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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**SMALL WARS PROJECT:  
DISARMING THE LOCAL POPULATION**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Small Wars Project: Disarming the Local Population

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**Thesis:** Disarmament operations are a critical component of security and stability operations (SASO). Despite the frequency and importance of disarmament missions to SASO, limited current guidance exists to aid commanders.

### **Discussion:**

Disarmament operations do not lend themselves to simple checklists for success. The single, most significant factor in predicting a successful disarmament operation is the psychological aspects or perception of security by the local population. In addition, disarmament operations require the careful balance of incentives and punishments through voluntary and coercive methods.

Disarmament operations do not take place in a neutral environment, but inside a complex cultural, religious, historical context. To successfully conduct a disarmament operation, one must understand the role weapons play within the targeted culture. By working within local cultural hierarchies and understanding the cultural terrain, tact and diplomacy are powerful toolsets.

### **Conclusion:**

As Marines continue to conduct disarmament missions worldwide, more detailed guidance is needed so Marines do not have to re-learn the same lessons from conflict to conflict. Disarmament operations will be a central focus of future battlefields. The lessons learned go well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.

The millions of unaccounted small arms will be a permanent feature on all future threat environments. The proper neutralizations of these weapons is a core tenet of SASO missions and critical to force protection. The absorption of these issues into training and doctrine is essential for Marines to succeed in the wars of the future.

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Disarmament is a critical component of security and stability operations (SASO). Since the 1990s, the U.S. military has been tasked with disarmament in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. While disarmament was not a pre-deployment priority for any of these operations, U.S. forces found themselves conducting large-scale disarmament during each operation. As SASO becomes a major focus of the U.S. military, the frequency of disarmament operations will increase.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the frequency and importance of disarmament missions to SASO, limited guidance or doctrine exists to aid commanders tasked with conducting these sensitive operations.<sup>2</sup> Historically, a 10-page chapter in the 1940 edition of the United States Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* is one of the few official publications on disarmament. The lack of official procedures forces small-unit leaders to rely on ingenuity, discretion, and flexibility to complete disarmament missions.<sup>3</sup>

This thesis will attempt to develop an analytical framework for disarmament by examining recent U.S. and international operations. The focus will be at the operational and tactical level, to provide the most benefit to expeditionary forces.

While the presence of small arms and light weapons<sup>4</sup> does not cause instability, the addition of large numbers of small arms into regions suffering from an array of instability factors increases the lethality and scope of the conflict's potential. The *Small Wars Manual* states that disarmament is the most vital step in the restoration of stability.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the presence of large numbers of uncontrolled weapons is a significant force protection threat to U.S. forces. In a recent example, after the seizure of Baghdad, the U.S. Army's 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division removed 20,000 rifles, 995 RPG launchers

(w/50,000 RPGs), and more than 7,000 artillery rounds.<sup>6</sup> Eliminating insurgent access to weapon stockpiles is an obvious priority for field commanders. In Iraq and Afghanistan it was hoped that “weapons for cash” programs would quickly reduce the numbers of uncontrolled weapons. A deeper analysis demonstrates that these programs are often rife with problems.

The United Nations (UN) estimates more than 600 million small arms and light weapons are in circulation. International organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN have deemed small arms a significant factor in instability, crime, terrorism, warlordism, and humanitarian disasters.<sup>7</sup> In 1997, the UN declared that all future peacekeeping missions would have a disarmament component. The U.S. Department of State declared illicit small arms and light weapons major obstacles to peace, economic development, and efforts to rebuild war-torn societies.<sup>8</sup>

The increased emphasis on SASO missions within the Department of Defense (DoD), coupled with the State Department’s more aggressive small arms policies, require a more focused effort on disarmament operations.<sup>9</sup> The Department of State has the lead on coordinating strategic programs to reduce the spread of illegal weapons, but at the tactical level, the U.S. military conducts most U.S. disarming operations. The current ad-hoc nature of U.S. disarmament missions, especially at the operational and tactical levels, need to be replaced with a fully developed program consisting of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); specialized training; and equipment.

## **Framework**

The term “disarmament operation” involves an array of missions differing widely in scope, direction, and philosophy. While disarmament usually occurs after large-scale conflict has ended, on today’s complicated battlefields, disarmament missions begin while combat missions continue. In Iraq, for example, disarmament began while major combat operations were still consolidating. In Mozambique during the 1990s however, such missions did not begin until years after a cease-fire.

Disarmament may be conducted by tactical units that raid a compound based on human intelligence, or it may be conducted by large international organizations such as the UN, which manages voluntary weapon buy-back programs. Before discussing methods for conducting successful disarmament missions, it is necessary to establish an analytical framework.

Disarmament operations are conducted by military, security, and law enforcement personnel to control the proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons. The aim is to further conditions that contribute to the development of a safe and secure environment. At the tactical level, disarmament operations are divided into five steps: locate, collect, transport, store, and dispose/destroy.<sup>10</sup> These missions may be conducted as part of an international peace agreement, such as large NATO and UN disarmament programs in the Balkans, or they may be carried out unilaterally by a military government, as in Iraq. Successful disarmament operations are an essential part of larger stability and reconstruction efforts that seek to address root causes of the conflict. It is important to note, however that, operations that focus exclusively on disarmament as a means of stability often end in failure.

Disarmament operations can be divided into two sequential phases. Phase one operations exist during the immediate cessation of conflict or right after the introduction of intervention forces. They are more likely to involve military forces, involuntary disarmament, and the use of force. Phase two operations are run by international organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and involve large, well-funded reconstruction and incentive programs encouraging disarmament. During phase two, military forces provide security and logistical support, but the actual disarmament is conducted by international organizations. Disarmament operations often occur for years after the cessation of combat, with significant overlap between phase one and phase two operations.

During phase one, tactical military units conduct the bulk of disarmament operations, often in an unstable and dangerous environment. Operations rely heavily on tactical intelligence and constant patrolling to conduct search-and-seizure missions to remove weapons from the environment. U.S. and multi-national forces, during the first years in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, conducted extensive phase one operations.

Programs in Bosnia from 1996-2004 demonstrate both phases of disarmament operations. From 1996-1998 NATO forces in Bosnia conducted phase one operations, mainly through ad-hoc confiscations of illegal weapons using cordon-and-search techniques.<sup>11</sup> Due to their organic logistical capability, rapid deployment options, and offensive capability, military forces are often the first tasked to conduct disarmament operations during the most unstable periods of post-conflict environments.

Phase one operations can be further divided into the two sub-missions of finding weapons caches and disarming the general population. Cache searches and general disarmament are very different missions that require a unique set of skills and procedures. For cache searches, platoon or company-sized units use grid searches to discover large hidden weapons caches. These are often highly visible, show of force operations conducted during the daylight with the help of combat engineers, military working dogs, and armored vehicles.

Disarming the general population requires a more subtle approach during phase one. These operations usually involve going onto somebody's property and seizing personal weapons. This type of mission relies on the soft skills of negotiation, discretion, personnel contact, and understanding local culture. Personal disarmament operations work best when carried out by small teams of experienced personnel, often at night or inside individual homes.<sup>12</sup>

As a region becomes more secure, phase one operations transition into phase two operations, which rely more on incentives and public awareness campaigns to encourage disarmament. In 1998, NATO began Operation HARVEST in Bosnia, which used deterrence and educational initiatives to encourage disarmament. NATO forces supported local police and international organizations by assisting at weapon collection points and with other voluntary programs. In 2003, The UN initiated a small arms project in Bosnia with similar objectives. A similar program in Afghanistan gives former insurgents \$200, a medal, a change of civilian clothes, a box of food, vocational training, employment counseling, and a certificate of service. Phase two operations, such as in Bosnia, often continue for 5-10 years after the cessation of actual hostilities<sup>13</sup>.

## **Operational Considerations**

Disarmament operations do not lend themselves to simple checklists for success. The varied threat levels, local conditions, and disarmament methods prevent guaranteed success. Despite these limitations, the study and analysis of disarmament missions in Somalia, Mozambique, the Balkans, and Afghanistan point to several operational and tactical considerations.

The single, most significant factor in predicting a successful disarmament operation is the psychological aspects or perception of security by the local population. While weapons have varied roles in different cultures, at the most basic level a weapon provides an individual with the perception of security. In Iraq, the first responsibility of every male is to protect his family. He will not willingly turn over his weapon until he believes his family's safety is guaranteed. It is the perception of security, vice actual security, that decides whether an individual will turn over a weapon. The *Small Wars Manual* states that Marines have the responsibility to provide security for disarmed citizens and must retain sufficient local presence to guarantee safety.<sup>14</sup>

In the period immediately following a conflict, individuals feel less secure, whether a dictator was overthrown, a civil war ended, or an ethnic war stopped. Uncertainty and fear causes individuals to focus on the basic needs of food, shelter, medical care and security. Until a new paradigm of security is perceived by the local population, any attempts to disarm them will fail. Disarming the local population of personal weapons is the most difficult type of disarmament operation, since it relies on an individual giving up what he perceives as his primary protection means for himself and

his family. Individual weapons are inherently more difficult to locate due to dispersion, complex terrain, and limited numbers.

There are several methods for increasing the perception of security among the local population. The most critical is to build trust and legitimacy between the local population and the local government. Legitimacy includes, establishing a perception of U.S. or multi-national forces as a positive influence in the region.

A key step in building legitimacy and trust between U.S./Coalition forces and the local population is to form relationships through close contact. In Iraq, commanders who practiced active patrolling were able to send a message of presence and involvement. They believed that staying inside well-protected U.S. military bases would alienate the local population to the U.S. presence.<sup>15</sup> In areas where U.S. forces stayed visible, responded quickly to incidents, and demonstrated consistent restraint, the locals felt more secure and were more likely to support disarmament programs.

Two key components in building trust among the local population are the transparency and openness of the disarmament program. The reasons for implementing a disarmament program must be well publicized and the links between disarmament and security must be fully explained. Clear and uniform policies for weapon ownership, turn-in procedures, incentive programs, and destruction methods are critical for gaining trust and legitimacy.<sup>16</sup>

When conducting disarmament operations in an area with significant tension between ethnic or religious groups, such as in the Balkans or Iraq, it is critical that policies and procedures are applied evenly to all groups. Any perception of favoritism to one group will immediately end the involvement of the other groups and could result in a

resumption of violence. After a NATO peacekeeping force entered the Kosovo region of the former Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO forces implemented a disarmament program. The majority Albanian population, who felt liberated from Serbian oppression, was more open to disarmament than the minority Serbs who now perceived themselves as a targeted minority.<sup>17</sup>

Careful planning is required to disarm groups evenly, so members of each group feel they are giving up their fair share of weapons and are not being unduly punished or weakened by the disarmament process.

The need for uniformity of disarmament policies is critical to building trust. The ad-hoc nature of disarmament operations in Iraq led to different policies being implemented in different regions. This variation caused distrust among the local population, as groups perceived they were being harshly penalized while other groups were allowed greater leniency. Often, policies would also change when U.S. units rotated out. Locals would immediately note the unit change and friction would increase when the new unit had a different disarmament policy.<sup>18</sup> All efforts should be made to ensure an evenly applied disarmament process.

The local media is useful in building trust and transparency during disarmament operations. Programs should include local media outlets, such as leaflets, radio, television, and other means to ensure the widest dissemination of information.<sup>19</sup> Events such as the destruction of large weapon stockpiles or initiation of large voluntary weapon collection programs are best held in prominent public places with strong media coverage. Participation by local, regional, and national leadership coupled with publicity of the program will aid in building trust and openness, and can lead to greater participation. In

both Kosovo and Afghanistan, large phase two disarmament programs were accompanied by ceremonies, awards, and public information campaigns.<sup>20</sup>

An exception to the desire for publicity is when disarming individuals in high-threat environments or when disarmaments may prove provocative despite the best efforts of those tasked with carrying it out. As an example, in Iraq, most individual disarmaments were conducted at night, under low visibility conditions, to prevent insurgents and criminals identifying those being disarmed while affording force protection to the disarmament force.<sup>21</sup> The ability for individuals to quietly and anonymously turn over weapons is a needed option for all disarmament operations.

Conducting disarmament operations requires the careful balance of incentives and punishments through voluntary and coercive methods. Incentives could include amnesty, cash, material goods, housing, training, employment, and medical care. Punishments may include weapons and property seizure, monetary fines, and detention.

In a perfect scenario, local populations feel secure by the presence of a mix of trusted indigenous and U.S./Coalition forces. The host nation would implement a well-published and fair voluntary weapons collection program. The local population, feeling that their security and basic needs are being met, will enthusiastically turnover small arms, creating a safe and secure environment for economic and social development.

In reality, the situation is always more complex. Finding the right mix between voluntary and involuntary disarmament is often the toughest aspect of mission planning. Historically military forces have relied on coercion and show of force to involuntarily disarm individuals immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Alternatively while large international organizations have generally relied on monetary incentive programs.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the increased use of incentive programs by U.S. military forces to assist in disarmament operations. The typical form of incentive is the cash-for-weapons program. Although exchanging cash for weapons has helped get some weapons off the street, the program has seen many problems. In Iraq, most of the weapons turned in were broken, rusted and useless.<sup>22</sup> In Bosnia, locals used the program to dispose of unwanted weapons. In Afghanistan, the UN was paying \$200 for an AK-47, twice the local rate on the weapons market. This program actually fueled the market as weapons flooded into Afghanistan only to be sold to the UN for a profit.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, it was suspected that groups used the program to finance the purchase of more advanced weaponry. In Iraq large volumes of low quality “junk weapons” were turned in at collection sites in Najaf, Sadr City, and Fallujah. Iraqis at these sites complained that Americans thought money was the answer to everything. Many Iraqis expressed they felt insulted that Americans simply threw money at the situation and did not spend the time to understand their true problem.<sup>24</sup>

A more successful incentive policy emerged when weapons were exchanged for useful every-day items. Despite the lack of guidance from higher headquarters, many individual units, often at the battalion and company level, improvised similar programs to remove weapons from the environment. Near Fallujah, Marines handed out wheelbarrows and bottled water to local leaders who helped turn-in weapons and identified IEDs or UXOs.<sup>25</sup> This gave the Iraqis something useful to rebuild their area instead of cash. Other positive examples include, Marines from 3/1 and 3/24 who gave out water bladders to cooperative towns and helped with water purification issues. These policies had the

two-fold effect of getting weapons out of the area and gaining the trust of local populations.

Disarmament operations do not take place in a neutral environment, but inside a complex cultural, religious, historical context. To successfully conduct a disarmament operation, one must understand the role weapons play within the targeted culture. In many societies, gun ownership goes beyond simple family protection and resonates at a deeply emotional level. In Kosovo, gun ownership is a source of cultural pride. Weapons are passed down from generation to generation as heirlooms, and are significant sources of local power and prestige. In Afghanistan, the ultimate symbol of masculinity is a mountain warrior fighting to protect his land and tribe. Weapon ownership is vital to this vision. It is no wonder that attempts to force these mountain fighters to give up their weapons in exchange for farming equipment and agricultural training often end in failure.<sup>26</sup>

While the cultural view of gun ownership is often a hindrance to disarmament operations, the use of cultural factors such as cultural hierarchy and tribal/clan/family relationships, can improve success rates. Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq all adhere to various levels of clan/tribe cultural hierarchies. Instead of targeting individuals directly, successful U.S. commanders in Iraq dealt with local tribal elders. These elders would use their established cultural legitimacy to facilitate the disarming of their tribe or clan.<sup>27</sup> In almost every case, individuals are more likely to honestly disarm if told to do so by their local cultural leadership, vice at gunpoint by a squad of foreign soldiers. Of equal importance, commanders would also bring the tribal leader into the process, holding him accountable for the actions of his groups. Any material incentives would also be passed

through the local leader to empower him by emphasizing his credibility. This also reduced individual perceptions that they gave up their weapons to a foreign military. The *Small Wars Manual* states that disarmament is only successful with the full cooperation of local leaders and that officers must be skilled in tact, psychology, and diplomacy.<sup>28</sup>

### **Tactical Considerations**

Several tactical themes have emerged from experience in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The lack of training and procedures has forced Marines to relearn the same lessons from conflict to conflict. Marines throughout Iraq independently came to the same conclusions that Marines discovered in Somalia and the Balkans years ago.<sup>29</sup>

Disarmament operations involve significant interaction with local populations. While the threat of force, punishment, or detainment is an important aspect of disarmament, the ability to negotiate, convince and discuss often proves a more useful tactic. The rules for disarmament vary from one conflict to another. In Somalia, locals could own certain weapons, but not carry or display them in public.<sup>30</sup> In Iraq, each family was allowed one AK-47 for self-protection.<sup>31</sup> Even with well-publicized rules, Marines must use discretionary judgment when enforcing disarmament regulations. Disarmament operations are unpredictable and decentralized. They require high levels of flexibility and creativity, since plans must be altered to meet dynamic local conditions. This imperative cannot be overstated in cross-cultural environments.<sup>32</sup>

During a disarmament raid on an isolated family compound in Iraq, 60 AK-47s were discovered. The Iraqis claimed 60 families lived in the compound, and therefore, they were entitled to 60 AK-47s. The Marines on the scene used their discretion and decided that 60 weapons were not needed to provide basic self-protection of the

compound.<sup>33</sup> In other situations, Marines would discover old hunting shotguns and .22 caliber pistols. The locals would claim the shotguns were family heirlooms that were used only to hunt to feed their family and the .22 pistols were used to slaughter sheep and other small livestock. The Iraqis would complain that they could not feed their families if Marines took these weapons. While the Marines were authorized to confiscate these weapons, they often did not. This use of discretion was an important tool in building trust among the local population. Sometimes weapons were confiscated and tagged with the full intention of returning them to families after engaging local tribal leadership. Concessions were made on both sides, empowering local tribal leaders while building rapport.<sup>34</sup> The locals were held accountable for their actions and helped build relationships between U.S. forces and the local population.<sup>35</sup>

The key precursor to discretionary judgment was having a strong situational awareness of the local environment. Once a commander understood the local culture, power structure, and internal dynamics, it became easier to use discretionary judgment. The amount of time it takes to gain significant situational awareness in a SASO environment is considerably longer than in a conventional operation. In Iraq, the physical environment of the terrain, streets, and major structures was learned within two weeks, but it took 1-3 months to be able to work effectively within the cultural environment.<sup>36</sup> The key was learning how to see what was out of place. A popular saying among the Marines in Iraq was “the absence of the normal, the presence of the abnormal.”<sup>37</sup> Once the Marines gained a feel for the area, they could easily spot when a compound had freshly dug piles of dirt (burying weapons is a popular method). Marines learned from experience when a group of young males did not belong in the area. Only

by living in and around a local area does one pick up the local knowledge and ability to spot these abnormalities.<sup>38</sup>

Constant, visible, dismounted patrolling is key to gaining the situational awareness required in disarmament operations. The more active the patrolling among the local population, the better chance of discovering hidden or illegal weapons. This reaffirms the U.S. promise to provide security, while also allowing the interaction of U.S. forces among the locals. When patrolling, the key is for locals to know that you are never far away, but not to be visible on every street corner or every time they turn around. Active patrolling uses varied routes, taking advantage of small alleys and cut-throughs. The goal is to be visible throughout the area, but in constantly changing and unpredictable ways.<sup>39</sup>

The likelihood that weapons searches will be successful increases when working alongside indigenous forces. In Iraq, indigenous interpreters and security forces quickly noticed when something was out of place, or if people were in an area they did not belong. Through common language and culture, indigenous forces were able to form a quick connection with the local population that increased the flow of information.<sup>40</sup> They also knew where Iraqis traditionally hid weapons and other contraband.<sup>41</sup> It was discovered that when working with indigenous forces from the local area, they would often protect their own group. This required U.S. forces to bring in Iraqis from other parts of Iraq to ensure impartiality.

Disarmament operations, especially searches for weapon caches, present unique challenges to U.S. military logistics infrastructure. The seizing of weapons is only one phase in disarmament operations. The need to account for, transport, store, and secure

large weapon stockpiles is time-consuming and manpower-intensive. Captured weapons must be constantly guarded and maintained by experts. In Iraq, weapons seizures numbered in the tens of thousands. The simple transport of stockpiles strained already limited logistic assets. The destruction of large stockpiles requires special skills and equipment often found only in the high demand/low density EOD community.<sup>42</sup> In Iraq, limited EOD assets were often focused on the priority threats of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The German military has developed specialized, field-deployable weapon-shredding machines, specially designed for disarmament missions. These machines work like giant paper shredders, and they can quickly destroy a large number of small arms. Crushing weapons under tracked vehicles offers an effective hasty alternative.<sup>43</sup>

When searching for weapon caches in Iraq, infantry units quickly learned the value of task-organized combat engineers down to the platoon level. The specialized equipment found in combat engineer units, such as metal detectors and earth-moving equipment, proved invaluable when searching villages and compounds for weapon caches. In response, the Iraqis became skilled at burying weapons and hiding them amid rubble and debris. Well briefed combat engineers however, were able to quickly work around these techniques. The flexibility of Marine Corps units allowed task organized combat engineer teams to quickly integrate into infantry platoons, significantly increasing their weapon cache locating capabilities.<sup>44</sup>

As the U.S. military continues to refine the conduct of SASO operations, the need for increased focus on disarmament will also increase. Disarmament operations conducted in a vacuum are doomed to fail; within a holistic program of security,

reconstruction, and institution building, disarmament will work. An Iraqi father will not surrender his weapon until he believes that his family is safe. The most critical elements in any disarmament process include building trust and legitimacy between the local population, local government, and security forces. By working within local cultural hierarchies and understanding the cultural terrain, tact and diplomacy are powerful toolsets.

As Marines continue to conduct disarmament missions worldwide, more detailed guidance is needed so Marines do not have to re-learn the same lessons from conflict to conflict. The millions of unaccounted small arms will be a permanent feature on all future threat environments. The proper neutralizations of these weapons is a core tenets of SASO missions and critical to force protection. The absorption of these issues into training and doctrine is essential for Marines to succeed in the wars of the future. Disarmament must be a key component of future Phase IV planning. Staff planners and field commanders need a solid background in the fundamentals of disarmament.

The *Small Wars Manual* has stood the test of time, and its wisdom on disarmament operations still rings true. The importance of its topic however, and today's security environment, require an updating of its core tenets. In this way, we can leverage the lessons of today's conflicts to improve the missions of tomorrow.

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Major Larry Huggins USMC, served as senior advisor 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion/2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Iraqi Intervention Force, May-July 2005. Interviewed October 2005, Quantico, VA.

Major Adam Strickland USMC, served as Company Commander/S-3A, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion 24<sup>th</sup> Marines, January 2004-September 2004, Interviewed October 2005, Quantico, VA.

Major Travis Homiak, USMC, served as Operations Officer, 2<sup>nd</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion, September 2004-April 2005. Interviewed October 2005, Quantico, VA.

Major Bill Moore, USA, Special Operations Coordinator attached to the 173rd ABN BDE from February to June 2003, Interviewed October, 2005.

LtCol David Rababy, USMC (ret), served as S-2 ,7<sup>th</sup> Marines, December 1992-May 1993, Somalia. Interviewed October 2005, Stafford, VA.

Major Landon, USMC, served as Heavy Weapons Platoon Commander, 15<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit, Somalia, 1993. Interviewed October 2005, Quantico, VA.

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<sup>1</sup> “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations”, Department of Defense Directive, Number 3000.05, Washington D.C., 2005, p1.

<sup>2</sup> “Guide for Small Arms/Light Weapons Elimination Operations (DRAFT), Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, November 2005, p3.

<sup>3</sup> Moore, Bill, Personal interview, October 2005.

<sup>4</sup> The U.N., with U.S. agreement, adopted the following definitions in 1997.

<sup>5</sup> Small Wars Manual, FMFRP 12-15, Department of the Navy, Washington D.C., 1990, p 11-1.

<sup>6</sup> Warren Richey “Iraq’s other challenge: small arms”, Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Hugues-Wilson, “Safe and Efficient Small Arms Collection and Destruction Programmes”, United Nations Development Programme, p iii.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Department of State “Background Paper: The U.S. Approach to Combating the Spread of Small Arms”, June 2001, p1.

<sup>9</sup> The Department of State’s small arms disarmament policies are carried out by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). It is tasked with creating local, regional and international conditions conducive to peace, stability and prosperity by curbing the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war such as light automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades, and removing and destroying others, such as persistent landmines and abandoned stocks of munitions, that remain and pose hazards after the cessation of armed conflict.

<sup>10</sup> “Guide for Small Arms/Light Weapons Elimination Operations (DRAFT), p5.

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- <sup>11</sup> “Small Arms and Light Weapons Disarmament Programs: Challenges, Utility, and Lessons Learned” U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 12 July 2004, p5.
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