The following article, written in the voice of Carl von Clausewitz and addressing the United States and its military leaders, explores the influence of politics on the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom. Despite official denials that politics did not influence military decisions during the conflict, this article concludes that the military campaign in Afghanistan vindicates Clausewitz’s thesis that war is dominated by politics.

When the guards at Valhalla’s gate allow me to venture back to the world of the living, I find it humorous to listen to new generations of war theorists who are convinced that warfare has changed so completely that all previous notions of it are invalid. They are so confident they are witnessing a military revolution they say my unfinished work, On War, is an anachronism and no longer salient.

Critics should look no further than Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to understand that my book is still relevant. Despite protestations and official denials, politics still influences war. When I wrote, “War is a mere continuance of policy by other means,” I was referring to the fact that politics and war are completely intertwined, intermeshed, and can never be separated. Ends and means are still interactively linked, and the conduct of war is influenced by the political means available. Furthermore, I still believe “war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object.” And, I believe wars are still fought to achieve political goals and are an element of political intercourse. Politics, meaning political objectives, therefore, still influences the conduct of wars.

This same political influence was evident in the early phases of the war America fought in Afghanistan. Like all wars before it and all wars that follow it, Operation Enduring Freedom has been affected by politics in two significant areas: how allies affected the way war was fought and how postwar objectives influenced the conduct of the war.

Having fought against French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, I understand alliances. I wrote: “[E]ven if two states really go to war with a third, they do not always both look in like measure upon this common enemy as one they must destroy or be destroyed by him. The affair is often settled like a commercial transaction; each according to the risk he incurs or the advantage to be expected.” This political effect of allies was seen in Operation Enduring Freedom in two subsets: first through the geographic effects of Afghanistan’s location; and, second, through the effect of allies’ desires and interests.

**Allied Territory Limitations**

Because Afghanistan is landlocked, you, America, had to conduct ground and air operations through a bordering country. This complicated how the war was conducted because many of your allies gave only limited cooperation. Politics and allies caused Afghanistan’s bordering states to prohibit cross-border ground invasions or basing large amounts of conventional ground troops within their borders. Because of the political situation, your allies vetoed any possibility of conducting a large-scale, conventional ground offensive.

Only Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan allowed you to base commandos and conventional forces within their territories. The danger of nuclear-armed Pakistan imploding caused you to limit the amount to which you used Pakistan. For example, the parachute raid your Rangers conducted on an airfield near Kandahar began in Oman—a country not ideally located to your target. Your allies’ reluctance to base large numbers of soldiers on their shores contributed to commandos and aviation assets being stationed on the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, which shows you understood the political ramifications of putting large numbers of forces in such a relatively unstable country as Pakistan.

The influence of politics and geography on war can best be learned by observing how you fought the air campaign. By the war’s fifth week, when Taliban opposition had crumbled significantly in the north and south, none of the bordering countries allowed you to base combat aircraft on their soil.

Your allies’ limited support influenced the way you fought the war. For example, because you could not base your aircraft in a border country, you operated from either Oman, Diego Garcia, your own aircraft carriers, or even from America. This resulted in extremely long sorties (most in excess of 6 hours). Some planes had to conduct in-flight refueling two or three times to complete just one mission, which affected the conduct of war because you could not launch the number of sorties you wanted.

In previous conflicts, American pilots flew two or three sorties a day. In Afghanistan, pilots were often able to carry out only one. This statistic reflects the effects of political issues. At the end of the fourth week, the average number of daily combat sorties was 63, with a continued decrease after that. In the Kosovo war, daily sorties averaged 500; in Operation Desert Storm it was roughly 1,500. The number of viable targets available no doubt affected this statistic, but more
important, it reflected your allies’ decisions not to allow you to base combat aircraft on their soil.

Your allies’ concerns, desires, and interests also affected the way you conducted the war. Anyone who doubts this need only look at the operation’s original name—Infinite Justice. You did not use that name because it might have alienated Muslim allies who believe only Allah can mete out infinite justice.

Pakistan is the most important ally whose wishes you considered—with good reason. General Pervez Musharraf came to power through a coup d’etat that limited his legitimacy and caused him to face significant internal opposition to siding with America. He identified three major concerns: ending the campaign quickly, halting bombing during Ramadan, and not having the Northern Alliance come to power as the sole leader in a postwar Afghanistan.

Musharraf’s first two concerns reflected his belief that the longer the campaign lasted, the more enflamed the passions of his Muslim constituents would become. The third concern stemmed from the fact that a significant Pashtun minority in Pakistan would object to Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazaras factions in the Northern alliance dominating their kin in Afghanistan.

Although you completely supported only Musharraf’s last request, you worked hard to attain the first and respectfully denied the other. Furthermore, the collapse of the Taliban made moot his requests that addressed the conduct of the war. Your policy was wise considering the political tightrope Musharraf walked.

You have several allies and considerable interests in the Middle East, and therefore you chose to take allies’ concerns into account. They asked you to do everything possible to limit civilian casualties, end the campaign quickly, and halt bombing during Ramadan. While the concerns did not have a major effect on the way you fought the war, they did influence the way you selected targets. Much to the chagrin of air power enthusiasts, you erred on the side of caution and tried not to cause public opinion to turn against you or to destabilize important Muslim allies (or anger friends in Europe). The air force officer who during the conflict, said, “It is shocking the degree to which collateral damage hamstrung the campaign,” should read my book. To preserve the coalition against terrorism—where allies freeze financial assets of terrorists and share intelligence—an army must not lose the public opinion on war.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had different concerns. They feared a repeat of Somalia and Operation Desert Storm because they believed you did not live up to your promises and lacked staying power. They were concerned that if they provided too much support they would face a resurgence of fundamentalist Islam, which would have been buoyed by the conflict had you not achieved victory. They were also concerned that any cooperation with the United States would upset Russia and damage their bilateral relations with this powerful neighbor. While these concerns were not completely fair, this was certainly their perception. I do not envy the work your foreign ministers and military leaders performed to keep the political balance among allies.

The concerns allies voiced significantly affected the way you fought the war in Afghanistan. The unique geographic situation and allies’ concerns limited options, showing without a doubt how Operation Enduring Freedom was influenced by politics. However, this political influence did not come only from alliances, it also came from the effect postwar aims had on the conduct of the campaign. I wrote: “No war is begun, or at least no war should be begun, if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: What is to be attained by and in war? By this dominant idea the whole course of the war is prescribed, the extent of the means and the measure of energy are determined; its influence manifests itself down to the smallest detail of action.”

Achieving Goals

Setting the goals of a conflict is the most important thing a warring nation can do. The goals should be paramount. Every tactic, every battlefield step, every action, and every engagement should be planned to guide the war in the direction to achieve these goals. In an age of technological development and media omnipresence, tactical decisions can have strategic effects. Imagine how different the situation would be today if the errant bomb that killed three Special Forces soldiers had instead landed a mere 100 yards away and killed Afghan Interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai.

You acted wisely and then determined your postwar objectives. You then tied the objectives to the ways you conducted war and your two major postwar objectives: replace the Taliban and al-Qaeda with a broad-based, multiethnic government and set the conditions to prevent a power vacuum from reoccurring in Afghanistan.

The first goal, although noble and important, is quite difficult. The best lesson from the Soviet Union’s debacle in Afghanistan is that they failed because they put an autocratic puppet government (with no legitimacy) in power in Kabul. In essence, the Soviets lost the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, which led to mass uprisings throughout the country and a protracted guerrilla war. One of your key postwar objectives was to avoid the Soviet Union’s fate. You worked to prevent a repeat of the Soviet mistake by openly supporting a post-Taliban government that included all major ethnic groups and a fair representation of minorities. The postwar goal was to install a new Afghan government that would have the legitimacy of its people, to avoid the morass of a protracted guerrilla war. In essence, this was accomplished. Karzai won the first Afghan national election through a fair and open campaign. Many pitfalls still await, however, and only time will tell if the achievements will last.

You meticulously chose ways to attain your objectives—by not allying yourself completely with the Northern Alliance, for example, you recognized, correctly, that this group did not represent all Afghans and you equivocated on complete support for them. When Central Command Commander General Tommy Franks was asked if the Northern Alliance could be trusted, he responded, “Well, we’re...
Winning the war too quickly could have led to a power vacuum that would have led to different ethnic groups not wanting to cooperate with each other, forcing you to abandon Afghanistan to its own devices. Your political representatives did not want to repeat an experience that happened 9 years ago when "internecine fighting among opposition groups smashed hopes for a peaceful transition of power in Kabul after the fall of the Soviet-backed government."111 This would have been a dangerous situation; a void could have developed and been filled by a radical element, much in the same way the Taliban came to power.

The goal of having a stable postwar Afghanistan, one devoid of power vacuums, can be seen in your work with the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, to establish a peacekeeping force that would keep different anti-Taliban factions from fighting each other. You obtained pledges from peacekeepers from France, Germany, Australia, Jordan, England, Turkey, and others, and you pressured the UN to establish an interim government. This peacekeeping force eventually transitioned to NATO control and to this day is helping to achieve this objective.

Your concern with Afghanistan’s postwar situation is evident from the mission’s humanitarian element. Risking aircrew and airframes, you dropped over a million humanitarian daily rations and sent engineers (most of which came from America) into the country. This shows a commitment to stabilize postwar Afghanistan and is echoed in the words of Secretary of Defense Colin Powell: “We will help them rebuild; we will not abandon them.”112 Having a substantial humanitarian component within the campaign demonstrated to the Afghan people that you were committed to their long-term well-being.

It is evident you applied my maxim on the importance of linking ways—or the methods you use—to ends—or the postwar political situation you desire. The policy of not supporting one Afghan resistance group more than another and the long-term political commitment to avoid a power vacuum shows the successful linking of these two concepts.

My book is not irrelevant. Quite the contrary, my thesis of the importance of politics in war is still valid. The thesis shows how politics significantly affected the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. Political limitations in the way you fought in Afghanistan were caused by the formation of alliances necessary to wage the war and gain political postwar objectives. But, there is nothing wrong with this. Political intrusion in campaign strategy is a natural state of warfare. However, I am troubled when I see your minister of war saying the war was not fought under political constraints. He should have said: Of course there are political constraints on this war. We are smart enough to understand Clausewitz and apply military means to achieve a political end so we will not have to fight this war again in the future.

NOTES
2. Ibid., 16.
3. Ibid., 21.
4. Ibid., 594.
7. Clausewitz, 569.
Fox Conner and Dwight Eisenhower: Mentoring and Application

Jerome H. Parker IV

Four years after giving his go-order for the Allied invasion of the Normandy coast, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the Army War College. He said his thinking about coalition warfare had been molded by the ablest man he had ever known, Major General Fox Conner. In a polite understatement, he gave Conner credit for offering “a preparation that was unusual in the Army at that time.” Indeed, the 33 months Eisenhower spent in Panama with Conner had jump-started his personal and professional life and set him on course to international prominence.

Conner received his commission in the artillery, although he preferred the cavalry. Within 10 years he was on the staff and faculty of the Army War College. Following America’s entry into World War I, Conner was recommended for detail to the European Front. On 19 April 1917 he was ordered to host and consult with the Viviani-Joffre Mission, a French delegation sent to discuss with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson how the United States could best help France. Conner worked closely with officers from the French general staff, discussing details of organization, artillery requirements, internal affairs, and the immediate needs of the French and British.

Conner was the youngest officer on the senior staff when Chief of Staff of the Army General John J. Pershing chose him to become General Andre W. Brewster’s assistant. Within 6 months Conner was named the chief of operations of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). By 1921, Conner was a 47-year-old brigadier general preparing for his first command of an infantry brigade.

Conner Chooses an Executive Officer

The story of the Conner-Eisenhower adventure began in the fall of 1919, when Conner became immersed in the congressional budget hearings that were to determine the Army’s post-World War I reorganization. He was about to command an infantry brigade and was looking for a top executive officer. Because he had been tied to high-level staff work for the past several years, he felt out of touch with the Army’s young officers. He turned to General George S. Patton, Jr., with whom he had enjoyed a close personal and professional relationship, for help with the matter and to talk to Patton about the armored tank’s place in the Army’s battle formations. Conner planned a fact-finding mission to Camp Meade, Maryland, for November 1919, where Patton commanded the light tanks of the 304th Brigade. Patton had arrived at Camp Meade in the spring of 1919, about the same time as Eisenhower, and Patton promised to introduce the two men.

During the war, Eisenhower had trained men for overseas duty. For 9 grueling weeks, he accompanied an experimental motorized convoy of more than 60 motor vehicles from Washington, D.C., to San Francisco. Few men in the Army knew more about motorized weapons and transport than Eisenhower.

Eisenhower stressed that the tank would be a profitable adjunct to the infantry. In November 1920, Eisenhower published his ideas about tanks in the Infantry Journal. However, the Chief of Infantry, Major General Charles S. Farnsworth, was not pleased with Eisenhower’s article and informed Eisenhower that his facts were incorrect and dangerous to the service. Farnsworth told Eisenhower to keep his opinions to himself or face a court martial.

Eisenhower was caught between the wartime Army and the changing peacetime Army. To complicate matters, there was a simmering conflict between AEF commanders and the officers who had remained stateside. This split affected Eisenhower’s promotion possibilities, and he believed that his wartime service was being demeaned.

At Camp Colt, Eisenhower’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ira C. Wellborn, recommended Eisenhower for the Distinguished Service Medal. AEF Tank Corps Chief Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach rated Eisenhower’s performance as average, however, and the War Department rejected the recommendation. The rejection, reduction from his wartime rank of colonel, and the recent death of his first son had been cruel blows to Eisenhower, and he seriously considered leaving the Army.

Conner pulled Eisenhower back. Conner wrote Eisenhower to ask if he would be his executive officer in Panama, and Eisenhower eagerly sent an affirmative response. However, Rockenbach denied the transfer. Fortunately, Pershing intervened when Conner sent a letter to Pershing’s aide, Colonel George C. Marshall, asking him to steer the matter through the War Department. Eisenhower arrived in Panama in January 1922.

The Conner-Eisenhower Team

The Conner-Eisenhower team meshed well from the start. Conner was a masterful leader who believed leadership could be taught by delegating authority, providing instruction and example, setting high standards, and holding everyone to those standards without fear or favor. A hallmark of his leadership style was the almost leisurely way he offered words of praise for a job well done and simple words of caution for things done poorly.

Even as he delegated authority, Conner never abandoned his position as a teacher and mentor. He convened all of his officers for lecture sessions that encompassed various relevant topics, such as jungle warfare and the importance of good intelligence gathering. He believed attention to detail made the difference between success and failure.
Eisenhower held independent command of Camp Colt, yet was puzzled by Conner’s running the camp as a field command. Conner required Eisenhower to write daily field orders for the operation of the post instead of issuing the normal general orders concerned with matters of policy or administration. Conner explained the goals for the day and made the appropriate troop assignments to carry out an action plan. Eisenhower became so well acquainted with the techniques and routine of preparing plans and orders for operations and logistics that they became second nature to him.11

Later, while attending the U.S. Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Eisenhower wrote to Conner expressing his uncertainty about his ability to handle work and the competition. Conner assured Eisenhower that because of his 3 years in Panama he was far better trained and ready for Leavenworth than anybody he knew.12

Conner was loyal to his junior officers, never hesitating to give credit when it was earned, but also expecting loyalty in return.13 Do not, he insisted, have a personal enemy on your staff who could sabotage you or your command.14 He spoke loudest when he selected Eisenhower as his executive officer. This great staff leader chose a man who would be prized by his superiors as one of the Army’s most capable staff officers.

**Field Knowledge.** As an officer of the mounted field artillery, Conner had an overriding concern that the Army effectively use whatever tools it had to allow the infantry to meet and destroy the enemy.15 A progressive military thinker, he proposed in 1919 that a division organization of three regiments (16,000 men) replace the cumbersome AEF division of 27,000 men and 4 regiments.16 He favored efficiency, quality, and less expense over quantity and ill-prepared soldiers. He insisted, for example, that any technological advance intended to replace the horse be proven capable of doing more and better than the horse. What did speed matter if the machines attached to the infantry could not keep pace? What did the load-carrying capacity of motorized transport matter if roads were impassable for motor transport, or if there was a fuel shortage, or if the machinery broke down owing to terrain or weather?

Conner encouraged the Army to do everything possible to develop its motor transport and weapons. In fact, he recanted his decision to abolish the tank corps, and recommended that tanks be separated from the infantry and allowed to operate independently as envisioned by Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr. But, in deference to a budget-conscious America, he insisted that change not come at the expense of existing arms.17

Eisenhower was obsessed with new 20th-century machinery and did whatever he could to see how it worked. He tested machineguns; worked to improve tanks and armor tactics; hitched a ride on a submarine to experience a dive and underwater operations; owned and maintained his own automobile; and, at the age of 46, learned to pilot Army training aircraft, accruing 350 hours of flight time.18

**Book Knowledge.** While they were in Panama, Conner asked Eisenhower what books he read. Eisenhower replied that he read mostly for pleasure and had little interest in military history because West Point treated military history as an “out-and-out memory” course.19 Conner received this without comment but later invited Eisenhower to visit his library—“a sort of graduate school in military affairs and the humanities.”20 The range of Conner’s thinking showed in the titles of his diverse library. Conner often quoted Shakespeare and related his plays to the wars he and Eisenhower were discussing. Conner also introduced Eisenhower to the works of Plato, Tacitus, and Nietzsche, all of whom examined the human condition.

Conner recommended that Eisenhower read Matthew Forney Steele’s *American Campaigns*.21 Steele was a lecturer at the staff school where Conner’s growth as a professional soldier was deeply rooted. Steele’s lectures, a comprehensive analysis of military operations from the American Revolution through the Civil War, included discussions of tactics and the behavior and motivations of commanders. There was no denying that modern military science was the American Civil War’s legacy. While the war could not—probably should not—have been avoided or the outcome altered, adequate preparation could have mitigated the terrible consequences of battle.

Conner repeated Major General Emory Upton’s assertion: “Had the Union possessed 50,000 battle-ready troops, the country would have been spared the loss of thousands of her youth, billions of treasure, and untold suffering.”22 Through his explanations of Upton’s theories about military history and reforms of the American military system, Conner warned that even if the Nation remained lax about military preparedness, the soldier could not afford to be unprepared for the inevitable job of defending the Nation.

Using a copy of *American Campaigns*, Conner introduced Eisenhower to the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth and to the “applicatory method,” which referred to case studies of historical battles and campaigns. At the school, students advanced from military history lectures and original research to applying the lessons to battle situations in indoor wargaming exercises.23 The students studied military scenarios and learned how to derive their own “estimate of the situation,” incorporating a systematic means of issuing orders in five paragraphs into their solutions.24 Such exercises were followed by tactical rides and field maneuvers with troops and ended with staff rides to study actual battlefields.25

During Panama’s dry season, Conner and Eisenhower rode on horseback to clear trails and map routes for the rapid movement of troops and pack animals. In the evenings they discussed Civil War battles.26 Conner demonstrated the benefits and dangers of indiscriminately applying the general principles of war. Eisenhower once casually referred to World War I as the “Great War.” Conner replied, “As far as we’re concerned, that was only large-scale maneuvers.”27

Conner asked Eisenhower to read Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War* three
times, each time reminding him that Clausewitz wrote primarily about operations and ignored logistics. He contended that officers spent too much time on writing tactics and too little on writing the fourth paragraph, which explained how the commander was to supply his troops. 

Coalition Warfare

During World War I, the allied coalition did not achieve any semblance of unity of command until late in the war. Conner predicted that in the next global war the United States would be forced to fight in a coalition. No nation had been given outright field command of troops of another nation, but Conner believed America should insist there be a unified high command possessing ultimate authority. The armies of a coalition would have to be coordinated, and the most practical method available to a supreme commander was persuasion.

Conner’s accounts of his AEF experience left indelible impressions on Eisenhower. In July 1942, Eisenhower had been in London only 11 days when he wrote Conner about issues he was having with his staff that were similar to the issues Conner had faced during World War I. Eisenhower was almost dismissive of the difficulties of making firm agreements with Allies and instead reeled off a list of familiar internal organizational problems. He assured Conner the answers would soon come to him but that he was struck by the similarities between his situation and those Conner had described.

During their discussions, Conner frequently mentioned Marshall, whom Conner considered a brilliant operations officer. Eisenhower first met Marshall while working on Pershing’s American Battle Monuments Commission in 1927. Conner repeatedly urged Eisenhower to seek a position with Marshall because “[Marshall] knows more about the technique of arranging allied commands than any man I know.”

When Conner was Pershing’s chief of operations he foresaw a global war pitting the industrial nations of North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim against each other. His belief came from his observations in October 1918, when negotiations were imminent between Germany and the Western coalition to initiate an armistice. After consulting with Conner, Chief of Staff General James W. McAndrew, Judge Advocate General Walter Bethel, and Pershing met with coalition commanders-in-chief at Senlis, France. At his commander’s request, Conner presented to Pershing a formal military recommendation to the Supreme War Council to oppose an armistice with Germany. As Pershing’s G3 and principal writer of strategy and policy, amalgamation, and AEF independence, Conner accompanied him to high-level meetings.

History shows that victorious armies often overestimate their enemy’s strength and precipitously seek what is often a premature truce. The American Civil War was rife with such examples, and Conner and Pershing were witnesses to the Allies using the same flawed manpower estimates to induce Pershing to insert American troops into Allied sectors during World War I. They were also reminded of the Armistice of 1871 signed by the French after the Prussians surrounded Paris while French Armies were still in the field. That armistice provoked a rebellion in France led by Montmartre’s mayor, Georges Clemenceau.

In 1918, the Americans hoped that by reminding Clemenceau of the events of 1871 he would reconsider his desire for an armistice. America felt that an undefeated Germany would feed political instability in postwar France and central Europe: “An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German Army and enable it to reorganize and resist later on, and deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory.” Conner was convinced the Treaty of Versailles had sown the seeds for a future war and urged Eisenhower to be ready for it.

At the War College

After leaving Panama, Eisenhower returned to Camp Meade. Three months later he was ordered to Fort Benning, Georgia, to command the 15th Light Tank Battalion. When Eisenhower did not receive an appointment to the infantry school at Fort Benning, Conner wrangled a transfer for him to Major General Robert C. Davis’s Adjutant General Corps and an immediate appointment to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. Eisenhower lived up to Conner’s expectations by graduating first in his class and being assigned to the Army War College, where the depth of his mentor’s influence became more apparent.

On 15 March 1928, Eisenhower submitted a staff memorandum, “An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army,” to satisfy a major requirement for the War College. The memorandum detailed that the Army needed 75,000 more men to carry out its missions. The only way to make up the deficiency was to organize all men discharged from the regular Army into an enlisted reserve. His review of several studies and reports provided the manpower numbers, but Eisenhower had actually revisited Conner’s lessons. He said the defense of U.S. territory was best served by having sufficient forces to win the opening battles of any conflict so the initial successes “would relieve us of the necessity of waging a long and bitter war with large armies with its consequent losses in men, material, and money.”

Coincidentally, 2 months earlier Conner had published “The National Defense” in the North American Review. After a thorough historical analysis of national preparedness, particularly during the Civil War, he decried the Nation’s tendency to forget the lessons of previous wars, leaving the United States without a force instantly available at war strength. He believed that three battle-ready regular Army infantry divisions and one cavalry division backed by the National Guard would be worth more in actual defense than a million men raised in the second 6 months of war.

Although Conner could not bring Eisenhower’s son back or give him back his rank, through true friendship and wise mentorship Conner helped heal Eisenhower’s wounds. When Conner died on 13
October 1951, Eisenhower was on maneuvers with the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, completing his tour as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. 

NOTES

4. Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1940), 137.
5. Miller, 133-205.
9. Camp Col was the Army’s tank corps training center at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; D’Este, 137.
14. Miller, 221-22; 279-81.
18. Miller, 221-22; 279-81.
20. Ibid.
21. Matthew Forney Steele, American Campaigns (Hammonsburg, PA: The Telegraph Press, 1906), 5; Swift, “Orders” (lecture for the course on tactics, School (CGSS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1906), 5; Swift, “Orders” (lecture for the course on tactics, School (CGSS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1906), 5; Swift, “Orders” (lecture for the course on tactics, School (CGSS), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1906), 5.
26. Eisenhower, At Ease, 185-95; Miller, 211.
33. D’Este, 186.
34. Eisenhower, At Ease, 195.
38. Lowry, 96; Steele, 166, 210.
40. Lowry, 96; Steele, 439.
44. Ibid., 10-11.
45. Jerome H. Parker IV is an adjunct instructor at Tarrant County College, Fort Worth, Texas. He received a B.A. and an M.P.A. from the University of Texas.

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The idea of diplomacy is the reasonable bargaining between men—a formula that fits Ellsworth Bunker’s diplomatic career. After a successful business career, he was an ambassador for a succession of presidents, from Harry S. Truman to Jimmy Carter. Bunker helped broker and negotiate agreements over West New Guinea, Yemen, the Dominican Republic, and the Panama Canal, but he might best be remembered as the Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1967-1973.

Bunker behaved as a professional, not a talented amateur. He believed his job was to maintain state-to-state relations and acted as a technician without grand theories of diplomatic relations or America’s place in the world. He concentrated on finding solutions to immediate issues to further U.S. foreign policy objectives, which made him a supple negotiator with firm beliefs about the right of self-determination and the improvement of the lives of ordinary people.

Bunker was most effective as a negotiator, in part because of the trust five presidents placed in him. His business experience stood him in good stead as he formulated the principles of a good negotiator, which to a great degree followed maxims formulated by the classic commentators on Western diplomatic practice, then modified to fit 20th-century circumstances. Although every negotiation was different, Bunker believed several common techniques could be followed to ensure success.

Bunker created an informal atmosphere, usually a secluded setting, in which the contending parties could develop familiar personal relations. He offered draft proposals that could become the basis for bargaining and used small, intellectually supple staffs to quickly anticipate changes before they could be second-guessed. He tried to avoid State Department bureaucratic in-fighting, and for the most part was successful. The only exception was the Panama Canal Treaty, where he defended his work to both the Congress and the American people.

Howard B. Schaffer has written a fascinating biography highlighting the ways military and diplomatic power can work together to settle knotty problems between states. Over the course of his life as a business executive and diplomat, Bunker exemplified patriotic American values in that he was willing to tackle difficult and sometimes arduous and dangerous tasks in the service of the Republic. His diplomatic career epitomizes the ideals of patriotism and selfless service. This biography gives the reader insights into the way diplomacy works on a day-to-day basis and how U.S. interests are furthered through peace and conflict.

Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D., Madison, Alabama


States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries is a collection of essays written by specialists about the ethical questions surrounding the concept of land and borders. The essays, which include Jewish, Confucian, Christian, natural law, Islamic, liberal, and international law perspectives, are concise and address a variety of topics including how land is considered “holy” within the Jewish tradition.

The book’s main strength is that more than one essay is provided for each tradition to allow for more than one viewpoint. Although the book is not all-inclusive, it certainly has use as an introduction or ancillary to the study of international law as it relates to the contentious topics of borders. The book’s main weakness, which really is not a weakness at all, is that the editors did not include more viewpoints.

The standout article, “Making and Unmaking the Boundaries of Holy Land,” by Menachem Lorberbaum, explains the arguments that can be directly related to Jewish land claims in Israel. The arguments in the article are succinct and not clouded with theology.

The book’s value to the defense community lies in its ability to help the reader understand how other countries arrive at their decisions regarding land rights and border delineation. Overall, I recommend the book.

David J. Schepp, Auburn, Georgia


In one of those rare, first-person accounts that bring history to life, Tom Reilly recounts the tale of a remarkable journey that takes him from his boyhood home in rural Wisconsin to a harrowing trek across Southeast Asia during the height of the Vietnam War. Reilly’s story, one of loyalty, brotherhood, and dogged determination, captures and holds the reader’s attention.

Reilly’s story begins in 1958, when, at the age of seven, he loses both his parents. Although he is raised by his sister, Reilly develops a close bond with his brother Ron, who helps define his young life. The brotherhood the two share guides Reilly through his first years and remains central to his existence until he receives official notification as
“Next of Kin” that his brother is a casualty of war: dead as a result of a nonhostile incident in the Long Binh compound north of Saigon. Left with a plethora of unanswered questions, the 19-year old Reilly makes his way to Vietnam in a journey as captivating as it is inspiring.

Reilly, an 18-year veteran of the disaster recovery industry, weaves an amazing tale of brotherly devotion, youthful discovery, and astonishing adventure in his first literary venture. *Next of Kin* is as much a tribute to the bonds of family as it is an expression of gratitude to the man who shaped Reilly’s life. Reilly succeeds in bringing to life yet another name on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

*Next of Kin* is a candid, compelling account reminiscent of Michael Takiff’s *Brave Men, Gentle Heroes* (Perennial, New York, 2004). Readers of all backgrounds will appreciate and enjoy Reilly’s story, but military readers will especially appreciate and enjoy Reilly’s story, but military readers will especially relate to the book’s strong sense of brotherhood and honor. The book is a good addition to any collection and one that resonates with the warriors of our trade.

**MAJ Steve Leonard, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Since the advent of “modernity,” the study of military history in the past half-century, particularly in the West, has focused on the great events in Europe and North America. Wars elsewhere around the globe have been largely ignored. Noted historian Jeremy Black’s essay collection *War in the Modern World Since 1815* redresses the situation and offers a collection of essays written by scholars from diverse historical backgrounds. The essays do not focus on the European way of war, but on the differences and similarities of ways of war that have manifested themselves around the world for the past 200 years. What emerges is a useful and interesting study contrasting military developments of which people in the West are only vaguely aware.

Traditional European methods of war appear in Black’s book; however, only one essay directly addresses them. Two other essays, which address naval and air power, center on developments in Europe and the United States; a third addresses the U.S. military during the same period. European colonialism is also a subject in essays that examine the past two centuries in China, South Asia, Japan, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa.

None of the regional areas studied had the same historical progress. In some cases, social factors were primary; in others economic factors were addressed; in yet others, cultural factors were examined. The essays reveal a vivid portrayal of warfare around the world that differs from the standard vision of Europe at war. The essay on the American military is disappointing as it is merely a chronological narrative that does not delve into the questions of “why.”

Black’s collection is a refreshing study. His breadth of historical analysis ensures the military history student will learn about previously unknown subjects. Considering the various locations in which U.S. military forces are currently deployed, it is wise to gather as much professional historical study as possible. Black’s contribution will be most useful in that undertaking.

**MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA, Hohenfels, Germany**

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Military operations on the Kansas-Missouri border between 1854 and 1865 provide classic lessons learned for today’s military professional. Union officers contended with guerrillas, vigilantes, armed gangs, and uniformed conventional forces in an area that had scarce resources and little law and order. In the *Civil War in Kansas*, Roy Bird suggests that Union forces’ heavy-handedness increased the ranks of Confederate forces and created terrorists such as Jesse James, William Quantrill, and Cole Younger.

Although not intended as a reference source for the Kansas-Missouri border war, the book does introduce bloody operations in the region and address Kansas and Missouri’s political settings before the outbreak of war; depict key leaders involved in operations on the border; offer a general timeline of key events in the region; and feature major events and battles that shaped military operations on the border.

**MAJ John Carrico, USA, Washington, D.C.**

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In the tradition of Edward Creasy, J.F.C. Fuller, and Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart, William Weir puts together a subjective list of important battles. A well-written introduction lays out the rationale for his particular approach. Weir meshes together the battles he feels ensured democracy and freedom, describes battles that gave Western civilization domination over the East, and provides examples of the political decline of the West—a recent trend in the examination of world history.

Weir thoroughly researched the battles he includes in his book and has a good grasp of their effect on the world. He includes several appendices, one of which includes several battles that did not make his list for more extensive treatment. He also includes a bibliographical glossary that addresses major leaders of the battles, a glossary of military terms, and a thorough index.

A chronological listing of battles is broken down by five different criteria:

1. A straight historical chronology, which is helpful because the book lists battles by order of importance, and often jumps from ancient to modern times and back again.
2. A list of battles pertaining to the development of democracy.
3. Battles of East versus West.
4. Battles dealing with European nationhood.
5. Battles reacting to Europe’s domination and control.

I have a few criticisms: the bibliography, while extensive and complete, does not cross-reference battles; there is a lack of maps; it is difficult to keep up with national and cultural boundaries because battles cross vast time spans; there is little for those interested in troop movements; and the space allotted to each battle is insufficient.

In every entry, Weir attempts to define the world, provide insight into the mindset of military leaders on both sides of a battle, and describe the battles themselves. Doing this is a daunting task, and Weir’s writing style suffers for it. While his narrative is informal and relaxed, a more structured approach would have better defined characters and events.

Weir concludes each entry with a brief discussion of how the battle affected the world or laid the foundation for the present world culture.

The book is best used as an introduction to battles for those new to military history. Although Weir obviously put a lot of work into the book, he does not explore each battle in enough detail to be of use to more than the casual reader.

CPT Stephen R. Spulick, USA, Schwetzingen, Germany


Michael B. Ballard’s Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi details the struggle for Vicksburg, Mississippi, and its corresponding portion of the Mississippi River. Ballard describes General Ulysses S. Grant’s Union forces overtaking Confederate General John C. Pemberton’s resource-poor forces to open the Mississippi River and split the Confederacy.

Ballard uses personal letters, diaries, memoirs, reports, and historical data to develop the history of the struggle for Vicksburg. He describes Grant’s many attempts to gain control of the Mississippi River; his final siege of the city; and the reasons for his setbacks. Ballard discusses why Union forces conducted “hard war” in response to Confederate guerrilla tactics and cavalry raids. He also describes the long-term effects the battle had on the local population in the Big Black River Bastion between Vicksburg and Jackson, Mississippi.

Vicksburg is a compelling, detailed history of Civil War leaders overcoming opponents who were equally committed to their causes and of the complexities that resulted from this type of warfare. Ballard’s book is a tribute to the courage, determination, and skill on both sides of the struggle.

Major Jeffrey L. LaFace, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Harlan Ullman, the former naval officer who popularized the phrase “shock and awe,” in a book by the same name (Kesinger Publishing, Whitefish, MT, 2004) diagnoses the failures in America’s role in the Global War on Terrorism in his current book, Finishing Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror, which is a starting point for anyone attempting to rethink the Global War on Terrorism.

Ullman suggests that America should recognize it cannot win the Global War on Terrorism as presently conceived. Radical Islam poses a political danger to America and threatens “massive disruption through real or threatened terrorist attacks.” Ullman further asserts the U.S. Government (as currently organized) cannot protect its citizens. He calls for governmental reform, congressional discipline, safeguards for individual liberties, and a conceptual shift from national defense to national security. Finally, Ullman recommends a comprehensive rather than a specific solution to global problems, and suggests that America “expand regional security arrangements more broadly.”

Arguing that America is not fighting a war against terrorism but against militant Islamic fundamentalism, Ullman says America should think of the Global War on Terrorism in terms of a struggle against an opponent and ideas rather than against a method. Ullman’s ideas are interesting, but some of his recommendations are likely beyond reach. He posits that the struggle against radical Islam will not end until the Israeli-Palestinian and Pakistani-Indian conflicts are resolved, and that is not likely to be any time soon. Establishing a national security university (a broader version of the National Defense University) to educate a broader section of America’s government in national security is more within reach.

Finishing Business has interesting, creative ideas. Though some are impractical, some might conceivably be implemented. Many more need further analysis.

Mitchell McNaylor, Gainesville, Florida


No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation addresses the theoretical debate over whether nuclear weapons proliferation enhances or diminishes international stability. Some rational-choice theorists (proliferation optimists) argue that proliferation helps deter major war by creating a threat of nuclear escalation, making the potential costs of war higher than the projected gains. These theorists argue that because nuclear weapons are so valuable, regimes will be motivated to ensure nuclear security and safety.

Competing theorists (proliferation pessimists) reject the rational-choice model in whole or argue that safety and security concerns surrounding proliferation outweigh deterrent benefits. Nathan E. Busch looks at the record of several current and potential nuclear states to assess their command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions and their discipline in fissile material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) to see which position is better supported.

Busch has meticulously documented case studies, (there are 97 pages of endnotes); however, the
sensitive nature of the information results in a lack of comprehensive data regarding C3I for cases other than those in the United States. Likewise, the top-secret nature of nuclear weapons programs, particularly clandestine efforts, makes it impossible to thoroughly evaluate MPC&A. Accordingly, much of the analysis is built on extrapolating measures from nonnuclear or foreign programs and assuming similar application in a nuclear context.

Busch concludes that proliferation is destabilizing because states with new nuclear weapons programs appear unable or unwilling to install high-tech security features on weapons; are incapable of developing reliable early warning systems that would permit other than launch-on-warning strategies; and are unlikely to observe strict discipline in securing fissile material. He also emphasizes the danger of domestic political instability, citing post-Soviet Russia’s difficulties in ensuring nuclear security. Although such arguments raise points of serious concern, the speculative nature of the available evidence makes this conclusion simply one alternative.

Proliferation optimists note that no major war has ever been directly fought between two nuclear powers, nor has a nuclear weapon ever been fired in an inadvertent, unauthorized, or accidental manner. Moreover, to date we have no knowledge of a successful theft of a nuclear weapon, and the only major nuclear accidents we know of originated from civil nuclear programs rather than weapons programs. While the book is a valuable addition to the proliferation debate, the reality of limited information impedes the book’s central inquiry.

Clifton W. Sherrill, Ph.D., Tallahassee, Florida


Faced with overwhelming odds against an army twice its size and leading a half-starved, poorly-equipped force during a winter campaign, Confederate General John Bell Hood never had a chance to reclaim middle Tennessee from the Union Army. Hood’s poor command decisions only made a bad situation worse, and in effect, doomed his southern forces.

Hood missed an opportunity in Franklin, Tennessee, to strike Union forces on the march and ordered a frontal assault into the teeth of the Union’s main defense. Once at Franklin, conditions were set for a successive disaster at the battle of Nashville. Although Hood chose to take the offensive rather than capture Nashville proper, he did not have the forces necessary to withstand a major Union assault.

James Lee McDonough points out Hood’s poor command decisions while pointing out the heroic accounts of individual soldiers and regiments. Unfortunately, the story is difficult to follow because McDonough tries to explain unit movements and tactical maneuvers without using adequate graphics. He provides only two simple sketches of Nashville, one from 1864 and one from 2004. The maps add little information for those unfamiliar with Nashville and are not precise enough to provide meaningful information for those who are familiar.

The book is a worthwhile study in battle command, however, and provides a good analysis of the complexities and interaction of decisionmaking at the tactical and operational levels.

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Acts of Injustice done between the setting and the rising sun
In history lie like bones, each one.
—W.H. Auden, The Ascent of F6

Throughout the history of warfare, mankind has chronicled human suffering and the extraordinary accomplishments of men and women motivated by survival and love of country. Bob Wilbanks explores these extremes in the Pacific Theater during World War II by examining the ordeals of Glenn “Mac” McDole, one of 11 survivors of Palawan Prison Camp 10A (a camp located on a remote Pacific island).

At the outset of war, Japan’s armies captured thousands of American and Allied soldiers, sailors, marines, and civilians. These prisoners of war (POWs) and internees were held in camps extending from Burma to the Philippines and even to mainland Japan. Regardless of location, the Japanese treated all captives with the same contempt: starvation, disease, beatings, torture, and execution were the norm.

Wilbanks’s biography follows McDole from his enlistment in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1940 to his retirement from law enforcement in 1989. Exceptionally researched and written, this book provides valuable insight into the Imperial Japanese Army’s initial exploits in the months following the attack on Pearl Harbor; the brutal fighting at Cavite, Los Banos, and Fort Hughes; the siege of Corregidor; and the subsequent capture and imprisonment of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Filipinos, and civilians.

Firsthand accounts of terrible camp conditions, horrific treatment endured by McDole and his comrades at the hands of Japanese soldiers and prison guards, and daily fights for survival make this book worth reading. More important, the book brings to light the little publicized massacre of 139 American POWs. Wilbanks describes how the Japanese used false air raids to get prisoners into underground shelters, then poured gasoline on top of them and used dynamite and machineguns to murder them. The 11 men who escaped survived the ordeal by hiding in coral caves, swamps, and jungles. Wilbanks details the roles they played during the war crime trials in Yokohama, Japan, in November 1945 for “minor” war criminals.

The book is an excellent companion to Edward Flanagan’s Angels at Dawn: The Los Banos Raid (Presidio Press, a Division of Random House, Westminster, MD, 1999); Judith L. Pearson’s Belly of the Beast I (New American Library, New York, 2001);

LTC Edward D. Jennings, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Alfred Emile Cornebise’s The United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938, provides insight into an exotic, almost forgotten era of U.S. regimental annals. The 15th Infantry Regiment’s (IR) experience in China from 1912 to 1938 epitomizes the U.S. Army’s small constabulary forces that existed before the massed armies of World War II.

The 15th IR, which operated as an isolated garrison in China, had an ambiguous mission that caused it to drift from usefulness to anachronism. Originally sent to protect U.S. citizens’ rights and properties during the instability of the Chinese monarchy in 1912, the 15th IR stayed on as a symbolic presence until recalled because of heightened Japanese aggression and American isolationist tendencies in the late 1930s. During this period, 15th IR personnel became the “great observers” of the evolution toward a modern China.

The book is not about U.S. military policy in China but is, rather, a detailed look at the 15th IR’s men, environment, and regimental lives. Here, the book succeeds admirably. Cornebise successfully links future military leaders George C. Marshall, Albert Wedemeyer, Joseph Stillwell, Matthew Ridgeway, and Walton Walker with the 15th IR and describes the challenges and lifestyle these men encountered. In particular, Cornebise draws conclusions about how Marshall and Stillwell’s stints with the 15th IR affected their careers. He references other future generals in the text but leaves the reader wondering what happened to them. Adding an appendix that lists the general officers of the 15th IR would have been helpful.

A solid bibliography of primary and secondary sources draws material from the The Sentinel, the 15th IR’s newspaper. Unfortunately, to compensate for the newspaper’s omission in the historical record, Cornebise tends to overuse it in the text.

I strongly recommend the book to scholars interested in the U.S. Army during the interwar years. The book provides a window into this period through the eyes of the 15th IR, whose unusual setting sets it apart from other military histories of the era.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland


The word “final” in the title of Fred Borch and Daniel Martinez’s Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report Revealed is not an empty claim. This indeed should be the final assessment of whom to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

The reader who knows little about Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short’s conduct on 7 December can learn here all they need to know. Countless books and reports look at other aspects of the attack, but this one clearly and objectively tells the story of how loyal and embittered champions of Kimmel and Short have attempted to clear their names.

The core of the book is the 1995 “Dorn Report,” named for Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn, who at the request of Senator Strom Thurmond investigated the question of posthumously promoting Kimmel and Short. The officers’ families and supporters saw such promotions (restoration of Kimmel’s rank to four stars and Short’s rank to three stars) as a vindication of the officers’ behavior at Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and Short advocates hoped that Dorn’s investigation would be objective and shorn of military bias. Borch and Martinez clearly show that the advocates’ hopes were fulfilled.

Borch, a career Army lawyer, was assigned by Dorn as an investigator and one of three writers of the report. Martinez is a respected historian highly knowledgeable about the Pearl Harbor attack. Their annotations include succinct explanations of murky military personnel regulations; a devastating 5-1/2 page critique that shows how Kimmel and Short’s “mental unreadiness” radiated through the Navy and Army command structures; and how “no one else in Hawaii was mentally prepared either.” Borch and Martinez named other general officers who were also relieved of command primarily because of judgment errors during World War II.

The authors link Kimmel and Short’s professional actions directly to the promotion issue that launched the investigation: “Given their errors in judgment, and the death and destruction that followed from these mistakes, the loss of a few stars is not much to ask of them.”

Tom Allen, Bethesda, Maryland


Just when you think every conceivable subject of World War II has been visited, along comes J. Revell Carr’s All Brave Sailors. Carr recounts the little-known World War II story about the survivors of a tramp steamer sunk in the summer of 1940.

As former director and president of Mystic Seaport, Connecticut, Carr became interested in the 18-foot “jolly boat” that carried the survivors of the British tramp steamer Anglo-Saxon on their ill-fated 70-day journey. Carr also tells the story of the German surface raider, Widder, which was responsible for sinking the steamer. Carr’s insightful account personalizes a seldom-chronicled area of World War II and the significant contributions of the Allied merchantmen and the German Reich’s equally committed sailors.

Carr’s meticulous investigation of the Anglo-Saxon’s sinking is
impressive. Readers will appreciate the careful research into the various crews’ characters, especially Hellmuth von Ruckteschell, the captain of the Widder, who was eventually tried as a war criminal.

Military history readers will benefit from this enthralling account, a little-known World War II action. All Brave Soldiers highlights the best of man’s perseverance and the evil he is capable of during wartime.

**LTC Timothy McKane, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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The deluge of terrorism “experts” since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks makes it hard to know who is real and who is a poseur. Marc Sageman is real.

Sageman, a foreign service officer in Afghanistan from 1986 to 1989, lived among the Mujahideen and battled the Soviet Army. Returning from Afghanistan, he worked in America as a forensic psychiatrist applying theories of antisocial behavior to murder investigations and earned a doctorate in political sociology focusing on terrorist-group dynamics.

Sageman brings his wealth of knowledge to bear from an empirical case study of nearly 200 captured or documented Mujahideen. His results form the foundation of Understanding Terror Networks. He refines the perspective from which so much knee-jerk terrorism analysis has been done since 11 September. By taking a measured look at the facts, he hopes to “go beyond the headlines and journalistic accounts [of jihadist terror] and stimulate a more sophisticated discourse on the topic.”

Theoretical pitfalls to be avoided in terrorism analysis are a product of the intelligence analyst’s professional culture. Intelligence analysts tend to base their research only on classified and, presumably, privileged intelligence reports. Sageman argues that more information is always better than less, and classified intelligence might not deserve its privileged place in intelligence research. The intelligence world’s culture of secrecy also discourages peer review of analysis, a sine qua non of good research in any rigorous discipline. Because analysts and officials are eager to arrive at hard-edged assessments to hang policies, Sageman argues they push premature thinking through a narrow review process that arrives at half-baked conclusions.

Intelligence analysts are also inclined to assume Islamic terrorists’ recruiting processes are like the classic agent-acquisition model in espionage—a candidate is spotted, developed, and won over by the assiduous efforts of the recruiting organization. What little we know about jihadists, however, seems not to fit the spy paradigm. In a case study of nearly 200 Mujahideen, Sageman concludes most of them joined the global jihadist movement on their own initiative. They were not recruited by Al-Qaeda representatives.

Understanding Terror Networks has a few faults. The index lacks detail, and Sageman spends an unseemly amount of energy arguing that the CIA’s involvement in the Afghan jihad—an enterprise in which he shared—was not responsible for the “blowback” of Islamic terrorism against the West. Still, Sageman’s critique is valuable. Terrorist attacks make it hard to know what might be done since 11 September.

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Sidney Reilly, fluent in Russian, French, German, and English, was the British secret service agent who plotted to overthrow the Bolshevik government, but in 1925 was caught, interrogated, and executed. He is buried in the inner yard of the Lubyanka secret police headquarters in Moscow. A gambler and a womanizer, Reilly enjoyed the lifestyle of the monied class, but he was no James Bond. He was an opportunist, a flim-flam man, a likeable scoundrel and, most likely, a murderer. Many of his deeds were of his own invention, but his future biographers recorded them as truth.

Reilly was a master spy, con artist, serial bigamist, and also a man of mystery. Several books and magazine and newspaper articles have been written about him. Reilly was also the inspiration for Ian Fleming’s James Bond series and the subject of a 1983 BBC miniseries, *Reilly: Ace of Spies*. So, what could one more book about a century-old spy tell us? Plenty, it turns out.

Most books about Reilly were written by his fans, a wife (Pepita Reilly), the son of a famous fellow agent (Robin Bruce Lockhart), and enthusiasts such as Fleming, Michael Kettle, Andrew Lycett, and Edward Van Der Rhoer. Andrew Cook is none of these. He set out to penetrate and debunk the myths and legends surrounding Reilly (many created by Reilly himself) to discover Reilly the man.

Cook, who frequently writes about espionage, served as an aide to Britain’s Secretary of State for Defense, George Robertson. Cook had access to closed MI6 documents and to closed or restricted records in Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, Poland, the Ukraine, and the United States. He also had access to intelligence files, personal testimonies, and an actual Soviet participant. He supplemented these records by examining available passport and birth records, academic transcripts, immigration documents, marriage certificates, military records, and business records.

To appreciate Reilly the man, the reader should first know Reilly the legend. Cook penetrates Reilly’s myths, but does not tell the actual story. Reilly seems destined to remain one of Britain’s best-known secret agents along with the fictional characters of James Bond and Austin Powers. While Cook’s tome helps penetrate Reilly’s mystery, he raises other questions, such as, how Reilly
beat the vetting process. He clearly did not, in the argot of Austin Powers, “Behave!”

LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, 
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


“Humans are more important than hardware” is a Special Forces truism that informs this riveting account by Linda Robinson, a respected journalist with an extensive background in military affairs. Robinson bases her informative and penetrating book on in-depth research, numerous interviews, and firsthand observances of the U.S. Army Special Forces in the field. Avoiding the breathless prose too often used to portray those who wear the Green Beret as Rambo-like supercommandos, Robinson depicts her subjects as flesh and blood. The reality is impressive enough.

The book’s subtitle is misleading. There is nothing “secret” here; this really is just a history of the last 20 years or so of an organization that is now more than 50 years old. These specially selected and trained soldiers certainly are “masters of chaos.” While all battlefields are chaotic, Special Forces often find themselves in particularly complex operational environments. Only a special breed of person can operate far beyond the reach of supporting ground forces and live among indigenous peoples while training them in guerrilla warfare or conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct-action raids. Those best suited to these demands typically display a unique blend of toughness, sensitivity, independence, and self-discipline.

Robinson introduces the reader to two-dozen officers and noncommissioned officers who qualified for Special Forces in the early 1980s. She follows them through 15 years of deployments to El Salvador, Panama, Operation Desert Storm, Somalia, and the Balkans. While recounting their successes—and occasional failures—Robinson not only illuminates their tactics and techniques, she captures the peculiarly collaborative culture of the operational detachment or “A Team,” where competence confers at least as much credibility as rank. Fully half the book describes the soldiers’ exploits in Afghanistan and Iraq following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Here, in their most prominent combat employment since Vietnam, Special Forces achieved results out of all proportion to their numbers, the sine qua non of special operations.

Robinson concludes her book with cautions and reflections about the future. Special operations forces are an extraordinary asset, but they cannot be mass produced nor created quickly or cheaply. And, while they can accomplish great things, particularly at the murky intersection of diplomacy, intelligence, and military force, they are not a panacea or substitute for other tools of national power. Nevertheless, given their capabilities and recent successes, they are likely to play an increasingly important role in our engagements abroad.

COL Alan Cate, USA, Retired, Carlisle, Pennsylvania


Kevin F. Kiley, a former artillery officer, has given us a loving treatment of a topic obviously near and dear to his heart—artillery equipment, tactics, and organization during the Napoleonic Wars. His book is a wealth of detail and a wonderful source work on the era. He is not really arguing anything new from the standpoint of artillery use during this era; however, he does reinforce the increasing importance of artillery on the battlefield and its concurrent importance to emerging combined arms tactics.

Kiley painstakingly highlights the evolution of 18th-century artillery systems culminating in Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval’s famous system of boring out cannon barrels instead of casting the bore into the piece, which allowed for finer tolerances. Especially noteworthy are numerous block quotes pertaining to artillery by de Gribeauval, Baron Jean du Teil, and Jacques de Guibert to whom Emperor Napoleon Bona-

parte owed so much.

However, the book is more than just a paean to the French. (It describes the artillery of all the major European armies, and the last chapter addresses artillery as the key to American General Andrew Jackson’s victory at the Battle of New Orleans.) But the book’s principal focus is on the French system, especially its tactics and leadership. The epilogue addresses the Old Guard artillery at Waterloo.

The book uses a mixture of secondary and primary sources and is especially well done with respect to line charts and plates that add value to technical discussions in the narrative. Napoleonic scholars will find the book, especially the technical portions, a valuable addition to their libraries. It should be of interest to general military historians.

CDR John T. Kuehn, USN, 
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia lies at the intersection of political science and war studies. Originally a doctoral dissertation at King’s College, London, this work is now recast as a book. Its author, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, is a lecturer at Utrecht University in the Netherlands.

Prima facie, this book seems germane to the military reader since its title implies an analysis of failed states and small wars, and an argument in favor of or against the continued relevance of the theories of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. However, this book is only of marginal use to Military Review’s readers because it offers a somewhat self-evident and nearly tautological framework for analysis.

Duyvesteyn’s principal aim is to refute the notion that Clausewitz’s work is irrelevant to non-Trinitarian wars by proving that these wars are essentially Trinitarian. Her comparative analysis focuses on the wars in Liberia and Somalia during the early 1990s.

The book begins with a short explanation of Trinitarian war, non-
Trinitarian war, and Duyvesteyn’s hypotheses. She provides short overviews of the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia, which any military reader familiar with those conflicts can rapidly skim. Three chapters analyze and compare the wars through the lenses of three stated variables: political actors, political interests, and political instruments in the context of conventional war. The book concludes with policy implications for similar future interventions. Although some of Duyvesteyn’s proposed solutions to these implications are rather Pollyanna-ish, this section of the book is most relevant to military professionals. Principally, Duyvesteyn argues that the three components of the Clausewitzian trinity—the state, the army, and the people—are still present in wars with nonstate armed groups in failed states.

Duyvesteyn substitutes the idea of “political actors” for the actual legal entity of the state. Her supporting postulation is that actors undertaking armed conflict in failed states are in fact political actors who fight for political interests, pursue political interests, use military force as a political instrument, and fight conventionally. Curiously, perhaps to complete Clausewitz’s timing, she considers it necessary to prove that the factions in these types of wars fight conventionally. For example, she says: “The use of the military instrument for political purposes in a conventional manner will further prove the continuing validity of Clausewitzian thinking.”

Clausewitz and African War describes topical subjects. Its analysis of these wars raises issues and challenges that the U.S. military is still confronting in Afghanistan and Iraq. The conclusion poses three principal questions: What do you do with the leaders of armed factions? Do you disarm them or establish security first? How do you win over a population that has been brutalized by conflict? Duyvesteyn also emphasizes the enduring questions of conflict that must be answered before the United States and other Western militaries undertake these types of interventions: Who is fighting, why are they fighting, and how are they fighting?

The book has two flaws that make reading a bit onerous: Duyvesteyn uses passive voice and her syntactical constructs are bothersome. Also, she poses a theoretical framework that postulates that Clausewitz is still germane to non-Trinitarian war by attempting to demonstrate that two such wars were in fact Trinitarian, which seems somewhat tautological.

**LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait**

**AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign 1989-1991**


*Airpower Advantage* is an excellent history of planning for the Persian Gulf War air campaign during 1989 and 1990. Diane T. Putney, a professional historian with 20 years experience with the U.S. Air Force, draws extensively from archival documentation, interviews with air planners, and postwar reports to produce a thorough, well-researched book that might well be a definitive history.

Putney reviews the planning process from the prewar operations plan through the initial plan prepared by the Air Staff’s Deputy Director for Warfighting Concepts (also called Checkmate), through Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm planning, through the integration of Army ground campaign planning, through the merging of the four phases, to the execution of the campaign. Of note is that the book focuses on planning for the air campaign but spends only about 20 pages on execution and, despite the title, does end with the war in 1990.

The book details the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC); the roles and relationships between the joint staff and the combatant commander; the roles and relationships between the JFACC and his staff and units; and the professional complexities of national intelligence support, imagery dissemination, battle damage assessment, and the use of a master attack plan (MAP) to help in producing the air tasking order (ATO). The MAP was a noteworthy innovation by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel David Deptula, who viewed the ATO as an administrative vehicle to get the plan out to units. Deptula believed the United States should not associate planning with the ATO, but, instead, should associate processing with the ATO.

While General H. Norman Schwartzkopf expected an air campaign with four distinct phases, the final product was a merging of the four phases with overlap and shifting emphasis during every phase. Of interest is that well-planned ATOs were prepared for only the first two days. After the first two days went smoother than anticipated, it was apparent it would have been useful to have a basic, preplanned ATO on which to build. Finally, Putney addresses concerns from the corps commanders that airpower was not responsive to their concerns, making the point that airpower was responsive to the theater commander’s priorities and serviced all targets, although not necessarily when the corps commanders wanted.

While readers with a knowledge of the U.S. Air Force’s organization, its doctrine, and the tactical air control system will enjoy the book, all readers interested in the operational level of war should also explore Putney’s work.

**LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA, Charlottesville, Virginia**


Brian Herbert is a *New York Times* bestselling author of several novels related to the *Dune Saga* (Orion Publishing Co., Great Barrington, MA, 1981), created by his father Frank Herbert. Brian Herbert is also an author of original publications in his own right. *The Forgotten Heroes: The Heroic Story of the United States Merchant Marine* (USMM), is one of those.

The USMM has contributed to America’s defense from the American Revolution to the present, but has not been recognized for its contributions during World War II. *The Forgotten Heroes* chronicles
the USMM’s actions during World War II.

Paraphrasing Brian Herbert: the USMM, while not an armed service, faced death and destruction on all the fronts on which U.S. armed services fought. According to the War Shipping Administration, the USMM suffered the highest rate of casualties of any service during World War II.

One reason the USMM is not as recognized as the Army or Navy is it did not record the events in which it participated. Also, the official policy was that because USMM personnel were civilians they did not deserve the same recognition as uniformed services. Eventually, this policy was changed, and USMM personnel received U.S. Armed Services decorations as civilians serving under Navy and Army authority. In 1945, once the war was over, the USMM continued to serve by transporting personnel and cargo to and from recovering nations.

Richard L. Milligan, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The continued Global War on Terrorism highlights the importance of traditional, old-fashioned spying. In an age where the lone actor has replaced the nation-state as the prime threat, the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) has superseded technical disciplines such as imagery and signals interception.

In CIA Spymaster, Clarence Ashley delivers a biography of perhaps America’s best HUMINT-er, George Kisevalter, who, ironically, was born in Tsarist Russia. Kisevalter left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution and eventually became a case officer for the CIA. He possessed an excellent memory, had a way with people, and had a facility for languages. The White Russian expatriate was also an ardent anti-communist.

Ashley uncovers the guts of Kisevalter’s operations, in particular how he handled, debriefed, and protected the identities of his most important agents, including two highly placed Soviet moles—Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov and Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Popov gave the Agency its first serious look at the inner workings of Soviet Military Intelligence and identified several Soviet agents working inside the United States. Penkovsky delivered reams of documents, including details about Soviet missile and nuclear weapons systems—information that was later used to craft America’s response to Khrushchev’s deployment of missiles in Cuba. Kisevalter’s spies stole thousands of classified documents for the CIA during the 1950s and 1960s.

Ashley and Kisevalter were close friends. After Kisevalter’s death in 1997, Ashley created a history for Kisevalter’s family from taped debriefings about many of Kisevalter’s exploits. He describes Kisevalter’s life and service to the CIA in exquisite detail. Ashley’s unique access to Kisevalter is a strength and weakness for the book. He presents lengthy first-person accounts about Kisevalter’s cases. In some chapters, however, Ashley uses pages of Kisevalter’s quotes, seeming hesitant to describe events in his own words. While it is understandable that Ashley eulogizes his friend when he talks about the CIA, it means readers interested in intelligence must wade through mundane details to experience masterful espionage. For example, when describing Kisevalter’s civilian life Ashley includes the entire chemical process used to extract retinol from alfalfa.

Intelligence specialists and espionage aficionados will benefit most from reading CIA Spymaster. Other books might give better descriptions of the Cold War, the CIA, and human intelligence, but Ashley successfully delivers the “history of the man” who was the CIA’s best Cold War case officer.

CPT Andrew R. Marvin, USA, Honolulu, Hawaii