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TITLE:

The Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars - Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms?

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Executive Summary

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Thesis: Although written in the first half of the 20th century, the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars provide keen insight into the conduct of small wars. Hence, both are highly relevant to the 21st century.

Discussion: Today, illegal immigration, international crime, weapons and drug proliferation, and Islamic totalitarianism threaten the United States' national interests at home and abroad. In this environment, military professionals are looking for previous experiences for insight to successfully engaging these irregular threats. The U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars are receiving unprecedented attention. Small Wars, first published in 1896, and the Small Wars Manual, produced in 1940, were minor classics in their time, but are these two texts relevant to 21st century confrontations?

Looking across the warfighting functions or battlefield operating systems, one can readily see that elements of Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars and the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual are either being employed or have potential for employment in recent or current small wars. These works provide proven methods for organizing the unconventional battlefield, offensively bringing an elusive enemy to battle, effectively disarming the population, successfully establishing a native force, and much more. Wise military professionals, who realize that historically they are more likely to be charged with the arduous task of fighting in a small war than with the conventional conflict, will seek guidance from the many lessons learned that are encapsulated in these two classics.

More than advocating professional study of the Small Wars Manual and Callwell's Small Wars, this paper also identifies elements of modern small wars that are not adequately reflected in these writings. Technology, globalization, changes in world demographics, and the complexities of civil-military affairs have altered the nature of small wars. **Appendix A - Elements of Modern Small Wars That Are Not in These Writings** broadly identifies areas where the utility of these documents is lacking. It provides the reader with considerations for future professional study, writing, and discourse.

Conclusion: The American and European armies gained a plethora of valuable lessons in their collective experience in small wars during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The wisdom found in the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars compels military professionals to seek guidance from these masterpieces and thus acquire a greater understanding of how to approach contemporary irregular conflicts. More than period pieces, they are essential elements to 21st century contemporary, professional military study and discussion. Collectively, they form a sound foundation for understanding effective means for prosecuting "small wars".

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Preface

A variety of factors combine to make the topic of “small wars” highly relevant to the military professional of the 21st century. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic increase in world globalization during the final years of the 20th century, the United States’ involvement in small wars was inevitable if not predictable. The United States’ overwhelming triumph over a formidable Iraqi foe during Operation Desert Storm convinced America’s watchful enemies of the folly of directly engaging the military might of U.S. forces. Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 was a watershed event that compelled the United States to embark upon a path of conflict that will undoubtedly characterize the military’s activity for the foreseeable future. The subsequent offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing efforts to “win the peace” in those chaos-stricken lands and other Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) engagements have increased American military interest in small wars.

United States involvement in unconventional conflicts is not confined to the first part of the 21st century. A cursory review of our nation’s history highlights the United States’ propensity to be involved in small wars more frequently than major conventional conflicts. Similarly, an examination of military expeditions by Western powers in general emphasizes the importance of such “irregular” conflicts. Yet, these oft-common unconventional conflicts generally receive less U.S. military institutional attention in education, training, and exercises. The tendency is to gravitate toward more consistent and predictable conventional conflicts because they are easier to conceptualize, study, and master. Such wars are relatively short, have clear goals, and obvious starting and ending points. In contrast, small wars tend to garner less public support because the national interests that they are fought to protect are often less apparent, they often drag on for many years, and their origins and conclusions are less finite. In

spite of their complexity and lack of glamour, military professionals neglect the study of small wars at their own peril.

In the context of today's national defense priorities, Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars and the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual are receiving unprecedented attention. Small Wars, first published in 1896, and the Small Wars Manual, the final edition in 1940, were minor classics in their time and are still two of the foremost works on the topic. Many associated with the profession of arms are dusting-off these works from antiquity in search of experiences that can give us an edge in these "dirty little wars". The significance of each of these works was eclipsed by two world wars and they remained obscure as military professionals and intellectuals turned their focus to the challenges of the Cold War. However, the issue now can be addressed: Are these two texts relevant to 21st century confrontations?

In this paper I postulate that these publications are more than "period pieces". Rather, they are indeed highly relevant to the complex and contemporary examination of small wars. By identifying select doctrinal innovations outlined in these literary efforts, I draw attention to insights garnered through the colonial powers' experiences in the 19th century and the United States Marine Corps' small war experiences in the Caribbean and Central America during the Interwar years. Because both of these works are comprehensive in their assessment of the topic, I evaluate their contributions to the study of small war doctrinal innovations across the warfighting functions or battlefield operating systems of command and control, maneuver, fires and information operations, force protection, intelligence, and logistics. By demonstrating that elements of these publications are either being employed or have potential for employment in recent or current small wars, I confirm their validity in modern, professional military study and discourse. I draw upon my own experience in Operation Enduring Freedom -Philippines (OEF-

P) and Operation Iraqi Freedom II-2 (OIF II-2) and those of other military professionals who have documented their experiences in small wars since the end of the Cold War. My hope is this paper will further compel military professionals who are charged with the arduous task of conducting small wars to seek guidance from these masterpieces of old.

More than advocating professional study of the Small Wars Manual and Callwell's Small Wars, this paper also identifies elements of modern small wars that are not adequately reflected in these writings. Both documents reflect the eras in which they were written. Technology, world globalization, changes in demographics, and the complexities of civil-military affairs have altered the nature of small wars. By broadly identifying areas where the utility of these documents is lacking in **Appendix A - Elements of Modern Small Wars That Are Not in These Writings**, perhaps this paper will be the impetus that compels a military professional to produce a practical "how-to guide", similar to Callwell's Small Wars. A literary work that is firmly rooted in recent small war experience and reflects the contemporary elements of these types of military engagements would be most helpful to the military community that is often charged with and plunged into these unconventional conflicts. Perhaps some of the issues I present in Appendix A will be incorporated in the writing of the supplement to the Small Wars Manual presently in progress during this academic year (2005-06). More than anything else, identification of areas not covered by these documents provides the reader with suggestions for future study.

The study of this topic has been enjoyable and of tremendous value to my professional knowledge and understanding of the complexity and proven methods of conducting small wars. To the degree that I have been able to impart that value to the reader, I am indebted to a host of "supporting characters". First, I owe an eternal debt of gratitude to God who has given me "all

things that pertain to life and godliness” (II Peter 1:2-4). Secondly, this work and other such humble accomplishments would not be possible without the unfailing support, patience, and love of my wife, Amber, and our understanding boys, Trey and Reagan. Finally, and certainly not lastly, I am indebted to Doctor Donald F. Bittner, my civilian faculty advisor, who provided me sound counsel and guidance in the writing of this paper. His efforts, in particular, in guiding me in transforming a “great idea” into a manageable topic for an academic paper were most helpful. Perhaps the greatest honor that can be bestowed upon a graduate of the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College is to be referenced with pride by Dr. Bittner as “one of your predecessors,” to subsequent classes. Maybe by his patient guidance, I have earned that honor.

Note to the Reader

The types of conflicts addressed in this paper have been referred to in many ways over the decades. They have been known as unconventional warfare, low intensity conflicts (LIC), military operations other than war (MOOTW), guerrilla warfare, and other similar designations. Today, irregular warfare has become the phrase of choice. While the reader may encounter allusions to several of these designations in the paper, the term “small wars” is used most frequently for it is the term used by Colonel Callwell and the writers of the Small Wars Manual.

INTRODUCTION

Brief Introduction to the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars

The United States Marine Corps' final edition of the Small Wars Manual was published in 1940 as a compilation of lessons learned from that service's vast experience in conducting counterinsurgencies and peacekeeping operations primarily in Central America and the Caribbean during the period between the world wars. Today, it is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information, but is not doctrine.¹ Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars, which first appeared in 1896, is an analysis of imperial conflicts in the 19th century. In addition to his almost encyclopedic knowledge of colonial campaigns, Callwell, who was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1878, incorporated his personal experience in the Afghan War of 1880, the first Boer War (1880-1881), the Turko-Greek War of 1897, and the South African War (the second Boer War, 1899-1902) in the third and latest edition of Small Wars.² See **Appendix B– History of Small Wars & the Small Wars Manual** for additional information.

Small Wars Defined

The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars do not characterize conflicts as small wars based upon the size of the forces participating in them, the extent of their theater of operations, or their cost in property, money, or lives. The essence of a small war is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its inception and conduct, the character of either one or all of the opposing forces as irregular forces, and the nature of the operations themselves. Small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate national power.³ See **Appendix C – Small Wars Definitions** for the definition of *small wars* as provided by the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars and the encompassed definitions of *military operations other than war (MOOTW)* and *low intensity conflict (LIC)* as provided by other authoritative references.

Uniqueness of Small Wars

Colonel Callwell and the authors of the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual emphasize the uniqueness and complexity of small wars by contrasting them with conventional conflicts. The Small Wars Manual reminds the reader that although the immutable principles of war remain the basis of these

operations, tremendous ingenuity is required in the application of these principles in small wars. As regular war never exactly takes the exact same form as previous conflicts, so, even to a greater degree, is each small war different from any conflict that precedes or follows a specific one; thus, the trap of fixating on stale and predictable tactics and techniques must be avoided.⁴ In Small Wars, Colonel Callwell draws significant contrasts between the objectives of small wars and conventional campaigns. In the former, the defeat of a hostile army is not necessarily the primary objective, even if such a force exists. Moral effect in small wars is often more important than material success. Operational objectives are often so limited that they defy the principles of warfare.⁵

Purpose and Approach of Paper

Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars and the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual are classics of their time that provide utility to American serviceman charged with fighting irregular wars. This paper will use the warfighting functions or battlefield operating systems as the construct for identifying some of the many elements of these publications that are relevant to the conduct of small wars today. By reviewing some of the lessons learned by the colonial powers during the 19th century and the United States Marine Corps in its campaigns during the Interwar Period, valuable insight can be acquired into proven tactics and techniques for fighting small wars and the appetite for further study of these works will be whetted. While it is folly to expect current or future small wars to mirror previous conflicts, many of the lessons learned from successes and failures in previous small wars have utility today.

RELEVANCY OF THESE LITERARY WORKS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COMMAND AND CONTROL

Requirement for Commanders to be Decisive

Even more so than conventional conflicts, Callwell asserts small wars are inherently shrouded in uncertainty. There is almost always doubt as to the fighting strength and quality of the enemy. Furthermore, it is always doubtful as to the degree and level of support the population will provide the enemy. The counterinsurgency in Iraq exemplifies these truisms. The Small Wars Manual poignantly states:

Small wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.⁶

In environments like these, it is no wonder Small Wars identifies *indecisiveness in the commander over uncertainty as the primary reason well planned campaigns in fail.*⁷

Right-Sizing the Staff

A force, irrespective of its size, engaged in small wars is usually independently or semi-independently responsible for tactical, operational, and even strategic tasks in a vast area of operations (AO). Given the rapid and complex nature of small wars, the Small Wars Manual emphasizes that the need for a robust staff to conduct comprehensive planning must be balanced against the requirement to provide subordinates clear guidance and sufficient latitude and authorization to oversee the execution of the mission.⁸

In January 2002, Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) deployed under the command of Brigadier General Donald Wurster to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their longstanding effort to defeat the Al Qaidi-linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Designated as Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) and conducted on the islands of Zamboanga and Basilan, JTF 510's operation initially entailed only 160 personnel in the field, later increased to 1,200. Although constrained by a force cap, the JTF sustained a hearty staff of 500 personnel to provide multi-faceted support to those charged with the accomplishment of this operation.⁹ *Because units assigned to small wars typically exercise broad spans of control and must pursue multi-faceted approaches to resolve complex civil and military challenges, hearty staffs are the norm. However, these large, but capable, staffs must be used to enable and not micromanage subordinates in the field, for ultimately units in the field are the ones who will secure victory for the force.*

Organizing the Battlefield for Success

Colonel Callwell stresses the importance of a beginning with a clear and determinate objective in small wars.¹⁰ In terminology that is reminiscent of conducting an enemy center of gravity (COG) analysis in today's military vernacular, Callwell quotes Lord Wolseley, the famed British field marshal of the South

African War, who said “your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion.”¹¹ ***Today, forces conducting small wars establish a viable campaign objective and plan when they correctly identify and devise an approach to directly or indirectly eliminate the enemy’s source of strength.***

Small wars are often characterized by guerrilla warfare, where the enemy repeatedly attacks with a small force in hope of achieving surprise and retreating before a decisive engagement can occur. Based upon Callwell’s vast experience and study of small wars, a commander who has organized his force to rapidly and effectively respond to fleeting opportunities and is resolute enough to do so brings a successful conclusion to the campaign.¹² The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars assert small wars are successfully prosecuted when regimental or battalion-sized units are given administrative and tactical responsibility for areas that correspond to the political subdivisions of the country.¹³ By establishing advanced posts in these areas and employing mobile or flying columns to project military power from bases of operation and supply into the interior of the country, the enemy can be systematically defeated, security can be restored, and enemy resources can be eliminated.¹⁴ Undoubtedly, the insurgency in Iraq would not be as virulent as it is today had U.S. forces planned and organized to swiftly defeat the small bands of armed resisters and looters that created chaos immediately after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.

Command and Control Functions Unique to Small Wars

Depending upon the character of a small war, intervening forces may be required to perform tasks that are unconventional and largely unfamiliar. The Small Wars Manual addresses three of these oft-common characteristics in detail: working alongside or establishing an armed native force, establishing an interim military government, and supervising elections.

Because the establishment of an efficient and well-trained native armed force, free from dictatorial control, is often a prerequisite for withdrawal in a small war, the Small Wars Manual outlines proven methods for planning, recruiting, and organizing constabulary forces for the purpose of assuming national military, organized reserve, and police responsibilities.¹⁵ The ability of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to

recognize the cultural and language nuances of foreign fighters routinely validates the role native forces play in restoring security to troubled countries.

In instances where the government is deposed, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, or merely ineffective, it may be necessary for an occupying force to establish an interim military government. While performing government functions at the local, provincial, or national level is a task that military professionals might find awkward, it is not uncommon for forces serving in small wars to have this significant responsibility. Guidance regarding the organization and functionality of law enforcement, public services and utilities, courts, commerce, and collection of public revenues is found in the Small Wars Manual.¹⁶

In operations where the establishment of a military government is necessary, as soon as practical U.S. efforts should shift toward the supervision of elections to rapidly transition authority to a popularly elected government. The Small Wars Manual recommends the employment of local civilians in this process to avoid the perception of undue U.S. military influence and to ensure language requirements are met. The manual also discusses the requirement to plan for security and the prevention of voter intimidation. The Small Wars Manual even provides guidance on voter registration and the process now made familiar by elections in Iraq of having voters dip their fingers in fluid stain to prevent multiple voting.¹⁷

Maneuver

Offense – Bringing the Enemy to Battle

Callwell's assesses that the enemy in small wars inherently has the strategic advantage. This is because they generally operate in small formations, strike, and then quickly disperse. Such a foe is typically not dependent upon formal lines of communication or static command and control nodes. On the other hand, regular forces often have the tactical advantage, because they are usually better equipped, trained, and organized than the enemy.¹⁸ Realizing the disparity between the occupying force's tactical capability and his own, the unconventional force will usually adopt a guerrilla strategy to attrite and harass the intervening force in a prolonged conflict with the ultimate goal of causing the intervening force to lose its military or political will to continue to aggressively prosecute the campaign.¹⁹ *Because of these innate*

*truths, regular forces should strive to bring irregular forces to battle as often and as decisively as possible by rapid movement and attack.*²⁰ Given the inherent difficulty in bringing the enemy to battle, Colonel Callwell insists the enemy should be destroyed with an enveloping attack or vigorous pursuit that cuts off his line of retreat. This entails more than simply defeating him.²¹ Small Wars identifies several tactics focused upon the historically effective principals of surprise and deception to bring the foe to decisive battle.²² Small Wars heralds raids as an effective application of surprise to rapidly and unexpectedly strike known enemy locations.²³ The Small Wars Manual outlines methods for rooting out known or possible enemy in houses, categorized as cordon and knock, or cordon and attack, missions in today's military terminology.²⁴

Callwell advocates the use of feints to draw the enemy into combat.²⁵ In the weeks leading up to Operation AL FAJR, the assault to liberate the city of Fallujah, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) employed this tactic on several occasions to attrite the enemy's forces and gain valuable intelligence regarding his defense of the city. Small Wars also suggests the Sun Tzu approach of enticing the enemy into open ground with a force that appears to be numerically inferior.²⁶ Likewise, feigning retreat or indecision could be enough to bring the enemy to action or cause him to attempt to defend an undefendable position. These deceptive tactics, coupled with an aggressively planned ambush, have the potential to obliterate the enemy's force and degrade his will to resist further.²⁷

In emphasizing the importance of bringing the enemy to decisive action, Callwell provides a stern warning to avoid desultory action, as it is only likely to harden the enemy's resolve and damage the conventional force's perception in the eyes of the eminent populace.²⁸ In April 2004, the United States' decision to attack insurgents in Fallujah, Iraq, in response to the brutal killing of four Blackwater USA security contractors, and then the subsequent cancellation of the operation is a contemporary violation of this wise warning. Because of this lack of political commitment, I MEF faced an enemy in November that year whose defenses and resolve had been hardened and who had expelled most of the city's uncooperative citizens.

Defense – Active Versus Passive

Both the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars concede it may be nearly impossible at times to bring the enemy to action; however, the principle of offense must be pursued as long as there is armed resistance.²⁹ *Patrolling to deny the enemy key terrain and freedom of movement, generally regarded as a component of active defenses, may be the only effective form of offensive action open to the commander.* Passive defenses that merely guard key infrastructure will engender confidence in guerrilla forces and create the impression among the indigenous population that intervening forces are inferior to him. The enemy's opposition to the intervening force will increase to alarming levels as a passive defense aids his recruitment efforts and the people are encouraged to provide him tacit, if not active, support. Patrolling demonstrates an active and vigilant security presence that reassures the citizenry and dissuades the enemy. When defending key infrastructure, defensive forces must remain vigilant against enemy ruses and stratagems by creating heightened expectations among the troops through regularly rehearsed immediate action drills.³⁰

Fires / IO

Artillery

The Small Wars Manual points out that the function of artillery in small wars is virtually the same as in conventional conflicts.³¹ Small Wars makes a minor but important distinction in the use of artillery in these unconventional engagements by emphasizing the need for artillery units to have increased mobility due to the often-encountered difficult terrain in small war theaters and the increased mobility of infantry units they are supporting.³²

Aviation

The Small Wars Manual notes that air opposition is usually non-existent or negligible in small wars; also, that long-range bombers usually lack substantial targets. The manual accounts for the obvious exception of hardened enemy holdouts,³³ like the Tora Bora caves of Afghanistan. Building or upgrading airfields will often be required due to the inherent limitations of theaters where small wars are fought,³⁴ as

exemplified by the preparatory efforts made in the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. *Ultimately, air reconnaissance, close air support, and air transportation are the key aviation tasks in small wars.*

Due to the advisability of operating in multiple, small patrols, the number of reconnaissance aircraft required in small wars is twice that for conventional operations.³⁵ When conducting aerial reconnaissance, intervening forces must be prepared to rapidly respond to fleeting opportunities by attacking the enemy when he is most vulnerable.³⁶ This requirement also necessitates consideration of equipping reconnaissance aircraft for kinetic action, as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Afghanistan. With regards to close air support, the employment of small strike forces, usually consisting of only three or four aircraft, typifies small wars.³⁷ Air transportation of supplies and troops is a major consideration in small wars because of the enemy's frequent targeting and general lack of railroads, improved motor roads, and navigable waterways in austere locations where small wars are generally fought.³⁸ The significant improvised explosive device (IED) threat in Iraq ensures personnel are more frequently moved about the theater via helicopter than motorized convoys. The increased speed, range, payload, and acceleration and deceleration capability of the MV-22 Osprey will likely ensure the future viability of air transportation for Marine forces in small wars.

Information Operations (IO)

Neither the Small Wars Manual nor Small Wars address information operations in the context of a coordinated plan or as a planned function. However, they both consistently discuss the importance of influencing the enemy to cease resistance and acquiring population support, explicitly or tacitly, of friendly efforts. Small Wars emphasizes the importance of the moral versus the physical defeat of the enemy in unconventional wars in particular. By example, Callwell says overawing of the enemy is the goal in putting down rebellions.³⁹ Likewise, both encourage the use of misinformation to deceive and surprise the enemy. Callwell writes that the enemy is often vulnerable to misinformation because of his intrinsic reliance on human intelligence.⁴⁰ He also insists that many within the enemy's ranks can be persuaded to

lay down their arms and not fight if they are convinced the occupying force is aggressive and resolute in its action and their reasons for fighting are being remedied.⁴¹ The Small Wars Manual recommends the employment of local guides, interpreters, prominent indigenous civilians, and native troops in small wars for their inherent capabilities and for the positive message of support to the friendly cause their association communicates, which also raises the issue of protection.⁴²

Force Protection

Lines of Communication

Small Wars perceptively notes that lines of communication (LOCs) are usually longer and more exposed to enemy action in small wars than in more linear conventional operations.⁴³ Because convoys of regular troops in small wars are susceptible to attack from any direction, the enemy should be denied all terrain from which he may inflict losses upon the column thus allowing friendly forces the advantage offered by their superior armament and accuracy of fire.⁴⁴

Lines of communication in small wars are difficult to protect without a large commitment of additional forces due to the non-linear characteristic of the battlefield.⁴⁵ In fact, Callwell notes several examples where the number of forces protecting LOCs equated to or exceeded the number of troops designated for offensive action. For this reason, he recommends employing the aforementioned lightly supplied and self-sufficient flying columns between intermittently established bases. *By minimizing the number of bases, which can serve as points of refuge and resupply but also become targets for the enemy, the majority of forces can be dedicated to bringing the enemy to decisive action.*⁴⁶

When flying columns deploy to execute an opportune attack, supporting forces can use hastily constructed defenses, termed laagers and zeribas, to protect the forces' impedimenta. Laagers, which use the forces vehicles or other equipment to form a hastily prepared defense, and zeribas, which use abattis or other natural materials, provide minimal protection against fire and significant protection against enemy shock action.⁴⁷ Modern material and equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and even concertina wire and sandbags, can further improve the protection afforded by these expedient defenses.

Population Disarmament

The Small Wars Manual identifies population disarmament as the most vital step in the restoration of tranquility. It inherently involves the responsibility to provide security for the indigenous people who have been disarmed and implies the presence of the arbiter's forces in sufficient numbers to guarantee safety. Considerable thought and planning must be given to developing procedures for collecting, storing or destroying, and accounting for acquired munitions. Following voluntary disarmament, often encouraged by financial compensation, occupation or native military forces or military or local police should confiscate clandestinely held arms.⁴⁸

Because peaceful and law abiding citizens may be armed, the greatest tact and diplomacy should be exhibited in disarming the population. In some cases, tools necessary for citizens' livelihood might be exempted, for example shotguns for hunting small game and scythes for farming. Requests for retention of such items must be based upon the seriousness of the security situation, the validity of the request to retain weapons, and the character of the individual making it.⁴⁹ Thus, overzealous disarmament must be avoided. Concessions must be made to ensure the populace's cooperation, but obedience to wise laws and regulations.⁵⁰ Also, special consideration may have to be made to permit locals to protect themselves in remote areas. In fact, the intervening force's plan may involve arming reliable citizens in remote areas where the lawless operate in great numbers.⁵¹ Aggressive and well-planned enforcement of an ordinance restricting the possession of arms will not affect active guerrillas, but can eliminate sources of supply and replenishment within the country. ***Disarmament efforts must be done in concert with border control to prevent rearming from without the country. This cannot be effectively accomplished without an adequately manned, equipped, and trained coast guard and border control force.***⁵² In Iraq, given the insurgent's daily use of weapons and munitions against civilian and military targets, it is obvious U.S. and Iraqi security forces still have much work to do with regard to this most crucial task.

Security of Operations

The asymmetric threat encountered in small wars requires particular attention to the security of one's force and the civilian populace. *A visible show of force, through active patrolling and armed presence*, will often dissuade belligerents from interfering with an election for example and instill confidence in voters.⁵³ When localized operations are conducted, a cordon system may be employed to secure the area while offensive action is pursued within the line. Placing a cordon of troops around an enemy-infested area and closing in while restoring order in the area or maintaining a stationary defensive barrier while patrols operate within the line are methods of employing this system. The blockhouse system is similar, but is defensive in nature. It involves the establishment of a line of defended localities and can be used to protect critical infrastructure or secure a static mission like the provision of humanitarian aid.⁵⁴ Operations in Iraq have employed both of these security methods.

When establishing force protection measures at refuge and resupply bases, Callwell advises the extent of the security procedures be based upon the degree of isolation from other bases, nature of the theater of war, and strength of hostile resistance.⁵⁵ He also highlights unique security measures for night operations and maneuvers conducted in mountainous and jungle terrain.⁵⁶

Intelligence

Friendly Collection and Dissemination Difficulties

The difficulty of obtaining reliable and timely information in small wars can be divided into two areas – uncertainty about the theater and doubt with regards to the enemy. Small wars inherently break out unexpectedly in unforeseen places.⁵⁷ Obtaining the latest geographical, political, cultural, social, and security information of a small war theater of operations is often very difficult due to the undeveloped nature of the environment,⁵⁸ as U.S. forces encountered in 2001 when they prepared for the invasion of Afghanistan. Initially, uncertainty as to how intervening forces will access the theater prevails until basing, overflight, and ground movement authorizations have been secured. Undoubtedly, information compiled at the tactical level prior to arrival in theater will be incomplete and inaccurate; therefore, it must be

supplemented by reconnaissance and research on the ground, and aggressively shared amongst units in the field.⁵⁹ As Callwell points out, in the early stages of the operation in particular, guides will prove invaluable, especially in difficult jungle or mountainous terrain.⁶⁰

The irregular force's general progression is to disperse into small guerrilla bands whose location, capability, and intent are difficult to determine.⁶¹ Intervening forces are by necessity dependent upon human intelligence sources; however, they also are prone to enemy manipulation and intimidation.⁶² Furthermore, getting reliable and timely intelligence down to tactical units in the field is difficult due to the dispersion of the conventional force's units.⁶³ However, as Callwell aptly points out, ***"In no class of warfare is a well organized and well served intelligence department more essential than in that against guerrillas."***⁶⁴ Conventional forces best overcome these distinct advantages by leveraging technologically superior collection capabilities, and developing and employing human intelligence sources.

Counter-Intelligence

Initially, irregular forces enjoy many advantages in the area of intelligence.⁶⁵ From the very nature of the campaign, their knowledge of the terrain, culture, and social characteristics of the theater are superior to that of the intervening force. Their understanding of the size, capabilities, intent, and location of the occupying force is simplified by its conventional formations. The press, which normally favors the conventional force, often inadvertently reveals important information to the enemy in reporting on the military operation.⁶⁶ Thus the dual challenge: An intervening force must degrade the human intelligence capability of the enemy, while simultaneously developing its own. The Small Wars Manual asserts that ***the guerrillas' intelligence system decreases in proportion to the mobility and number of the patrols employed in the theater of operations or the level of presence the conventional force has.***⁶⁷ Units whose operations are characterized by secrecy and rapidity of action, and who aggressively disperse the irregular force from place to place, will in time break down the enemy's intelligence system by forcing him to lose contact with his sources of information.⁶⁸ Avoiding routine actions, maintaining the security of communications, aggressively pursuing spies in and around bases, and distributing false information

pertaining to operational details are additional ways to thwart guerrilla collection efforts.⁶⁹ The cooperation of the citizenry is integral to the success of an intervening force's counter-intelligence plan and development of its own human intelligence capability. The Small Wars Manual recommends the occupation force ensure the population understands that the purpose of the operation is to aid the country, goes to great length to make friends with the populace, and liberally uses intelligence funds to encourage citizens to provide information concerning the enemy.⁷⁰

Logistics

Supply

Because small war theaters are austere and formidable, Colonel Callwell characterizes small wars as generally campaigns against nature rather than against hostile armies. For example, despite contemporary technological improvements over Callwell's era, when the theater of war is a desert for example, with only a few scattered sources of water, water is a matter of supply that has to be carried with or pushed to the force with considerable forethought, planning, and effort. From Callwell's point of view, the difficulties of small wars arise almost entirely from the challenges presented by the requirement to supply the force in these operations. *Supplying the force in small wars must be thoroughly planned, as it is at the root of most of the difficulties conventional forces have in these endeavors.*⁷¹

Maintenance

Motorization and mechanization of military forces were just occurring and had limited utility in the small wars theaters reflected in Small Wars and the Small Wars Manual. Beasts of burden and the cavalry's horses were more likely to be the forces' modes of transportation than the trucks, heavy equipment, and tanks that characterize the modern army. Although references to equipment maintenance are not directly presented in either of these texts, conceptually their allusions to the care of animals used in mounted detachments are similar to contemporary maintenance of mechanical equipment. Because of the harshness of typical small war theaters, the Small Wars Manual strongly encourages thoroughly inspecting the pack animal and its saddle, packs, harness, and shoeing before embarking on a march.⁷² Similarly, the

brutal climate and terrain of many small war theaters today necessitates thorough pre-operational checks of tactical and commercial vehicles prior to beginning a convoy. The Small Wars Manual emphatically points out the prevention of injuries and disease in horses is far more important than their treatment.⁷³ Likewise, *preventative maintenance is imperative in arduous small war theaters, where receiving repair parts is often complicated by the lack of modern transportation and commercial systems, or existing infrastructure is vulnerable to attack.* A conventional force that neglects to properly maintain its equipment in harsh small war theaters will find itself vulnerable due to equipment malfunction or failure at the most inopportune time.

Transportation

During small wars in the past, every possible type of transportation known to mankind has been used, from dogs, elephants, camels, and porter service to railroad, aviation, and motor transportation.⁷⁴ Today, in many small war theaters, roads exist only in a few localities and are generally in a poor state of repair, especially during rainy seasons. Many of these theaters have airfields that are inadequate for sustained military use without significant maintenance and upgrade. Often, local economies cannot provide modern vehicles, ideally suited for typical small war missions. The Small Wars Manual notes, “Sudden demands by the occupation force on native means of transportation will usually exceed the supply, resulting in very high costs for transportation; but this cannot be avoided.” In environments like these, transportation means other than tactical vehicles and military aircraft have to be considered.⁷⁵ In rural Afghanistan, Special Forces supporting Operation Enduring Freedom used horses to rove the countryside while directing operational fires.⁷⁶ Due to the limited availability of dump trucks on Basilan Island, construction materials were delivered in commercial vehicles similar to buses, called jeepneys, to support JTF-510’s efforts in OEF–P.

Engineering

The Small Wars Manual identifies the construction, improvement, and maintenance of lines of communication as some of the most important factors in successful small wars campaigns.⁷⁷ Of a related

nature, the manual outlines considerations for the construction of non-standard bridges, ferry sites, fords, and rafts.⁷⁸ Significant military and material resources often must be applied to these engineer efforts to maintain the mobility of intervening forces and improve the credibility and effectiveness of local governance in small war theaters. Survivability is also a related engineer task that must be considered.

One of the most urgent and colossal challenges in Iraq today is disposal of munitions that litter the country's remote areas. While contracted technicians are routinely hired to eliminate these stockpiles, military explosive ordnance and disposal (EOD) technicians have the dubious honor of getting rid of those explosives that have been weaponized by the enemy. The Small Wars Manual predicted the inevitability of this mission as it states: ***“Due to their widespread use in commercial and military functions, explosive materials are readily available for irregular force use; therefore, counter-demolition capabilities must be planned”***.⁷⁹

Health Services

Because small and independent forces operating in austere environments typify conventional armies experiences in small wars, Colonel Callwell expresses concern about handling of the wounded.⁸⁰ These conflicts still require considerable planning and resources, to include additional medical personnel, to ensure the wounded receive adequate medical treatment within “the golden hour”.⁸¹ The asymmetric threat encountered by forces in small war theaters also requires consideration of the prevention and treatment of psychological injuries. Furthermore, the lack of modern health standards and the prevalence of many communicable diseases in small war theaters necessitate the planning of comprehensive preventative medicine functions to aid the military force and the populace. ***Providing medical and dental care to citizens who do not have other sources of medical and dental attention is one of the strongest elements for gaining the confidence and friendship of the native inhabitants in the theater of operations.*** This can indeed aid in winning the peace.⁸²

General Services

The need for a well-organized aggressive contracting capability is common to most small war theaters. Because the need for infrastructure improvements and the desire to provide stimuli to the local economy are often characteristics of small wars, the organized force should make provisions to hire local nationals (LNs) to perform various skilled and non-skilled tasks. When communicating directly with the public is desirable as it may be in counterinsurgencies, it might be necessary to execute contracts for handling certain official dispatches through radio or television. A contracting capability is valuable for acquiring a host of items in theater to include commercial vehicles, construction material, and even the right to use private property.⁸³

CONCLUSION

Looking across the warfighting functions or battlefield operating systems, Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars and the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual principles are either being employed or have potential for employment in recent or current small wars. In the context of today's national defense priorities, these publications are receiving unprecedented attention. The American and European armies garnered a host of valuable lessons in their collective experience in small wars during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The richness of the wisdom found in these works compels military professionals to seek guidance from these masterpieces to gain a greater understanding of how to approach contemporary small war conflicts. More than period pieces, they are essential elements to contemporary 21st century professional military study and discourse. However, experience of the past can only be tapped if commanders and staff officers know what occurred, and inquire or task subordinates to find relevant sources and assess their utility in current conflicts. Otherwise, the wheel keeps being reinvented. Colonel C.E. Callwell's Small Wars and the U.S. Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual outline principles from the past that have modern day applicability.

Appendix A - Elements of Modern Small Wars That Are Not in These Writings

While the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars contain lessons learned by the European and American colonial experiences in the 19th and early 20th centuries, they reflect the eras in which they were written. Although the core fundamentals of small wars are timeless, technology, globalization, changes in world demographics, and the complexities of civil-military affairs have altered the nature of small wars. In many ways these changes have further complicated the inherently complex composition of small wars. By broadly identifying areas where the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars do not reflect the contemporary aspects of current small wars, a greater appreciation can be acquired of the modern elements of these types of military commitments and a course direction for future study and discourse.

Increased Role of Technology

Transportation

Due to the undeveloped nature of many small war theaters at the time of the writing of the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars, the works focus on beasts of burden such as donkeys, mules, and camels for logistical resupply. In discussing ground mobility, the works emphasize the role of cavalry. While aviation was beginning to prove its utility on the battlefield at the time of the writing of the Small Wars Manual, airpower capability had not fully developed. The enemy and friendly forces use of water transportation was confined to rivers.

While transportation infrastructure and modes remain meager in many small war theaters, motorized vehicles have reached many more areas of the world than they had in the early 1900s. The resulting increase in the convenience and speed of travel provided by various types of motor transportation has increased the complexity of the tasks performed by conventional forces in small wars. Intervention forces today must confront the increased lethality and rapidity of guerrilla action made possible by motorized transportation. Conventional forces devote considerable planning, training, and tactical effort to control the movement of the enemy by establishing deliberate and hasty vehicle checkpoints (VCPs). Units in Iraq must plan and train to counter the insurgents' weaponization of all types of motor transport in the

form of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Tanks, light reconnaissance vehicles, multi-role trucks, and heavy equipment have similarly increased the survivability, lethality, and rapidity of action of conventional forces in small wars. Although by effectively employing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan has degraded some of the advantages modern motor transportation provides intervention forces. Additionally, the increased utility of aviation, especially of UAVs, reduces response time and makes the conventional force more effective in locating enemy holdouts.

Modern Weapons – Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and Non-Lethal Weapons

The globalization of information and travel has increased the likelihood of weapons proliferation. Because of the world's increased interconnectivity, its most destructive weapons have increased potential to come into the possession of unconventional forces. While it is inconceivable U.S. forces would employ biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons in a small war, many of the nation's enemies in the 21st century small wars battlefield might employ these deadly weapons if they had them. The complexity and resource intensiveness of WMD searches and other actions to prevent proliferation that typify the modern threat obviously are not addressed in the Small Wars Manual or Small Wars.

The potential for conventional forces to use non-lethal weapons in operations where the lines between hostile forces and civilians are blurred is significant. The small wars environment where non-lethal weapons might have utility, as foreseen by the Small Wars Manual, has come to fruition.⁸⁴ In such conflicts, the strategic and practical reasons for using the minimum amount of force necessary when dealing with civilians are often just as important the legal and moral factors. Technological advances continue to make these weapons more practical, cost-effective, and, if used, less politically negative. Non-lethal weapons are being employed in modern small wars theaters and have increased viability for the future.

Information

Satellites, the Internet, cell phones, and television have increased the rapidity and breadth of information exchange. A commander in an operations center thousands of miles from the battlefield can

receive and send timely information to units in the field because of such sophisticated command and control architecture. The nation's enemies in South America can instantaneously observe, receive, or share information pertaining to successful guerrilla tactics employed by similar foes in Asia. The media can feed real-time information from the modern battlefield to millions of viewers around the world.

Information operations are no longer merely important. In small war theaters, in particular, they can be decisive. While the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars address the use of information, they do not treat it as a warfighting capability to be planned, synchronized, and protected. The effective use of information can influence the enemy to take action that is not in his best interest or the interest of his strategic goal. In counterinsurgencies, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, the actions of the citizenry are often central. The ability to convey a message that supports a mission and deny the influence of the enemy's message on the populace will often mean the difference between success and failure.

Because of the inherent uncertainty that still prevails in small wars and the natural human inclination to eliminate uncertainty, modern conventional forces must be aware of the pitfall of "information overload". Ensuring the right information is available to enable the commander to make timely decisions, or effective information management, is paramount in small wars.

The Small Wars Manual actually discourages commanders from engaging the press and recommends they report instances of negative press to higher authorities.⁸⁵ The contemporary commander must accept that the media can either be a tremendous asset in communicating the conventional force's message or a liability by publicizing the enemy's perspective. General Anthony Zinni, the former Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, often reminded his subordinate officers that the media is like terrain and weather: It is neither negative nor positive; the force that accepts its influence on the battlefield and best uses it gains a decided advantage.⁸⁶ ***Commanders in small wars must work with the media to ensure accurate, uncompromising, and reliable information pertaining to the intervening force's positive efforts, intentions, and goals are represented to the public.*** The first battle for Fallujah in April 2004 was

prematurely aborted primarily because the insurgents more effectively communicated their message about the battle's events than did I MEF. Thus, the enemy can use information technology and his information plan against the United States and allied, coalition, or friendly forces.

Modern Demographics

Increased Urbanization

The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars entirely reflect small wars conducted in the rural regions of the world. Small Wars has a chapter devoted to both hills and brush warfare, but neither work addresses insurgencies in metropolitan areas. However, urban insurgency was not notably successful in the 1960s and 1970s, leading increasingly towards a combination of rural and urban insurgent action in modernity.⁸⁷ Today, an insurgency marked by action in austere environments and metropolis sprawls is commonplace and a challenge that must be confronted.

Increased Role of Ideology, Ethnicity, & Theology Over Nationalism

Insurgencies have become increasingly motivated by ideology, theology, and ethnicity, and less so by nationalism.⁸⁸ The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars largely address conflicts fueled by nationalism, competition over limited resources, or struggles for political power. The increased role of ideology, religious beliefs, and the opposition to outside influence necessitates a deeper understanding of culture, religion, and a society's historical context. Small Wars is largely a reflection of European attempts to impose their culture and ideology on third world countries. The Small Wars Manual addresses the need to be respectful of religion and culture, and the importance of learning the local language to avoid becoming over reliant upon interpreters and guides.⁸⁹ In today's conflicts where ideology, religion, and ethnicity motivate suicide bombers, *appreciating a society's culture and religion is not enough. Military professionals must have a deep understanding of the society's culture, religion, and history of conflict.*

Increased Youth Population

Consistent with traditional modus operandi, modern insurgencies target the civilian populace, in particular the youth.⁹⁰ Because insurgent leaders know they would risk destruction by confronting

government and/or intervention forces conventionally, they attempt to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of a government or governing authority through guerrilla warfare or terrorism. The goal is to influence the population to actively or passively support their efforts.⁹¹ Idealistic, impressionable, energetic, and often naïve, adolescents and young adults are at the greatest risk for manipulation by insurgent leaders. With even more numerous populations in the 15 to 29-age range expected in the next 20 years, many of the world's historically unstable or poor-developing countries are fertile ground for insurgencies.⁹² The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars do not address the unique and complex challenges faced by military forces operating in small wars where a significant and growing proportion of the population is young.

Increased Role of International Non-State Actors

Increased globalization and the persistent presence of ungoverned areas have given rise to an amplified role for security and stability threats perpetuated by non-state entities. International terrorism, crime, and human and drug trafficking are commonplace in today's world and have increasingly threatened the security and stability of well-established and modern societies. While criminal gangs and tribal, religious, and ethnic factions have always filled the void of ungoverned areas, the increased availability of transportation and information technology has increased the span of their virulent influence. While Al Qaeda is certainly not the only non-state organization whose international tentacles carry instability around the world, it is the one that is presently in the crosshairs of the United States. The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars do not reflect the challenges of conducting small wars that are transnational in scope.

Increased Role of Inter-Agencies

Small Wars, and to a lesser extent the Small Wars Manual, deal with colonial disorders as essentially a military problem with little regard for the legal, diplomatic, social, economic, or political aspects of small wars. Although their treatment of small wars as purely or primarily military conflicts reflects the American and European approach to small wars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, modern conflicts are far more complex. Because many modern small wars arise out of grievances or perceived grievances with the government or an existing society, resolving those grievances almost always requires

non-military national or transnational elements of power. In fact, in most instances the armed forces are not in a lead role and military action must support economic, legal, or political activities. *Neither of these works addresses the important and challenging role of inter-agency cooperation and synchronization.*

Appendix B – History of Small Wars & the Small Wars Manual

The first edition of Small Wars, published in 1896, reflected Callwell's experiences in the Afghan War of 1880 and the first Boer War the following year, his study at the Army Staff College, Camberley, in 1886, and five years in the intelligence branch of the War Office. Callwell served with Greek forces in the Turko-Greek War of 1897, and joined the staff of Sir Redvers Buller on the outbreak of the South African War (second Boer War) in 1899, the year in which a second edition of Small Wars appeared. He fought in several of the major actions of that war while commanding a mobile column against Boer guerrillas. In 1906, Callwell published a third edition of Small Wars that incorporated the experiences of the South African War.⁹³ Like his illustrious contemporaries, A.T. Mahan and Julien Corbett, Callwell wrote about and reflected his time. However, his work does transcend the narrow boundaries of his historical era. Although Small Wars has never been viewed as official doctrine, the armed forces of western countries have generally treated it as recommended reading. Callwell is highly regarded and widely read today because he possessed a profound knowledge of the unconventional conflict of his day, offered interesting ways of thinking about such conflicts, and because the conditions in which small wars proliferate are multiplying, not decreasing.⁹⁴

The Small Wars Manual was first published in 1940 as NAVMC 2890. It encapsulates the Marine Corps' experiences acquired during the Interwar Period in Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. An internal debate within the Marine Corps ensued during the Interwar Period as to whether the Marine Corps should focus its doctrine, training, education, and systems acquisition on its historical role in small wars or its possible future in Pacific amphibious conflicts. Many in the traditional camp began to systematically analyze the character and requirements of operations short of war proper, or "Small Wars". Articles on the subject appeared regularly in *The Marine Corps Gazette*. Major S.M. Harrington of the Marine Corps Schools delivered a formal report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) entitled "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars" in 1921. In addition, Major C. J. Miller in 1923 wrote an 154 page report on the 2nd Marine Brigade's operations in the Dominican Republic titled

“Diplomacy and Spurs in the Dominican Republic”. The results of such efforts were encapsulated in Small Wars Operations with revisions in 1927 and 1935. The 1940 revision was renamed The Small Wars Manual.⁹⁵

The Small Wars Manual and Small Wars Today

American military interest in the study of small wars, training to perform their unique tasks, and overcoming their peculiar challenges, ebbs and flows with the perceived threat of irregular warfare to the national interests of the United States. Produced immediately before World War I, the third edition of Small Wars largely lay dormant during the Great War.⁹⁶ The Small Wars Manual, too, was overshadowed by world events immediately following its production with the advent of World War II. Both of these works received little attention during the Cold War with the exception of the Vietnam years. The Marine Corps’ renewed emphasis on the Small Wars Manual led to the employment of combined action platoons (CAPs), one of the few successes of the Vietnam War.⁹⁷ Today, illegal immigration, international crime, weapons and drug proliferation, and Islamic totalitarianism threaten the United States’ national interests at home and abroad. In this environment, wise military professionals are looking for previous experiences to help in successfully combating these irregular threats. The study of small wars is once again in vogue. Although there are significant differences between their eras and the 21st century, the Small Wars Manual and Small Wars encompass lessons learned from nearly a century of American and European small war experiences and are masterpieces too rich to be overlooked.

Appendix C – Small Wars & Other Associated Definitions

small wars

Small Wars Manual - Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.⁹⁸

Small Wars – Small wars include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. Small wars cover operations varying in their scope and in their conditions. Small wars denote operations of regular armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.⁹⁹

military operations other than war (MOOTW)

DOD Dictionary of Military Terms - Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.¹⁰⁰

low intensity conflict (LIC)

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 - a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.¹⁰¹

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- ¹ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940 (Washington , D.C.: GPO, 1940), Foreword.
- ² Colonel C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice, 3rd ed. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), vi-vii.
- ³ Callwell, Small Wars, 21. and U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 1-1 – 1-2.
- ⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 1-6.
- ⁵ Callwell, Small Wars, 42.
- ⁶ Ibid, 1-6.
- ⁷ Callwell, Small Wars, 47.
- ⁸ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 2-10 – 2-11.
- ⁹ http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_1_17/ai_n9543881
- ¹⁰ Callwell, Small Wars, 37.
- ¹¹ Ibid, 40.
- ¹² Callwell, Small Wars, 126-129.
- ¹³ Callwell, Small Wars, 130-134 and U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 5-7, 5-15, 5-16. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment's operations in Tall Afar, Iraq are a current example of successfully applying these principles. See Ann Scott Tyson, "Ten Days in Tall Afar," *The Washington Post*, Sunday, 26 March 2006, Outlook section.
- ¹⁴ Callwell, Small Wars, 133-143 and U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 5-8 – 5-10. Mobile and flying columns are combined arms forces that operate at a distance from and independent of supporting units and are lightly equipped to ensure mobility. Flying columns are sufficiently strong enough to avoid being tied to a base of supplies by a fixed line of communications (LOC), whereas, mobile columns are more dependent upon their base of supplies. The columns may vary in size depending upon the enemy threat, the terrain, the type and conditions of transportation, and the means of communication. Generally, they will range in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced regiment, but the size found to be best adapted to such operations is a reinforced battalion. The column should be of sufficient strength to effectively cope with the largest enemy force likely to be encountered, yet, no larger than necessary to ensure maximization of its mobility. Columns should always carry one to two days of supplies and cash in small denominations for the purpose of purchasing subsistence and guides and interpreters, as necessary. Given the asymmetrical threat typically encountered in small wars, the column should move with all-around security.
- ¹⁵ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 12-1, 12-3, 12-5 - 12-12, 12-16.
- ¹⁶ Ibid, 13-12 – 13-18.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 14-34 - 14-36.
- ¹⁸ Callwell, Small Wars, 85-87, 90.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, 99.
- ²⁰ Ibid, 91.
- ²¹ Ibid, 106, 151-152, 207-209.
- ²² Ibid, 148, 240-244.
- ²³ Ibid, 245.
- ²⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 6-80.
- ²⁵ Callwell, Small Wars, 227-228, 248-252.
- ²⁶ Callwell, Small Wars, 102-103, 229, 231 and Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66.
- ²⁷ Callwell, Small Wars, 235.
- ²⁸ Ibid, 100-101.
- ²⁹ Callwell, Small Wars, 150, 236. and U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 6-5.
- ³⁰ Callwell, Small Wars, 196-200. and U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 5-20, 6-87.
- ³¹ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 2-49.
- ³² Callwell, Small Wars, 438-439.
- ³³ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 9-1.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 9-14.
- ³⁵ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 2-3.
- ³⁶ Ibid, 9-22.
- ³⁷ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 9-1.
- ³⁸ Ibid, 9-3.
- ³⁹ Callwell, Small Wars, 42.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, 54.
- ⁴¹ Callwell, Small Wars, 76-78.
- ⁴² U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 6-14.
- ⁴³ Callwell, Small Wars, 115.
- ⁴⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 5-10 – 5-11.

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- ⁴⁵ Callwell, Small Wars, 116-117.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid, 134. In early 1960, the French successfully employed mobile and flying columns during the Challe Offensive to root out and destroy the rural insurgency in Algeria.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, 277-285. The terms “laagers” and “zeribas” have their origin in the Boer and Zulu wars.
- ⁴⁸ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1940, 11-1, 11-4 – 11-6.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid, 11-1 – 11-2. In some areas, forces disarming the populace will encounter significant cultural issues. The propensity of many citizens in the 19th century American west to carry pistols is an apt analogy.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid, 11-4.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, 11-4, 11-10.
- ⁵² Ibid, 11-10.
- ⁵³ Ibid, 14-7.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid, 5-21.
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- ⁵⁷ Ibid, 43-44.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, 44.
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