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BUILDING INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES THAT REFLECT THE REALITIES OF METT-TC

By MAJ Rob Thornton

Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves. By this stage, you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them, and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities, and seek to supplant the insurgent's role.

David Kilcullen
Twenty-Eight Articles
Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

Kilcullen raises the central issue regarding advising and developing foreign security forces. The U.S. provides security assistance to any number of countries around the globe. In the vast majority of those cases our assistance is financial, technical, and logistical. We only place advisors where immediate tactical advice and assistance is needed, usually badly. Building effective indigenous security forces involves more than mustering a set number of troops, providing them weapons, and training them on tactics. Deciding on the correct number of troops is a decidedly complex issue. If you have any doubt about that complexity, look at the debates of the past five years on the size of the U.S. military. Selecting weapons and tactics can be equally challenging. And none of those questions--size, equipment, and methods--can be answered without looking at the issue of threats. This paper discusses the organizational design, functions, and capabilities of security forces in developing and transitioning states to counter threats from enemies whose goals, strategies and tactics oppose long-term security and stability. This is an important question for U.S. security; our own resources are better-spent developing

self-sustaining security capacities in our allies as we face the Long War.

Working as an advisor with the Iraqi Security Forces over the last year made me ask others and myself how we could best help indigenous leaders build something that looks and acts differently from anything we've ever seen? Had we seen it, we would not have been comfortable with it because it would not fit well in our own military culture. How do you as the agency, the command, or the group tasked with this mission exercise the analytical foresight to ensure that the security forces you are helping them build meet the current and emerging threats and needs? These are not rhetorical issues. They are both immediate and long-term. The Long War promises that we will do this more often in a variety of ways in locations around the globe.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES AS A REFERENCE POINT

Iraq offers many variables to the questions raised above. Geographically and culturally the threats differ from province to province, city to

city, and in the case of Baghdad, district to district. Currently the greatest threats are internal but external forces are clearly in play and in the future could dominate security concerns. We have to look for adaptive models both regional and global that offer better templates for developing security forces.

The first challenge is deciding what end state we are seeking in our efforts. We want an Iraqi security force capable of internal defense and regional external defense. And we have to recognize that developing the first is not necessarily a linear path to the second. This means stepping outside our own experiences. For example, we have regular military, reserve military, and National Guard. In the U.S. only the latter can exercise the functions we call internal defense in Iraq. Police functions in the U.S. are just that functions left to law enforcement, not military.

The key point at this stage is to recognize that it is more efficient to develop capacities in the Iraqi security that compliment but do not necessarily replicate Coalition Forces' (CF) capabilities. Consider some of the observations we've used to compare U.S. Forces-driven operations with Iraqi-driven operations concerning the main and alternate supply routes (MSRs/ASRs) versus the population. We want Iraqi capabilities to focus on securing the people not the MSRs/ASRs for CF traffic. CF can secure the MSRs/ASRs. We want the Iraqis to develop a HUMINT capability that is covert and can operate at equal advantage with the enemy. We want the Iraqi forces to patrol more inside the neighborhoods with their uniformed assets. And we want to see the Iraqis execute an information operation (IO) campaign that talks about the real threats and develops common interests with the population. All of this will

assist in defeating the immediate internal threats facing Iraq.

Of course, the Iraqi Army is going to have to at some point transition from internal COIN to regular external threats in a more conventional sense. When that happens, it may not be enough to task the Iraq Police with internal security as state and non-state entities are likely to become an increasing danger and a long-term presence for Iraq. Many states may aid groups like the Mahdi Army, Hezbollah, or Al Qaeda to destabilize or weaken Iraq. Iraq's long term security then may require some type of paramilitary organization on par with the Spanish Guardia Civil or the those forces employed by other states. We must also be careful trying to create general-purpose forces for specialized missions. The U.S. does this, but we also have the resources and institutions to at least prepare our soldiers and marines to be adaptive. Most states we assist will not have the resources to be modular in organization or mission scope; if they did, they would probably not need our assistance in the first place (assuming we are not rebuilding a security force that we had dismantled previously).

THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT

Here are some samples of questions MiTT leaders in Iraq have discussed regarding Iraqi capabilities. In setting the parameters for these discussions we used the following to describe the threat in the current operational environment:

- IEDs,
- Mortars
- Small Arms Fire
- Ambushes
- Precision Small Arms Fire or snipers

- Kidnapping
- Assassination
- Black Market activities
- Other insurgent, terrorist and criminal activities

Is there a need to understand the way the environment impacts the enemy? How does the enemy's actions impact the environment? How do we help develop structure and capabilities that neutralize key environmental advantages for the enemy and maximize them for the security forces?

The enemy's greatest environmental advantage is that he is part of it or at least more so than CF. Enemy actions unchecked reinforce that advantage. Iraqi security forces by moving inside that environment challenge the enemy's previous control. Intelligence is a key factor in making that happen. HUMINT (focused on undercover, covert close target reconnaissance) is a capability that US Forces would be hard pressed to produce. Iraqi forces can. While Iraqis don't have great technological capabilities, their ability to blend in with the populace would allow them to collect information and confirm assumptions US Forces cannot through signals or imagery intelligence.

Is there a need for Iraqi forces to perform every warfighting function in the manner we consider them?

The first question we needed to do was identify strategic context for the nascent Iraqi military. The U.S. strategic context for our armed forces demands expeditionary capabilities and mindset. That paradigm to a large degree drives how we organize, train, and fight. Put simply we--the U.S.--prefer to do our defensive fighting, abroad and on the offensive. The military--excluding somewhat the National Guard--is something we use abroad. The U.S. has an interest in providing Iraq a security force

capable of internal security, especially for the immediate future, and a force capable of defending the country from external enemies, both conventional and unconventional. Internal security forces are capable of meeting an external unconventional force; indeed what we are now engaged in is creating that internal security force. As for meeting an external conventional threat, that will require greater emphasis on conventional maneuver warfare skills. But it is highly doubtful that the U.S. needs to build an Iraqi military based on a power projection, expeditionary mindset.

– Granted that the Iraqi security forces can best develop a HUMINT collection capability suitable for internal defense, where should that capability reside?

What type of organizational structure would support that and at what echelon would it be resident? Internal security has and is traditionally the role of the Ministry of the Interior in Iraq. But the immediate need is at the tactical level. Much of this also depends on how units are arrayed geographically. A unit with habitual responsibility for Mosul for instance would logically want to develop HUMINT collection capabilities.

– Do security forces focused on internal security need a logistics system as we in the US Army understand it, or could it be more fixed with parts of it drawn from the economy and parts from a RSU (Regional Support Unit)?

Wal-Mart Logistics is a term we settled upon to describe the use of the local economy and RSUs to support different echelons. We struggled with and lost valuable time here with the IA trying to establish a logistics system where requests originate at the battalion level, require stamps at the brigade and division then often get rejected or lost when the battalion travels to the RSU to pick up supplies because there is

no division representative present as required. Prior to these requirements being put in place, the battalion could request parts directly from the RSU, travel to the RSU, and pick up their supplies from the RSU without higher echelon oversight. Then US Forces decided that we had to exercise a system that involved all echelons of command, which greatly complicated the system. For forces that operate from fixed sites a majority of the time it may be much more effective and efficient to allow battalions to draw for themselves. Brigade and division headquarters companies should do the same without bureaucratic oversight. Higher echelons don't need to know what lower echelons are ordering because the brigade and division will not be building the parts or supply list – the RSU will. This is why one Wal-Mart store's stocks in one location may be different from another in a different location.

– Is there a need for Mobility/Counter-Mobility/Survivability (M/CM/S) assets within the division or could those capabilities be contracted on the civilian economy? Currently in the Iraqi Army, the division has an engineer company that operates heavy equipment and is responsible for M/CM/S. For a conventional army, this organization makes sense, but what about for an organization focused on internal security? Could it meet its M/CM/S needs by contracting through the local economy, or through the assistance of other government agencies?

– How do you sustain a reasonable amount of patrols out in the area of responsibility (AOR) to secure the public and still retain enough combat power to do other security tasks? Ambushes, over-watches and small kill teams require enough personnel to execute the actual mission, security elements, and a QRF on standby to extract them. Patrols require

sufficient numbers of soldiers and survivable vehicles to ensure that the patrol can succeed if it has to react to new information, or has chance contact. Patrols have been the most critical component of the battalion's security plan because the influence and provide information on the population, disrupt enemy activities and provide flexibility.

The biggest question regarding patrols is selecting the right number. Without good intelligence, the number of patrols, their sizes, and their frequency must be increased. If the security force has good intelligence--either through the population or through its own ability to collect information and do timely analysis--then the number of patrols can be reduced. Valuable resources can be reallocated to other tasks. This is very much a chicken and egg issue. For the population to support the security force with timely information the security force must win the public's support and secure the public against retribution. For the security force to have enough resources to collect and analyze its own information it must dedicate a significant portion of its strength to those tasks, which takes away from its ability to patrol. In the latter it also assumes the requirements and risk of training and resourcing another capability while trying to sustain its pace.

– Why would an explosive ordnance disposal capability be better at say at brigade level than at division level? Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are an asymmetrical fact of life on the battlefield of today and tomorrow. They range in explosive power from purely anti-personnel devices to devices capable of destroying heavy equipment (and crews). They are easy to construct, export, emplace and detonate even as they challenge their targets to detect, defeat and reduce them. They require specialized

equipment and training to neutralize. While a large part of defeating IEDs extends outside of the EOD community (IED awareness, aggressive patrolling, etc), the actual reduction of IEDs belongs in the hands of EOD. Currently the IA has an IED team at the division level. It has proved entirely inadequate because they are too small and too limited to respond to all the IEDs that occur. Even the CF EOD teams are hard pressed to keep up between UXO unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal ranging from dud mortar rounds to rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) to be able to be everywhere when they are needed. For an internal security force a team at the brigade may be best. It balances resource expenditure and against needed capability in a world that will probably only see more IEDs as a tactic of terrorists, criminals and insurgents.

What type of information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) capability would internal security forces need? What would be their functions?

We've seen the need for the special fields within the IA that go with operating in the COIN environment. IO will become an increasingly important component of security operations on the domestic and international arenas. IO is particularly important in maintaining security and stability as the enemy seeks to disrupt government efforts, inflate their own victories and stature, and sow disharmony, bigotry, prejudice, and racism through their own IO campaign to psychologically affect the populace. Security forces must at a minimum be able to counter enemy IO themes (propaganda) and explain their actions and efforts to the public. On the other hand CA is most useful during rebuilding and expeditionary efforts; inside Iraq, local

government would probably take on that function once stability is established.

How does a "low tech" COIN security force share information and intelligence quickly at a reasonable investment? Developing, resourcing, training and implementing an information collection and sharing system that feeds a distributed security force's analytical network could rapidly generate actionable intelligence. that can be targeted by security forces to disrupt enemy activities and detain key leaders for further exploitation. The security force would need network solutions that mirror the conditions in the security environment. It would need an intelligence system that drives maneuver, puts the security force in front of enemy operations and keeps it there.

NETWORK OBJECTIVES

Provide the security force a network that allows for rapid transfer of information for distributed analysis. This would put the "most eyeballs" looking at the most faces so the "analysts" attached to those "eyeballs" can use cell phones, IM or chat to share information on that "face"

Example A: A patrol from Unit X stops 3 men in a flash traffic control point (TCP) on the west side of a river. The patrol leader suspects they are terrorists but does not want to bring them back to the battalion. He takes a cell phone photo of their faces and identification cards and sends them to an address group for the battalion and brigade intelligence and operations sections. The addressees download the photos into their laptop running commercial anti-gang network software. Neither battalion nor brigade can match the photos but they send them to counterparts and division. The division finds a match based on a recent raid in unit Y's AOR. The detainees are brought in for valid reason. the intelligence and

operations sections at Unit X coordinates directly with their counterparts at Unit Y.

Example B: A close target reconnaissance (CTR) cell from Unit X observes a garage owner discussing business with unknown male who arrived in a vehicle matching description of a listed vehicle for TIER 1 personality from nearby city. They send a photo to the battalion intelligence and operations sections. From there it goes via internet to an addressee list that includes other security force units, agencies, and CF in both cities. The suspect's identity is confirmed and a patrol is launched. The CTR team gets further instructions to track several other contacts who are all photographed. As a result, the security forces roll up most of a cell. In detention, that cell gives up leads to other cells.

Make it an Iraqi Solution – buy tech Iraqis are familiar with & come with Arabic features:


- Cell phones are already predominant form of communication in Iraq. NET for cell phones is not required.
- Photo sharing infrastructure is in Mosul, and not cost prohibitive given Intel capability returns.
- Computer skills are minimal. Internet use is primarily email, or IM. The IA has demonstrated those skills.
- Keep it affordable – buy laptops with Arabic keyboards and software in Arabic, buy model of cell phone based on mission – i.e. a patrol leader who takes up close shots of identity cards and “mug” shots does not need as high speed a camera as a undercover scout doing CTR.

Opportunity for growth in scale of network

- Start from ground up so information sharing is ingrained at “grass roots”
- Start expanding from IA battalions and IP stations to IA brigades and CF task forces to IA divisions and CF brigade combat teams to adjacent cities to the Ministry of Defense and major detention facilities and prisons such as Buka..

Example: Unit X detains a man on transporting IEDs. Through network sharing his history reveals dates of previous internment in Buka, known contacts he made there, and case histories of those contacts. Put together this intelligence reveals a sophisticated network that has outside backing and ties to AQ in Iraq

Building a commercial network-like capability into evolving security forces levels the playing field and mirrors many enemy capabilities. Many traditional military networks are ponderous, stove piped, costly and limited. This is one of the reasons the insurgent and terrorist networks are very agile against indigenous forces. The enemy is already using cell phones and the Internet in ways that are both economical and effective. They are representative of an IT-driven world that allows for groups to adapt existing commercial networks for their own uses. They are in effect using the Internet and cell phones much like they use civilian identities and commercial vehicles to blend into the white noise. Indigenous security force design should consider both how the enemy is using commercial networks (cell phones, Internet – IM, Chat, Multi-Player On Line Role Playing Games), email and other WWW resources) and look at ways to counter those enemy capabilities and turn them into vulnerabilities.



DESIGNING AN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE

After considering the Iraqi forces and the questions above in the context of a "re-emerging" state where internal security needs will remain even as it transitions to focus on more conventional external threat, we looked at the requirements for a dedicated internal security force. We considered how an internal security force might be organized and "who" at

which level might do "what". This is a key question in Iraq's future; the transition from COIN to more conventional defense is we assumed inevitable. Paramilitary internal security missions will remain. Just as we have learned, Iraq's conventional units cannot do everything for everyone at every level. Some units will have to specialize and indeed some specialized functions--like HUMINT collection--will have to be emphasized. Tracking that one capability helped us make determine where the

other capabilities needed to be to allow different echelons to achieve their missions.

THE COMPANIES IN A SECURITY FORCE BATTALION

Given that the basis of internal security is local, we started at the level of implementation for that security, the lowest level that would include all capabilities needed for local, internal security. With that as our framework, we saw the basis for an internal security force would be a security force battalion. Much of this is based on the challenges we've seen from the environment and from observations about indigenous challenges to an organization. As you read, you might find easy comparisons with like units in our own organizations based on size or echelon, In some cases it was more helpful to use different names for a particular type of unit to distinguish it from our own terminology. An organizational chart (fig 1) can be referred to during an outline of the brief descriptions below to discuss capabilities:

The close target reconnaissance company (CTR). The CTR company provides covert CTR of population, suspects, target areas, and other people, places, and things to collect relevant information, provide alert reports to battalion headquarters and patrols. The CTR company disrupts enemy activity through its active collection and passively as a threat to the enemy's operational security. It works closely with the security force battalion intelligence section.

The basic unit in the CTR company is a "cell" consisting of four plainclothes, undercover operatives. These men may work mounted or dismounted. They live on the economy and use commercial technologies that blend in with the operating environment. Relaxed grooming

standards and other characteristics that allow them to blend in are the norm. Two cells together constitute a "team". Team structures and missions are task organized according to mission. One cell in a team might be the collection effort while the other is support and security element. The support cell is armed with assault rifles, communications, and other special equipment to secure the collection cell doing HUMINT collection. Cells would operate out of flats/apartments and drive common cars. In Iraq that is the Opal. Four teams make a platoon. There are four platoons per CTR company. Operational cycles of these teams are set to ensure cell members have the opportunity to refit, conduct sustainment training, and to avoid burn out on a very difficult job. A CTR company should be able to sustain operations with 4 to 8 teams out in the AOR depending on the scope of the current threat as provided by higher, and the flow of intelligence driven operations.

The patrol company. Patrol companies conduct mounted and dismounted patrols in sufficient number and size to overmatch threats identified by the CTR company, hotline tips, higher headquarters, or by chance. The patrol companies are also responsible for crowd management and riot control as necessary. These patrol companies can augment the raid platoon from the special service company for missions such as inner and outer cordon during a raid.

Basic unit in the patrol company is a "car" with a driver, a vehicle commander (VC), a gunner, and two dismountable soldiers. Three cars make a "patrol"; the patrol is the smallest unit to conduct operations. Three patrols equal a "platoon". Four platoons equal a company. A company would have four patrols out at any one time. Shifts and patrol schedules would




FIG 1: A *conceptual organization discussion* about how the companies in a BN might be laid out in terms of composition and roles.

alternate, but would overlap with enough time to allow the outgoing patrol to do a battle handover with the oncoming patrol. Here the Iraqis have reorganized themselves into similar patrol units with three 1025 Level II HMMWVs or Land Rover armored cars. Any armored type patrol car with a crew served weapon would suffice.

The fixed site security company. The fixed site security company provides site security for

important events, over watches Tier 1 IED sites or other named/targeted area of interest where enemy activity is likely in the next 24 hours. If provided necessary support these outposts can be sustained for periods longer than 24 hours.

The special services company. The special services company provides direct action and protective services capabilities. It has two raid platoons and a single very important person

(VIP) security platoon. A technical support platoon completes its structure.

- A raid platoon has two 14-man entry squads organized into three 4-man teams, a heavy weapons squad, and a sniper squad. Each entry squad has a 4-man breach element and two 4-man clearing teams, a squad leader and assistant squad leader. Each heavy weapons squad has two 3-man machine gun teams and a squad leader. A sniper squad consists of three 3-man sniper teams and a sniper squad leader. The platoon vehicles are larger and more capable than those of the patrol company, along the lines of a wheeled APC/ICV like Stryker or the Buffalo.
- The VIP security platoon in the special services company might consist of three teams organized into a "detail". Two of the teams would use armored sport utility vehicles (SUVs); one of them would use an armored sedan. There would be two details in the platoon. This platoon would provide security for VIPs or identified targets such as likely kidnap victims or civilians potentially targeted for assassination due to their role or remarks. This platoon could also cover events in the area such as rallies or ceremonies where visiting VIPs might be targeted. Details would need to be able to work in both uniforms and civilian clothes depending on the mission and would use a variety of protection service weaponry.
- The special support platoon in the special services company would be there to cover special technical support such as video, communications, computer, surveillance, etc.

THE SECURITY FORCE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF

The structure of the security force battalion headquarters and staff is not about providing command and control (C2) for maneuver elements. The headquarters does provide C2 but more as a static element in charge of semi-static entities, the companies underneath it. With that in mind, we saw the battalion headquarters oriented toward providing technical and analytical support, synchronization operations, and providing resources and administrative support. With its heavy emphasis on HUMINT in the companies, the battalion's operations and intelligence section under a major or lieutenant colonel would provide technical and analytical support in five 6-man field teams. The teams would analyze information, investigate incidents, and develop targets for exploitation. Each team would have one officer and five NCOs with experience in the line companies. They would act as detective "cells". Their goals would be:

- Establish linkages and target specific activities
- Develop target packages that can be refined through collection by the CTR companies and analyzed for action by the special services company.
- Follow through on captured criminals, terrorists, and insurgents. Support their effective prosecution by overseeing and assembling evidence files, witness lists, and other measures,

The synchronization would come from shifts similar to the way law enforcement commands provide information and direction to units on patrol in the field. The resourcing would come from other sections of the staff that might even

be composed of civilians. Shifts would be staffed with a captain, two lieutenants, and eight sergeants as in a western police force in a large city. They would battle track patrol company elements, dispatch patrols and other elements, and coordinate with brigade and other area offices. They would also disseminate information to patrols and cells as necessary. The goal is to provide the support for a long-term (think decades) area security force that resolves problems quickly by facilitating the

development of information into intelligence that can be exploited. The remaining sections of the battalion headquarters would deal with the expected functions of personnel administration, supply, and communications.

THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND STAFFS

The brigade headquarters and staff--like its subordinate internal security force battalions--is neither designed nor intended to C2




FIG 2. The BN HQs and Staff is heavy on investigative and analysis capability.

maneuvering subordinate battalions. It is focused on facilitating coordination of activities between local government offices; providing technical support to help the battalion field teams focus on physical development of evidence; supporting sustainment type training, and providing an EOD capability.

The heart of the brigade staff is its operations and intelligence section. This section is to connect subordinate battalion operations and intelligence sections to local and national agencies. The section has a large cell of analysts to answer requests for information from the battalions and to track information requests into higher and local agencies. The analyst cell could maintain limited case history and suspect files. The operations and intelligence cell would also handle liaison functions with judicial and penal agencies. It would operate the brigade consolidated training facility for weapons training, classroom instruction of all types, and annual recertification. The brigade operations and intelligence section would have no detention capability; all detainee functions are retained at the division. The brigade operation and intelligence section has an EOD cell capable of dispatching three teams at once. The logistics section is responsible for supporting the brigade headquarters only through the regional support unit. It does not have the functions of a U.S. S4 shop; it does not approve or disapprove battalion level contracts. The communications section provides communications for the headquarters and integrates those communications throughout the brigade area.

THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF

The internal security force division has no C2 function with regards to maneuver. The

division functions as a central hub for certain resources most efficiently used in a centralized fashion. Like its subordinate commands, the division is centered on the operations and intelligence section. The operations and intelligence section at division performs all internal investigations on soldiers below it because at two levels up the division investigations would be objective. The operations and intelligence section operates a major crime laboratory, allowing it access to other national and perhaps international assets. The division operations and intelligence section handles inter-agency coordination at the regional and national level. As such, it is a principle hub for intelligence sharing among its brigades and battalions as well as other agencies and elements. The division would also operate the only detention facility in its area for short-term internment prior to going to trial, or being brought in for questioning. The division develops information operations that counter enemy propaganda and push forward the government's messages. Finally the division is the training institution for its region, operating basic training, specialty schools, and secondary service schools.

CONCLUSION

Returning to Kilcullen's point on building security forces we--the U.S. military charged with building a new Iraqi military--went through the mental odyssey inherent in working across radically different cultures. We built those forces based on our own comfort zone and knowledge base. And because we recognized that we had limited time to do so. Put another way we had to do something about the swamp even as we were hunting alligators.

Like other critical areas in the COIN fight, there was much we did not know and much that

was unexpected. For most of us, developing anything else besides a force that mirrored our own was too much of a leap beyond our own experiences. Remember we were asking ourselves the questions in the first part of this paper about the Iraqi military even as we fought common enemies with them. Not a small part of that fight was bridging the understanding canyon between coalition forces and the Iraqis. We made mistakes and we contributed to mistakes made by the Iraqis. Trained on U.S. tactics, the Iraqis tried to execute only to fail because they lacked some of the technology and training that facilitate those tactics.


All experiences--good or bad--offer lessons to those astute enough to recognize them. We learned lessons. Key for us was the realization that training the Iraqis to maximize their strengths could offset standing coalition force weaknesses. Now that Iraqi Army units are doing their transfers of authority) and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command has assumed the lead, Iraqi units are starting to adjust their TTPs and organizational structure into something that acknowledges strengths and weaknesses. It is working.

That does not mean the advisory mission is anywhere near complete. At some stage, the Iraqi Army (or portions thereof) still has to transition from an internal to an external threat. The Iraqi Police while growing stronger may not have the right organizational structure to combat repeated insurgency or major terrorist movements. In working through these issues we came to see that a capabilities gap will exist for at least the next five years.

Filling that gap has to be the next step of the advisory effort, one taken before the Iraqi Army can begin to shift toward an external threat. In offering a possible blueprint for an

Iraqi internal security force built on paramilitary battalions, brigades, and divisions, we suggested an approach to bridging the internal security cap between the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police as they are now configured.

Rob Thornton currently serves as a Major in the US Army in Strategic Plans & Policy field enroute to an assignment at the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth. He has recently served as an advisor to an Iraqi Infantry BN in Mosul Iraq. Prior to that he has held various command and staff positions as an Infantry officer.



03/31/07 - An Iraqi police officer takes a break in Baqubah, Iraq, March 31, 2007, during a joint operation with U.S. Army Soldiers from 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. The purpose of the operation is to clear houses and palm groves of insurgents near the Diyala River. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall) (Released)