Why is it Important to Talk to the Taliban?

Natalie

You are right, I should have but a bit more thought into my argument. I will attempt to put forward a stronger case.

1. My focus would be on the local Taliban.

Yes, there are a complex and competing array of bad dudes and these guys must be eliminated the good old fashioned way or given an offer they cant refuse.

The local Taliban respond to those external cues such as power, courage, loyalty, politeness, bravery, protection for their traditional values etc

3. The path to negotiating

I dont pretend to be a military strategist however there is a distinct absence in many parts of Afghanistan of a zero tolerance on violence and attacks. The 'oil spot' approach is more like a weak stain. For example, in Ghazni one of the worst villages full of foreign Taliban was about 4kms from the FOB. As a naive civilian I couldnt believe it. This village terror needs to be stamped out with absolute focus. We need to camp out in these areas and destroy the foreign Taliban will convincing the local guys we are prepared to outlast them.

We both know that many of the Governors and sub-Governors are despicable individuals. Why are they any better than the local Taliban? Most dont live in their area of responsibility, are reaping as much cash as they can from USAID contracts. ANP Commanders like former CMDR Petang in Andar was a thug, feared by locals. Whereas Mullah Hossair commanded far more respect among locals, lived in the villages and was prepared to negotiate.

4. The most powerful

The current and former military guys who contribute to SWJ will be more qualified to suggest who this might be. But I would imagine it is the Battlespace Commander.

5. Local concessions

This will need to be on a case by case basis. Districts will have different needs, unique local strategic parameters and power structures. We also need to accept that we cannot solve every issue and every dispute.

There continues to be a substantial proportion of the population who support the local Taliban. This support is not necessarily based on an Afghan nation administered from Kabul by a Taliban Government. Just because they support the Taliban does not mean they support nor have any ideas on international terrorism.

Are we there to create absolute harmony?

In order to move towards a more lasting solution to the problem of mass violence, we need to understand and acknowledge that for significant groups this violence represents not a problem but a solution. We need to think of modifying the structure of incentives that are encouraging people to orchestrate, fund, or perpetuate acts of violence. Can we do much more than that? Probably not. There are many places in the world that unfortunately are violent - as long as they are not being used as a base to launch terrorism or to destroy a neighbouring state like Pakistan then we must question whether our mission needs to go much further from a military perspective.

No doubt there will be further questions and cracks in my rational here. Drop me an email if you like: jason@jasonthomas.net.au

Jason, thanks for your comments. There are a few throwaway observations and solutions you provide in your response that require a little more finessing.

The first and most glaring is the inherent contradiction in your recommendation to have a "strong narrative, with language that resonates with THE Taliban" while at the same time, disaggregating "the Taliban" into not only a range of different actors at the national but also at the "local" level.

Second, is your proposed approach to negotiating with said Taliban. Networks and relationships are important parts of negotiations, however the path to the negotiating table ("when each local leader is at the point of talking") is notably absent. What exactly, in your opinion, does it take to bring all Taliban to a three-cups-of-tea party? More problematic is the idea that one must negotiate with the "most powerful". HUMINT notwithstanding, how does one decide and then effectively negotiate (if at all) with such figures? What will your criteria be?

Third, in the course of negotiating to meet the "interests" of each local Taliban, how will you reconcile making certain concessions in some cases and not others? How will you navigate disputes between groups caused by imbalances and shortfalls from negotiations?

Your thoughts appreciated.

NS

Last night night I gave a presentation to the Australian Institute for International Affairs entitled Talking to the Taliban.

Much of it based on my experience with negotiating directly with senior Taliban Commanders the a shadow governor.

I wish I had seen this excellent article before my talk as it would have been a superb reference.

It is paramount that the decision makers begin in earnest to begin setting the framework for such discussions.

The problem is who is the Taliban?

It's not as if there is a strict command structure. I may be wrong but the violence stems from:

The Taliban are not a homogenous unit:

*Pakistan Taliban - funded, fueled, armed and supported by ISI

*Local Taliban - parochial, isolated geographically.

*Warlords & drug barons.

*Criminals & thieves who claim to be or whose acts of violence are labeled as Taliban.

As Thomas Johnson from the US Naval Postgraduate Schhol of Culture and Conflict Studies said recently, The structure of the Taliban is complex. The organizational structures at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels are not all necessarily tied together in a unified hierarchy and the political leaders (the Quetta shura, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda) remain outside of Afghanistan."

Further, the paradox of eliminating the senior Taliban leadership is that there are now fewer rational Taliban leaders left and more radicalised young fanatics, not fighting for Afghanistan but for a range of other causes.

My view is that we focus on the local Taliban. The ones closest to the Tribal structures and itimately involved with the villages. They have parochial interest. In fact far more connected and intetested in the local population than most of the unelected corrupt governors and sub-governors.

We need to have the networks and relationships on the ground to establish when each local leader is at the point of talking.

The negotiations need to be with the most powerful people at each stage of the discussions. They respond to power.

The local Taliban are not interested in world domination. And they are not interested in hosting AQ if we make deals that fit with their LOCAL interests (which may not be in the interests of Kabul)

We also need to be sophisticated in how we enter the discussions. This means preparing a strong narrative, with language the resonates with the Taliban. Most importantly we need to deliver on what we say. Loyalty needs to be built on a intense consistency between what is said, what is done, and what is seen.

But first we need to stop kidding ourselves and realise we are simply not going to get to this point with a surge that barely starts before it ends and with policy advice from deep inside the fortified compounds in Kabul. So there are a few parameters we ourselves must accept.

Before one can even get to a conversation about the Karzai government or the Taliban challengers, one must first stop and get their brain wrapped around the concept that Afghanistan has suffered under some 30 years of illegitimate government. Also understand, that arguably 90% of the populace really don't care because it just does not affect them on way or the other. No ammount of goodness will win them over or badness beat them down, it just does not affect them.

But for those in the governance business and those who ARE affected by the government or who wish to participate in the government it matters very much in deed. For nearly 10 years the government of Afghanistan drew its legitimacy from Moscow, and that was causation for the LEADERSHIP of the Muj to resist. For the rank and file it was simply a resistance insurgency like they have waged against foreign invaders forever. (Oh, and for those who think we are special, many locals when they meet us assume that we are Russians. [remember, they don't care] They are unaware that outsiders have come and gone twice.)

For another 10 years they had the Taliban that drew it's legitimacy from I-Bad; and that was causation for the Northern Alliance. Now for some 10 years its been the Karzai government that draws it's legitimacy from D.C. At some point we have to break the cycle, and not try to shape the answer, but merely create the conditions to allow a legitimate answer to arise.

This means that all of the competitors for participation in the governance of Afhganistan must be able to compete within the processes recognized as legitimate by THIS POPULACE. This means Shuras, it means Jirgas, and ultimately in means a massive, open to all traditional representatives, Loya Jirga. It probably does not mean elections (Toto, you aren't in Kansas...)

Then, once the dust settles, we need only to recognize whatever emerges, (not like, just recognize) and commit to working with them to build a better future.

This will take the head off of the insurgency, allowing the troop levels to be reduced, thereby calming the larger resistance insurgency as well. This is COIN strategy.

Any who speak of "Pop Centric" or "Surges" or even "Reconciliation and Reintegration" are talking tactics, logistics, and unnecessary interventionism. All good stuff, but none have much of a chance until one has the moral courage to take on the legitmacy problem first.

Address the legitimacy problem, Empower the legitimate processes of these people, and then work with what they self-determine. It is that simple and it is that difficult all at once. But the answer is right there at our finger tips, we just need to reach out and grasp onto it.

Before one can even get to a conversation about the Karzai government or the Taliban challengers, one must first stop and get their brain wrapped around the concept that Afghanistan has suffered under some 30 years of illegitimate government. Also understand, that arguably 90% of the populace really don't care because it just does not affect them on way or the other. No ammount of goodness will win them over or badness beat them down, it just does not affect them.

But for those in the governance business and those who ARE affected by the government or who wish to participate in the government it matters very much in deed. For nearly 10 years the government of Afghanistan drew its legitimacy from Moscow, and that was causation for the LEADERSHIP of the Muj to resist. For the rank and file it was simply a resistance insurgency like they have waged against foreign invaders forever. (Oh, and for those who think we are special, many locals when they meet us assume that we are Russians. [remember, they don't care] They are unaware that outsiders have come and gone twice.)

For another 10 years they had the Taliban that drew it's legitimacy from I-Bad; and that was causation for the Northern Alliance. Now for some 10 years its been the Karzai government that draws it's legitimacy from D.C. At some point we have to break the cycle, and not try to shape the answer, but merely create the conditions to allow a legitimate answer to arise.

This means that all of the competitors for participation in the governance of Afhganistan must be able to compete within the processes recognized as legitimate by THIS POPULACE. This means Shuras, it means Jirgas, and ultimately in means a massive, open to all traditional representatives, Loya Jirga. It probably does not mean elections (Toto, you aren't in Kansas...)

Then, once the dust settles, we need only to recognize whatever emerges, (not like, just recognize) and commit to working with them to build a better future.

This will take the head off of the insurgency, allowing the troop levels to be reduced, thereby calming the larger resistance insurgency as well. This is COIN strategy.

Any who speak of "Pop Centric" or "Surges" or even "Reconciliation and Reintegration" are talking tactics, logistics, and unnecessary interventionism. All good stuff, but none have much of a chance until on has the moral courage to take on the legitmacy problem first.

Address the legitimacy problem, Empower the legitimate processes of these people, and then work with what they self-determine. It is that simple and it is that difficult all at once. But the answer is right there at our finger tips, we just need to reach out and grasp onto it.

Bravo, Maj.Iqbal! Good thinking that is well put.

Mark Rogers

Another bright Major sahib from Pakistan!
Great article, but I do have a minor comment: why not drop the "savior of the pakhtuns" card and let it go? Is this picture of "punishment of all pakhtuns" really accurate? What would ISI lose if they took the plunge and really re-examined their notions about everything in the region being a zero-sum competition between India and Pakistan (in this case, with Pakistan on the side of the "oppressed Pakhtuns" against the "india-friendly" Tajiks)? Wasnt it this tunnel vision which brought us to this pass? After all, like the good major sahib, many Pakistani army officers are dismissive of the "medieval barbarians" (major Mehar Omar Khan's term for the taliban) of the jihadi world, but they happily hosted and trained half a million of these "barbarians" because they were focused on giving India a bloody nose and gave no thought to other consequences. Even now, when this whole policy has come back to bite Pakistan harder than it ever bit India, Major sahib cannot resist playing the Pakhtun card. And the irony is, he doesnt even need it. This would still be a great article without that little aside...My apologies for going off on a tangent; I do think the new leadership of the Pakistani army will one day complete this turnaround, and I am sure the good major sahib is not responsible for the insane jihadi policies of the eighties and nineties, but I guess i am impatient and want to urge them to get there faster...