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General Anthony
Zinni's MOOTW Considerations Make Sense in Iraq
Dave Dilegge
Urban Operations
Journal
28 February 2003
General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret); experienced in the
theory, planning, and conduct of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
as well as a leading proponent of cultural intelligence; developed the
following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and
peace enforcement operations. The successful conduct of operations in
Iraq extends well beyond 'taking down Saddam'. The end state we achieve
in Iraq - and how we achieve it - will have a direct and
serious impact on all future operations in the conduct of our war on
terrorism.
They are presented here as helpful guidelines on winning
the peace before, during, and after the dust settles in Baghdad and other
Iraqi urban areas.
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Each operation is unique. We must be careful what
lessons we learn from a single experience.
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Each operation has two key aspects - the degree of
complexity of the operation and the degree of consent of the involved
parties and the international community for the operation.
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The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for
success.
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Start planning as early as possible, include everyone in
the planning process.
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Make as thorough an assessment as possible before
deployment.
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Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determine the
centers of gravity, end state, commander's intent, measures of
effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated duration of the
operation.
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Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks
with political objectives. Avoid mission creep and allow for mission
shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision, made by political
leadership in consultation with the military commander, responding to a
changing situation.
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Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the
operation. This allows subordinate commanders to make appropriate
adjustments to meet their individual situation or rapidly changing
conditions.
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Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish
coordination mechanisms that include political, military,
nongovernmental organizations, and the interested parties.
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Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the
decision-makers are. We must know how the involved parties think. We
cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own culture.
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Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.
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Don't lose the initiative and momentum.
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Don't make unnecessary enemies. If you do, don't treat
them gently. Avoid mindsets or words that might come back to haunt you.
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Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the
fewest possible seams between organizations and involved parties.
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Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for
each of the involved parties.
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Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.
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Personalities are often more important than processes.
You need the right people in the right places.
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Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who
you invite to participate, use as a go-between, or enter into contracts
with since you are giving them influence in the process.
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Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused
on it. Whatever the image; humanitarian or firm, but well-intentioned
agent of change; ensure your troops are aware of it so they can conduct
themselves accordingly.
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Centralize information management. Ensure that your
public affairs and psychological operations are coordinated, accurate
and consistent.
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Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and
political compatibility and military interoperability are crucial to
success. The interests, cultures, capabilities, and motivations of all
parties may not be uniform; but they cannot be allowed to work against
one another.
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Senior commanders and their staffs need the most
education and training in nontraditional roles. The troops need
awareness and understanding of their roles. The commander and the staff
need to develop and apply new skills, such as negotiating, supporting
humanitarian organizations effectively and appropriately, and building
coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.
General Zinni offers basic, common-sense guidelines here.
Unfortunately, many of these guidelines are left behind at our military
think-tanks and schoolhouses once the first round goes downrange. We are
reaching critical mass and can ill-afford to relearn lessons from such
places as Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, and elsewhere. It is time to start
winning wars instead of battles - winning hearts and minds instead of
temporary respite. With that we will win the peace.
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