone. What better way to develop an understanding of cultures in
this littoral zone than by assigning an officer to the various littoral
countries of interest to the Marine Corps? While it would be impossible to
provide a Marine officer for each littoral nation, we should provide more
in areas of high interest. Perhaps a doubling of the current number of
Marine officers within the DAS may begin to cover our potential areas of
amphibious interest. Officers serving in these positions live in the
culture and work with that nation's military on a daily basis. Officers
returning from these tours are the cultural experts that this study
suggests we need to develop and expand.
While we may be ambivalent within the US Armed Forces
as to the worth of building and retaining cultural experts, this need is
not going unnoticed within the halls of the US Congress. While the former
VCJCS was the driving force behind the expansion and institutionalized
maintenance of this capability within the Joint Staff, other proponents
within the DOD and the remainder of the US Government also recognize this
need. Bureaucratic attempts to stall or stop these efforts are sure to
occur from personnel managers within the military services, but, there is
sufficient inertia spread throughout the Federal Government to keep the
program moving forward. Should the US Armed Forces, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Department of Defense inadequately build and maintain this
capability which transcends the battlefield from the strategic through
tactical level, legislation may be in imposed mandating special protection
for this skill.
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Notes
1 Col. Gunther A. Mueller,
Foreign Language Skills Process Action Team: Report (Colorado Springs,
CO: USAF Academy, 1 December 1995), 3.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, "The
Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993): 22-29.
Reprint in Theory and Nature of War, vol. 3, ed. United States
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, (Quantico VA: USMC CSC, 1995),
K-9.
3 Huntington, K-9 through K-10.
4 Philip Bagby, Culture and
History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 122.
5 Bagby, 40.
6 Bagby, 88.
7 Bagby, 140.
8 Bagby, 146-147.
9 Huntington, K-10.
10 Huntington, K-10.
11 Huntington, K-11.
12 Bagby, 127.
13 Carl von Clausewitz, On
War, ed. and tr. by M. Howard and P. Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 75.
14 Clausewitz, 117.
15 Clausewitz, 117.
16 Clausewitz, 117.
17 Sun Tzu, The Art of War,
trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) 41.
18 Bagby,3.
19 Bagby, 127.
20 Ibid.
21 Huntington, K-12.
22 This was evident to the
author of this paper when he engaged local civilians in Liberia and
Senegal during Operation SHARP EDGE, the Non-Combatant Evacuation
Operation (NEO) and security operations in Monrovia, Liberia during 1990.
As discussions with Christian and Moslem members of the local populace
moved towards their animist beliefs the subjects grew increasingly
uncomfortable as the author questioned them about the powers of the local
"Juju" Men (Witchdoctors). In Liberia these animist beliefs resulted in
atrocities such as the removal of hearts and heads from prisoners to
convince an audience that "mysterious powerful forces" were involved in
the conflict.
23 This was apparent whenever
the author turned on his television and radio in Kiev, Ukraine when he
served as the Acting Defense and then US Naval Attaché to that newly
independent state.
24 Victoria E. Neufeldt, ed.,
Webster's New World Dictionary of American English (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1988), p. 467.
25 This was experienced
by the author while he was involved in NEO and security operations in
Monrovia Liberia during 1990. During the Liberian Civil War if a member of
one tribe traveled into an area controlled by an enemy and was captured it
almost always resulted in the death of the trespasser. Individuals
differing from those controlling an area would be sought out by their
appearance, mannerisms, and speech. Those identified and sometimes even
suspected of being members of an opposing tribe were tortured or put to
death.
26 This was noted by the author
during his tour in Ukraine as the Acting Defense and then Naval Attaché
from 1993 through 1995. The Russian and Ukrainian ethnic rift was clearly
the underlying cause for the sometimes violent political conflagrations
associated with Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. On occasion this also
became an issue in the Donbass region in Eastern Ukraine where the ethnic
Russian population exceeded that of the ethnic Ukrainians. However, as
time goes by the embers of ethnic conflict seem to be burning out despite
an occasional reflash.
27 Compton's Encyclopedia,
1996 Edition Version 4, under the words "India and Caste." (Carlsbad, CA:
Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia, 1996).
28 The author saw this first
hand in the Indian diplomatic and expatriate society in Kiev, Ukraine
while serving as the US Naval Attaché there. Additionally, Indian
diplomats went to great length to explain this social stratification as a
positive aspect of their society whenever discussions ventured into that
area.
29 Steven Peter Rosen, "Military
Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security
19,no.4(Spring 1995): 21-22.
34 Ibid
35 Ibid
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 The author has
experienced this numerous times from his contemporaries in the
international diplomatic community while he served as the US Acting
Defense and then Naval Attaché from 1993 to 1995 in Kiev, Ukraine.
39 Hawley, Sir Donald,
Manners and Correct Form in the Middle East (London: Debrett's Peerage
Ltd., 1984), 94.
40 Hawley, 93.
41 This was very obvious to the
author as he traveled in Western Ukraine.
42 During his multiple
trips to Sevastopol, the author personally experienced this reaction by
the predominantly Russian population of that city.
43 This was a theme heard from
the hundreds of Ukrainian World War II veterans which this author met in
Ukraine, while serving as the US Naval Attaché to Ukraine, during the 50th
Anniversary V-E Day Celebrations in 1995.
44 This is something the US
leadership never learned during the war.
44 Stuart A. Herrington,
Silence Was A Weapon (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 16.
45 Herrington, 23.
46 Herrington, 22.
47 Herrington, 23.
48 Herrington, 39.
49 Herrington, 29.
50 Herrington, 27.
51 Herrington, 36.
52 Herrington, 123.
53 Herrington, 34.
54 Herrington, 113.
55 The author participated in this
exercise, Valiant Blitz 1980, as an artillery liaison officer with
Battalion Landing Team 2/4, part of Regimental Landing Team 4, the ground
combat element of 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade during this November 1980
event in Mindoro, Republic of the Philippines.
56 Eric Hammel, "The 'Root Redux,"
US Naval Institute Proceedings, 119, no. 6 (June 1993): 77.
57 Hammel, 78.
58 Hammel, 78.
59 Hammel, 78.
60 Hammel, 77.
61 Hammel, 77.
62 Hammel, 79.
63 Hammel, 79.
64 Hammel, 80.
65 Hammel, 80.
66 Hammel, 80.
67 Hammel, 80.
68 Hammel, 80.
69 Soroya S. Nelson,
"Cultural Differences a Factor in Deployment," ..Air Force Times,
10 September 1990, 18.
70 Nelson, 18.
71 John Keegan, The History of Warfare
,(1993), xi. Quote in Theory and Nature of War Syllabus, United
States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, (Quantico VA: USMC CSC,
1995), 83.
72 This was an ongoing challenge for the US
Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine during the winter and spring of 1993. As the
Acting Defense Attaché during this period, the author was present during
many of these discussions with Ukrainian government officials.
73 Headquarters US Marine Corps, Foreign Area
Officer (FAO) and International Relations Officer (IRO) Program,
Marine Corps Order 1520.11D, 21 April 1995, 1.
74 Marine Corps Order 1520.llD,
1.
75 Marine Corps Order 1520.llD,
1.
76 Marine Corps Order
1520.llD, Enclosure (1), 1.
77 Marine Corps Order 1520.llD,
Enclosure (1), 1.
78 Marine Corps Order
1520.11D.Enclosure (1), 1-2.
79 Marine Corps Order 1520.11D,
3.
80 Marine Corps Order 1520.11D, 3.
81 Headquarters, US Marine
Corps, Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer Program, Information
Paper, 1995.
82 Headquarters, US Marine
Corps C41, DIRINT's Guidance for all Marine Officer's Assigned to the
Defense Attaché System.
83 A military source within
Headquarters, US Marine Corps who works cultural training issues and
wishes to remain anonymous, interviewed by author, 29 November 1995.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 A senior source within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence (OSD/C3I), who wished to remain anonymous, interview by
author, 23 January 1996.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Randy P. Burkett, The
Training and Employment of Area Specialists in the
Military," Masters Thesis (Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1989),
14-43.
92 Burkett, 44-54,
93 Burkett, 55-63.
94 Ibid.
95 Chief of Naval Operations,
Revitalization of Navy Political-Military (Pol-Mil) Subspecialty.
Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations 1500 Ser N511/4U602231, 6
January 1995, 1-6.
96 Burkett, 64-82.
97 Col. Gunther A. Mueller,
Foreign Language Skills Process Action Team: Report and
Recommendations,(Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Academy, 1 December 1995),
1-2.
98 Headquarters US Marine
Corps, POS-22, DAO/SAO Steering Group. Information Paper, 7 July
1995.
99 Ibid.
100 Department of Defense,
Department of Defense Directive (Draft): Service Foreign Area Officer
Program, 9 November 1995, 2-3.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 A senior source within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence (OSD/C3I), who wished to remain anonymous, interview by
author, 23 January 1996.
104 Ibid.
105 Marine Corps Order 1520.11D,
2.
106 Marine Corps Order
1520.11D, Enclosure (3), 2.
107 This was readily apparent to
this author while he served as the Acting Defense and then Naval Attaché
in Kiev, Ukraine from 1993 through 1995. Tactical and operational
credibility gave him access into the Ukrainian military services, the
General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense. This broader background
allowed the author to be more credible with his host nation's military,
particularly when compared to the "professional military attaches" used by
some other nations. Professional military attaches stand out because they
cannot "walk the walk and talk the talk" of an officer qualified in a
tactical military occupational specialty.
108 Linda C. Cavalluzzo
and Jeremy N. Suess, Translator-Linguists: An Assessment of
Requirements, Inventories, and Process for Ensuring Personnel Readiness.
Center for Naval Analyse Report, no. CRM 95-178. Alexandria, VA: Center
for Naval Analyses, December 1995, 2.
109 A senior source within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (OSD/C3I), who wished to remain
anonymous, interview by author, 23 January 1996.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Headquarters US Marine
Corps, Marine Corps Foreign Area Officer Program. Information
Paper, 1995.
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