

SMALL WARS JOURNAL

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Why Study Small Wars?

Col TX Hammes, USMC (ret)

With the massive advances in technology and the incredible success of U.S. conventional forces in the last decade, one might ask why you should be interested in small wars. There are a huge number of interesting and vital subjects out there. Why should I spend my limited time studying small wars that have been

around for millennium? Even some leading historians are arguing that there is nothing new here. For cripes sake, Alexander the Great fought insurgents! Warfare is changing. Why should I look back thousands of years to figure out what I will face tomorrow?

You need to study Small Wars for the same reason our enemies do – they work. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States has continued to pursue high technology as the holy grail of warfighting. This is a natural outgrowth of America's fascination with and prowess in the development, production and fielding of extraordinary high tech weapons systems. Even our European allies admit they cannot match U.S. capabilities. Pursuing this course has led to total dominance of the conventional battlefield by U.S. forces. It has even led some to believe America is so dominant on the battlefield that none would dare challenge us.

Unfortunately, this deep trust in high technology has developed independently of what has actually been happening in the world. Rather than focusing on high technology, our enemies have looked to history, modern science and common sense to develop a form of war that has allowed military weak powers to

SHOT, OVER...

Welcome to this first edition of the SWJ Magazine. We would like to recognize our contributors as plankholders for this endeavor. It is a privilege for us to feature their work and send this first round down range from what was merely an idea before they climbed on board. Together with the online Small Wars Journal, SWJ Magazine's purpose is to advance the practice, theory, and effectiveness of Small Wars prosecuted in the interest of freedom, prosperity, and self-determination. We thank our plankholders for their commitment to this cause, and hope you will continue to join us as we build a resource for this community of interest to share information, ideas, successes, mistakes, and engage in a professional dialog on this painfully relevant topic.

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consistently defeat much greater military and economic powers.

History

Guerrilla tactics have been around for over 2000 years – and in use almost continuously throughout that time. Yet it is only in the last sixty of those two thousand years that insurgency has become the dominant form of war. From the times of Alexander and Dairus, guerrillas have fought around the world. But for the most part, they were using guerrilla tactics as a last result. They did not become guerrillas because they thought it was the best way to fight. They became guerrillas because they had been defeated using conventional war. The practitioners of guerrilla war through history saw it as their only remaining option in a military contest that had seen their conventional defeat.

That has changed in the last sixty years. Mao started the change by writing a simple, short manual that told insurgents how they could use superior political will to defeat much greater military and economic power. His view was different than previous guerrillas. He did not see insurgency as an action taken when defeated conventionally but rather as a three phased strategic approach to winning a war. Insurgency was not a last resort but a first choice for a war winning strategy. Mao admitted the insurgent would start out weaker militarily and economically than the government. To compensate for this weakness, he designated Phase I specifically to build the political strength of his organization. He understood that political will was the insurgents' most powerful weapon. Only when he was satisfied he had reached sufficient political strength should the insurgent proceed to Phase II. Phase II was the guerrilla phase to “change the correlation of forces” between the government and the insurgent. While he stated all insurgencies must end with a conventional campaign, he was also adamant that such a struggle could only be successful if the guerrillas used Phase II wisely to insure the enemy's political will was already broken before the conventional campaign started.

Since Mao's victory in 1949, insurgency has steadily evolved to become the dominant form of war in the modern world. While the high technology gurus continue to champion concepts like Transformation and Net Centric Warfare, the fact is they cannot point to specific examples where this approach to war has resulted in a major success.

Since World War II, wars have been a mixture of conventional and unconventional. Conventional wars — Korea, the Israeli-Arab wars of 1956,

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1967 and 1973, the Falklands, the Iran–Iraq war and the 1991 Persian Gulf War — have ended with a return to the strategic status quo. While territory changed hands and, in some cases, regimes changed, each state came out of the war with largely the same political, economic and social structure with which it entered.

In sharp contrast, unconventional wars — the Communist revolution in China, the First and Second Indochina Wars, the Algerian War of Independence, the Sandinista struggle in Nicaragua, the Iranian revolution, the Afghan–

Soviet war of the 1980s, the Soviet–Chechen war of the 1990s, the first Intifada and the Hezbollah campaign in South Lebanon — each ended with major changes in the political, economic and social structure of the territories involved. While the changes may not have been for the better, they were distinct. The consistent defeat of major powers by much weaker fourth-generation opponents has made it the preferred form of war for our enemies.

In short, our opponents have studied the outcomes of wars against the west and have found that only insurgency gives them a chance

to win. The history of our success in conventional wars means we must study Small Wars.

Modern Science

The second area that tells us we will be fighting highly complex human network is modern science. Specifically, three new areas of study – complexity, network theory and emergence – reinforce the historical evidence that networked, politically organized insurgent can defeat a much greater military power.

While we have tried very hard to develop a system of war (JV2020, Network Centric War, Transformation) that eliminates uncertainty, the new science of complexity seems to prove we can't. Complexity shows that very minor changes in initial inputs can cause massive changes in system output. It has been popularly expressed as the Butterfly Concept in that if a butterfly unexpectedly flaps its wings in China, New York's weather can change from sunny to a storm several days later. The problem is no matter how many sensors we have available, there will be more variables to measure – and an infinite number of paths forward from those initial conditions. And even if we could find enough sensors to monitor every single input, how do we determine when do measure initial conditions? Were initial conditions for Midway set upon the sortie of the Japanese fleet, when the famous message about water status on the island or earlier with Doolittle's raid on Tokyo? All had direct impacts on the operation. Changes in any could easily have changed the outcome of the battle.

Two other new sciences are closely related – network theory and emergence. Both show the

remarkable strength, adaptability and flexibility of a network – particularly in relation to a hierarchy. The insurgent's emphasis on political organization and networking worldwide maximizes their strengths. Our tendency to respond with hierarchical, inflexible military forces reinforces that strength.

In short, science indicates our high technology fantasy of information dominance is not going to happen. And shows that the speed, flexibility and survivability of a network makes it extraordinarily difficult to defeat.

Common Sense

Finally comes the big reason for studying small wars. Successful warriors are practical men. They tend to use what works. And insurgency works. Insurgents have defeated the U.S. in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia; they defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Can you think of any other form of war that allowed small movements to repeatedly defeat superpowers?

Small wars avoid U.S. strengths, exploit commercially available technology and maximize the value of the insurgent's local knowledge and HUMINT capabilities – two areas of notorious U.S. weakness. Further, they have seen the United States continue to ignore this form of war for decades. They know small wars require deep study and intense human networks based on long-term interaction to develop the kind of genuine cultural, political, economic, social and military expertise to operate in Small Wars. They also know our personnel promotion system actively punishes those who strive to become the true experts we need.

Even if the U.S. should change our personnel policies, it will take a decade or more to build the HUMINT, language and cultural skills we require to be consistently successful.

In summary, we need to study Small Wars. It is clear that based on history, modern science and common sense, our enemies are choosing Small Wars as the only path that presents a good chance of defeating the United States. And the same 4GW techniques that work for insurgents in Small Wars can also be used by opposing states to neutralize U.S. military-technical superiority.

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How Do We Fight a War of Ideas?

COL David S. Maxwell, USA

Secretary Rumsfeld has heralded a battle of ideas in the War on Terrorism. He is absolutely right because this war must be viewed as a counter-insurgency on a global scale. It truly is a fight for legitimacy between liberal constitutional, democratic nation-states with free market systems and those who would return the world to a Middle Ages system of rule. Although many want to view this as a religious war, it is not about religion, even though for Bin Ladin, Al Qaeda, and Jemah Islamiyah it is about establishing fundamentalist Islamic states. It is about ideas and ideology. The terrorists' long term goal is destruction of the secular states because they are the antithesis of their fundamentalist beliefs. A nation without a state religion goes against all that the terrorists believe (or would so have us believe). They believe that over the long term they will be successful because, through their asymmetric and asynchronous approach, they will wear down the will of people of the United States and other free nations of the world. They believe that the perceived decadence of our so-called godless societies will lead to collapse and their ultimate victory. Time, in their mind, is on their side.

What has been the response to this "threat?" We have focused very tactically on finding and either apprehending or killing the leaders and members of Al Qaeda and their supporters. We have tightened our borders and increased security to prevent another 9-11 tragedy through such efforts as the Patriot Act and the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security. The inevitable witch hunts were

launched to find out which political leaders and government agencies from the current and past administrations were responsible for 9-11. We invaded Afghanistan (rightly so) to destroy Al Qaeda and liberate it from the rule of the Taliban. We have provided the only significant, but still minor assistance to one country in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and we have invaded Iraq and ousted Saddam (again, rightly so) all as part of the War on Terrorism.

However, we have not fought this war at the strategic level. First and foremost we must remember that the values set out in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution are incontrovertible. They cannot be challenged as they are "inalienable" and "held to be self evident." We need have no fear of any other ideology challenging our way of life.

There is good news and bad news here that we must face. First is that we cannot lose and the terrorists will never be able to break our will. The American people and freedom loving people around the world cannot be dissuaded from ever giving up our way of life with the individual freedoms we hold so dear. It will not happen and it is as fundamental as that. Although General Boykin is being severely criticized for his remarks on religion (mostly because of the perceived political damage that they may have done), what must be kept in mind is that he has the right to his beliefs not because the United States is founded on a Judeo-Christian tradition but because we live in secular country that values individual freedom

higher than anything else and this includes every person's right to worship the God in which he believes and express his beliefs without any fear of retribution.

The bad news is that we cannot win a war on terrorism. We can never eliminate terrorism and no one is going to come out of a cave in Afghanistan or a Baranguay in the Philippines or an island in Indonesia and wave a white flag and present his sword in surrender. The problem is we are not fighting against a nation state with a homogeneous population with territory that can be invaded and occupied. We cannot cause the regime change of terrorists. It is a hydra-headed monster. Terrorism has always been and always will be used by those who are disaffected politically and will always be a tool of extremists. We can never be successful in identifying and stopping all terrorists as we can never predict what individuals (e.g. Timothy McVeigh) or even certain organizations will resort to using the tools of terrorism. Most important though is that to try to defend against every possible terrorist act (and we do very well in planning to defend against the last act) we run the risk of violating the age old military adage of "he who defends everything defends nothing."

Against this background then the obvious question is how do we deal with this threat. First and foremost we retain the moral high ground. We remind ourselves and the world that our values are correct and morally defensible and cannot be compromised. We remind ourselves and the world that people who have tasted the fruits of freedom will not hesitate to sacrifice to maintain those freedoms. Second, we must eliminate the "bunker mentality" that is a natural response to threats – we hunker down behind large barriers

or restrictive rules and draconian measures that go against all that we believe in and most important cut us off from the people we want to influence. Whether it is in Iraq or around the world we have to remain engaged and not curled up in the fetal position waiting and hoping that another blow will not hit us. Along with the bunker mentality we must eliminate the risk averseness we have in employing our military forces in conjunction with allies and friends around the world to help them combat the terrorism. While we have taken great risks with out military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have not demonstrated the same level of commitment in such places as the Philippines and Indonesia where probably the most significant terrorist threats outside of Afghanistan exist. While we cannot and should not undertake the same type of operations in those sovereign countries we must be willing to demonstrate to their governments and their people that we are willing to sustain the same level of commitment for the long term in order to achieve our mutual goals of protecting our nations' from the scourge of terrorism. In one of the unofficial mottos of Special Forces we must be willing to operate in an unconventional manner, "through, by, and with" our friends and allies. To date, particularly in Asia, we only half heartedly have done so.

Yes we need to stand and fight but in a different way than what has come to be known as the American way of war. For all our talk about transformation we have to realize that there are not technological solutions to the problems we face. We have to learn to fight an asymmetric war and be offensive in nature with our ideas and ideals, with more of our actions and less of our words. We have the big stick and have proven our will to use it. Now it is time to speak softly as Teddy Roosevelt might

have us do. We still need to kill or capture those terrorists that mean to do us harm but as importantly we need to fight for our legitimacy among the people of the world. We need to back off our highly visible military operations and begin working behind the scenes to destroy networks and help our allies to do the same. But most importantly we have to understand the nature of this war and realize that we are operating on the “battlefield of human terrain.” Our efforts can be neither terrain oriented nor force oriented but truly the battle for the hearts and minds particularly of those who are on the fence and may tacitly or passively allow the terrorists to operate. Technology can provide useful tools but it will not provide any solutions to the underlying problems we face.

There are four key tasks that need to be successfully executed in this fight. First, we have to deny the terrorists sanctuary, do not allow them the ability to rest, regroup, plan and operate from secure locations. Second, we have to deny their ability to move throughout the world. This is a task for the world community and must be done on a cooperative basis among governments to prevent terrorists the ability to maneuver. Third, we have to deny terrorists their support mechanisms. Again this takes worldwide cooperation among governments and financial institutions. And finally, we have to separate the terrorists from the population at large. This is where the battle for ideas must be fought. We have to undercut the legitimacy of all the terrorist organizations by demonstrating that people have a chance at a better life economically and the ability to practice the religion they believe in by living in a world of liberal constitutional law instead of the shackles of some Middle Age ideology. We have focused our energies on the first three

tasks but not on the fourth. And by focusing on the fourth it will provide the support we need to execute the first three because to be truly successful in the first three we need the support of the people.

Although it would appear counter-intuitive one of the most important things we must do is to continue to allow immigration from around the world, including from the Middle East and Islamic nations. Although the naysayers will say this makes us more vulnerable we must realize that only by maintaining the moral high ground do we demonstrate our strength. Furthermore, if we establish the right procedures, gain and maintain strong international cooperation, and capitalize on the awareness of the public as they are on the lookout for unusual or suspicious activity we will have a better chance of thwarting future attacks instead of being lulled into a false sense of security by the imposition of rules and regulations that only really hurt the legitimate travelers and potential immigrants.

Actions speak louder than words. We can have the best public relations programs and marketers trying to tell our story but the only way we can tell it is to remain fully engaged in a positive way throughout the world and demonstrating the strength of our values. To borrow from President Franklin Roosevelt, “we have nothing to fear but fear itself.” We are not going to lose the war on terrorism because no one can ever take away our ideals.

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Terrorism and Cities

A Target Rich Environment

By Dr. Russell W. Glenn

It should surprise no one that the North Vietnamese chose to strike Hue and Saigon during their 1968 Tet Offensive; that attacks by Tamil Tiger bombers have focused on the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo; or that New York City and Washington, D.C. were the foci for the aggressions of September 11, 2001. Cities are the richest of terrorist targets. They are rich in *significance* due to their density of high visibility and politically symbolic features. They are opulent in the *attention they bestow* on those committing a terrorist assault; television, radio, and print media representatives are inevitably immediately at hand, likely in considerable numbers. There is a wealth of *concealment and support* for individuals preparing to perpetrate an act, especially in those urban areas of the developed world in which virtually every nationality and demographic group are found in some numbers. The sheer density of activities per unit of time means that a man or woman rarely attracts notable attention unless their behaviors are of a character so unusual as to dramatically contrast with others in the immediate vicinity. This abundance of activity allows perpetrators to enter, exit, or pass through an urban area with relative ease. Familiarity with one's neighbors and the homogeneity of most rural environments mean that a stranger attracts immediate notice. The outsider is in contrast often the norm in large towns or cities, allowing him or her to move about and mingle effectively unnoticed.

Urban areas are also affluent in *relevance* to the daily lives of much of the world's population. Over half of earth's population resides in built-up areas. Most developed nations are in particular highly urbanized; many developing nations have extraordinary rates of escalating urbanization. Television and motion pictures frequently focus on the lives of individuals residing, working, or seeking new beginnings in cities. An attack on a rural target may be difficult to relate to for those not in the immediate vicinity, especially a strike involving lives in a distant nation. The ubiquity of urbanization, on the other hand, means that images of destruction and descriptions of metropolitan havoc are readily comprehended by city dwellers anywhere. Tragedy among Japanese farmers is likely to stimulate little sympathetic understanding in many parts of the world, not because there is a lack of compassion but rather because the farmers' lives are so alien to most hearing of the event. Contrarily, many residents of New York, London, Moscow, Hong Kong, Cairo, and Calcutta had little trouble envisioning the consequences of the September, 1995 Tokyo subway nerve agent attack.

Cities are rich in the *extent of consequences* an attack can precipitate. Urban events are far more likely to have local, regional, national, and international impact than is the case in any but the most exceptional rural incidents. The September 11, 2001 strike on the World Trade Center had financial and commercial

aftereffects that permeated the most distant economies. While there is some redundancy in world financial and commercial systems, there is also great interdependence, a series of interrelationships that ensures a blow against one point is felt throughout affected economic sectors. In comparison, redundancy in the agricultural sector comes with less interdependence; a strike might well be of considerable magnitude but have only regional or national consequences. Other suppliers readily stepped forward when the British beef industry suffered a bout of foot and mouth disease in 2001.

Surprisingly, perhaps, a terrorist group may find metropolitan areas in developing nations even more lucrative than those in developed countries. A native metropolis frequently offers perpetrators a larger and more secure support base on which to draw. Indigenous terrorists are likely to find a greater proportion of residents sympathetic, or at a minimum apathetic, to their motivations. Predominant demographics can facilitate anonymity. The successful attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and federal building in Oklahoma City are three instances in which the similarity of terrorist characteristics and those of the indigenous population worked against preemptive detection.

These many factors ensure that cities will continue to attract the attentions of undesirable non-state actors and state-sponsored irregular aggressors. Two elements are especially notable in the battle against urban terrorism. First, any resolution should incorporate all of a state's means of favorably influencing the desired outcome. Success is rarely attainable without an orchestration of appropriate

economic, political, diplomatic, and other means in addition to those involving the military. This is particularly true when there are even moderate constraints on the use of force. Second, public preparation linked to an effective response system is crucial. Urban residents must be convinced of the need to support anti-terrorist efforts and told how to assist in countering the threat. Given their willing participation, the public must further be convinced that their cooperation will result in effective action. There is a need to demonstrate to the man or woman on the street who makes a report that justice in dealing with legitimate threats will follow. (There is similarly a requirement to demonstrate that deliberately false reports, whether made for the purpose of settling scores or other reasons, will result in punishment of the accusers.)

Neither of these two elements is unique to urban contingencies, but the character of challenges in a built-up area notably influences the nature of both. The greater density of individuals and groups that must be influenced means that achieving desired objectives will be very demanding of time and resources. The positive effects of density, which include faster transmission of propaganda, are more than offset by the multiple counter influences that such densities provide. The typical urban resident has a broader spectrum of influences on his or her life than is the case with those living in more sparsely populated environs; he or she therefore has more alternative perspectives impacting his or her daily decision-making. Northern Ireland provides an effective example; there multiple groups struggle to support their interests, at times using coercion to ensure compliance amongst the hesitant and those supporting alternative stands. Progress in interdicting support for

Unionist and Republican acts of violence has been slow to show itself despite years of orchestrating economic, political, social, and military initiatives. Similar opposing influences will affect the viability of an education campaign elsewhere. Success can mean having to overcome generations of deeply ingrained antipathies. Sometimes little more than an insightful approach is needed to trigger success. In Greece, efforts to "put the black hat on the bad guys" by advertising the horrors suffered by victims of terrorism was fundamental to undermining popular support for the perpetrators and their causes. Officials having to overcome such long-standing prejudices are only rarely so fortunate. Progress is far more likely to demand a long-term, well orchestrated, and carefully managed dedication of economic and other resources to redress actual and perceived grievances.

Educating citizens domestically would include psychologically preparing them for urban terrorist-related events. Such education would improve national preparedness to detect, counter, and minimize a strike's negative consequences. A more aware public would know to report a parcel left unattended in a public area. Its members would understand how to identify and notify authorities regarding suspicious activities. Ideally they would become savvy in the ways of the terrorist and thus know how to react should an incident occur in their vicinity (for often a first attack is but a means of flushing a greater number and density of targets into the kill zone of a second). It would be hoped that the educated man or woman would better respond to on-scene authorities' guidance, thereby reducing the incidence of panic, facilitating quarantine procedures should they be necessary, and otherwise causing members of the public to act

in the best interests of themselves and others. Specially targeted groups (e.g., police, fire, emergency medical, hospital, and transportation system employees) would receive training tailored to take advantage of their responsibilities and the constant public presence their positions entail.

Education is but a part of what should be a greater program of preparing a public for urban terrorism, whether domestically or abroad. Responses to an attack should be in accordance with standing plans and procedures. Those responses should be rehearsed at multiple echelons by all with relevant responsibilities. Rehearsals should include devil's advocates' input, that from individuals capable of challenging officials with realistic scenarios (such those involving a city's off-duty emergency response personnel voluntarily rushing to a point of attack, their good intentions thereby putting the city's readiness for subsequent strikes and continuous operations in jeopardy). Such challenges must incorporate strategic as well as tactical considerations so as to ensure that post-event decisions act to mitigate negative economic, diplomatic, and other consequences. Effective rehearsals and exercises will therefore require participation by a wide range of parties representing many governmental and private organizations.

That cities offer a wealth of benefits to the terrorist attacker is readily apparent, as is the inevitability of future strikes. Yet there is also abundance available to others seeking more favorable objectives. The collective character of many cities' residents has a richness of which those responsible for combating terrorism should make better use. The residents of London have repeatedly refused to be

intimidated by the Irish Republican Army's threats much as they stood fast against World War II aerial bombardment. Oklahoma City did not break despite the sudden loss of 168 citizens on April 19, 1995. The attacks of September 11, 2001 let the world see that New York City is more a community than its aloof reputation would have led many to believe possible. Assaults on London, Oklahoma City, New York, and Washington, D.C. were attributable to those urban areas' political, economic, and symbolic affluence. The notoriety and other consequences of such strikes did resonate worldwide, but the resonations rapidly took on a character counterproductive to the perpetrators' objectives. Ultimately it was the bounteousness of the urban residents' character that came to characterize each of these events. Urban terrorism may never be eliminated, but its probability of success and level of impact can be diminished by initiatives that capitalize on the wealth of support, expertise, and strength of collective character existent in many city populations.

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Small Wars Website Quick Looks

These websites are recommended for Small Wars research. Look for links to these sites and more at www.smallwarsjournal.com.

1. Small Wars Journal

<http://www.smallwarsjournal.com>

"Our" Internet research site – the SWJ is an online aid and web portal for members of the United States, allied and coalition military services researching Small Wars. Of particular note are the Reference Library (containing several hundred articles, papers and studies) and the Research Links section.

2. Air War College Gateway to the Internet

<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awcgate.htm>

The granddaddy of all portals for conducting Internet-based military research. Constantly refreshed with new links, documents, studies and articles of interest this site remains a SWJ favorite. Of particular interest to those researching Small Wars is the Issues, Doctrine and Warfighting section.

3. Small Wars Center of Excellence

<http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil>

Much of the site requires registration and access is limited to official use only. This site is the number one official Small Wars Internet research site. Content includes military lessons learned (or unlearned), after action reports, Emerald Express (operational insights and observations) reports, studies, papers, interviews, book reviews and more.

4. Britain's Small Wars

<http://www.britains-smallwars.com>

The history of British military conflicts since 1945. Beginning with India and Palestine (1945) and covering all of the U.K.'s Small Wars through the current conflict in Iraq, this site contains first-hand accounts of these actions.

5. Center for Army Lessons Learned

<http://call.army.mil>

Requires an Army AKO (Army Knowledge Online) account for access. CALL collects and analyzes data from a variety of current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events, and produces lessons for military commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates these lessons and other related research materials through a variety of print and electronic media, including this web site.

6. Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review

<http://www.ndu.edu/itea/index.cfm?state=resource.2>

The ITEA program, sponsored by the National Defense University, serves as the national focal point for innovation in learning, research, and gaming that addresses the U.S. government interagency response

to complex crises. The ITEA web page contains briefings, documents, publications, after action reviews, community news and general references.

7. Foreign Military Studies Office

<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/fmsopubs.htm>

FMSO researches, writes and publishes from unclassified sources about the military establishments, doctrines and strategic, operational and tactical practices of selected foreign armed forces. It also studies a variety of civil–military and transnational security issues affecting the U.S. military, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, counter–drug support, terrorism, insurgency and peacetime contingency operations. FMSO studies and articles are contained on this web page.

8. Global Security

<http://www.globalsecurity.org>

Very large repository of military and military related documents, studies, articles, maps, imagery and more from across the globe. Addresses every major (and minor) conflict since the 18th century (some in much more detail than others).

9. Center for Strategic and International Studies

<http://www.csis.org>

CSIS addresses the full spectrum of new challenges to national and international security maintaining resident experts on all of the world's major geographical regions. CSIS studies and articles are contained on this web page.

10. Rand

<http://www.rand.org>

Rand conducts a broad array of national security research for the U.S. Department of Defense. Rand also carries out an extensive research program in homeland security, homeland defense, and terrorism–related research for the U.S. Government, as well as selected research for key allied governments and ministries of defense. Many of Rand's research products are contained on their web page.

World War II vs the Global War on Terror

Finding the Enemy Center of Gravity

MAJ Andrew Harvey, Mr. Stan Kluth and Mr. Ian Sullivan

Introduction

On the 60th anniversary of the Battle of the Huertgen Forest a group of U.S. officers participating in a staff ride were confronted with the question, “In World War II everyone knew that taking Berlin was the objective; is there a similar objective in our ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT)?” This paper responds that while the fall of Berlin was the goal that would indicate complete military and political victory over the Third Reich, today’s GWOT lacks a similar single physical or symbolic objective that would spell the end of the conflict with radical Islamists. Although the Second World War in the European Theater of Operations included competing ideologies, it remained a conventional conflict between states. The GWOT is a war of competing ideologies that involves a long-term worldwide clash of systems between radical Islamism and the U.S.-led global system.¹ For the United States to prevail in the GWOT, it must be able to fight and win an insurgency on a global scale (or pansurgency²) against an adversary who neither gives nor accepts quarter, and who has

no respect for what are considered the accepted laws of war. If the United States is to defeat the radical Islamist pansurgency, it will require the complete transformation of the Muslim World’s political and social structures.

Ideologies

There are some similarities between Nazism and radical Islamism. Both include radical ideology as a response to externally imposed conditions, and present a social / economic panacea wrapped in cultural identity. Both believe in a manifest destiny to re-shape the world system, and include violent intolerance as an integral aspect. Ultimately both lead to totalitarian rule. The key difference between Nazism and radical Islamism is that the Nazi source of power was the German state, while radical Islamism’s source of power is the attractiveness of a transnational ideology. Nazi expansion was based on military conquest but radical Islamism’s expansion is based on information operations (IO) and proselytizing. **Nazis were fanatical but not suicidal, Radical Islamists are fanatical *and* suicidal (death is not only good, it is a reward).** Nazi leaders acted as state leaders while radical Islamist leaders act as renegades outside of all accepted legal authority. Nazi leaders were willing to negotiate with enemies. **Radical Islamists will accept only *our* unconditional surrender.** Our current conflict of ideologies is centered on the answer to the question posed by Plato and Aristotle of what constitutes a “good life.” To

¹ John G. Ikenberry. “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1996.

² The concept of pansurgency was pioneered by Dr. Ilana Kass from the National Defense University for a briefing to both the White House and to Congress. Dr. Kass defines pansurgency as the organized movement of *transnational actors* seeking to overthrow values, cultures, or societies on a global level through subversion and armed conflict with an ultimate goal of *establishing a new world order*.

us it is found in the individual rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. For the radical Islamist, it is the creation of an all-encompassing system based on submission to the will of God through the imposition of their interpretation of *sharia* (Islamic law) throughout the entire Muslim world.

Learning from History

We face a dilemma similar to one that confronted (and confounded) the leaders of the Western Allies at the end of the First World War; how to re-shape the Middle East. The decisions made by the British and the French on how to deal with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire shaped the modern Middle East and are the genesis of many of the problems the United States faces today in fighting the GWOT. London and Paris believed they could re-shape the political fundamentals of the region by imposing an artificial nation-state system on the Middle East with no regard for existing ethnic and religious boundaries. The British and French chose different paths for re-shaping the region, and both failed. The British first sought to co-opt Islam in the hopes of creating an insurrection inside the Ottoman Empire, which would lead to its collapse and strip the Central Powers of a key ally. The British hoped to find a “pope of Islam” who would rally the Arab world against the Turkish-dominated Ottoman Empire, while at the same time bolstering London’s hold on its imperial possessions. This was a fundamental misunderstanding of the region and of the decentralized nature of Islam. The British switched courses of action and sought to install vassal secular governments based on concepts of Western nation states. This policy also met with failure as Arabs in Iraq, Egypt, and Palestine, revolted against “puppet” regimes

imposed by the British. It was not until London allowed these areas a measure of self-determination that the situation was stabilized (but never resolved). The French recognized the importance of Islam to the region, and made no effort to restrain it. Paris, however, made a different error. Instead of allowing the newly formed states of the region a measure of self-determination, it created separate conflicting communities in Lebanon and Syria, and then proceeded to back one against the other in order to maintain control over its mandate. This division eventually led to the sectarian strife that plagues Lebanon to this day³. Imposing a solution on the Arabs did not work then, and will not work now. From a practical standpoint, this means that **Western democracy should not be considered a panacea to the region’s turbulent political environment. Indeed, the imposition of Western-style democracy in Iraq is fraught with danger that would repeat some of the same mistakes made by Britain and France** (a secular state viewed as a puppet and also a factionalized state involving Sunni, Shia, and Kurds).

Pansurgency

The issue that makes the GWOT so fundamentally different from other ideological conflicts in history is that it pits the U.S.-led global system against non-state actors who transcend political boundaries by appealing to religion, culture, and even pan-Arab nationalism to forge a de-centralized core of ideologically motivated insurgents fighting to overthrow the U.S.-led global system and replace it with one based on their radical interpretations of *sharia*. This conflict is

³ David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Owl Books, 2001).

The U.S.–Led Global System

This system includes not only norms of interaction, international law and treaties, but also institutions. The most important aspects of the post-World War II world system are the West's multi-national organizations. They owe their origins to the 1941 Atlantic Charter of liberal principles established to guide the post-war world, and the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference on monetary order (both American initiatives). These gave birth to various organizations, e.g. the U.N., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These organizations and the world order of open economies and dispute management were intended to prevent problems among Western industrial capitalist states - - not to fight Soviet communism, which was a separate system - - and they continue to endure despite the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the underlying Western-inspired world order (here after referred to as the "global system") remains intact and is even expanding as Russia, China, and other states of the former Soviet Union join Western organizations.

completely asymmetrical. Unlike Nazi Germany, the enemy realizes it lacks the military capability to directly challenge the U.S.–led system on a global scale. Instead, it relies on the strategy and tactics of the insurgent to selectively engage U.S./Coalition forces, (Khobar Towers, Kenya/Tanzania embassy bombings, the *USS Cole* bombing, 11 September) while striking in other venues to make political gains (e.g. the Madrid bombing, Bali bombing, kidnappings and murder of foreign nationals in Iraq) to erode Coalition cohesion. Unlike other insurgencies, the GWOT is unique because of its scale. It is in effect a pansurgency.

A different kind of enemy

An analogy between the radical Islamists to past enemies may be the Imperial Japanese soldiers of WWII. In both cases, the adversary is governed by a fatalistic philosophy. In WWII, it was the concept of dishonor to oneself and ones family if a soldier failed to fight to the end—to “die for the Emperor.” In the case of the radical Islamists, to die in the “holy war” is the ultimate sacrifice to Allah and guarantees a place of honor in the afterlife. In addition to the concept of the ultimate sacrifice, we are also faced with the problem of “unconditional surrender.” The U.S. position toward the Axis Powers was unconditional surrender. This forced the United States and the allies to prosecute the war to this outcome—leading to the fanatic resistance of the Japanese soldiers under their own code of honor (Bushido), and ultimately requiring the use of nuclear weapons to force Tokyo's surrender. In the case of the radical Islamists, ***we are the ones who have been confronted with the demand for “unconditional surrender”*** through all of the “declarations of war” against the West issued by Usama bin Laden since 1995; with the threat of violence should these conditions not be met. Given this situation, where we are faced with a fanatically dedicated, totally intractable adversary, for whom no compromise is possible; **the only option for victory for the United States is the discrediting of the radical Islamist ideology and the subsequent elimination of its support base.** Therefore, the war against the Islamist pansurgency must be waged on two fronts – direct action against the terrorists themselves, as well as elimination of radical interpretations of the Koran and Islamic teachings used by the Islamists to justify their jihad

The COG and Endstate

If the United States is to succeed in winning the pansurgency, it must target the enemy's center of gravity (COG) – the attractiveness of its ideology among the Arab and wider Islamic community, which in turn leads to either direct or indirect support of Islamist insurgents around the world. The United States needs to convince the Arab and Islamic world that the U.S.-led global system – based on political freedom and economic prosperity – is a far better alternative than the backward-looking radical Islamist agenda based on imposition of *sharia*. There will never be a “final victory” in this conflict in which radical Islamist teachings are totally eradicated. Instead, the end-state will be the reduction of radical Islamism to a local “nuisance” vice a worldwide threat, and continued monitoring to suppress any future attempts to export “holy war.”

Ends, Ways, and Means

To succeed, the United States must accomplish several key goals. The Islamist ideology is bolstered by three pillars: widespread Arab/Islamic doubt regarding Washington's intentions in the region (pro-Israel bias, anti-Arab crusaders, interest in oil, etc.), the tacit and covert assistance of states (namely Iran, but including Syria and others) for radical Islamist groups, and the growing alienation among Arab populations and their often absolutist governments (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt, Tunisia, etc.). Nullifying each of these pillars becomes a goal and an End of a unified national strategy. In meeting these objectives, U.S. military power is only one of the Means to be directed at countering the threat. Military means can be used to target specific individuals and cells, and then in rolling back radical Islamists in their safe havens. These are

the Ways in which the military instrument of power can be employed to achieve the desired Ends. In addressing the broad range of activities needed to achieve the desired Endstate, a unified plan, involving all aspects of national power is the only solution to this strategic problem. For example; a key Way to achieve these Ends is an offensive IO campaign designed to discredit our enemy's ideology.

A Global Fight

In order to defeat the Islamist threat on a worldwide scale, a three stage approach: containment, roll-back, and long-term suppression appears the most probable course of successful action. The first stage in containing the enemy was the elimination of the only state controlled by the enemy – Afghanistan. The removal of the Taliban regime and denial of the prime safe haven for the al-Qai'da jihadist movement forced the enemy to operate without this contiguous safe haven. At the same time, elimination of some senior leaders, disruption of the “command structure,” freezing and confiscating their financial assets, and establishing a modicum of homeland defense in the United States to deny access and disrupt any cells already in place has denigrated the ability to conduct spectacular actions in the United States on the scale of the 11 September attacks.

- **Containment.** A key element in the containment phase that directly attacks the enemy COG is the elimination of their ability to freely disseminate their ideology. A robust IO campaign designed to discredit our enemy's ideology should be launched including actions such as: closing down internet sites and internet communications (a critical capability for the insurgents)

which support the radical Islamists, a propaganda effort to counter the negative image of the United States in the Arab language media over the issue of Israel–Palestine and as an “occupying power” in Iraq, offensive IO to target the reputation of key militant leaders and highlight the suffering they cause to Muslim civilians, as well as taking the moral high ground by explaining the ideas and values that are the foundation of our society and freedoms we enjoy. This must be a decentralized campaign employing all media, governmental and non-governmental, dedicated to spreading a broad message espousing the values and benefits of the U.S.–led global system. Until we begin this campaign we abdicate the initiative in what is the most critical battlefield in this war of ideas; the conflict of perceptions over what constitutes a “good life.”

- **Removing leaders.** Elimination of Adolf Hitler and the senior Nazi leadership would probably have led to a negotiated surrender of Germany and an early termination of hostilities. This may have been possible during the early stages of bin Laden’s pansurgency, but is no longer an option today. Although Bin Laden is a symbolic (even mythic) figure to the international jihadists, he lacks the absolute power of a Hitler in Germany or an Emperor Hirohito in Japan. Since the late 1990s, the Islamist radicals have become a widespread, loosely connected movement of autonomous cells and groupings, over which no single individual or group has true command and control. These jihadists operate under a decentralized command and control and a general “commander’s intent”, often transmitted by bin Laden in videotaped

messages or other released notes; but most importantly, the franchise groups need no further guidance. Their ideology includes a goal and endstate, the overthrow of apostate Muslim regimes and the imposition of *sharia* throughout a restored Islamist caliphate. Elimination of bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, or Abu Musab Zarqawi in Iraq, will not eliminate the problem – in fact, it might even harden the will of the enemy, since the individuals would simply become “martyrs” who died for the cause. Containment must focus not only on the leaders, but on identifying and neutralizing existing militants and their supporters in those countries where their presence has been tolerated, ignored (or even supported) and inadequately combated (in places such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen, and other Arab states), and in which the radical Islamist ideology is still not aggressively suppressed. This must be accompanied by a conscious, dedicated effort on the part of the rulers to supplant the radical Islamist theology by a mainstream, moderate Islam, which promulgates tolerance of non-Muslims vice the holy war against the infidels, espoused by the radicals.

- **After containment is rollback.** The next phase should be to eliminate the enemy’s ability to directly attack the United States. This effort must focus on the enemy presence in areas that offer the most opportune launch pad for such attacks, such as in Europe. Radical Islamists are actively pursued by local governments, but only when identified as posing a threat, or when tied to specific legal offenses. Furthermore, radical Islamist operatives are able to blend into the rapidly growing Muslim communities, much like guerillas in

previous conflicts. After 11 September, and in some cases only after the Madrid bombings, did European governments begin to seriously hunt down suspected radical Islamists, with or without direct links to terrorist organizations. The key to eliminating the threat, however, is to convince the moderate Muslim community, which constitutes the majority of the Muslims in Europe, to distance itself completely from the jihadists and to actively take part in efforts to identify and neutralize the radicals. The European nations have only recently begun a serious effort to work with Muslim residents in this regard. This effort is vital if the European Muslim communities are to be persuaded to report propaganda efforts, radical teaching in local mosques and meeting places, and suspicious activities by their fellow Muslims, etc. Without this active participation of the Muslim communities, the radicals will continue to “swim in the Muslim lake” in Europe. Elimination of the enemy within from Western nations would rollback the Islamist movement back to its roots, primarily in the Arab Muslim states. Although this does not constitute victory, it will drastically reduce the threat of direct attack on our soil. In order to achieve our desired end state, rollback must be followed by a third phase of suppression.

- **Long-Term Suppression.** This must be a multi-faceted effort focusing on reforming the social and political order within Muslim states, coupled with the strict control of the Muslim clerics, Koran schools and public media to insure that the teaching of militant jihadist doctrine is not tolerated. This will force the remaining radicals to conduct their activities underground, and eliminate

open recruiting and support, particularly the ability to raise and move funds used to conduct terrorist activities. In the end, it may be possible to reduce the threat to level it was prior to the rise of al-Qai'da, a regionally contained, low-level underground subversive movement with the ability to conduct local terrorist acts, but no longer a worldwide threat to the U.S.-led global system. Given the deep seeded historical, economic, and social roots of the radical Islamic movement, there will never be a final victory in which radical Islamist teachings are totally eradicated. The best that can be achieved will be the reduction to a local nuisance vice a worldwide threat, and continued monitoring to suppress any future attempts to export holy war.

A Stake in Their Future; Re-Shaping the Political Landscape

Any plan to discredit the Islamist agenda must convince the Arab and Islamic world that they can thrive within the U.S.-led global system. Afghanistan can be touted as a success story, and if Iraq can follow in its footsteps (a government that operates under international norms with an Iraqi flavor; where the Iraqi citizens start benefiting from the global economy), then U.S. policy will be off to a good start. **Washington must aim at providing the same opportunities to citizens of other states whose governments reap the benefits of the global system (such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, the states of North Africa, etc.) but whose people do not.** Many of these states have authoritarian governments that are stable, and often pro-U.S. (such as Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait, or Morocco). Nevertheless, these same states, where many of the citizens have become disillusioned with their authoritarian

governments, are ripe targets for radical Islamists, who use them as recruitment and support hubs. **Political reform, in which the citizens of a country have a stake in their future, is critical to any plan to re-shape the region.** This does not require the imposition of western-style democracy, but it will force Washington to work with its friends (including criticizing them and holding them accountable for their actions) to bring political and societal reforms where the cycle of hopelessness and despair (on which radical Islamism thrives) is broken and replaced with one of hope in the future.

Winning Trust: Solving the Arab–Israeli Conundrum

Any effort designed to re-shape the region must begin with winning over the trust of the Islamic world. Most Muslims perceive U.S. Middle East policy as unfairly biased and even hostile. The best way to reverse this trend and win back this trust is for the United States to play a leading role in resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is a dominant issue for the Arab and Islamic world. In fact, U.S. relations with the Arab world have been strongest in the aftermath of Washington's deep involvement in the Arab–Israeli peace treaty.⁴ Solving the Arab–Israeli conflict will not end the ideological pansurgency, but it is the necessary pre-requisite for changing

⁴ In mediating the Camp David Accord (1979) between Israel and Egypt, Washington was able to transform Egypt from a state firmly entrenched in the Soviet camp into a staunch U.S. ally. Similarly, Washington's willingness to support a regional peace conference (eventually the Madrid Conference) led to Syria's support and commitment of troops to the Coalition in the First Gulf War.

Arab/Islamic perceptions of U.S. intentions in the region.

Ideological Wars

"Wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy, tend to be value based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable." (Joint Pub 3-0, p III-30)

Conclusion

In his seminal work *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, Paul Pillar examined 142 wars from 1815 to 1980 in an attempt to discern patterns and trends on how wars might end. His research reveals five methodologies for conflict termination: Capitulation (in which one belligerent imposed the solution on the other), by extermination (in which one belligerent ceased to exist), by absorption (into a larger conflict), by withdrawal of one of the belligerents, by intervention of a third party (such as an inter-governmental organization), or by negotiation⁵. None of these methodologies, however, offer a clear path for the United States to seek victory in the GWOT. Our enemies clearly seek a victory by capitulation – in which they impose their system on the rest of the world. Victory for Washington however, is based on the maintenance of our position of primacy in the U.S.–led global system. As a result, there is no Berlin to be taken (or even a Berlin Wall to crumble) which will result in a symbolic end of the conflict. Instead, an active, and very lengthy campaign designed to challenge the

⁵ Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1983).

enemy until his ideology is discredited and irrelevant becomes the optimal path for the United States to follow.

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Psychological Operations in Haiti

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Arata, USA

BACKGROUND

Haiti, with a population of 6.1 million people, is the most densely populated country in the Caribbean with a population density of 182 people per square kilometer. Haiti's capital city, Port au Prince, located in the Southern Region, is the largest city with approximately 1 million residents. The population of Haiti is divided into an upper class, a middle class, peasants, and an urban lower class. The upper class consists of 2 percent of the population and controls about 44 percent of the wealth and hold key positions in trade, industry, real estate, and the professions. The middle class comprise 8 percent of the population. The criteria for membership in the middle class include participation in a non-manual occupation, a moderate income, literacy, and a mastery of French. Education and urban residence are the keys to upward movement for the middle class. Peasants comprise 75 percent of Haiti's population. The remaining 15 percent of the population consist of the urban lower class. They are the poorest strata of Haitian society and live primarily in Port au Prince in the slums of "Cite Soleil," where citizens inhabit makeshift dwellings, rundown shacks and buildings with no potable water or electricity. Open sewage and garbage piles fill the streets. As elevation increases toward the west of town, there is a sharp improvement in living conditions

In 1994, Haiti was suffering under the brutal regime of General Raoul Cedras, reinforced by his henchmen in the Haitian Army, Haitian

Police, and thugs who were members of an organization known as the FRAPH. This group had seized power from legally elected President Bertrand Aristide in 1991. From that date, until the US action in 1994, Haiti lived under a crippling economic embargo imposed by most nations in the western hemisphere. By the summer of 1994, Haitians had begun to leave their island in considerable numbers to attempt the voyage to the Florida coast of the United States. This potential humanitarian disaster brought our nation's attention to the problems in Haiti, and members of Congress, under the incessant lobbying of President Aristide, clamored for US action to re-establish democracy in Haiti by overthrowing General Cedras' illegal regime and restoring Aristide to the presidency. In September 1994, the 10th Mountain Division received orders to conduct operations in Haiti.

MISSION

There were originally two OPLANs developed for military operations in Haiti. The first, OPLAN 2370, called for an armed intervention led by elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. Thanks to last minute diplomacy on the part of President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell, General Cedras accepted an ultimatum to step down and allow US forces to enter the country to set the conditions for the restoration of President Aristide to power. The second OPLAN (2380) called for the entry of US forces into Haiti in a permissive environment. Specifically, the mission of US forces under OPLAN 2380 was to conduct

military operations to restore and preserve civil order; protect US citizens and interests and designated Haitians and third country nationals; create a secure environment for the restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti; and provide technical assistance to the government of Haiti. At the brigade and battalion level, this mission initially boiled down to providing security by “presence” and by patrolling with US soldiers in the streets of Port au Prince. Limited patrolling began immediately upon the division’s arrival on 20 September and continued as the division expanded its lodgment in Haiti.

Those in the division and brigade who had experience in Somalia, where a humanitarian mission developed into combat operations, concluded that there would be a high possibility of armed incidents with the FAD’H (Haitian military) or the Haitian police. As a result, training over the summer focused on preparation for a combat mission and utilized some of the Somalia lessons learned.

The brigade implemented MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) training with squads and platoons focusing on roadblocks, security techniques, and crowd control. The 10th Mountain Division prepared for all possibilities across the spectrum of operations. At the tactical level, however, little thought was given to the integration of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

THE THREAT

When the United States military arrived in Haiti to begin operations, several internal Haitian threats faced us. These included the population, the environment, the Haitian Army (Forces Armée d’Haïti or FAD’H), and the

Revolutionary Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH). The threat from the Haitian population included the common criminal element, large crowds and the threat of riots, and Haitian on Haitian violence. This included retaliation and retribution by the Haitian people towards former FAD’H members.

USE OF PSYOPS IN GENERAL

The ultimate objective of American psychological operations is to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations, as well as target audiences, to take actions favorable to the US and its allies. Psychological operations (PSYOP) can promote resistance within a civilian populace against a hostile government or be used to enhance the image and legitimacy of a friendly government. When properly employed, PSYOP reduces the morale and efficiency of enemy troops and builds dissidence and disaffection within their ranks. It is US policy that psychological operations be conducted across the operational continuum. Psychological operations are conducted to influence foreign governmental and civilian perceptions and attitudes to encourage foreign actions favorable to US national security objectives and interests. Any level (strategic, operational or tactical) of PSYOP can be executed at any point along the operational continuum. The operational environment does not dictate or limit PSYOP actions or the level of PSYOP applied

PSYOP can be of tremendous utility in unconventional environments such as peace operations. The use of deadly force in peace operations is typically constrained by rules of engagement. Given that constraint, PSYOP provides peace operation forces with a combat multiplier that can be used to create favorable

conditions for stability and deter potential conflict without the need to resort to violence or deadly force.

Tactical PSYOP are planned and executed in assigned objective areas in direct support of Army or joint tactical operations. All tactical PSYOP themes and products must support operational and strategic objectives. Typical tactical PSYOP objectives include lowering the opponents' morale and combat efficiency; supporting deception operations; facilitating the occupation of opponents' areas by delivering ultimatums and giving rallying point locations or directions for the cessation of hostilities; supporting strategic PSYOP by furnishing detailed, timely intelligence on local vulnerabilities that may be used in strategic plans and operations; or building a favorable image of US soldiers and leaders among the local population.

PSYOP forces offer the commander, regardless of the level or intensity of conflict in which he is engaged, a significant combat multiplier. PSYOP derive their maximum effectiveness from being a part of a total operation. They are not a substitute for combat forces. However, they may be employed when the use of combat forces is inappropriate. When properly integrated with military and political actions and objectives, PSYOP forces may make the difference between success and failure.

A tactical PSYOP team (TPT) is normally attached to or in direct support of a maneuver battalion. It consists of three soldiers (led by a staff sergeant), one HMMWV, SINCGARS radios, and both mounted and man packed loudspeaker systems. The TPT leader acts as the PSYOP staff planner for the battalion. There are several types of loudspeaker systems that

can be mounted in helicopters, on armored or wheeled vehicles, on small boats, or carried in rucksacks. This means that a PSYOPS TPT can operate in any environment, with any type of unit, on just about any type of mission.

USE OF PSYOP IN HAITI

Haiti offered a challenging environment for PSYOP employment. Literacy is low, and Haitian society relies on word-of-mouth communication. Official news broadcasts and publications are viewed with suspicion. Rumors are the preferred source of information, and credibility is judged by how well the listener knows the person repeating the rumor. Anyone in a uniform is to be mistrusted and even feared. There was no rule of law, so justice was meted out in an arbitrary and violent manner. In this environment, the PSYOP Team developed and executed an information campaign directed toward three audiences. To the Haitian military, it communicated the benefits of professionalization. To the police, it communicated the desirability of separation from the army, and to the population at large, it communicated confidence in the democratic process as well as confidence in the ability of US forces to ensure stability and peace. This was a message that had to be reinforced, every day, through the actions of US forces on the ground.

It became contingent upon all tactical leaders at all levels to be able to communicate with local leaders in Haiti to achieve specified objectives. Tactical PSYOP Team members are uniquely equipped to aid in this mission as they are trained to be aware of cross-cultural communication techniques and are skilled in the use of interpreters. These skills helped on numerous occasions when the tactical

commander, usually a LT or a CPT, would become frustrated with the low level of trust he would see among the Haitian population on an almost daily basis. The Haitians were happy we were there, but were not sure if we were just replacing one totalitarian regime with another. Uniforms and weapons still cowed them. If a junior leader on patrol became frustrated with this outward sign of mistrust and hostility he would normally revert to his level of comfort, end the communication and write off his lack of success to any number of flaws with the Haitian people. This usually meant the end of the communication process, just as it might have been succeeding.

Knowledge of foreign communication, debate, and bargaining techniques was invaluable in salvaging negotiations with Haiti who could potentially provide valuable information or become allies in a particular neighborhood or sector. Tactical PSYOP teams provided invaluable experience and training in helping tactical commanders learn how to negotiate in foreign, difficult situations. Communication is the tactical PSYOP team's bread and butter.

As our tour of duty in Haiti progressed, the ability of our tactical commanders and soldiers to communicate on the streets led to increased credibility of US forces in the eyes of the Haitian population. This ability to communicate ran the spectrum from having linguists who could explain our actions on a one to one basis, to having a tactical PSYOP team prepared to deal with anything from a riot involving hundreds of people to simple, but sometimes deadly, Haitian on Haitian violence.

Daytime patrols were often affected by large crowds, especially early on in the operation. Curiosity seekers would mass in numbers up to

a few hundred around a platoon sized patrol. Their presence could sometimes channel the element into the middle of the street and drive it into a file and, in doing so, heighten the tension among the patrol members. The ability of PSYOP teams to explain to the crowd the reason for the patrol, and to literally order the crowd to back off, had a telling effect on the conduct of the Haitian people, and the anxiety of the US soldiers on the patrol.

MISSIONS

Riots were an all too common threat in Haiti and had the potential to be massive in scope, potentially lethal, organized, and involving large numbers of women and children. Overall, PSYOP teams helped control the activities of the different elements involved in a riot. The first step would be to separate lethal from non-lethal elements. Next, PSYOP teams would use their loudspeakers and linguists to communicate the consequences of certain actions. Finally, they would give directions for subsequent actions or movement.

Tactical PSYOP teams also helped with the seeking out and capture of several known members of the FRAPH who were wanted by the joint task force headquarters for questioning. In early October, one task force planned a series of raids on suspected locations of members of an activist political organization and other hostile individuals known as attaches. The tactical commander decided to use a graduated response tactic that began with TPTs broadcasting surrender messages, followed by a countdown sequence. Approximately 80% of the individuals at each objective surrendered and the rest offered no resistance when the assault team entered the building. Not a shot was fired during the entire

operation. Again, a well planned and well executed PSYOP campaign, in direct support of the tactical commander's mission and intent, was invaluable to the successful and safe accomplishment of the mission.

It was important to inform the local population of our activities during tactical operations, and specifically, cordon and search operations. Most people affected by cordon and search operations were not themselves, the subjects of those operations. The space needed to create an outer and inner cordon invariably encompassed many dwellings and large numbers of inhabitants. We needed to understand that in the past, the arrival of heavily armed troops would have struck fear in the heart of every inhabitant in the area. We needed to counter their fear by explaining what we were doing, who we were after, and why.

Under these conditions it was important to communicate to the inhabitants of the affected area of operations. PSYOP teams, using vehicle mounted loudspeakers, broadcast why the search was being conducted, and who was being targeted. They would produce signs for outer and inner cordon teams to use to help control the flow of traffic into, out of, and around the area of operations. They pre-recorded messages to explain our presence in their neighborhood. They also explained how the removal of a bad guy from their midst, who may have provided a modicum of security for their neighborhood, was a good thing for them. In almost all of the above cases, it was a good thing if the operation could be followed up with Civil Affairs teams operating in the area. We had to overcome the inhabitants fear that there would be retribution coming their way for standing by while a bad guy was taken from their midst. It was important that tactical units

continued to patrol in that area while civil affairs units engaged the population. This combined information campaign of engendering trust was just one way in which tactical PSYOP teams helped us to effectively accomplish our mission.

Finally, one of the major programs that the infantry battalions, along with other units, were involved in was a weapons buy-back program. The intent of this program was to remove, voluntarily, dangerous weapons and munitions from the streets of Haiti, in an effort not only to protect the local population, but also to enhance force protection for the soldiers in the multi-national force. Payment price increased according to how dangerous the item was or what operational condition the weapon was in. The better the condition of the weapon, the more money was paid to the Haitian turning it in. Although the intent of the program was worthy, it was the opinion of many that the weapon buy-back initiative was only marginally successful. Most weapons turned in were rusted and non-operational, and most explosives appeared unstable and perhaps posed a greater danger to the soldiers and Haitians handling them at the turn-in station. Be that as it may, it was very important to involve PSYOP teams and products at these turn-ins. Many Haitians feared what would happen to them if they turned in a weapon. There was also the fear of getting robbed once you left the site. Tactical PSYOP products like pre-recorded messages broadcast in the local community and at the turn in site, along with signs, could help temper these fears. Troops patrolling the area around the weapons

CONCLUSION

Low Intensity conflict places civilians, regulars and guerrillas on the same battlefield. LIC often requires decentralized execution. Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping operations require that the individual soldier know more and be responsible for more than the average soldier of 20 years ago. This is the argument to give psychological operations assets to the lowest level possible so that they can impact the actions of those subordinate leaders in their inevitable interactions with local nationals. It is even more important that subordinate leaders learn about the capabilities of these PSYOP assets, so that there are seamless operations in the presence of foreign nationals.

There are several things that we can do to ensure that PSYOPS are well integrated into Infantry operations:

1. Integrate PSYOP planners in the S3 section to achieve the best results. This is sometimes hard to do as they were the busiest soldiers in the battalion. It would be best if they could be incorporated during CPXs, or at the National Training Centers.
2. Allow the PSYOP planner to brief the commanders and staff. Often LTCs are not used to being briefed by E6s. It is always good to let the commander and staff see what the TPT is capable of, and how they approach tactical problems.
3. Give the PSYOP planner clear guidance on the brigade or battalion mission and intent. Let them develop their products to support the specific intent of the commander's mission.
4. Include the PSYOP planner early in the mission analysis process. There exist many competing requests from brigades and battalions for PSYOP products to support their operations. PSYOP assets can be woefully short when faced with many competing requirements, especially from planning staffs that don't necessarily understand the capabilities of the TPTs. Let the PSYOP planner help determine how best to use the PSYOP assets.
5. PSYOP are critical to brigade and battalion operations during contingency deployments. The integration of PSYOP elements in the combat training centers is a step toward gaining an understanding of their unique capabilities. PSYOP can be expected to play an increased role in the management of foreign perceptions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior.

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Book Review

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The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power

By Max Boot

New York: Basic Books, 2002. Pp. 428, 6 maps, index. \$30.00. ISBN 0-465-00720-1.

Reviewed By

Dr. John P. Cann

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Editor's note: Dr. Cann's review was first published some time ago. His introduction refers to that earlier time.

Today nearly a quarter of a million troops are arrayed in an ever-tightening noose around Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein. They represent the classic modern conventional force and reflect the substantial resources of a wealthy nation. It is a large and powerful army in the sense of those mass on mass collisions led by Napoleon, Wellington, Grant, or Eisenhower. Equipped with the most advanced technology and capable of overwhelming firepower, it epitomizes the modern concept of the American way of war, an army capable of annihilating any opposing force and of achieving the unconditional surrender of any enemy. Yet, there is another, less celebrated, American way of war, one that embodies a long tradition of fighting small wars. The U.S. Marine Corps, for instance, between 1800 and 1934

executed 180 landings abroad. The other services contributed a few themselves. Some of these were short and quick and others extended for decades. As one would expect, some were successful, and others not. Yet, most of these campaigns were fought by a relatively small number of professional soldiers pursuing limited objectives with limited means. Max Boot, who is Olin Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations and the former editorial features editor of the Wall Street Journal, has examined this genre in a "not to be missed" volume. His fascinating and easily readable *The Savage Wars of Peace* has made a valuable contribution in drawing back the curtain on this heritage. Beautifully researched and filled with great story-telling, it not only presents the historical facts but also the engaging personalities and forgotten heroes of the campaigns. His essential and provocative conclusion is that none of these wars would adhere to the Powell Doctrine, which holds that the U.S. should commit its forces to battle only when its vital national interests are at stake, and then only with the purpose of a quick, decisive victory and an immediate withdrawal.

There was excessive criticism during the Clinton administration that U.S. forces were being tasked with nation building duties with no exit strategies, no clearly defined goals, and no mobilization of public opinion. As a result, the Bush administration has been publicly

hostile to peacekeeping duties for U.S. troops, saying that they have not traditionally undertaken such assignments and are not particularly good at it. This is a myth with little basis in fact, and Boot's perceptive book explodes this false notion. For more than 200 years U.S. forces have routinely violated every tenet of the Powell Doctrine and done so with great success. Over these years there has been nothing novel about wars without a vital national interest. The seven month occupation of Veracruz in 1914 was precipitated by a failure of the Mexican government to render a 21-gun salute to the U.S. flag, as demanded by the local naval commander. Clearly demanding and receiving a salute to the national flag does not represent a vital national interest. Americans talked of civilizing missions in an earlier era, and today of spreading democracy and defending human rights. It is an idealistic impulse that has historically driven the prosecution of small wars, whether it was to free Cuba in 1898 or Kosovo in 1999.

Nor have any of these wars needed significant popular support. From time to time there would surface some domestic mobilization of an opposition; however, a body of professional soldiers proved able to function effectively far from home in the face of this obstacle. Mobilization of public opinion is needed for large conflicts, as legions of conscripts are necessary. It is far less important when a small contingent of troops are dispatched to some remote trouble spot. It follows from the low importance of public opinion that declarations

of war are also unimportant. There were no declarations of war in any of the conflicts chronicled by Boot. Exit strategies have also proved unimportant. The U.S. military stayed in Haiti 19 years (1915–1933), in Nicaragua for 23 years (1910–1933), in the Philippines 47 years (1899–1946), and China for 100 years (1840s–1940s). The U.S. has yet to find an exit strategy for Korea 50 years after the armistice.

Lastly, U.S. soldiers have been working in non-traditional roles throughout U.S. history, providing disaster relief, quelling riots, escorting children to school, and a host of other unconventional duties. As Boot ably points out, if the military wins the battle and then goes home, "as advocated in the Powell Doctrine and actually happened in the Gulf War, the fruits of victory are likely to wither on the vine." Only an occupation force can guarantee lasting peace. Perhaps Afghanistan would not have become the incubator of terrorism had the U.S. stayed after the defeat of the Soviets, and the World Trade Center might still be standing.

In all of the cases in which the U.S. military has been thrown into a small war, it adapted quickly to the unconventional challenge with great success. Witness the recent action in Afghanistan. Boot asserts that while small wars have their cost, as in Beirut (1983) and Somalia (1993), they are never going away. If the past is any indication, then the U.S. has many more small wars in its future. Mr. Bush and his advisors would thus do well to read this excellent and important treatise on strategy.

Book Review

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The Implementation Course and Guerrilla War

By Abu Hajir cAbd al-cAziz al-Muqrin,

(n.p.: Mucaskar al-Battar, Shacban 1425/September–October 2004), 78 pp.

Reviewed By

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Written by the former leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Abu Hajir cAbd al-cAziz al-Muqrin, and published posthumously (since the author was killed by Saudi security forces in June 2004), this is the organization's official doctrinal manual for conducting an insurgency. Several of the book's portions had appeared earlier as separate essays by al-Muqrin, but they are integrated here in a cohesive doctrine. This autonomous branch of al-Qaeda, based in Saudi Arabia, has been one of the most active subversive groups in the region, although a vigorous Saudi reaction has done much to eliminate its organization and leadership over the past two years. Nevertheless, it still represents a worrisome terrorist threat because of its ability to target Americans working in the Kingdom. As is true of most doctrinal publications, this manual provides a window into al-Qaeda's thinking and as to how the latter operates, taking into account the inevitable modifications to theory dictated by events on the ground. The manual proceeds

from a strategic-level assessment of war seen in a traditional manner, as a "state of conflict" with the intent of achieving political, economic, or ideological objectives. He classifies wars in traditional terms as just or unjust based on who is fighting—with "the oppressed" by definition fighting a just war and "unjust forces" automatically fighting unjust wars. In many instances, one can also trace here the influence of Mao's revolutionary war theory, as in the sequential phases and the specific military and political activities appropriate at each stage of the insurgency which the manual recommends. However, the author adapts borrowed concepts to the operational and strategic environment and religious framework of the Middle East. After all, what motivates the author is "fighting on behalf of God to make the sharica [Islamic law] supreme, and for God's word to be uppermost." (p. 9) Relying on a cell-based system, al-Muqrin lays out systematically his view of operational art, whether fighting in the mountains or in urban areas, and always emphasizes the political impact desired. Nearly half the manual consists of detailed guidance in support of operational and tactical objectives, including tactics, techniques, and procedures for ambushing a convoy, mounting kidnappings and assassinations, or laying out the set of skills to be developed in a guerrilla. Clearly, he saw his guidance as valid not only for his own organization, but also as a universal method for other Muslim insurgents to adopt, as he says, "may it become a beacon and a model which the Umma [Islamic community] will follow."

(p.71) Despite al-Muqrin's death and limited success, his remaining followers and other like-minded groups probably still find this manual attractive because it is a systematic and succinct blueprint for organizing and waging an insurgency and it will continue to guide their actions. Ultimately, this manual serves to remind us that we face a thinking opponent with an independent will, one who can adapt and innovate, and one who should never be underestimated. The manual has appeared on Islamist sites on the internet but these are often ephemeral, vulnerable to hostile hackers, only to reappear again at some other unexpected location. The reviewer is now preparing a translation and analytical study of this manual.

Short Notice Mission: 1999 Sarajevo Balkans Summit

Mr. Thomas Greco

It was a short notice mission to protect leaders of forty nations from a variety of potential threats at the 1999 Sarajevo Balkans Summit. A mission like this would be no easy task for any mature national security service, so an international task force from over twenty nations' security and military services was enlisted to secure the 1999 Balkan Summit in Sarajevo. The key component of this successful effort was the establishment of optimal cooperation between the multitude of agencies with varied capabilities in order to identify and neutralize potential threats.

At the Summit the leaders would announce far reaching economic packages and other initiatives to increase the fragile stability in a Balkan region that had been unstable for most of the decade. Holding the Summit in Sarajevo, and publicly committing to a plan for the future would have great symbolic importance for the international community.

However noble the intent of the Summit organizers, the leaders from Western and Eastern Europe, and members of numerous international agencies, there were factions who stood to harvest a profit from continued instability. Like many former communist controlled countries, among its other problems, Bosnia had to deal with powerful criminal and terrorist organizations. Despite the improvements in the security situation with the influx of several thousand NATO, Russian and other nations' soldiers since 1995, there was still considerable internal tension among the three entities that composed Bosnia

Herzegovina. When analyzing the mission, it occurred to security planners that a well-timed and targeted terrorist attack would reap a publicity bonanza equivalent to winning a major lottery.

With only two weeks notice, the planning for this mission was rapid but detailed. The immediate actions were to evaluate the capabilities available to conduct the mission, to identify key threats and their likelihood of occurrence and to evaluate significant areas that would require specific consideration.

Bosnia had the advantage of the remnants of a fairly sophisticated and a professional internal security apparatus. Add to this the availability of several thousand soldiers from eighteen nations under NATO leadership including a special force of Italian Carabinieri; and there were significant capabilities on site when planning began. In order to augment perceived shortfalls, additional assets were brought in on short notice. Having the resources is not enough; employing them optimally required the use of liaison officers with communications gear, maps with standardized keys to explain the operational concept, and the rehearsal of key events.

With the heads of forty nations in attendance, there was no shortage of individuals and groups with enough perceived grievances to consider them potential attackers. There were literally dozens of forms of potential attack: snipers, bombs of all types, surface to air missiles, chemical attacks; to name a few.

Every potential attacker and form of attack had to be rapidly analyzed. The intelligence staff analyzed the intent of the potential attackers and the forms of potential attack considering the limitations or advantages afforded by the city and its surrounding area. The terrain included roads with choke points that could be easily interdicted. One narrow main street earned the name “sniper alley” during the siege of Sarajevo. The high ground around the airport had also been the site of anti-aircraft activity during the war. Lines of sight from certain locations dominated the area below. Through the analysis of the terrain and integration of potential threats, the planners were able to develop several models of potential threat events, and use those models for security rehearsals.

Some rehearsals took place on a map enlarged to cover the floor of a room the size of a volleyball court. Other rehearsals took place on site. During the execution phase of the Summit, reporting confirmed or denied the indicators catalogued during the rehearsals. Confirming indicators of a model can be preferable to trying to connect dots to predict an incident and queue personnel with varied amounts of training for things to observe. A clear common understanding of both the security framework and potential threats was essential to the operations success. Rehearsals helped build this understanding.

Integrating the forces required the use of a flexible set of concentric bands with restricted access. The meeting area where the heads of state would assemble was the innermost band and had the strictest access controls. The surrounding building was the next concentric band. The building and the meeting room were primarily the responsibility of the host nation

and selected security services that controlled access and monitored activity. The airport, hotels and the routes to the meeting site were the next bands. Police, Carabinieri, Military Police and specially trained troops secured these areas. The rest of the city was secured by military patrols in conjunction with local police. Military forces patrolled key terrain in the suburbs. Military aircraft with technical reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities patrolled the sky above the city.

Coordinating the efforts throughout these bands of security required the use of liaison personnel (with independent communications equipment) at numerous operations centers at key coordination points. The mission used translators to bridge the language gap. Copies of specially annotated maps of the city were provided to key participants. These maps gave all elements a common view of the operational area. All these measures boosted confidence of the ability of the diverse security forces to work together.

And work together they did. The Summit went off without the security effort distracting the world, yet it deterred or neutralized all potential threats.

Mr. Tom Greco (LTC, USA Ret.) is the Special Assistant for Intelligence at US Army Europe. Before retiring he had five tours as a G2 or CJ2, and is a graduate of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).

Revisiting Old Ideas – The Combined Action Program

Maj Adam Strickland, USMCR

Like many Marines preparing to deploy to Iraq in January and February of 2004, my Marines and I were selected to attend a crash course in the Combined Action Program at Camp Pendleton, California in preparation for utilization as a Combined Action Platoon in Iraq's Sunni Triangle. While many of my Marines were wholly unfamiliar with the idea, after attending the periods of instruction, generally all were enthusiastic about the idea, and the difference each believed their participation would make to our overall efforts in country. While I shared in some of their optimism, my own knowledge of past USMC efforts with Combined Action Platoons in the Banana Wars and Vietnam led me to be a bit more skeptical, for while I believed in the concept, I was not convinced that it was the cure all that others believed it to be, nor did I believe history disproved or contradicted my opinion.

After arriving in country as part of the advance party for 3rd Battalion 24th Marines, I quickly set out to “get out of the wire,” and begin formulating my own opinion on what would be the best course of action for the Marines' efforts in country. To this end, I mounted up with soldiers from Brigade Combat Team 1 and the 82nd ABD on vehicle convoys and mounted security patrols so as to see as much as possible. Quickly, it became evident that in the area I was to patrol and provide security that little effort had been made to make common cause with the people, or to directly share in their daily struggles. With each new vehicle patrol that furthered the lack of interaction with locals, or verbal abuse I witnessed the locals

endure, I became convinced that the USMC way was the right way, and thus trusted the Combined Action Program would satisfy many of the needs I identified of both the coalition and host nationals increased cooperation and security.

MISSION

My battalion was to provide security for 1st FSSG aboard Camp Taqaddum, located 10 kilometers west of Camp Fallujah along MSR Michigan (Route 10), and ensure freedom of movement and action for FSSG assets supporting I MEF and 1st Marine Division efforts through the country. Camp Taqaddum was a relatively safe environment to operate, however, support forces continually had to deal with the threat of indirect fires. In the first 30 days I was aboard the base, we were hit 9 times. While these attacks were less than effective, little was being done to stop them, and by the time my battalion arrived in country, attacks were occurring two to three times a week. Obviously, we would need to create a safe zone around the perimeter from which insurgent forces could not penetrate to launch their rockets and mortars. The irony of this situation is that in 1965 around Phu Bai, South Vietnam, this exact scenario occurred leading to the creation of the Combined Action Program. Viet Cong or National Liberation Front forces were attacking the airfield with indirect fires, thus forcing the Marines to develop a new course of action for interdicting these forces. To this end, Marines of the 3rd Battalion 4th Marine Regiment were deployed with Popular

Forces as Combined Action Platoons to ensure security for the base. As a student of Small Wars, this irony was not lost on me, and thus I set out to continue my research on the CAP in Vietnam beyond my reading of Bing West's The Village, and try to learn as much as I could so as not repeat mistakes made between 1965 and 1971.

In a time dominated by Search and Destroy tactics and General William Westmoreland, the USMC sought alternative means rooted in their Small Wars history and Banana Wars experiences of the early twentieth century. While I do not agree with LtGen. Victor Krulak, that "of all our innovations in Vietnam, none were more successful than CAP," I will concur with British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson's thought that CAP was one of the best ideas seen in Vietnam, though the CORDS Program and Operation Phoenix were undeniably more useful. With 30 years of review, it is now clear that while moderately successful, Combined Action Platoons were utilized in situations where there success was beyond question, or misused in areas where they had little or no hope of success, thus skewing any true study of CAP accomplishments. At its height, 2,200 Marines participated in the program, and claim to have secured 800 hamlets and over 500,000 South Vietnamese nationals. This force represented about 3% of all USMC forces in South Vietnam. CAP missions as defined by LTC William Corson, Director of the Combined Action Program were as follows:

- Destroy the communist infrastructure within the platoon's area of responsibility.
- Protect public security; help maintain law and order.
- Organize local intelligence nets.
- Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the communists.
- Motivate and instill pride, patriotism, and aggressiveness in the militia.
- Conduct training for all members of the combined action platoon in general military subjects, leadership, language, and increase the proficiency of the militia platoon so it could function effectively without the Marines.

Keeping these previous missions in mind, I set out, as others from 3rd Battalion 1st Marines, 2nd Battalion 7th Marines, and 1st Battalion 23rd Marines did as well, to define my own mission essential task list, and establish reasonable expectations. While this may be seen as a "no brainer," setting reasonable expectations appears to be something that we as a society as reflected through public opinion polls and elected civilian leadership are woefully deficient. I wanted to ensure that we were not being asked to accomplish missions when there was no reasonable hope or expectation of satisfying as was the case with many of the Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam. After much thought, the Mission Essential Task List was comprised of the following:

- Create a mortar or rocket belt past which the effects of enemy indirect fires would be negligible.
- Establish security for the locals.
- Engender a feeling of trust in order to establish a spirit of cooperation and gain intelligence.
- Come to be considered locals by the locals.
- Create a positive impression with young males and children of all ages.
- Remain offensive in spirit.

What these really mean are: create and maintain security for coalition personnel, create security for host nationals, collect information and potential intelligence, create a positive presence, remain aggressive, and leave the neighborhood better than you found it. While all the Combined Action Platoons put their own spin on their METL, basically, all came down to security and intelligence. *(Note: Unlike all other CAPs, at this point, we had little interaction with Iraqi Security Forces due to their small numbers, and lack of any presence in our AO. In fact, our first major interaction with the ISF occurred when they detonated a large car bomb against a patrol injuring 4 Marines.)*

3/24 CAP IN IRAQ

On March 25, 2004, 2nd Provisional Rifle Platoon (81mm Mortar Platoon), Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion 24th Marines mounted up in 7 ton trucks, and head out to establish a firm base 6km west of Fallujah. The area was dominated by Albu Issa Tribesman, who numbered 400,000 in the area, and dominated the towns of Fallujah, Ramadi, Habbaniyah, Khalidiyah, and Al Amiriyah. During Saddam's reign, the area had been dominated by Regional Baath Party members and high ranking military officials living in the area. Most of the locals either worked as tile or factory workers in Fallujah, or engaged in subsistence farming and herding. The vast majority, maybe over 60%, had no running water, as most of the pumping stations had long since fallen into disrepair, and were limited to electricity from portable generators scattered throughout local villages. Many reported that they had not had constant electricity or safe drinking water since 1994–1996. While there were several schools in the area, all were adorned with painted slogans such as “God Bless Saddam” and “God Save the

Palestinians.” The only hospital in the area was in Fallujah, which would further aggravate the situation during periods when access to the city was denied to locals. Unlike our Vietnam predecessors, we mixed our CAP, and thus were neither stationary nor purely roving, but a mixture of both. Our AO covered many small town and villages, the largest of which Qaryat al Jaffah sat at a critical intersection and maintained a population of 4000. Approximately 18,000 locals called our area home to include a significant number of Wahhabi Muslims. In the end, this proved very manageable with our small group of 36 Marines and Sailors.

While most locals simply tried to avoid us, once we demonstrated altruistic intentions, they quickly began simply to view us with benign neglect. As we would often say, “they don't screw with us, so we don't screw with them.” While many may disagree with this way of doing business, I had decided that the Iraqis did not need to prove themselves to us, but rather, we had to prove ourselves to them. Thus, not trying to rush the relationship, I decided to take things slowly. While we conducted many checkpoints and hasty and deliberate vehicle stops during this first week amongst the Iraqis, we did everything possible to simply be seen and not heard. While the Iraqis most assuredly did not enjoy being stopped and searched, they soon realized that the process was less intrusive than it could have been made to be, and in the end was also done in a manner consistent with their local and religious customs. We allow women and children to stay in vehicles and out of the sun whenever possible, we NEVER searched females, and searched men away from their families so as not to embarrass them. At the end of this 5 minute process, they would be handed a bottle

of water or two, but asked one of the following questions, who is your sheik, where do you live, what mosque do you attend, who is your imam, where do you work. When stopping and speaking with 1000 people a day, it was not difficult to quickly get a fix on whom the leaders of the area were, what mosques we needed to observe, and what the professional demographics were in our area. Essential to our operations were Iraqi interpreters, for they could easily recognize subtle differences in dialect or accents that were lost to non-native speakers. We called this process “building the white and yellow pages.” We found digital photography and a small laser printer to be invaluable to our campaign of goodwill during this process, for most Iraqis had not photos of their families. For locals we would see everyday, we would take pictures, and then print them out, and return them the following day in a covered sheet for their cooperation. While this may not seem like a big deal, picture taking moments are non stressful moments that afforded us the opportunity to demonstrate our altruism, and share a handshake and smile with potential informants. Many of our best leads came from these periods of portrait taking. As is human nature, people did not want their neighbors to have something they did not, thus sought us out to speak and have a family picture. In the end, this allowed us to “paint the picture” for HHQ as to who the head tribal and religious leaders were in the area, what areas each controlled, which mosques were militant or potential weapons caches, demographics, assess local infrastructure, conduct a semi-accurate census, and locate the individual homes of Imams, Sheiks, and former military personnel. Again, while this may not sound like a large gain or big win, gaining intelligence is one of the keys to combating insurgents. Within 45 days, this process had created an

environment permissive enough to allow/encourage 3 former military members to put their uniforms back on, and drive up to one of our checkpoints to engage in conversation with us directly.

While this initial campaign started out very well, in was done in conjunction with two other operations: 24 hours patrolling and soft knocks. It was essential for us to always provide a presence, but to do so in a manner where none truly every knew where or how many of us were out and about. By adopting the British method of satellite patrolling, we were quickly able to seemingly be everywhere at all times to may of the Iraqis. While we did everything possible to avoid establishing patterns, one thing was made clear, we were going to patrol the main MSRs, thus if you wanted to put an IED along the road, you did so at great risk. Thus the number of IED emplaced along the roads plummeted. Even in those rare occasions when insurgents chose to engage us, it was done at extreme distances, and for short durations. Insurgents quickly realized that if they were going to be effective against us, they would have to progress to the next step of aggressive intimidation of locals, and Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices. During these soft knock operations, it was not uncommon for us to search 75 homes in a single day. We ensured that all witnessed that there was no top or bottom to the “ladder of law,” thus making all equals in the eyes of the coalition. This was critical to our efforts to make common cause with females, elderly persons, and children present during daylight operations.

Everything we did or attempted to do was in accordance with the law and lawful behavior. For example, when we searched a home and

found a weapon or ammunition, so long as it was in accordance with the one Ak-47 rule and 30 rounds of ammunition, we handed these weapons back. Many simply wanted to retain a weapon for reasons of status or personal safety, thus in the end, we often traded weapons we coveted more such as SKS Rifles for AK-47s we had previously captured, in an attempt to further demonstrate our altruism and desire for their safety. On several occasions, we recovered mortar or rocket systems, yet could not determine who they actually belonged. Rather than arrest everyone in a show of absolute power and semi-frustration, we would arrest no one, and simply keep observing the area. While not sanctioned by higher, on several occasions, we arranged a “no arrest” policy, and thus allowed people to turn over contraband to use without fearing arrest or detention. This policy resulted in further intelligence, several light and medium machineguns, and furthered the spirit of cooperation.

SCORECARD

While only utilized from March 25 to June 1, 2004, the following were the accomplishments of 2nd Platoon, also known as ARCHANGEL:

- 3 large weapons caches recovered containing over 1000 artillery, rocket, and mortar rounds utilized for IEDs and Indirect Fire attacks on coalition personnel.
- 29 Improvised Explosive Devices Recovered.
- One 7 man terror cell arrested and sent to detention at Abu Gharib.
- 15 insurgents killed
- Limited indirect fire attacks to 2 in 57 days with no injuries or damage.
- Established contacts with local leaders and provided HA to local Iraqis.
- Provided school supplies and shoes to hundreds of Iraqi children.
- Provided Hundreds of cases of water to local Iraqis.
- Recovered 8 complete mortar systems and 2 multiple rocket launch systems.
- Recovered unknown number of small arms, machineguns, and RPG launchers.
- Ensured the safety of over 4000 coalition personnel and 18000 Iraqis.

LESSONS LEARNED

- First and foremost, we learned not to expect more from the Iraqis than we did from Americans. When reviewing crime statistics, or levels of cooperation in certain inner city neighborhoods in America, we realized that US policemen had little to no reasonable expectation of cooperation, thus we adjusted ours in Iraq accordingly.
- We always remembered that we had to prove ourselves to them, and not the other way around.
- It was essential to remember the hierarchy of needs: subsistence, healthcare, schools, and then inter-personal needs. While handing our school supplies and soccer balls were appreciated, hungry people can't eat those, and in the end, are forced either to sell them or engage in some sort of illegal activity with them to secure food.
- Just as the collection of intelligence is limited only by one's imagination, so is basic assistance. The water table was so high in our AO, that when we destroyed explosives, we often sprung water and even oil wells. I am unclear as to why well digging is not a growth industry in Iraq.
- Always remember that you are being watched and scrutinized, thus every action has second and third order effects.

- Always “ring the doorbell with your elbow.” In other words, have something in your hands to give them.
- The enemy will change and modify his behaviors off of your actions, thus predict what the next act will be, and be on the lookout. If IEDs have become too dangerous to attempt, trust that the next logical step is vehicle bombs or suicide bombings.
- 7 ton trucks are intimidating, just as 18 wheel big-rigs are at times on US highways. Insurgents would see these with troops in the back ready to dismount, and know that they wanted none of it.
- Treat others as you wish to be treated; however, do so in a manner consistent with local and tribal norms. Violence begets violence in the areas we were in, thus when the insurgents attacked us, they fully expected to be hit back. Failure to do so is a sure sign of weakness.
- Fire discipline is essential. On several occasion the Marines were free to engage targets, however, did not for fear of collateral damage. On one occasion, instead of shooting an insurgent who had just mortared us and tried to throw a grenade, the Marines chose not to fire into a residential neighborhood where there was a potential to injure civilians, and create insurgents.
- The little things mean the most. On several occasions, we assisted local farmers round-up a cow or ox that had broken free, and were rewarded we further cooperation.
- Never become too attached to any individual, or become overly trusting. Understand that you are still an invader, regardless of all the good you do. People that appear to be helping you are interested in survival, thus will work with whomever to meet those ends. The local Sheik who

appears to be friendly and cooperative, can secretly be working against you. Trust no one, for you never know if insurgents have intimidated someone into committing an act out of fear for the safety of his family.

- Risk Aversion is CAP’s biggest enemy. At a time when public support remains our critical vulnerability/center of gravity, leaders must not become risk averse. Combined Action Platoons are at a much higher risk of attack than other forces, thus leaders must be prepared to answer the question, “How did 30 Marines get killed all at once?, or Why were 30 Marines living out amongst the Iraqis in a position unsupported by organic fire support?”

CONCLUSION

While not included in the above the list of lessons learned, the most important lesson we learned centered around the revolution of rising expectations. Unfortunately, while we achieved much success in pushing insurgents away from our firm base and providing security for locals and coalition personnel, we unknowingly created rising expectations amongst the locals that we were unable to meet. After feeling safe, locals quickly pointed out that they had no safe drinking water or electricity, and that the hospital in Fallujah was closed. They continuously came to us for help, yet we were unable to meet these higher order needs. Once we left on June 1st, the situation deteriorated slowly at first, and then rapidly once it became clear that US forces would no longer create a permanent presence in the area. Locals who had cooperated with coalition forces were intimidated and murdered, while Iraqi Security Forces who had recently been stood up, struggled to keep their ranks from diminishing through desertions and overall apathy.

Just as in Vietnam, the Combined Action Program worked with some success in Iraq; however has been hampered by a lack of semi-trained and competent Iraqi Security Forces, and a general risk aversion amongst civil and military leaders. In the end, I like many others believe that if utilized in a widespread fashion, 50 Combined Action Platoons could quickly push the insurgents out of Iraq, or back into a position of non-hostile non-compliance.

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Small Wars Events Calendar

To have your Small Wars related event listed with Small Wars Journal online and in SWJ Magazine, see www.smallwarsjournal.com . Listings are free for official government events.

April 2005

19 – 20 April – The RUSI Air Power Conference 2005 (Conference – London, UK). Sponsored by the Royal United Services Institute and Defence Event Management and supported by the Royal Air Force and United States Air Force. The conference will look at the impact of air capabilities across the spectrum of military tasks, from peacetime, through the differing stages of combat, to peace support, stabilization and re-construction.

26 – 28 April – Red Team 2005 Conference (Conference – Albuquerque, NM), Sponsored by Sandia National Laboratories. This government-wide event is focused on discussion of adversarial-based assessments including variants such as VA, risk assessment, and red/blue/green teaming, as applied across the lifecycle of scenarios and systems from concept, R&D, prototype, deployment, and operation, through consideration of physical, cyber, CBRNE, and other threats. Dual themes, “Red teaming for Homeland Security” and “Red Teaming Information Operations,” will be represented in two primary tracks with side sessions, demos, and tours. We are now calling for participation in this forum for sharing and discussion about current events, process, tools, lessons learned, training, and certifications for this field as it is applied to solve a range of current program and analysis issues. If your organization is interested in presenting or exhibiting at this conference, please make contact at the email below. U.S. citizenship and Secret clearance are required to attend. All government assessment and red team organizations and those contractors they sponsor to perform such work are encouraged to attend. Those government organizations that use or are considering use of red teaming as a tool in their programs and missions are encouraged to attend. Send a message to redteam2005@sandia.gov for more information or to request future updates via email.

May 2005

1 – 6 May – Unified Quest 05 (War Game – USAWC Carlisle, PA). Sponsored by the United States Army and United States Joint Forces Command. Annual war game. Unified Quest 05 will examine the early stages of conflict, UQ 06 will examine conflict termination / durable peace. The campaign plans will include political end-states to guide players throughout the entire conflict. UQ 05 game objectives and draft study questions can be found at the TRADOC Unified Quest 05 link above.

16 – 19 May – NDIA International Infantry & Joint Services Small Arms Systems (Symposium – Atlantic City, NJ). Sponsored by NDIA. This symposium is a premier event where the Small Arms Communities come together for technical paper presentations, informational speakers, and exhibits of the hardware used by current and future defense organizations. A firing demonstration is scheduled for Thursday May 19, 2005.

22 – 26 May – Joint Urban Warrior 05 (War Game – Potomac, MD). Sponsored by the United States Marine Corps and United States Joint Forces Command. Annual war game in support of the USMC / JFCOM Joint Urban Warrior Program. The JUW program is focused on: the integration of the full spectrum of advanced operational concepts and approaches, organizational innovations, technologies, and other transformational opportunities in complex urban operations necessary to enhance operational effectiveness in the context of the Three Block War; the critical importance of political end-state planning in shaping the nature of the joint urban campaign; and the critical importance of the stability and support aspects of urban operations.

June 2005

8 – 9 June – Future Combat Vehicles 2005 – Goals, Challenges and Realities in Changing Force Structures (Conference – London, UK). Sponsored by the Royal United Services Institute and Defence Event Management and supported by the Association of the United States Army. A forum for a proactive and productive trans-Atlantic dialogue on future combat vehicle programme developments, this vital conference returns for a fifth year. In 2004, the event featured the head of six armies (US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden). In 2005, the conference will continue to provide the most comprehensive, open forum for discussion and analysis of critical future ground combat vehicle systems, notably the US Future Combat Systems and the UK Future Rapid Effects System programmes. With both these and other programmes reaching crucial points in their development during 2005, this will be the most important and timely Future Combat Vehicles event in the calendar.

21 – 23 June – 73rd MORS Symposium (Symposium – USMA West Point, NY). The MORS Symposium provides a unique opportunity for users of military operations analysis and military analysts to exchange information, examine completed research or analyses in progress, and discuss military topics of interest with colleagues and interested participants alike at the classified level. All services and the civilian sector are represented.

21 – 23 June – Soldier Technology 2005 – (Conference – Brussels, Belgium). Soldier Technology 2005 will provide you with unique access to the key decision-makers, practitioners and customers involved in delivering future dismounted soldier systems. As well as having the opportunity to hear in-depth briefings from Soldier Modernisation programme managers, there will be a specific focus on “Power & Batteries” as well as a greater focus on technology solutions and the showcasing of test results.

28 – 29 June – Force Tracking 2005 – (Conference – Washington, DC). Sponsored by the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement. Fratricide remains a huge concern. There's no other place than at IDGA's Force Tracking event to learn the latest in Blue Force Tracking, the tracking of our own forces and our allies. Finding the enemy has never been more difficult. In urban terrain and with insurgents seeking refuge in border countries, Red Force Tracking is vital. Civilian contractors are playing an unprecedented large role in OIF. Learn how to track them, so they can safely and efficiently do their jobs. Learn what this technology can offer, now and in the future. There will be more speakers and more topics than in 2004. The 2005 program will feature 2 tracks of sessions in the afternoon, allowing you to design your own conference experience and attend sessions that are most valuable to you.

July 2005

4 – 15 July – 2005 International Peace Operations Seminar – (Seminar – Canberra, Australia). Sponsored by the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre. The Seminar runs for two weeks and involves 40 to 50 participants from Australia and overseas. The first week is conducted in Canberra and the second week is at ADFWC, RAAF Williamtown. The Seminar content is adapted annually to reflect the needs of the ADF and current operations. The following topics are indicative of those presented in varying degrees:

- Conflict, conflict prevention and diplomacy
- The United Nations, its evolution, structure and reform
- ADF/Aust Government policy, doctrine and planning for peace operations
- Training and Operations
- Civil/Military Coordination (CIMIC)
- Legal and Humanitarian aspects
- NGO's and other agencies
- Gender and Cultural aspects
- UN Logistic system
- UN Training Assistance Teams (UNTAT)
- Media and operations

Participant rank level is at Major O4 (equivalent) to Lieutenant Colonel O5 (equivalent). The Seminars are designed to be topical, and accordingly the content of some subject areas will remain dynamic. Case Studies are sometimes included to address particular successes or short-comings in current or past UN and multi-national missions. The Seminar's approach is specifically aimed at the strategic planning level.