Tribal Engagement: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

Haak---one more comment concerning the HTS---what it was orginally designed for is not what it is today.

Military Review Jul/Aug 2005 by McFate/A. Jackson

• Provide on-the-ground ethnographic research
(interviews and participant observation) in all areas
of strategic importance (such as Eastern Europe,
the Maghreb, Sub-Sahara Africa, the Middle East,
Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia)
to support development of training, education,
wargames, Red Teams, planning, and concepts.

Mabe we should pay more attention to history than we normally due:

The National Intelligence Estimate 53-63 "Prospects in South Vietnam" submitted by the director of Central Intelligence and dated April 17, 1963, contains the following paragraph:

"South Vietnam was and remains highly vulnerable to rural terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Its people have no tradition of loyalty to a government in Saigon. The Vietnamese peasant has always accommodated himself to whatever force was the best able to protect or to punish him -- or offer him a vision, however illusionary, of a better life. The 'government' meant the local officials with whom he was in contact, many of whom tended to be ineffective and often venal. Various forms of minor corruption and petty bureaucratic tyranny have long been rife in the provinces and the offenders were seldom disciplined by their superiors. Most peasants are primarily interested in peace and do not care who wins the military victories. Security is significant to the peasant largely in terms of how it affects him personally."

As stated in 1963: "The Communist effort in South Vietnam is essentially one of political subversion in which extensive military activity plays a predominant role. The primary aim of the Communists is to secure the support of the rural population -- support buttressed, where possible, by positive loyalty. By various forms of military and terrorist action, they endeavor to cow the recalcitrant, demonstrate that the government cannot protect its adherents, and create a general atmosphere of insecurity."

According to NIE 53-63, Viet Cong regulars numbered 24,000-25,000. They were armed with light infantry weapons but were a disciplined, well-trained and a superbly led force. The Viet Cong regulars were supplemented by up to 100,000 semi-trained local militias. An important factor contributing to their success was an effective intelligence system. Viet Cong agents, informants and sympathizers infiltrated virtually every level of the South Vietnamese government and military.

Haak---not only were there systemic start-up problems there have been on occassions accusations that portions of the FM3-24 were written by key HTS members and that some of their paragraphs could have been lifted from other authors who were not credited.

So if we can not get clear defining statements
from core HTS personalities how can one put much faith/believe in their paraphased research.

"In some sentences, the Manual so directly follows the vocabulary and structure of sentences in other works that the sources can easily be identified. For example, the Manual's (3-26) entry for "ethnic groups" says:

"An ethnic group is a human community whose learned cultural practices, language, history, ancestry, or religion distinguish them from others. Members of ethnic groups see themselves as different from other groups in a society and are recognized as such by others."

Elements of this definition closely echo a passage in Anthony Giddens' 2006 Introduction to Sociology text (5th ed, p. 487), discussing ethnicity:

"Different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups from one another, but the most usual are language, history, or ancestry (real or imagined), religions and Members of ethnic groups see themselves as culturally distinct from other groups in a society, and are seen by those other groups to be so in return."

Haak---

The inherent problems of the HTS program are systemic in nature based on the way it was founded, and what some initially thought would be a closer tie-in to the MI side similar to the Area Studies program of the 60s/70s carried out by FAOs at the embassy levels.

The overall program was driven in late 2005 by the Lincoln Group tied to the then Commander of TF Tory who then had to fight for funding which initially came out of JIEDDO. After a rather rocky start with internal organization disputes leading to the exclusion of the Lincoln Group it settled on using academics to the exclusion of military personnel.

Had they in fact followed the initial advice of tying themsleves very close to MI and integrating themselves into the IPB processes they would probably be a program of record by now.

The HTS program built an empire for a critical few and that is what it has evolved into especially for a few select defense contracting companies.

Jim:
Part of this discussion goes to the heart of Army's COIN doctrine--what you propose while sounding revoluntionary to a number of people in the COIN community is in fact a further evoluntionary development of the SF CIDG program with similiar experiences gained during the "Awakening" applied to real time experiences gained in Afghanistan.

The core problem of acceptance lies in the fact LTCs and COLs currently assigned BN and BCT Cmd time have been trained in a certain form of COIN reinforced by countless CTC rotations and they will never embrace an evoluntionary idea that challenges the very reasons they made Command, nor what has to be done for a solid OER to make it to that one star.

What you have been proposing is in fact a development towards a true UW form of COIN for the 21st Century or potentially what some call 5G warfare--it is not so surprising that a large number of CAPTs and MAJs get what you say
simply because their boots on the ground experience tells them there has to be a different way but they are trapped between the reality they see and Commanders who simply do not understand that Afghanistan is a UW environment and who want to answer the situation with their CTC/CAC training experiences.

Where is a centralized UW training center teaching a UW Tactical Defeat Model coupled with the now proven "open source warfare theories" which teach far eastern battle tactics such as "swarm attacks" which in 2006/2007 became the core battle tactic for the various Sunni groups and which I am assuming your Sitting Bull knows only to well from his Soviet fighting days.

In some aspects the recent critical article by the J2 in Afghanistan points to the same type of systemic MI failures as MI has not made the leap to UW as they are still focused on the CIED fight--and are not focusing on what it takes to support a TET.

Stay on your engagement model as it is the only viable way forward for the coming 21st Century 5G warfare the Army will be seeing far more frequently.

First of all, I would like to make two concessions. 1) I accept that Afghanistan is an exceedingly complex social system where conceptions of social identity vary significantly relationally, geographically, and temporally. 2) I accept that tribal institutions are often weak, broken, or absent in particular systems, making engagement along tribal/kinship lines impractical.

That said, I reject the supposition that tribal engagement cannot form a foundation for the empowerment of local institutions and the establishment of rule of law. I see the main utility of this strategy coming not from the idea of enabling "tribal" social units per se, but more aptly, enabling favorable local institutions (be they villages, tanzims, factions, elites, valleys, etc) in order to activate/establish local patronage networks that ISAF may leverage. The strategy of delegating resources to local leaders, thus creating/reactivating traditional patronage networks, whether they be in Mogadishu or Kandahar, is hardly a new concept. Though in recent years some have been at pains to emphasize the admittedly significant differences between the Iraqi tribal system and that of Afghanistan, it is not difficult to recall the jeers of opponents to the Sahwa movement, arguing that Saddam had thoroughly warped the tribal system, or that tribal engagement would inevitably lead to national disintegration. I suppose time will tell.

Some seemingly indignant Afghanistan specialists and anthropologists (you could never understand Afghanistan... [sigh]) seem to be getting hung up on the definition of "tribe," and defeating the straw-man argument that "tribe is the only meaningful source of social solidarity in Afghanistan." Behind the semantics and bibliography recitations, the real debate seems to center on ISAFs need to directly exploit and empower existing/potential social networks to wage a more effective population-centric counterinsurgency. All social systems are complex, all counterinsurgencies thorny, be they in the Middle East, Central Asia, or Northern Ireland, but simply delivering diatribe on Afghanistans resemblance to a snowflake in its impossible complexity is a luxury that policy-makers and soldiers simply do not have.

Jim-

email sent

Anonymous-

Yeah, that kind of stuff can cause issues... or be properly leveraged. Everyone just has to be sync'd up on the game plan. Obviously easier said than done most times. But that's one of my concerns with a broad implementation of Jim's idea. Great idea, I'm firmly behind it, but the devil can be in the details when so many elements are out on the playing field and each has a different coach.

May be the Fusion Cells oriented towards this concept can deconflict some of this.

Basically, my question isn't how to get everyone on board, for the sake of discussion I'll act as if that's already there, but how do you sync efforts in a way that doesn't take away the TET's tactical agility by adding layers of leadership while still fully supporting them in a meaningful way and ties in their programs to strategic programs?

Major Gant,

Thanks for continuing the discourse, of which my side is probably attributable to the snowpocalypse as well. Your responses are thought-provoking and I will hold them in my mind as I continue to research and study the country. I do understand you envision an ultimate reconciliation between the central government and the tribal leaders, and I also understand that you view this as the least-worst solution to a difficult challenge.

Looking forward to seeing how your TES concept develops and the initial results once it is operationalized--which, based upon the idea's momentum, seems likely at this point. Wish you luck in what looks like will be an exciting year.

All best.

v/r
Haak

Josh - You touched on a real problem. Several similar situations like you ID'd nearly brought down Sahawa al Anbar (before it was widely known as the 'Awakening') and before anyone outside of Anbar realized that 'it' was the way forward in Iraq. Unless it is truly a operational/strategic target, TF needs to keep the dogs kenneled. Too much 'recon by targeting' for only targeting's sake occured in OIF and earlier stages of OEF!

Jim - Based on your experience, what are your thoughts on Dan Green's concept of enlisting the tribes? While he doesn't specifically address who will do it(i.e. TETs), he does present several ideas for linking tribal leadership and tribal security forces to ANSF & GIRoA.

Jim-

Is the TET a SOF only idea or is it something that conventional units can do as well (i.e. as in Bing West's The Village)?

What are the two next higher echelons for the TET? Do you envision the Chain of Command up also being the Chain of Supply down... not just for beans, bullets, band-aids but also concerning the intel asset/ISR allocations and the taskings of non-kinetic teams (i.e. PRT/CA, engineers, etc. that would be needed for non-kinetic projects)?

What happens when you get outside elements not controlled by the TET Chain of Command coming into the AO (TF types, FFTF, etc.)? Targeting info isn't always shared, so what happens if special intel reports illuminate someone in the supported tribe and he gets hit?

My team's very down with your concept, but we're trying to figure out how fused kinetic and non-kinetic targeting will work under the concept. Not just how it will happen, but how it will be supported and delineated with other units.

Major Gant,

Thanks for your thoughtful response. To address your questions--I don't believe a general panacea for the conditions of conflict in Afghanistan exists, though I wish I possessed the academic and experiential background necessary to better identify a positive way forward. I think a good place to see what there is in the way of an emerging "plan" among the open-source COIN community might be the comments section for MAJ Springer's "Silver Bullet" post over at the CAC blog.

It is usually a waste of time to "argue semantics," but I believe semantics may be the crux of what's at stake here. Your paper's thesis ("[the US military must give] top priority to the most important political, social and military force in Afghanistan--the tribes")--just like the paper's title and practically all of its content--will inevitably give the majority of your readers the impression that engagement with the tribes should be reified over all other considerations in the Afghan theater. I fear it will divert the attention of strategists away from other key identities, institutions, and structures in Afghanistan.

Your strategy certainly succeeded in earning the friendship of the Noorafzhalis in Kunar, and I do not doubt that the strategy could be applied on a large scale. However, I am worried about what the end results would be. Enabled through your recommended "tactical changes" on p. 6, ODAs/TETs could be easily co-opted or manipulated by tribes. I am afraid the adopted "families" of TETs would be targeted specifically by enemy forces. Because the strategy would focus on the tribes (strengthening their constructed role in Afghan society) and arm them (strengthening their material power), many tribes will likely become dependent on US support. Upon US withdrawal, I believe the stage would be set for the country to descend into another semi-tribal, multifactional civil war, just like what we saw in '92-'96.

I am also wary of you plan because it seems like a deceivingly simple technical solution. Your Tribal Engagement Strategy (TES) and Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) remind me another initiative, the Human Terrain System (HTS), along with its Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). Just like your plan, it was launched after the soil was tilled with a flurry of essays by one of the program's founders, Dr. Montgomery McFate, which served to promote the HTS agenda. As the program has been implemented on an increasing scale, though, controversy has risen over its effectiveness, management, and cost. Like this program, it called for compartmentalization of skill rather than a structural change within the Army/Marines/SOCOM. Dr. McFate called for the military to tap social scientists for strategic benefit, when the real solution will only be found when the military branches tap the actual social sciences (sending officers/NCOs to attain advanced degrees in regional studies, anthropology, political science, sociology) so that they become smarter, more aware organizations. Similarly, as you say, US forces need to interact more closely with Afghan populations, learn Pashtu (and Dari, Hazaragi, Uzbek, Turkmen, Nuristani...), study the history and culture, and above all--as you put it--listen, understand, learn, and influence the different social groups. However, the entirety of the ISAF forces in Afghanistan need to join in on these efforts: the country is too big, and our force levels too low, to sequester these tasks some TTE program--another fledgling organization-within-an organization. I think the TES is a short-term palliative which would deflect attention away from deeper inadequacies rooted within the military.

I am critical in the hope that you and others will refine this plan or take certain elements from it to create a new synthesis. I would love nothing more than to eat my words, and for this plan to succeed in every way imaginable, so that Afghanistan becomes stable, prosperous, and fully independent. Thank you for your service, your passion, and your empathy for the people of Afghanistan.

v/r
Haak

Jim,

Haven't talked to you since working with you at Robin Sage. Good article, whether you choose to agree or disagree with you findings, it has spurred much needed educational discussion on the topic. I think that the basis of your findings are solid, for what it is worth. I've read many of the postings about the subject on tribal engagement; common thread appears to be arguments about semantics. Although, words do mean something, we can generally agree that the problem must be addressed from the ground up. I think that we can meet the intent of establishing a central government; however, we need to embrace a likely scenario that the central government will never be anything more than a service provider to the various regions and an international voice to gain resources for the country. Central government in Afghanistan cannot equal strong central control. I agree with you that the control must be established at the local level. We will have to devise a way to eventually link the local governance to the central government. If the central government gets enough breathing room from the security solution you suggest, they are more likely to be effective at procuring sustainable resources for the country. We should be able to bring the local leaders to the negotiating table based on desire for more resources. My ramblings do not suggest merrily paying off the tribes, villages, locals, ect. This would be viewed as a concession; concessions are viewed as a sign of weakness and ultimately erode legitimacy. All negotiations must be performed from the position of strength.

Let me attempt to stay focused. Observation: The military has paid money to cultural anthropologists to determine what the tribes look like, act like, ect. Much of the military have determined what we need to do, engage the locals, tribes, ect. I feel we also need to focus on the why and how as well? You bring up some very valid points for the how; however, I noticed in other postings that you were engaging people in DC (another tribe in and of itself). As a suggestion, I think you could gain some more traction with the academics, senior leaders, and politicians if you address 'why are they protesting' and 'how to affect change in behavior'. Without getting into the weeds of academia, perhaps we could put together an information brief steeped in Social Movement Theory and elements of your proposal as an answer. Social Movement Theory (SMT) would end the semantics debate by referring to 'nodes of influence'. Additionally, SMT could help educate people on the incentives to protest, information framing processes (information operations), and how mobilization occurs (by the way, mobilization occurs at the micro level and spreads to the macro--sounds familiar huh)

My head is hurting and I'm sure yours is as well. I think that we face the problem on the ground in Afghanistan and another problem within the ranks and at DC. We must consider ways of educating the force and policy makers to fully grasp your concept.

Just random thoughts mostly. Let me know if I can help in any way. Heading to back to Iraq soon. Take care,
phillip

Tribal identities are just one level of identity among many for the inhabitants of Afghanistan. You need consider family, village, kinship, subtribe, tribe, ethnic, regional, class, religious, and national identity as well... which are all in a constant state of flux... with alliances and networks which will shift and flip in ways that will make your head spin. As long as analyses as rudimentary and under-informed as Gant's or Merten's stir up interest you know the US defense establishment is, intellectually, still stuck somewhere in the 19th century. Mapping the tribal networks and approaching tribes is not useless, but it's step 1 on a 100+ step process for understanding and engaging with human networks in Afghanistan.

And this is where we are after 8 years.

Rick Bennett - You speak of tribal overlap across Afghanistan.

Indeed there is, but I would point its demographic mapping may be one of intelligence deficiencies recently pointed out.

Without adequate knowledge of the competing interests within these tribes and their overlap across what may no longer be traditional borders, we may find like the Pakistani ISI, we will create armed groups that get away from our control.

Certainly, there will never be any control centrally by Kabul, and upon leaving, will we have an understanding of what we have left behind?

We seem to pay lip service and treasure to Karzai, yet are chipping-away at his authority - or it that the plan?