Retreat and Rebuild? ISIS as a Virtual Caliphate

Retreat and Rebuild? ISIS as a Virtual Caliphate

Thomas R. McCabe

As the ISIS statelet in Syria and Iraq is eradicated, an obvious question is what will happen in the aftermath of that eradication. We must remember that that the statelet in Syria and Iraq was only part--although a central part-- of ISIS, which was, functionally speaking, in some ways a worldwide entity mobilized by social media and tied together by the internet—the ‘virtual caliphate.’[1] This enabled ISIS to create and mobilize, virtually, a new global jihadi identity and a collective psychology, which globalized local conflicts even more than al Qaeda had done. This system allowed people at a distance to identify with and functionally join remote conflicts, and provided them with a command system, a mechanism, and a battlespace for doing so.[2] In functional terms, ISIS created a worldwide community united into an online alternative reality by its virulence and its murderous fantasies.

There has been considerable apprehension that the ISIS survivors, wherever they are, will use the virtual caliphate to remain a major, or at least a significant, threat.[3] The concern is that ISIS will try to define its defeat as actually being some kind of a victory,[4] will attempt to create and exploit nostalgia for the lost cause by claiming that for a brief time truly Islamic rule actually existed on Earth, define its defeat in Syria and Iraq as another trial sent by Allah to test the steadfastness of the faithful,[5] and rally its supporters to continue the jihad.

This article will argue that it is likely to be difficult for ISIS to do this. Aside from the psychological impact of defeat, the loss of the physical caliphate (and the ongoing disruption of its command staff[6]) will remove, or at least weaken, many of the factors that attracted people to ISIS and it will have to deal with the following:

• The practical difficulty of rebuilding and operating what was a major and sophisticated media machine.
• The loss of the functional appeal that came from success.
• The discrediting of the ISIS claim to have a right to rule, including its religious justifications.
• The loss of most of the psychological and especially the tangible factors that drew recruits and support to ISIS.

The Challenges of Defeat

The practical difficulty of rebuilding and operating what was a major and sophisticated media machine. The success ISIS had at blanketing the world through social media,[7] especially the radical Muslim infosphere, with its propaganda didn’t happen by chance. ISIS built a very impressive media machine, with a sophisticated concept for information operations,[8] an effective and adaptable support network,[9] and a sophisticated facility and staff in a reasonably secure rear area to produce large amounts of very high quality propaganda in numerous languages.[10] That secure rear area, the resources that supported it, and that facility evidently no longer exists, and production has reportedly dropped drastically,[11]although very recently it has apparently shown some signs of recovery.[12] Further, although ISIS has a large number of overseas branches (“wilayats”), wherever ISIS or its remnants might try to find a refuge is not likely to be secure either. Even in spaces uncontrolled by national governments, such as parts of Afghanistan or Pakistan, Somalia, or Libya, they can expect to be competing with other factions, including other jihadis such as al Qaeda. In addition, over time pressure from governments and publics on internet providers and social media companies, in addition to actively targeting ISIS internet operations,[13] are likely to gradually at least restrict the ability of ISIS to operate as a virtual caliphate.[14]

It will have lost the functional appeal that came from success.  Much of the support ISIS has received, especially the outside support from the virtual caliphate, was due its claim to be a genuine state in control of territory, and its appearance of success as an invincible force that was routing its enemies—when ISIS could claim to be living up to its motto of “Remaining and Expanding.”[15] Those days are obviously long over, and they will only be able to spin defeat for so long before it is obviously double talk for losing, although they can be expected to try.[16] Despite whatever residual guerilla war and terrorism ISIS manages to continue in Iraq and Syria, the central and ultimately inescapable fact is and will be that it has lost the war there, and in the process of losing will have brought vast devastation to the people on whose behalf the war was supposedly being fought and for whom its state was supposedly being established. If much of the appeal of ISIS was because it was successful, if it is now seen as unsuccessful we can expect its appeal to decline, most likely drastically.

The ISIS claim to have a right to rule, including its religious justifications, will have been discredited. The self-proclaimed “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed his position as caliph and his authority to proclaim the Islamic State by right of conquest.[17] Now that those conquests have been lost, on what basis will he and ISIS claim to retain the right to rule?  If al-Baghdadi manages to operate underground in Syria or Iraq--likely to be difficult[18]--it will be hard for him to claim to be a ruler of much of anything. A caliph without a caliphate is just a fugitive on the run. Unlike, for example, the leadership of the Afghan Taliban, he is not likely to have a sanctuary in a neighboring state, such as Al Qaeda Central and the Taliban had in Pakistan and Iran after 9/11 and the previous iteration of the Islamic State had in Syria, from which to operate.[19] And if he is known to be killed, it will automatically dissolve all oaths of allegiance (bay’at) taken to him, which will both dissolve the organization and leave the survivors up for grabs.[20]

In addition, defeat will be devastating for the religious justifications that were central to ISIS’s claim to rule. Consider the religious questions that the destruction of the ‘caliphate’ raises (immense potential for psychological operations here):

• Since they lost, Baghdadi and ISIS obviously never really had divine sanction to rule. This means ISIS and its method of rule (the “Prophetic Methodology”) actually had no claim to religious legitimacy and, along with being sacrilegious, Baghdadi was actually just another murderous would-be tyrant trying to carve out an empire of shattered states and ravaged peoples.
• Alternatively, Baghdadi and ISIS may have originally had divine sanction, as shown by their early successes (undoubtedly a physical manifestation of the favor of Allah) but lost it because somewhere along the line because he and/or the “Prophetic Methodology” became profoundly flawed. [Hopefully, the infighting over exactly where and how this happened will be extremely bloody—jihadis have been known to settle doctrinal disagreements with gunfire and bombs.]
• Since Baghdadi and ISIS lost, does this mean that someone on the coalitions ranged against them (the Christian ‘crusaders,” Muslim “apostates,” Jews, etc.) were the ones who actually had the ultimate sanction of Allah? If ISIS tries to claim it lost simply because it was overwhelmed by the firepower of its enemies, does this mean that humanity has a veto over Allah’s will?

We should also remember that, effectively speaking, this is the second time ISIS has been defeated—the first time was the crushing of Abu Musad al-Zarqawi’s Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) by American and Allied forces in Iraq nearly a decade ago. How many times can ISIS claim that their defeats are trials inflicted by Allah to test the faithful before the faithful lose patience?

In addition, the loss of the ‘caliphate’ will have other religious impacts. Obviously, Baghdadi and ISIS will no longer be able to claim leadership of the global jihadi movement, let alone the world’s Muslims, once the ISIS statelet is gone and Baghdadi is a fugitive or dead.

Most of the psychological and especially the tangible factors that drew recruits and support to ISIS will be gone. Supporters, in particular active recruits, for ISIS were attracted by a variety of factors. Supporters from Iraq and Syria, who are not the primary focus here, were largely drawn by some combination of religious radicalism, opportunism (I’ll go along to get along—ISIS is just the latest group of fanatics to rule here and I need a job)[21], and desire for revenge and protection against predatory regimes and hostile factions. The foreign supporters, who are the major concern of this article, were and are a diverse group with various motivations. Leaving aside those with mental problems,[22] ISIS recruits from the rest of the Muslim world and the Muslim diasporas in the West have largely been drawn from two main clusters of support for ISIS.  These are what we might call the murderously devout and the devoutly murderous.  Although they posture as addressing the world, ISIS has consciously targeted these two groups in particular for mobilization and recruitment. 

The murderously devout are those who believe that ISIS’s interpretation of Islam is the correct one and the procedures and policies ISIS follows are the way a truly Muslim society should be run.[23]  Ominously, it appears this group has included the many Western ISIS recruits who claim to be seeking a Muslim identity or felt a sense of religious duty. They were drawn to the ISIS claim to supposedly be a truly authentic, even utopian, Muslim society.[24]  Such adherents sought a hyper-orthodox Sunni Muslim regime that went beyond the virulently anti-Western and anti-Semitic hostility so typical of jihadis (and even radical Muslims in general).[25]  They were also often murderously hostile to both Shia Muslims, who ISIS claimed deserved to be exterminated,[26] and those they consider inadequately devout Sunnis. They embraced, or at least accepted, extreme violence as part of their religion, were proud of doing so, and accepted—or endorsed—mass murder, genocide, and slavery because they believed these actions were endorsed by Allah.[27] Typical religious motivations for such people included:

• Establishing and protecting the Islamic State.[28]
• Pride in being Muslim and seeking a higher purpose in life by being a member of an elite vanguard and a participant in something greater than themselves.[29]
• Religious solidarity and defending Islam and Muslims, including their honor and dignity,  from attack by unbelievers, and/or defending Sunni Islam from attack by Shia Islam; [30]
• Seeking salvation, redemption and status in being a combatant for Islam who is willing to sacrifice everything in a cosmic war of good against evil.[31]
• The offer of a positive vision with dreams of revival (frequently along with delusions of grandeur.).
• Fulfilling a religious duty.
• Seeking a refuge from governments hostile to radical Islam.

The devoutly murderous are often a younger and more variegated group, with a more diverse set of motivations that undoubtedly varies from individual to individual and which, to a degree, evolved over time.  These motivations include a variety of religious, psychological, and practical reasons, such as:

• A search for meaning and personal fulfillment in life.
• Revolutionary and religious romanticism. Many of the ISIS troops racing around in their pickups undoubtedly thought of themselves as the reincarnation of the cavalry of Muhammad and shock troops in the rebirth of a conquering warrior empire.
• Revenge against real or imagined grievances and victimization.[32]
• Seeking a short cut to reclaim an idealized past of greatness supposedly stolen from them by traitors and malignant outsiders.[33]
• Seeking a sense of empowerment against scapegoats and conspiracy theories blamed for the failures of their societies and often their own personal failures, and gratification for the will to power.
• Peer pressure, family ties (jihadism tends to run in families) and group belonging (many jihadis traveled as groups)[34]
• Glorification of war as a heroic adventure.
• The thrill of domination and conquest--wanting to be part of successful military venture that was routing its enemies.
• Nihilism,[35] exuberant bloodthirstiness, the thrill of being a licensed outlaw and of being a law unto themselves with the power to kill (especially appealing to a certain kind of young men), along with the belief that extreme violence and brutality, justified as redemptive violence, are worthy attributes of power.[36]
• Adolescent rebelliousness, against their societies and, for that matter, against the older generation of jihadis,[37] and boredom.
• The ability to inspire fear in their enemies.
• Financial incentives—especially among some of the central Asians.[38]
• For those with a criminal background, the practical appeal of an identity that confirms their hostility to Western society and offers a community and a mechanism for carrying out that hostility.[39]
• Sex. ISIS offered wives and/or sex slaves—a matter of considerable appeal to young men who otherwise can’t afford to get married.[40]
• And the old standby—lack of anything better to do.[41]

Obviously, ISIS has been looking, all too successfully, for those with an inclination to violent radicalism with ambitions to pursue and grudges to settle.[42] But what will happen when ISIS can no longer offer theocratic rule, a refuge, psychological fulfillment and/or tangible benefits? Obviously, most of its attraction to both the murderously devout and especially to the devoutly murderous will be gone.

Conclusions and Implications

ISIS reportedly claims that it will take a generation after it loses control of all territory to kill the idea of ISIS.[43] For most ISIS adherents, it is likely to take much less time than that. While the romantic appeal of “the Lost Cause” may retain residual attraction to its more fanatical supporters—especially some of the murderously devout[44]--it is likely to lose support among those looking for more enduring substance or more tangible benefits. That is likely to be much or most of its support.

Unfortunately, we cannot expect this defeat to end ISIS. Even if the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq is eradicated, its embers and fragments from the rest of the virtual caliphate will still be out there. The fragments most likely to survive are some of its wilayats, especially those that consisted of preexisting groups that chose to swear allegiance to ISIS which are likely to resume an independent existence, and individual members and cells. All too many of its remnants are likely to gravitate to other jihadi groups.[45] After all, ISIS is just the latest in a series of uprisings by fanatics who believe in the fantasy ideology of jihadism,[46]  and one of the major long-term effects of ISIS has been to enlarge the pool of fanatics available to draw on. The situation in the Muslim Middle East remains as bad or worse than ever, with state collapse and civil wars in several states, the spreading conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, widespread failures of governance, and economic and social stagnation, with ample potential for further deterioration. Radical Islam of various types remains the primary ideology of protest in the Muslim world and the mechanism and vessel for the alienated there to express their alienation and for the power hungry to pursue their ambitions, along with its being being weaponized by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Jihadism remains the revolutionary flavor du jour in the Muslim Middle East, and we should not underestimate the fanaticism of radical Islam in general and the jihadis in particular. Unfortunately, the eclipse of ISIS will not change any of that. The committed will look for a stronger horse, and al Qaeda is still out there, working to regenerate in the shadows.[47] Ominously, the virtual caliphate model provides a template that it and other groups can use in their continuing wars against the world.

End Notes