From the siege of Troy, to the great battles of Alexander the Great, through the conquests of the Roman and British Empires to the battlefields of World War Two, the nature of war has remained almost without any changes. Three main characteristics of the traditional or 'old' style of war were: 1) participants were states or other legitimate authorities; 2) the disputes were generally over property, defined primarily in terms of land, population or natural sources; and 3) wars were fought by 'combatants' only[i].

Despite the third characteristic of the traditional war, non-combatants or civilians were always a part of war; not only as a part of the armies, but also as the raison d'etre. This always turned them, even within the traditional war, into collateral damage. Some of the more obvious examples, even if just from modern history, include the siege of Leningrad and the bombings of Dresden, London, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, waging war has always been the duty of combatants, and therefore the prevalent behavior of civilians was either to escape or to take cover, but definitely not to fight back. One, who decided to fight, could take a weapon, put on a uniform and join the lines of combatants, whose duty was to defend the innocent non-combatants.

In the last several decades, we are witnessing cardinal changes in the nature of war. The traditional characteristics do not exist any more: 1) participants are not necessarily legitimate authorities, but mostly non-state actors; 2) the disputes are more over religion and ideology and less about property or territory; and 3) the distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants is not as clear as it was in the past. The experience of modern wars proves that the definition of traditional war is no longer suitable. Throughout the years, academic and military scholars suggested different definitions for the so called 'new war', such as 'asymmetrical war', 'hybrid warfare', 'war on terror', etc. All of them argued that the   traditional dichotomous distinction between combatants and civilians in a war zone, which is based on the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Two Additional Protocols of 1977, is no longer suitable and has to be more flexible.

This flexibility in distinguishing between combatants and not-combatants was and is still necessary, especially in cases where civilians participate in hostilities without being awarded the status of combatant.

Therefore, in the 'new' war the distinguishing is not between combatants and not-combatants, but rather between different levels of participating in the war. The best two examples for such types of distinction are the U.S. Army Field Manual and the Israeli High Court of Justice. The first one lists four types of participants: 'leaders and combatants', 'political cadre' or 'militants of the party', 'active sympathizers' and 'supporting populace'[ii]. The second one suggests a more general division between direct and indirect participation in hostilities; direct participation, which includes: transporting militants, operating weapons or supervising the operations; and indirect participation, which includes: providing food, medicine and shelter to combatants, monetary aid, logistical support and distributing propaganda[iii].

Throughout the history of war, there had always been civilian participation. For example, during a siege of city, everyone – combatants as well as civilians – took a part in the defense of the city, directly or indirectly. The most interesting fact is that the phenomenon of civilian participation in war is as old as war itself, but only now, in the twenty-first century, humanity found itself facing the problem of its definition. The understanding of this requires research of the changes that had happened in causes and conditions for civilian participation: why civilians decide to participate in a war and what enables this participation.

The first part, the causes, is understandable and it has never changed– civilians want to defend themselves from the enemy and try to help, in any possible way, combatants with the burden of waging a war. Therefore, the change had to happen in the conditions that allow civilian participation. The search for the condition that allowed this change leads back to city' sieges. The attempt to find the explanation for civilian participation during such sieges and not in other occurrences, points at the reason that something there facilitated their participation. The Research of the conditions for the phenomena of civilian resistance (like the Welsh fighting England, the Russians fighting Napoleon and later the Germans) provides additional explanation for the most important condition for civilian participation a war – they must be organized.

Organization plays an important role in the turning of the non-combatant to a combatant or a direct, or indirect participant. In the past, every man had a weapon in his house (axe, sword or bow), but only militaries were able to provide the necessary organization that turned laymen into combatants. Civilians that desired to participate in the war were able to do this only where the necessary organization was offered. Therefore, the more organized the populace, the more possibilities arise for their participation in the war.  

In the last few decades significant change has happened in the ability to organize civilians. In the past, only authorities or very powerful and charismatic leaders were able to organize the civilian population around a mutual purpose and to cause them to act, especially in life threatening events, such as war. In the 'new' wars, which are waged against non-state actors, modern armies face the ability of said actors to organize civilians to participate in their fight. The accessibility of organizing civilian is the main reason for the need to find new definitions for distinguishing between combatants, non-combatants and all those who fall in between.

Social Networks – A Tool for Civilian Self-Organization

The ability of non-state actors to organize civilians to participate in their plans has risen significantly in the last fifty years. Researchers of terrorism connect this rise to the development of the media. They point to the direct connection between terror organizations and their use of the media to influence the public. The media's development from live broadcast, through the appearance of the Internet, to the online flow of information, not just enhances the ability of the people to be organized by persuading bodies (e.g. terror organizations), but also speeds up the organization process itself.[iv]  While countries around the world have tried to face this reality and to adjust their ways of war accordingly, a new challenge has come a knocking.

Social Internet Networks are not a new phenomenon. The first social networks had started in the late nineties. However, in the last few years 'Facebook' and 'Twiter' dominate this field with hundreds of millions of users each. Despite the fact that the Social Network's theme has attracted many researchers, no one could have predicted that these networks could provide civilians the ability of self-organization, nor the speed and the success of this process with no visible or apparent leader.

This phenomenon was first to appear in the Middle East, with a chain-reaction of civilian demonstrations, which ignited the whole area. The first country to face this phenomenon and failed to deal with it, was Tunisia, the second one to fail was Egypt. After them came Syria, Yemen, Libya and others – part of them collapsed and others are still fighting their own citizens. Today we call this domino effect the "Arab Spring", however the first name given was the "Facebook Revolution". "Thanks to the People! Thanks Facebook!"[v]-a message captured on a Tunis street in January 2011 articulates succinctly the entity that organized the revolution.

The first stage of any organization process is unification. Before the appearance of the social networks people needed leadership to be unified, but the "Arab Spring" events proved that people can be unified by themselves. One Egyptian blogger published one of best descriptions of the social networks' power:

Before this social media revolution, everyone was very individual, very single, very isolated and oppressed in islands. But social media has created bridges, has created channels between individuals, between activists, between even ordinary men, to speak out, to know that there are other men who think like me. We can work together, we can make something together.[vi]

The second stage of the organization process is the coordination of activities. In that, also, social networks allow people to act by themselves. Tunisian Internet activist, whose pseudonym was 'Foetus', explained Facebook's role in this process:

Facebook is pretty much the GPS for this revolution. Without the street there's no revolution, but add Facebook to the street and you get real potential[vii].     

Today it is obvious that Social Internet Networks provide civilians everything needed to be organized. In fact, this is not just secluded to autocratic states. Social media was one of main causes that facilitated the expansion of the London Riots in August 2011[viii]. Today, even ordinary civilians need no one to be organized to participate in dangerous activities in order to achieve their mutual goals. Accordingly, if they are able to withstand their own governments and law enforcement agencies, then it is reasonable to surmise that they would be able to withstand a foreign attacker. This raises the question of the nature of future warfare and the feasibility of an on coming change.

Contending with the Threat of Self-Organized Civilians on the Battlefield

As discussed, civilians can participate in war only if they are organized for this purpose. Modern armies that waged or had waged wars in the past ten years had to invent systems to distinguish between combatants; participators on different levels, who were organized by non-state actors; and innocent non-combatants. The reality of the Social Internet Networks presents a new challenge: self-organized civilians on the battlefield, who answer to no existing definition. Not combatants, nor direct – or indirect – participants, the self-organized civilians pose a modern army with the problem of facing a new undefined force.

"After four hours of battle with well equipped enemy, the battalion accomplishes its mission and conquers the town. The battalion's commander raises his binoculars to his eyes and sees two thousands civilians (men, women, children and the elderly) march in his direction. He recognizes a well organized, unarmed demonstration against his army that marches directly onto his new fortifications." – this could well be a prevalent scenario in a future war, and the commanders of the modern armies should be prepared for it. The outcomes of any decisions taken by such commanders, involved in this kind of a scenario, would be posted and reposted hundreds of times on YouTube, Facebook and elsewhere, and the consequences of these decisions will determine the future of the whole campaign.            

This is a complete new threat on the future battlefield. Although the fact that modern militants had already participated in similar situations, it was never done during actual fighting operations. Successfully contending with this threat on a real battlefield demands serious and meticulous preparations at the all three tiers of military planning: strategic, operational and tactical.  

At the strategic level, there is a battle for the hearts and minds of the enemy civilian population. The purpose of this battle is to influence the emotions and motives of civilians and cause them to support the goals and objectives of the army. The definition of such a kind of activity is Psychological Operations (PSYOPs). According to the   U.S. Army Field Manual, one of the roles of PSYOPs is to "Influence foreign populations by expressing information subjectively to influence attitudes and behavior, and to obtain compliance, noninterference, or other desired behavioral changes."[ix] PSYOPs, at the strategic level, before the starting of war can minimize the possibility of the enemy's civilians to act against an oncoming army. However, even the most successful PSYOPs can not guarantee the full convincing of the entirety of the other side's population. The influence of PSYOPs, at the operational or tactical levels, toward the threat of an enemy's civilian self-organization is almost non-purposeful. If the initial strategic battle for the hearts of those civilians failed, they will meet the oncoming force in front of their town, and not, possibly, after it was conquered. In such a case, the military force will have to use completely different means to contend with such a situation.

At the operational level, there is an Informational Warfare. The main purpose of the army at this level is destroying the civilians' ability to use the Internet for self-organization. Two main methods can be applied to achieve this goal – cyber and physical. The cyber method means getting control of the servers and communication infrastructure across the country by technological tools (cyber attacks, viruses, etc.). The second method, the physical one, is easer to apply, as it means the actual physical destruction of the Internet and/or communication infrastructures by military tools (aerial bombings, missile attacks, etc.). It seems that successful activity at this level would be able to neutralize civilian self-organization by the Internet. However, the experience of the 'Arab Spring' proves that it is impossible to block the Internet completely. Therefore, the military has to be ready to face self-organized civilians on the battlefield.     

At the tactical level, there is the actual friction between the military and self-organized civilians during the fightings (unarmed men, women, children and the elderly protesting against the military). The military commander in that situation has three possible options of reacting. Yet, whatever his decision, it will be posted online. Therefore, the options of retreating or indiscriminatingly shooting civilians are unacceptable, as they will have crucial negative outcome to the whole campaign. At the tactical level, the only option possible is using military tools (weapons) that enable facing civilians without causing death - Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW).  

The Readiness of Modern Armies to Contend with the Threat of Self-Organized Civilians

The examination of the readiness of the armies to contend with the new threat of self-organized civilians has to take into consideration the fact that no matter how successful the strategic or the operational activities would be, the armies have to be ready to content with this threat on the battlefield.

At the beginning of second decade of twenty-first century, Modern Armies and their governments have gotten a lot of experience in the delivering of PSYOPs. In modern, politically-correct terminology, there are no more 'declarations of war' or 'conquests', but 'operations for freedom' and 'peacekeeping'. The attempt to influence everyone, especially the local population, to support the goals and objectives of the oncoming army already has a significant part in strategy making. Nonetheless, the experience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proves that PSYOPs have limited outcomes and their influence wanes over time.

Although the fact that today the modern world manages itself mostly by the Internet, the offensive cyber warfare has many juridical problems. Probably, it would be easier to justify the bombing of communication infrastructures, than to gain virtual control of local servers. One way or the other, modern armies definitely have the ability to harm civilians' accessibility to the Internet. However, the 'Arab Spring' proves that no matter how much the authorities will try to prevent the usage of the Internet - videos, pictures and 'statuses' will always find a way to be posted.    

Non-Lethal or Less-Lethal Weapons (NLW or LLW) are weapons intended to incapacitate people without causing death or permanent injury. In the last twenty years, many countries have invested a lot of money in the developing of NLW. Despite the increased research, only few NLWs have been deployed on a large scale.[x] Most part of contemporary NLWs were developed for law-enforcement units and they are designated for crowd-control missions.  Despite the fact that modern technological solutions are able to provide a very large spectrum of NLWs – such as kinetic, chemical, electrical, optical, acoustic and laser – the military use of available NLWs has been limited.[xi] No army has organized a training program, not for NLWs, nor for the tactics of facing self-organized civilians on the battlefield.

Conclusions

Self-organized civilians' activities against the military in war are not a theoretical assumption. It is a concrete threat that modern armies will face in the next war. No matter how successful strategic and operational efforts will be, the armies will have to contend with the phenomena of self-organized civilians on the battlefield. Any adaption of new weapons and abilities by any army is a long and difficult process. The current NLW's technologies demand more development and their adapting to usage not only by the infantry, but also by tanks, artillery and aircrafts. An operating system has to be developed too: an instilling of non-lethal abilities to the existing forces or establishing new units. Historically, the next war never looks like the previous one, as warfare continually develops. The 'Arab Spring' offers a peek into the nature of the future battlefield, and it must not be dismissed.