

PART I.

NEW EMPHASIS ON SPECIAL WARFARE



Special Warfare is probably the hottest subject in the U.S. Army today. What world events brought this about? What has the Army done about Special Warfare and what will it do in the future? This opening part will answer these questions.

In the lead article, Secretary of Defense McNamara analyzes Khrushchev's speech of early last year (6 January 1961) wherein the Soviet leader endorsed "wars of liberation" in the developing countries of the world. Secretary McNamara points out that continued nuclear and conventional forces are essential for our defense, but he emphasizes that we must also deal with the problems of covert aggression.

The Army's answer to these problems lies in those activities embraced by the term Special Warfare. In the second article, the Chief of Staff reports to the Army on what has been done recently to build up and emphasize Special Warfare. He also points out some future actions that will be taken.

Throughout this part, as well as the rest of the booklet, you will run across terms like *counterinsurgency*, *paramilitary*, and *unconventional warfare*. If you are not clear on the meaning of these terms, turn back one page and read into the "language."

Excerpted from an address given before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, 17, February 1962.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANSWERS

The Third Challenge

**By The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense**

Khrushchev [in a speech January 6, 1961 analyzed] three categories of wars: "world wars, local wars, and liberation wars or popular uprisings." This breakdown, he said, "is necessary to work out the correct tactics with regard to these wars."

As to world wars, he declared that "Communists are the most determined opponents" of such wars; and he asserted that "we can forestall the outbreak of a world war." Local wars, he thought, were more likely to occur in the future; but he rejected them also because a local war "may grow into a thermonuclear rocket war."

But "liberation wars and popular uprisings," he predicted, "will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists. . . . Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. . . . We recognize such wars. We help and will help the people striving for their independence."

Chairman Khrushchev then asked and answered a series of rhetorical questions about these wars of liberation. "Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there be such uprisings? There can . . .



LEADERS MEETING in Hawaii, February 1962.

From left, front row: General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Admiral Harry D. Felt, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific (Unified Command); W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Back row: General Paul D. Harkins, USA, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam; Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); Carl Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one . . ."

Then after a description of the horrors of a thermonuclear war, Khrushchev stated a significant conclusion. "The victory of socialism throughout the world," he announced, "is now near." But "for this victory, wars among states are not necessary."

Khrushchev is saying here that a major war in the nuclear age has become too dangerous to play the role of "midwife to revolution" which Communist leaders before him had always preached. At the same time, the Soviets wish to keep alive the threat of nuclear wars as a means of intimidation, a form of blackmail intended to discourage the Free World from resisting Communist encroachment at other levels.

What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings, I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression. We have learned to recognize the pattern of this attack. It feeds on

conditions of poverty and unequal opportunity, and it distorts the legitimate aspirations of peoples just beginning to realize the reach of the human potential. It is particularly dangerous to those nations that have not yet formulated the essential consensus of values, which a free society requires for survival. . . .

Our response to this new Soviet threat cannot be a simple one. Clearly the new Soviet posture as announced by Khrushchev gives us no cause to relax our nuclear guard. The Soviet decision to concentrate on wars of covert aggression was not taken in a power vacuum. . . .

What should be our military policy to meet the threat expressed in Khrushchev's speech? How can we continue to confine the Communist threat to the area delineated by Mr. Khrushchev, and within that area, how can we best meet and overcome it?

Meeting the Nuclear Threat

The first requirement for such a policy is clearly to maintain our nuclear strike power as a realistic, effective deterrent against Soviet initiation of major wars. . . .

But it is equally clear that we require a wider range of practical alternatives to meet the kind of military challenges that Khrushchev has announced he has in store for us. Unless the Free World has sufficient forces organized and equipped to deal with these challenges at what appear to be the highest appropriate levels of conflict, we could be put into difficult situations by the Communists. . . .

An adequate level of non-nuclear military strength will provide us with the means to meet a limited challenge with limited forces. We will then be in a position of being able to choose, coolly and deliberately, the level and kind of response we feel most appropriate in our own best interests; and both our enemies and our friends will know it.

The non-nuclear build-up will increase our capacity to tailor our responses to a particular military challenge to that level of force which is both appropriate to the issue involved and militarily favorable to our side. Not only will it avoid complete dependence on nuclear weapons, but it will also enhance the credibility to the Soviets of our determination to use nuclear weapons, should this prove necessary. . . .

Nuclear and non-nuclear power complement each other . . . If we strengthen one and not the other, part of the effort is wasted. Our policy is aimed at achieving the best balance of military capabilities—over the entire range of potential conflict, in the various areas of the globe where the Free World has vital interests, and over the years as far ahead as we can reasonably plan. I firmly believe that the non-nuclear build-up will—by improving and expanding the alter-

natives open to the Free World—reduce the pressures to make concessions in the face of Soviet threats.

This then is the reason for our present urgent emphasis on balancing our nuclear strength with limited or non-nuclear war forces. . . .

The Limited War Threat

The measures we took last year and those we propose for the coming fiscal year to improve our limited war capabilities follow a number of well-defined lines. Our overall purpose here, as in our strategic build-up, is to augment our forces in a balanced fashion. We have increased the number of combat-ready divisions to meet the military contingencies with which we may have to deal. As we have increased manpower, we have modernized and expanded weapons procurement. We have increased our tactical air power to match our ground forces, and we have launched a program to provide sea and airlift tailored to the men and equipment. . . .

As we develop a balanced, modern non-nuclear force, ready to move rapidly against aggression in any part of the world, we continue to inhibit the opportunities for successful conduct of Khrushchev's "local wars." It is tempting to conclude that our conventional forces will leave us free to compete with Communism in the peaceful sphere of economic and social development where we can compete most effectively.

The Third Challenge

But we shall have to deal with the problems of "wars of liberation." These wars are often not wars at all. In these conflicts, the force of world Communism operates in the twilight zone between political subversion and quasi-military action. Their military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. Their political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of threatened nations to resist these tactics by appropriate means. You cannot carry out a land reform program if the local peasant leaders are being systematically murdered.

To deal with the Communist guerrilla threat requires some shift in our military thinking. We have been used to developing big weapons and mounting large forces. Here we must work with companies and squads, and individual soldiers, rather than with battle groups and divisions. In all four Services we are training fighters who can, in turn, teach the people of free nations how to fight for their freedom. At the same time that our strategic weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated, we must learn to simplify our tactical weapons, so that they can be used and maintained by men who have never seen a machine more complicated than a well sweep....



*General George H. Decker
Army Chief of Staff*

SPECIAL WARFARE:

A Progress Report

**By General George H. Decker
Chief of Staff, United States Army**

Today the Communists are waging war—a special kind of war—throughout the world.

Like other wars our Nation has fought, this war is not one of our choosing. Its primary weapons are subversion and covert aggression. It is a psychological struggle for men's minds. It is a brutal, terror-ridden

attack by an enemy band on a South Vietnamese village, an assassination in the Caribbean, a kidnaping in Berlin. Sabotage, arson, pillage, and murder all have their part in this action. Mr. Khrushchev calls it a succession of "Wars of Liberation."

I want to tell you what the United States Army is

doing and intends to do to cope with this conflict. You need to know this because you have a share in this struggle.

As a result of the Communists encouraging such warfare, one of the U.S. Army's functions has assumed giant proportions almost overnight. This function is Special Warfare—counterinsurgency, unconventional, and psychological activities. Mastery of the techniques involved gives us the means for dealing with the enemy we are facing now all over the world.

The Army has a long history of participation in special or unconventional operations—from Marion's Swamp Foxes to Merrill's Marauders. But those operations were in conjunction with operations of regular or conventional forces. Today's events call for emphasis on another aspect of Special Warfare, that of counterinsurgency. We train local forces to fight guerrillas and also teach them skills vital to building their nation. Great changes in the world in recent years

clearly make the counterinsurgency part of Special Warfare of prime importance in many situations and areas.

These changes have given Special Warfare new impetus. In the last few years, many newly independent countries in Southeast Asia and Africa found themselves not only free, but also faced with the problems of running their own affairs. At the same time, other free nations, such as those in South America, began experiencing tremendous social and economic revolutions.

Most of these countries—the new and the old—have many things in common. They lack money, have little industry, are primarily agricultural, and have serious educational and public health problems. Despite these handicaps, the new generation in these nations has developed goals in life that are much higher than those of their fathers. The generation of today wants a better way of life, including more education, medical care, and housing.

These increased wants of millions of people combine to produce a powerful force. The people will listen to those who promise to fulfill these desires. This is where the Communists come in. They promise exactly what the people want. Starting with a few followers, and then by threats, terrorism, and subversion, the Communists work to gain control of a population. In the end, the people, who wanted something different, get something different. But it is not the freedom to run their own affairs; rather it is the death-grip of Communism.

These new and emerging nations form one of the battlegrounds of the Cold War. They are part of the global struggle between the powers of the Free World and Communism.

How does the U.S. military strength fit into this battleground? We can determine this by taking a look at our overall military power and the threats it will handle.

The U.S. nuclear strike forces of manned bombers, ICBM's and POLARIS submarines—absolutely necessary though they are for thermonuclear war—are of little direct use in the jungles of Southeast Asia. These forces are, however, symbols of advanced technology and U.S. ability to "bat" in the "major league" of world power politics. They are a powerful restraint on the Communist Bloc to keep the level of conflict as low as possible and to avoid uncontrolled general war.

Our splendid field armies in Europe and Korea and in reserve in the United States, combined with sea and air combat units, are designed for conventional and tactical nuclear warfare. Their purpose is to meet clearly-defined, large-scale military threats. Obviously these units are not the proper response to a band of




*General Herbert B. Powell
Commanding General
United States Continental Army
Command*



*Brig. Gen. William B. Rosson
Special Assistant to the Chief of
Staff for Special Warfare
Activities*



*Colonel William H. Kinard, Jr.
Director of Special Warfare
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations*



This is a possible special Army unit for counterinsurgency operations. The unit would be tailored for the type of activity—low or high intensity—in a particular area. (Chart was adapted from that used by Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, in his statement on 26 January 1962 before the Senate Armed Services Committee.)

guerrillas which in a flash will transform itself into a scattering of “farmers.” Neither are they best geared to move into a weak country and help it move up the development ladder by training local forces to improve the people’s health, transportation, and building program. However, they, like the nuclear strike forces, are a strong restraint on the Communist Bloc.

We need a decisive answer to the various threats of the present Cold War—threats that range from guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia to the possibility that Communists will try to seize control of weak countries in Africa and South America. We must be ready to help some countries fight guerrillas, and at the same time help other countries build themselves up in every possible way so that Communists cannot succeed in taking them over. That is where Special Warfare enters the picture as a “must” capability.

Special Warfare is not confined to the magnificently trained Special Forces groups. It takes in also the disease-preventing actions of a U.S. soldier who trains local water purification teams. It includes the economy-boosting effect of an engineer squad helping a local military unit to build a farm-to-market road and the stabilizing influence of a civil affairs officer

advising local military forces on actions which will benefit the community.

To respond to undercover wars of the Communists, the Army increased greatly its Special Warfare capability in the last year. An increase in strength was the first big action. In March, 1961, the number of persons authorized specifically for Special Warfare activities—special forces, psychological warfare, and civil affairs—was *more than doubled*. As of now, more than 4,000 officers and men are so assigned. In addition, the Army has tens of thousands of men whose skills—construction, communication, sanitation, medicine, maintenance, and transportation—can be used in Special Warfare, particularly “nation-building” activities.

Along with more personnel, Special Warfare is profiting from stepped-up Army school programs which will provide better training in all Cold War subject areas. Expanded counterinsurgency courses are taught at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the U.S. Army Caribbean School in the Panama Canal Zone. This schooling is reaching an ever-increasing number of foreign officers. For example, the Special Warfare School has installed facilities for simultaneous translation of Spanish, French,

and English. Thus Spanish and French speaking officers who do not know English well are able now to undergo instruction.


There have been improvements in the command and organizational setup in order for the Army to efficiently direct and control our growing Special Warfare activities. In January, the Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command assumed direct control of the Special Warfare Center and overall field responsibility for Special Warfare schooling, training, and doctrine. Early in February, I designated Brigadier General William B. Rosson as my Special Assistant for Special Warfare Activities. His responsibilities include Cold War activities of the Army. Also at Department of the Army level, the Special Warfare Division under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations has been raised to Directorate status.

The most important organizational action is in the units that will do the "fighting," whether it is returning the fire of attacking guerrillas, training local forces to seek out and destroy guerrillas, or helping local forces construct a communications system. For such counterinsurgency activities, the Army is organizing four special units. Each unit will be oriented toward a particular geographical area and will be tailored for the situation there. In areas where Communist guerrilla activities are intense, the unit is being built around a Special Forces group to emphasize counter guerrilla and counterinsurgency actions. Where Communists are not active, the force will emphasize "nation-building" functions such as construction, communications, civil affairs, and sanitation.

In the long run, the Army's effectiveness in Special Warfare can be no better than its training. Hence, selected regular units in the Army are now developing a specialized capability for counter guerrilla operations. To enhance this training, commanders have been given liberal quotas for special courses in counterinsurgency conducted by the various service schools. In addition, all Army Reserve and National Guard units on active duty are receiving special counterinsurgency training.

Another training action involves key senior officers. Many are being assigned for short tours of temporary duty to Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Military Missions in areas with difficult Cold War problems. This action bolsters the Army's overall command and planning capabilities for Cold War.

In research and development, the Army has expanded its program for development, test, and evaluation of equipment for Special Warfare operations. Funding for this program in Fiscal Year 62 totaled 20.5 million dollars. FY 63 probably will see this amount climb to more than 30 million dollars.



More and more officers and men understand the great potential that the U.S. Army has for fighting the Cold War. We are well along toward making our solid two-pronged capability (conventional and nuclear) into a confident triple-pronged force (conventional, nuclear and Special Warfare).

Additional actions to strengthen further our Special Warfare capabilities are in prospect. We intend to train all eight Army combat divisions and other key units in the continental United States in counter guerrilla and counterinsurgency concepts, techniques, and tactics. We plan also to expand the Army National Guard and Army Reserve Special Forces and Psychological Warfare units. Such units are organized now in many states.

Schools also will receive further emphasis. Counterinsurgency schools shortly will be established and operating on Okinawa and in Germany. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Ga., will start soon a comprehensive course on the Cold War and its implications.

This, then, is what the Army is doing and will do.

But how will our Special Warfare forces operate in different Cold War areas? As I pointed out earlier, the Cold War includes areas where Communist activity is high, such as South Viet Nam, as well as areas where dangerous Communist infiltration has not yet been accomplished, such as some of the South American countries. These diverse areas call for different actions. It should be pointed out here, however, that whatever action we take, it must be at the request of each host country.

In areas where the Cold War is less intense, special Army units will be geared largely to training local military forces in "nation-building" tasks. These include construction of roads, dams, and bridges, as well as setting up communications, transportation, and medical facilities. The jobs can be begun by tech-

ally competent U.S. military personnel while concurrently, local personnel are being trained to assist and eventually to take over and continue the programs. In addition to promoting internal stability, the special units will help train local forces in intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterinsurgency techniques. All actions by the special units to assist the population will be directed toward gaining support, loyalty, and respect for the local military forces and the government they represent.

In Cold War areas where Communists have a "take-over" underway, activities will be geared primarily to creating, training, and assisting local counterinsurgency forces. Counter guerrilla operations probably will have priority, but civic action elements will be re-

tained and employed to the extent permitted by the local situation.

I have pointed out, briefly, how the Army is taking positive and purposeful actions to expand and improve its Special Warfare capabilities. These actions insure that the Army is ready to meet Cold War situations in critical areas of the world. Army Special Warfare capabilities provide the means for assisting indigenous military forces in effectively combatting Communist-inspired subversion and insurgency, and at the same time making a substantial contribution to the social and economic development of their countries.

An understanding of this type of warfare is mandatory for all members of the Army in strengthening our capabilities to meet today's critical challenges.

