Is a Responsible Strategic Threat Assessment Too Much to Ask For?

Is a Responsible Strategic Threat Assessment Too Much to Ask For?

By al Dhobaba

Well, my last article failed to generate a cacophony of calls from recruiters eager to get me back into a uniform, so I suppose I’ll step on a few more toes.

As early as 2008, Army Colonel and West Point history professor Gian Gentile led a chorus of voices that characterized counterinsurgency operations as a dangerous distraction from what might be characterized as “real soldiering”: combined arms maneuver, force-on-force combat, and engagements against what are popularly referred to as “near-peer threats.” By 2015, most of the American defense establishment was onboard! Counterinsurgency was over! Land wars in developing countries were passé! China was a rising power, and America would pivot its attention to the Pacific to contain it! Russia was resurgent, threatening the interests of America and American allies the world over! It was time to reconfigure the service branches to deter or defeat these strategic competitors!

Don't get me wrong, I'm also concerned about strategic competition from Russia and China. However, I offer a modest proposal: shall we take a deep breath and conduct a sober threat assessment before we all go overboard on “managing the risks” from these supposed “near-peer threats”?

First, let's just disabuse ourselves of the notion that the phrase “near-peer threats” carries any real meaning in either of these cases.

Even in its current state — which many would concede to be marginally compromised following two decades of prolonged operations, an inconsistent funding paradigm, and tasking that exceeds resourcing — the American military can put troops virtually anywhere on the planet in a matter of hours. Marine Expeditionary Units are afloat aboard U.S. Navy ships, which can themselves impose American will — be it belligerent or benevolent — on the roughly half of the global population who live within cruise missile and/or helicopter range of the oceans. Air Force bombers and/or transports, carrying ordnance and/or Army airborne units, can reach virtually every other remaining inch of the world's surface in reasonably short order. Once they've donned their ridiculous uniforms, such that they resemble villains from an episode of Star Trek, the Space Force presumably adds to this ensemble cast: plucky, Carellian comic relief, perhaps. (I doff my cap to any of you who picked up on any of the disparate components of that joke.)

Neither Russia nor China come anywhere near to this level of capability — certainly nowhere in the proverbial ballpark of “near-peer” status.

Shall we start with China? Aside from occasional hand-to-hand border skirmishes against the Indians, the People's Liberation Army hasn't fought a serious conflict in decades. Their last significant engagement was the failed campaign against Vietnam between 1979 and 1980. As recently as 2008, Beijing struggled to transport troops, most of whom are conscripts, to provide relief to earthquake victims in Sichuan Province.

Many commentators, particularly those looking to beef up America's cyber security defenses, look to the PLA Air Force as evidence of Chinese success in industrial espionage: the Chengdu J-20 looks like the American F-22! Except... No. The J-20 features a variety of design differences, most notably a pair of forward-mounted canards that presumably expand its radar signature. Aside from this, making an aircraft look like a competitor's more advanced aircraft isn't actually that hard. Not unlike the Simpsons episode “Class Struggle in Springfield,” in which Marge repeatedly alters a single bargain bin Chanel suit into a variety of different designs, Iran has built a cottage industry out of turning aging Northrop F-5 Tiger II airframes into anything from phony stealth fighters to F/A-18 Hornet knock-offs. To assume that Chinese officials aren't doing the same — particularly when Chinese engineers reportedly struggle to produce a functional home-grown jet engine — is simply naive.

And, in recent months, corruption within the Rocket Force — a distinct service branch roughly analogous to U.S. Strategic Command — reportedly resulted in the sale of ICBM fuel, and its replacement with water in fuel storage tanks. Finally, much can be said about the PLA Navy (PLAN), which is really more of a coast guard with limited blue water capacity. Perhaps the best description I've heard of the PLAN was offered up by noted British maritime historian Andrew Lambert in a 2021 interview:

“The Chinese fleet is a diversion from their real agendas, which are domestic... When all of this is done, and China is stable, and they've worked their course for the twenty-first century, the navy will probably disappear. They're not spending much money on this, this is a very cheap navy. There's a lot of stuff, but it's not expensive stuff. Second-hand rusty Russian aircraft carriers, Chinese copies of rusty Russian aircraft carriers, a bit of photoshop, roughly the same number of destroyers and frigates as the Americans, but not in the same ballpark in terms of capability. It's largely a show for the populace, and it's to use the nationalism card as tool for the creation of the new empire.”

How about Russia?

The Red Army built a reputation during World War II by slaughtering Germans at Stalingrad and occupying Berlin, and sustained it during the Cold War by keeping a swath of imperial holdings in check. Even during the Soviet Union's waning months, one excuse for the vaunted Iraqi army's spectacular failure was that they used export versions of their Soviet sponsors' equipment, not the real McCoy. Russia’s lengthy effort to retain separatist Chechnya commenced in 1994, and concluded in 2009 due largely to sheer bribery. Remember, dear reader, that Chechnya is slightly larger than Connecticut, and currently boosts about a third of its population. In 2008, when Russian forces annexed portions of Georgia, success depended upon fielding more vehicles than could break down on the road – because no shortage of Russia’s inventory did precisely that. Not exactly the juggernaut that it’s usually portrayed to be.

Fast forward to 2014, and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula effectively depended upon the spontaneous abrogation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, by which Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan had been cajoled into surrendering the very nuclear arsenals that would have deterred Russian interventionism in the first place. Then, more so by marginal success at covert action than actual military prowess, Russia's “little green men” fomented a civil war in Ukraine's disputed territories that eventually became the casus belli for the 2022 invasion. Strategically adept, yes, but not exactly a case study in conventional warfare.

To say that Russian ground forces' performance in Ukraine since 2022 has been an embarrassment would be charitable. Russian national logistics have been such that Vladimir Putin has infamously sourced artillery shells, and now possibly troops, from North Korea. Just a reminder on that note: Russia's traditional military strength, its core competency, has been artillery. Useful idiots interviewed by Western media sources — I'm looking at you, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis — buy into the ridiculous claims that Moscow has managed to streamline and reinvigorate Russia's defense production, clearly oblivious to the fact that post-2022 specimens lack many of the key components that made their original production models nominally effective. The current solution to Ukraine's drone-dropped ordnance appears to be an entire sheet metal shed built atop Russian tanks, limiting the platforms' effectiveness by restricting the rotation and elevation of the main cannon. This and other field expedient solutions to hand grenades dropped by hobbyist quadcopters give a whole new meaning to the Iraq War vintage phrase, “hillbilly armor.”

Meanwhile, whereas America used private security contractors to safeguard facilities, convoys, and civilian officials, Russia threw Wagner Group mercenaries straight at the front lines before resorting to conscripting inmates, and now foreigners who happen to find themselves in Russia. While recruiting sergeants on both sides of the conflict have struggled to source enough bodies to fill uniforms, these measures in Russia represent the brand of desperation that arises when a sovereign nation's own citizens see little enough value in a war effort that they resort to measures like voluntary exile and self-harm to avoid fighting it.

All of this took place against a backdrop of Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War that has, nearly a decade on, failed to fully consolidate Bashar al Assad's position.

Elsewhere, in the skies above Ukraine, Russian's Air Force lacks the critical mass to establish air supremacy. As more advanced Western airframes like the F-16 begin to arrive in Ukrainian skies, Russian pilots may even lose air superiority. This state of affairs also arises from Russian logistical challenges: Russian industry infamously engineers competitive aircraft that can only be produced in limited numbers, curtailing effective training, maintenance, and inventory management practices. Russia also claims that the Sukhoi Su-57 Felon and Su-75 Checkmate aircraft employ advanced stealth capabilities — a capability that Russian industrial espionage efforts have attempted to exfiltrate from American sources since the early 1980's — but open source reporting calls these claims into question. In 2008, Moscow made headlines by sending a pair of nuclear-capable Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bombers on a “training patrol” to Venezuela, governed at the time by infamously portly strongman Hugo Chavez. When asked about this development in 2009, a notoriously frank American official stated, under Chatham House Rules, that “If Vladimir Putin wants to fly those old planes down there to hang out with that fat ass, he can be my guest.” Patrols such as these, using those “old planes,” continue, but seem to serve little purpose other than to prompt NATO pilots to run their interception drills.

Surely, the storied Russian navy must have gotten its act together since 1991, right? Well... No, not really. Starting with Russia's sole aircraft carrier (or, in order to skirt the Montreux Convention, “aircraft-carrying cruiser”), the Admiral Kuznetsov has infamously broken down during several modest deployments since 2014, and eventually had to be accompanied full-time by a tug as a precaution against propulsion failure. Its current refurbishment began in 2018, suffered from a variety of mishaps and malfeasance by officials supervising its repairs, and is currently projected to leave its shipyard in 2025; but it may remain in port longer than that, as its crew has allegedly been converted into a “mechanized battalion” and rerouted to Ukraine for frontline service. Additionally, during the course of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Ukrainian attacks have turned several prominent components of the Black Sea Fleet into artificial reefs, euphemistically speaking. These are merely the proverbial high points of the Russian navy’s decline.

Since Putin took control of the Russian government in 2000, the Kremlin has announced a series of modernization and upgrade initiatives that never seem to come to fruition. For example, amid an announced program to deliver fifty surface ships to the Russian fleet in 2024 — we believe you, Komrade Kommissar, really, we do! — Moscow's flagship naval construction project is the mega-submarine Belgorod. Belgorod constitutes a dramatic modification of the long-unfinished hulk of an Oscar II class submarine (the same class as the ill-fated Kursk) that will, allegedly, carry a mini-sub, an autonomous nuclear-powered torpedo, and other autonomous vehicles. It's bonkers, almost certainly beyond Russia's actual capacity to deliver on, and — according to several credible analysts — the sort of thing one should expect from someone like Vladimir Putin: a “big ideas” guy who fixates on exciting initiatives and larger-than-life super-weapons, rather than the sort of nuts-and-bolts logistical administration and project management that keep a modern military functioning. Thus, Russian sailors might one day set sail aboard a temperamental, semi-functional super-submarine. Meanwhile, on the front lines in Ukraine, Russian troops are short of rifle ammunition and body armor, and firing North Korean artillery rounds.

As Thomas Rid, one of the most underrated strategic commentators of our generation, noted in a 2018 interview:

“Russia is in deep trouble. Their economy is not doing well, their young, bright minds want to leave the country because they're so frustrated at home. Russia is [utilizing 'active measures'] out of weakness, not strength.”

And the inevitable rebuttals? Xi Jinping wants to use the Belt and Road initiative to retake China's place as a global superpower!  Vladimir Putin wants to reassemble the Soviet Empire! Yeah, and I want to surreptitiously acquire some bootleg Uranium from some Libyans so that my best friend, a discredited and geriatric nuclear physicist, can help me make a few specific alterations to the timeline. Unfortunately for me, Xi, and Vlad, there's often a difference between what we want, and what's actually possible. In neither case has either state earned “near-peer” status, and neither state is a serious conventional military threat to the United States. If you disagree, I just don't think you're paying close enough attention (or else, you may have an ulterior motive of one sort or another, but let’s table that for the time being).

Strategic competition? Sure. Obviously. In 2024, I'd hate to be a Filipino sailor or a Ukrainian infantryman. In the Pacific, the AUKUS submarine deal, awkward though its announcement was for Paris, is clearly a smart move, and the next occupant of the Oval Office should prioritize another shot at a more viable Trans-Pacific Partnership. Economic deterrence by way of the 2022 CHIPS Act and other efforts to control the semiconductor market are among the few coherent foreign policy moves that the sitting administration can be credited with. Elsewhere, sustained support to Ukraine would be even better if someone could develop a coherent strategy that delivered a win for Kyiv without “fighting to the last Ukrainian,” as I've heard the current approach described. Indeed, the potential for Chinese and Russian conventional forces to undermine American interests by way of confrontation with America's allies and partners is clear and present. These circumstances, in and of themselves, do not render those competitor forces “near-peer” – at least, not if “peered” with the United States. As some politicians are fond of noting, most of America’s allies and partners fall far short of “near-peer” status themselves.

Couched differently, the question is not whether China and Russia do or do not constitute strategic competitors to the United States. The answer to this question is clearly “Yes, they do.” The terms “strategic competitor” and “near-peer” are not, in and of themselves, mutually inclusive. The second question, then, should be very simple: how? Meaning, in what manner or form? The answer to this question should, then, determine the form of America's response.

An example I've often offered up in conversation is the 2003 Iraq War, which the Pentagon — even upon recognizing its character as an insurgency — attempted to treat as a conventional campaign. General Eric Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army whom the Bush 43 Administration controversially sidelined, has been vindicated in some circles for having opined that the Iraq campaign would require a significantly larger force package than the United States intended to send. As one plucky Internet meme puts it, “Well yes, but actually, no!” Five million troops wouldn't have been enough if they had all been combat arms troops and their support package. The delayed, then rapid, reconfiguration of America's combat training centers betrayed the indisputable fact that American forces prepared for a repeat of the 1991 Gulf War, rather than the vastly more complicated conflict that the Pentagon found itself mired in. The quality of troops sent – this is to say, what type of troops, rather than whether or not they were well-trained or effective in their roles – was at least as important as how many were deployed. Consider it this way: a thousand carpenters might be great at building a house, but eventually, you're going to need a plumber, and an electrician, and a roofer, and an HVAC guy... You get the idea.

Similarly, with regard to Russia and China, conventional deterrence is important. However, if both challengers' conventional forces fall well short of the “near-peer” mark, Washington should focus development efforts on assets and programs that will counter the methods that Moscow and Beijing are most likely to employ. You know, a realistic threat assessment to inform how those threats should be countered. This is why a responsible threat assessment is so important: at present, the Pentagon risks failure at countering actual strategic competitors by way of a mismatch of strategic efforts.

So, what does a successful campaign of countermeasures for this “new Cold War” look like? As a matter of fact, we have some clues by way of precedent from the last Cold War.

Let's start with the military itself. Conventional deterrence? Absolutely! But during the original Cold War, actual, force-on-force confrontations between American and Soviet conventional forces basically didn’t happen. Instead, the respective competitors tended to engage one another indirectly, via proxies, by providing either open or covert support to sympathetic governments and/or rebel groups. So, for example...

• The U.S. Army will continue to field conventional brigades that are capable of traditional, conventional warfare. Conversely, “Big Army” should get serious about Security Force Assistance, which some analysts currently perceive as little more than an effort to preserve conventional force structure. Oh, and sorry, Special Forces: direct action may be fun, but your real value to the nation lies in training and advising proxy forces like foreign partner armies and militias, not in carrying out kinetic raids or building bespoke special operations units.
• The U.S. Navy remains oriented around aircraft carriers: either the Nimitz and Ford class supercarriers, or the amphibious assault ships that form the core of the Navy’s expeditionary strike groups. Proxy engagements require a “brown water navy” capability akin to that which the Navy deployed in Vietnam.
• The U.S. Air Force loves fast, stealthy aircraft that can be used to establish and maintain air supremacy, or else deliver precision-guided munitions against advanced targets, with minimal risk to the lives of the air crew. In proxy engagements, the Air Force’s needs look a lot more like the infamously cancelled OA-X program, augmented by remotely-piloted aircraft operating in capacities similar to those witnessed in Ukraine and elsewhere.
• The U.S. Marine Corps seeks to restore its perceived distinction from the U.S. Army after two decades spent being pressed into service as a de facto second land army. While several options exist, core among these should involve the Corps’ return to their traditional role as a standby amphibious force, poised to initiate short notice amphibious operations in support of American strategic goals.
• [insert something pithy and upbeat about the Coast Guard and Space Force here]

Y'know what that sounds a lot like? The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, that the Army and Air Force in particular have spent years actively trying to bail out of. Sorry, generals, we all know that it's easy to fight uniformed conscripts in second rate tanks and jets. Unfortunately, many of the “foreign enemies” that you all swore to defend the Constitution from remain guerrillas in street clothes brandishing Kalashnikovs and RPG launchers donated by America's nation state adversaries. They're still going to require a significant portion of your attention, too.

Of course, the military represents only one of the many national capabilities that America needs to reorient in order to keep these strategic competitors in check. America’s intelligence community is rife with opportunities for reform and reorganization to ensure that intelligence professionals are oriented toward twenty-first century threats. Various departments, led perhaps by the Departments of State and Commerce, must improve America’s export control regime to ensure the persistence of American competitive advantages. Critically, the Department of State remains overdue for reorganization and revitalization, in part to relieve the military of their persistent but ill-fitting role as America’s leading diplomatic and international development agency. Additionally, multiple agencies carry the weight of improving America’s digital resilience, both within and beyond the federal sector, against both natural and anthropogenic disruptions.

One doesn’t need to spend much time reading the news to know that most of the focus has been on reorienting the Pentagon to resume a conventional warfare posture, rather than addressing these other, and equally critical, shortfalls. This is to say nothing of the intelligence community, whose share of post-9/11 failures and frustrations merit their own article, even as they continue to score occasional high profile wins against America's adversaries. Even those Americans who recognize that diverse workforces offer operational benefits could be forgiven for concluding that the so-called “Three Letter Agencies” have come to prioritize inclusion quotas over efficiency, competence, and mission accomplishment.

And yes, I’ll dare to say it: for all the focus on defending democracy overseas, Russian and Chinese propagandists have, in recent years, thrived upon vulnerabilities in domestic democracy that America and other Western allies have allowed to fester. Much ink has been spilled about Donald Trump’s refusal to accept the results of the 2020 election, while ignoring Stacey Abrams’ refusal to accept the results of Georgia’s 2018 gubernatorial election. Without delving deeper, it’s plain to see that election integrity, be it the result of voter fraud or voter suppression, is a bi-partisan issue.

In America, Europe, and elsewhere, even more ink has been spilled about the resurgence of the so-called “far right,” but this label is often used as an excuse by mainstream politicians to ignore key issues like immigration policy and economic immobility that impact the everyday lives of members of their own electorates. One of the first rules of war, politics, or any other competition is to deny one’s opponent an opening. If American officials (and their Western counterparts) truly care about “making the world safe for democracy" – and they should! – then the best way to undercut "disinformation" and "active measures" propagated by foreign competitors is to deny them the satisfaction of these controversies. The Western world is in a much better place when the apparatchiks in Moscow and Beijing have to resort to claiming that the CIA invented HIV, rather than exploiting the legitimate concerns about electoral shenanigans or poor governance.

Ultimately, some sort of bi-partisan, inter-agency effort to assess where America's adversaries are actually concentrating their efforts — as opposed to this foolishness about “near-peer threats” — would facilitate both a data-driven shoring-up of Western defenses, but also, a more effective campaign to nullify foreign adversaries where they're strongest. It would be the epitome of fighting both smart, and hard.

So, how about it? Oh... No? Well, that's disappointing. Which leads me to my next diatribe...

Al Dhobaba (“The Fly”) is the pseudonym of a freelance foreign policy analyst and military historian. Having trained as a naval officer, a congenital medical condition prevented him from commissioning, leading him to pursue an ongoing career as a security practitioner. His professional experience includes providing force protection training for deploying soldiers, managing physical security at a DoD activity in the USCENTCOM theater, and advising federal, state, and private sector organizations on information security management. He holds a bachelor’s degree in History and a master’s degree in International Relations.