NOTE TO THE READER: This generic political-military plan is an educational aid for government officials, including both military and civilian, to better coordinate and plan for a complex contingency operation. The first generic pol-mil plan was developed in 1995 to facilitate interagency training activities. Since that time this generic pol-mil plan has been updated periodically to capture lessons learned from recently conducted missions. Accordingly, the reader should view this generic plan as a “living document” because it integrates recent “best practices” under the Advance Planning Process, the methodology used within the interagency to complete policy planning tasks at the strategic level in anticipation of a complex emergency. This document should be viewed as a representative plan since an actual pol-mil plan often varies somewhat due to specific policy planning requirements for a particular operation. Nonetheless, the format and content of this generic plan are very similar to those produced by the interagency since 1996. Those efforts produced pol-mil plans in about 3-5 weeks time in anticipation of a regional crisis. These planning efforts were initiated normally by the Deputies Committee, although a few originated at the call of the NSC, a department Under Secretary, a U.S. Ambassador or a regional Combatant Commander. Please note that this generic plan does not in any way determine U.S. policy for any particular crisis that may occur in the future.
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

Purpose
Summarize the purpose of the pol-mil plan. Describe the crisis and its associated threat to regional peace and security. Forecast what adverse developments loom on the horizon if the situation grows worse.

Geo-Strategic Situation
Explain why the crisis is important for policy makers to be concerned about—highlight the geo-strategic affects of the emergency, with emphasis on how it will likely affect the United States at home and abroad. Emphasize the important geo-strategic realities posed by this crisis.

Crisis Planning Scenario
Describe briefly the crisis planning scenario as outlined in Section 1.0 of this plan. Briefly forecast what events are likely to occur as well as the potential scope of instability that could arise as the crisis unfolds.

Key Actor(s) / Adversary(s)
Name the key actor or adversary in this crisis and highlight his likely intentions, aims and commitment in the emergency. Convey a sense of who this actor is and what he seeks in this crisis at the end of the day.

Policy Planning Guidance
Summarize the Principals / Deputies Committee’s policy planning guidance as presented in Section 2.0 of this plan. Emphasize what Principals / Deputies view as critical in managing down this crisis.

U.S. Strategic Purpose
Present the broad U.S. purpose in responding to this crisis, as stated in Section 4.0 of this plan.

Mission Statement
Present the mission statement for the complex contingency operation as spelled out in Section 4.0 of this plan.

Desired Pol-Mil Endstate
Present the desired political-military endstate for the mission as spelled out in Section 4.0 of this plan.
U.S. Political-Military Strategy
Summarize the U.S. strategy to manage down this crisis on our terms as presented in its entirety in Section 5.0 of this plan. Highlight the central thrust of the U.S. approach as well as the major components of the strategy to achieve our aims and summarize the core strategy that strengthens the current U.S. position to act on our terms in this crisis; the crisis prevention strategy that seeks to avert the crisis; the coercive strategy that outlines both military and non-military coercive measures to be taken in harmony against key actors and adversaries; the escalation control strategy that seeks to contain the spread and escalation of hostilities; and last, hedging strategies for major geo-strategic discontinuities that would require a full reassessment of the Administration’s approach to managing down this crisis.

Mission Organization
Briefly describe the coalition that will be formed to carry out this strategy and list the likely participating nations and organizations that will form the core of the coalition’s capabilities. Briefly explain how the coalition will be led and supported.

Concept of Implementation
Summarize the concept of implementation as presented in Section 6.0 of this plan

Major Mission Areas
List the Mission Areas as presented in Section 8.0 that require intense interagency planning and coordination at all levels—political, strategic, operational and tactical. These Mission Areas include a range of critical efforts involving diplomatic, political, military, anti-terrorism, law enforcement, economic, public diplomacy, emergency response, and security efforts, among others. Emphasize that agency officials are accountable for integrated implementation of lead agency assignments for each Mission Area.

Interagency Management
Describe briefly the special interagency coordinating mechanisms, such as an Executive Committee, or “ExComm,” that will be responsible for interagency management of policy development, coordination, planning and assessment throughout this crisis. The ExComm normally supports the Deputies Committee in its day-to-day management of crisis response. Agency responsibilities for effective participation in interagency management of this crisis are spelled out in Section 9.0.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose
Briefly outline how this political-military plan responds to a tasking, usually issued by the Principals or Deputies Committee, to prepare an interagency plan on an expedited basis (usually in about four weeks time) to deal with a potential or ongoing regional complex emergency. Underlining the importance of the interagency planning effort, highlight specific concerns of the Principals / Deputies Committee that could arise as a result of the evolving emergency situation.

Highlight references that support the development of this pol-mil plan, many of which were prepared under the Advance Planning Process, the methodology used by the USG interagency to conduct policy planning at the strategic level for a regional complex emergency. For example, these references could include:

- Department of State: Regional Policy Assessment and Near-Term U.S. Regional Strategy
- National Intelligence Council: Illustrative Crisis Planning Scenario / Intelligence Community Assessment of the Situation
- Deputies Committee / National Security Council: Initial Policy Planning Guidance to Agencies
- Policy Planning Committee: Interagency Mission Analysis of the Complex Emergency
- Policy Planning Committee / Interagency Working Group: Strategic Outcomes Projection (In Two Years) and Associated Policy Issues Paper
- Deputies Committee / National Security Council: U.S. Strategic Approach to the Crisis

1.2 Geo-Strategic Context
Discuss why the region is important to the United States. Explain in specific terms how the potential or ongoing emergency could have wider adverse consequences for the United States. For example, the crisis could:

- Undermine regional stability & development progress
- Deny access to vital energy supplies or strategic resources
- Weaken alliance / regional organization collaboration & cohesion
- Incite fanaticism & anti-U.S. resentment in the region
- Export terrorism to the U.S. homeland
- Threaten U.S. citizens and facilities abroad
- Radicalize the region & undermine friendly moderate governments
- Jeopardize progress in democratization in the region
- Empower corrupt / criminal governments
- Displace whole populations
- Divert scarce economic resources & diminish economic growth
- Proliferate weapons causing mass casualties
- Promote illegal weapons sales & support mercenary operations
- Perpetrate human rights abuses & atrocities
- Undermine American commercial opportunities in the region
1.3 Summary of the Evolving Situation
Summarize the key events on the road to crisis. In less than a page, briefly highlight the recent events in the country and in the region that have led to (or could trigger) the emergency. Draw attention to the concerns of neighboring states and other influential actors affected by the crisis, as well as any U.S. commitments that may come into play in the future. Explain how at this point why this ongoing emergency could lead to a damaging situation that would require a major contingency operation, such as a protected humanitarian response, an international or regional peacekeeping mission, or a forcible multi-national military intervention in order to bring peace and stability to the region.

1.4 Response Efforts to Date
Outline efforts to date taken by the United States and others to deal with the crisis. Give a brief update on steps taken by key actors, such as the government of the host nation, a key neighboring state, a regional power, the regional organization, a major power, the UN Security Council, or the United States.

1.5 Crisis Planning Scenario
Summarize the crisis planning scenario that, at the direction of the Principals or Deputies Committee, serves as the focus of the interagency pol-mil plan (given that there will likely be several possible scenarios at play in the crisis, but many are not likely to be threatening enough to justify a major complex contingency operation). Forecast how the crisis could likely evolve, with sufficient detail so as to enable policy-makers to appreciate the severity of the emerging situation and make value judgments regarding the consequences of inaction.

A crisis planning scenario helps policy-makers better understand the key actors, the forces at play and the dynamics of a confusing, controversial, and complex situation. Hence, a scenario should not attempt to give perfect forecast of the future situation.

Also, as needed, name any possible scenarios that were specifically ruled out by the Principals or Deputies Committee for interagency pol-mil planning at this time. While these scenarios may be possible, they may be far-fetched or so severe that their occurrence would call for a major U.S. response that would well beyond the scope and scale of what is sensible for the current emergency.

Specifically, list the range of destabilizing events that could occur as a result of the crisis scenario. These developments could include a major humanitarian disaster, internal conflict, civil war and state failure, the rise of a new regional threat, the expansion of terrorism or organized criminal, occupation of disputed territory, restrictions of trade and commerce, missile attacks against a friend or ally in the region, or the use of weapons of mass casualties.

Next, list the specific threats associated with the crisis scenario that would thwart long-term U.S. regional aims. These threats should be clarified because their occurrence would likely raise immediate policy issues for further consideration. Some related threats may include kidnapping of U.S. relief personnel, covert attacks against U.S. diplomats, or U.S. civil and commercial activities in the region, terrorist attacks, organized criminal activity, cyber attacks on U.S. communications and computer systems.

Finally, list the array of unintended consequences that could emerge that would likely pose additional policy issues for consideration. These unintended consequences could include urgent demands by other nations for support, evacuation, early warning, intelligence, emergency aid, air defense, chemical and biological protective gear, immunization, consequence management support operations, and other emergency assistance.
2.0 POLICY OVERVIEW

This section provides the policy context for the operation. It links interests, desired ends, and preferred options to respond to the crisis. Because this section outlines the policy decisions of the Principals and Deputies Committees, it drives the policy planning content of the rest of the pol-mil plan.

2.1 Policy Context
Present the policy context of the crisis. Clarify the important strategic realities regarding the role of the United States plays in ensuring the policy aims can be realized in the face of this crisis. Explain the Administration’s overarching policy aim in resolving this crisis on favorable terms. In addition, outline what policy aims the Principals / Deputies Committee seeks on a range of important ongoing regional initiatives such as regional security, counter terrorism, nonproliferation of WMD, democratization and the rule of law, ethnic or religious accommodation, internal economic reform, commercial relations, and safety of U.S. citizens and facilities in the region. Also, outline briefly what difficulties further chaos and upheaval could bring to wider regional stability.

2.2 Policy Planning Guidance
Express the consensus view of the Principals / Deputies Committee of how the crisis should be contained and brought to an end to bring about the Administration’s overarching desired policy result. Give the Principals / Deputies Committee perspective on how urgent the crisis should be brought to an end on favorable terms as well as how aggressive, intrusive and forceful the United States will be in ensuring a successful outcome. Also, suggest opportunities that are created by the crisis that the Principals / Deputies Committee seek to exploit as part of the overall effort to achieve a desired political result to the crisis.

Discuss how the Principals / Deputies view the U.S. in managing down the crisis expeditiously. Explain how the Administration will seek to marshal international and regional support for its effort and bring together a multi-national consensus to deal with this threat to peace and security. Discuss the thrust of the U.S. strategy of coercive diplomacy to focus power to take the initiative in managing down the crisis. Clarify the Principals / Deputies policy planning guidance for the complex contingency operation, which may include the following:

- What is the overriding U.S. purpose in responding to the crisis? How aggressive does the Administration expect to be in achieving this purpose and bring an end to this emergency?
- What is the desired outcome or end state of the operation? In terms of our overall long-term regional strategy, what does the Administration view as the important outcomes of the operation?
- What is the Administration’s basic approach – e.g. the use of coercive diplomacy – in achieving our policy aims?
- What international or regional entity is to be constituted or employed to bring an end to crisis on favorable terms?
- What nations in the region and elsewhere are key to sustaining political will through the duration of the operation to end the crisis on our terms? How aggressively will the United States go about in marshalling their support, bolstering their resolve, and ensuring their cooperation during and after the crisis?
- What previous commitments, if any, will the Administration honor?
- What additional responsibilities will the Administration accept (or not accept) throughout the duration of the response? If the U.S. does not accept some responsibilities, who does the Administration think will shoulder these responsibilities?
- Who will manage the day-to-day implementation of the strategy to bring about our policy aims? What interagency group – e.g. an ExComm – is to support the Deputies Committee.
2.3 U.S. Interests at Stake
State U.S. interests at stake in the crisis—what is the Administration is concerned about as a consequence of this emergency. Possible U.S. concerns could be:

- Regional security and cooperation
- Humanitarian and human rights abuses
- Safe havens for terrorists
- Scarce resources and access to markets and trade
- Non-proliferation of use of WMD
- Progress toward democratization
- Internal political transition and democratization
- Economic reform, recovery and privatization
- New commercial relations in the region
- Safety of U.S. citizens and security of U.S. facilities and activities
- Advancement of American values abroad

Note that U.S. interests are determined by many factors, not all are complementary, and in fact some interests may clash with others. Consequently, a crisis naturally poses several policy issues, and each will require timely resolution as the emergency unfolds.

2.4 Regional Policy Aims
Outline the several regional policy aims of the United States in responding to the emergency. Note that some policy aims pertain to region-wide priorities, while others focus on host country itself.

2.4.1 U.S. Policy Aims for the Region and Elsewhere: Outline the several regional aims sought by the Administration in this crisis. Here is a sample listing:

- Sustain cohesion within a regional organization and cooperation with the United States
- Protect regional allies and friends
- Restrain neighboring states from attacking the host nation
- Prevent expansion of the conflict elsewhere in the region
- Minimize civilian casualties, adverse collateral effects, or environmental damage.
- Thwart terrorist threats to U.S. persons and facilities in the region
- Deter use of WMD by any party
- Safeguard U.S. citizens and protect U.S. facilities and activities against hostile action
- Enhance U.S. influence in the region on a long-term basis

2.4.2 U.S. Policy Aims Regarding the Host Nation & The Threat to Peace and Security: Outline the several aims that pertain to the host country and the threat to peace and security. Here is a sample generic listing:

- Avoid provocations leading to unwanted U.S. involvement
- Neutralize the rebellion’s military, militia, and terrorist capabilities
- Defend against air attacks on a regional state by the rebellion’s forces
- Bring a cessation of hostilities within the host nation
- Avert potential civil war or wider chaos in the host country
- Isolate the rebellion’s logistic, financial, and informational capabilities
- Avert expanded hostilities in the region that would interrupt commerce and trade in the region
- Deter escalation of conflict by any party
• Deter and neutralize WMD threats by any party
• Work with the host country regime in implementing democratic reforms
• Implement a broad post-conflict reconstruction effort in the host country
• Assist all regional states in conducting relief and restoration operations following hostilities
• Establish new regional confidence-building measures
• Preclude future aggression through a region-wide cooperative security framework

2.4.3 Potential Aims NOT SOUGHT in this Crisis:
Explicitly rule out any potential aims, such as regime change, that are NOT sought by the Administration under current policy planning guidance. It may be necessary to outline the rationale for not pursuing some aims.

2.5 Preferred Strategic Approach
Taking into account the U.S. Strategic Approach, a document prepared by the NSC under the Advance Planning Process for this crisis, briefly outline what the Principals / Deputies Committee seek to accomplish in its strategy to bring an end to this crisis on the Administration’s terms. Highlight the key drivers for achieving success in undertaking the strategy, usually a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Show the links of diplomacy and force along with other means to be used to bring an end to the crisis on our terms. Discuss ways key regional players can participate in the operation to leverage their comparative advantages. Highlight key vulnerabilities in sustaining a successful strategy and how those vulnerabilities will be protected or avoided.

Describe, from the beginning, how the Principals / Deputies see the operation unfolding – the expected momentum of events as the contingency operation unfolds. Discuss how events are likely to proceed from discussions on common interests at risk, to quiet diplomacy with the parties backed by carrots and sticks, to coercive diplomacy backed by force as necessary. Note that in a usually complex and ambiguous situation, the application of U.S. military force must be adapted, or even constrained, by U.S. policy aims and priorities.

2.6 Major Policy Decisions Through Crisis Resolution
Define the major policy decisions that are expected to arise as the emergency unfolds. This will help Principals and Deputies, as well as our coalition partners, to appreciate the gravity of subsequent policy decisions that will likely arise in order to keep pace with developments in the crisis. Policy makers should recognize that they will be confronted with the many tough decisions as a crisis proceeds to its resolution, such as:

• Decision 1: Should the Coalition adopt a coercive strategy to this threat, a strategy that entails the use of military force against military targets in the host country?
  No—Revise Coalition policies aims, and then adopt an alternative strategic approach.
  Yes—Retain policy aims, prepare national justifications for the use of force. Go to Decision 2.

• Decision 2: Should the Coalition issue an ultimatum to cease continued threats to peace and security?
  No—Revise policy aims, and adopt an alternative strategic approach.
  Yes—Issue an ultimatum, and then position capabilities to use force. Go to Decision 3.

• Decision 3: Should the Coalition conduct limited military operations if the antagonist fails to meet the terms of the ultimatum?
  No—Accept defeat, revise policy aims, and adopt an alternative approach.
  Yes—Conduct military operations to accomplish specific policy objectives. Go to Decision 4

• Decision 4: Should the Coalition mount expanded military operations, if the rebellion does not surrender after initial operations?
No—Accept defeat, revise policy aims, and adopt an alternative strategic approach.
Yes—Conduct expanded operations consistent with a possible host nation campaign. Go to Decision 5.

- **Decision 6:** If WMD were to be used, should the U.S. respond unilaterally to eliminate the threat?
  - No—Accept the consequences of crossing a WMD threshold in conflict in the Gulf.
  - Yes—Take appropriate action. Go to Decision 7.

- **Decision 7:** Should the Coalition conduct a major post conflict reconstruction effort and establish new regional confidence-building measures?
  - No—Accept victory, but prepare for recurring threats to regional security.
  - Yes—Implement a post conflict reconstruction effort and negotiate new confidence-building arrangements in the region.

### 2.7 Risks and Potential Predicaments
Outline the risks and potential difficulties associated with the proposed complex contingency operation. These unwelcome consequences may develop within the host country, within the region, or among major powers.

### 2.8 Downstream Policy Issues Attendant to the U.S. Strategy
Present the downstream policy questions that are likely to arise as the Administration undertakes its preferred strategy, because once it is initiated, the strategy could possibly lead to major difficulties in the region, which could incur unwelcome consequences for U.S. interests.

### 2.9 Other Possible Strategic Approaches
List the other possible strategic approaches that were considered, but not adopted, by the Principals / Deputies Committee, recognizing that each would entail substantial recasting of U.S. policy aims as well as the Principals / Deputies policy planning guidance. For example, other possible approaches to a measured military response to a threat to important U.S. security interests in a region may be as follows:

- **Contain, watch and wait.** Step back, protect regional states, and encourage the host nation to deal with the threat without outside assistance. Accept the consequences of inaction.
- **Accommodate the threat.** Moderate U.S. policy aims regarding the host nation’s instability. Provide incentives to avoid confrontations with the United States. Revise U.S. policy toward the host nation’s internal stability. Accept consequences for a repeat of this crisis in the months ahead.
- **Align with the threat leadership.** Reverse U.S. policy and provide direct support the rebellion’s leadership. Bolster its breakaway effort to eliminate the current ruling regime. Once a new regime is in place, shape its path of engagement to be friendlier to the United States. Accept consequences for a major ground war in the host nation and upheaval in the region.
- **Co-opt the threat leadership.** Apply appropriate pressure, offer the leadership a “buy-out” option. Give the threat leadership an exit without the possibility of return. Accept consequences for setting a precedent for “selling out” to insurgencies, rebellions or terrorists.
- **Act unilaterally.** Take unilateral military action using overwhelming force against the threat. Unilateral U.S. action would be taken without regional coordination or host nation awareness, to eliminate the threat forces. Accept the adverse consequences for unilateral U.S. military intrusions in the region.
3.0 SITUATION ASSESSMENT

This section presents the interagency's assessment of the potential crisis. It identifies essential elements of information that, in the aggregate, constitute a comprehensive assessment of the situation. Its aim is to provide participating agencies with a clear picture of the key actors and the anticipated operating environment. Key sub-paragraphs for the situation assessment may include the following sections. (See also Appendix B—Intelligence Assessment).

3.1 Assessment of the General Situation

Provide a “big picture” perspective of the anticipated crisis. Summarize the history of the conflict--its origins, major factions, grievances, economic drivers, political aims, and key issues at stake. Sum up the general territorial dimensions of the conflict--forces employed and deployment footprint. Summarize the scale of armed units deployed, relative combat power, scope of violence, and any outside military activities conducted by neighboring states / actors both friendly and hostile. Highlight the legacy of group vengeance—history of aggrieved ethnic or communal group injustices, patterns of atrocities committed, specific groups singled out by abusive government authorities, degree of political exclusion and persecution, and extent of public nationalistic scape-goating of groups by “hate radio” activities. Briefly discuss the warring faction’s leaders / warlords, the faction’s aims and whether any of these aims would be negotiable. Describe the nature of regional or international support for each warring faction. Summarize the economic drivers of continued fighting—internal and external sources of funding to support armed operations. Outline U.S. equities at risk and the nature of the threat posed, if any, by each faction of the conflict to U.S. regional aims. Briefly outline the extent and nature of current multilateral international involvement in the crisis.

3.2 Assessment of the Key Actor(s), Protagonist(s) or Adversary(s)

3.2.1 Key Actor / Adversary Intentions, Aims, Commitment and Motivations

Assess the key actor’s intentions and his degree of commitment to those aims. Explain whether the key actor / adversary will risk hostilities to achieve his aims. Give an explanation for the key actor’s motivations.

3.2.2 Anticipated Key Actor / Adversary Actions in the Near Term

Forecast what actions the key actor / adversary will likely to undertake to achieve his aims in the near term. Include a list of the likely provocations that the key actor could use against his neighbors or others in the region. Then identify the key actor’s likely courses of action to achieve his aims.

3.2.3 Potential for Key Actor / Adversary Cooperation in the Crisis

Given the ongoing internal political situation in the host nation, clarify whether the key actor would be open to negotiations and cooperation due to internal pressures as this crisis unfolds?

3.2.4 Key Actor / Adversary Reactions to Preventive Diplomacy

Briefly forecast the likely reaction to a U.S. preventive strategy (see the range of options outlined in the U.S. Strategic Approach outlined in Section 5.0).

3.2.5 Key Actor / Adversary Reactions to Coercion

Briefly forecast how the key actors will likely respond to anticipated coercive measures (see the range of options outlined in the U.S. Strategic Approach in Section 5.0).
3.2.6 Key Actor / Adversary Actions before Defeat
Assuming that regional and international military-non-military coercion were to be successful in time, forecast what the key actor / adversary would likely do at the point when the shooting stops. Accept defeat and move on? Dither, stall and procrastinate? Play hardball and deceive? What?

3.3 Assessment of the Local Conflict

3.3.1 Internal Political Conflict Situation
Assess the political roots of the conflict. Discuss the host nation's internal political situation or fragmentation or collapse, the political nature of the host government, key centers of power, ruling elite or party, and opposing factions or insurgent groups. Clarify the root sources of internal political conflict (skewed wealth distribution, occupied territory, limited resources, abusive power, ethnic identity, religious rivalry, or ideological confrontation), intensity of grievances, level of political polarization, extremism and mobilization. Describe the type of local government (e.g. clans, tribes, or community groups), status of democratization, and government responsiveness to recent political and social reform initiatives. Assess the extent of criminalization / corruption of the government leadership—profiteering of the ruling elite, resistance to transparency and public accountability, and the rise of crime syndicates linked to the ruling elite.

3.3.2 Ethnic Conflict Situation
Analyze the ethnic foundations of the conflict. Clarify whether one dominant ethnic group (45-90% of the population) controls power, resources and rights at the expense of another group(s). Explain the nature of the country's ethnic divisions—social differentiation based on ethnicity, intensity of internal cohesion within ethnic groups, degree of ethnic hatred and fear between ethnic groups, expected costs and consequences of ethnic defeat for each ethnic faction, nature and power of ethnic group leaders (hard-liner or moderate), and quality of the leadership within each ethnic group. Assess the territorial dimensions of the ethnic conflict—exclusive control of areas, access to natural resources, control of religious sites, etc. Assess political power of ethnic groups in controlling State government functions—the rise of a ruling ethnic elite that owns the State bureaucracy. Explain how the ruling elite distributes State privileges and controls State resources, how the State discriminates and abuses weaker ethnic groups, how the State uses terror to intimidate and control, how the State apparatus limits public services to certain groups, and how the State abuses legal, political and social rights for the narrow political aims of the ruling elite. Discuss the legitimacy of the government among ethnic groups.

Outline uneven economic dimensions of ethnic conflict--group-based inequalities in education, jobs, and economic opportunity, group-based inequalities in economic standing, mortality rates, unemployment, etc. Outline the scope of economic flight—brain drain, emigration of middle class, and other productive segments of affected groups.

On the security side, discuss how the ruling elite uses the State’s security apparatus to control ethnic groups, how the State uses militias or special police to terrorize political opposition. On the military side, assess the stage of escalation or de-escalation of the ethnic conflict—current stage of the fighting, how quickly can the fighting escalate, what are the escalatory dynamics, under what circumstances will the conflict escalate, and under what circumstances will the situation be amenable to mediation. Identify outside sources of support from the Diaspora or neighboring States for military operations of the ethnic insurgent groups in the conflict.

Assess disparities in population demographics. Determine what mounting social pressures exist among competing ethnic or communal groups. Outline pressures from the country’s skewed population distribution owing to “youth or age bulge” or from divergent rates of population growth among competing ethnic or communal groups. Outline the extent of high population density in major ethnic groups relative to food supply and other limited life-sustaining resources. Identify social pressures deriving from ethnic or communal group settlement patterns that restrict the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity.
such as employment and economic opportunity, in-country travel, social interaction, religious worship, etc. Identify pressures resulting from ethnic or communal group settlement patterns in the physical environment such as border disputes, control of valuable natural resources, land ownership and occupancy, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, proximity to environmental hazards, etc.

3.3.3 Military Conflict Situation
Assess the military aspects of the conflict. Discuss the military, para-military, and militia forces operating in the region, numbers of troops, size of operating units, and overall military balance. For each warring faction discuss the type of equipment used and its capabilities, degree of military discipline and cohesion within each faction, and operational military objectives in the conflict. Overall, present the types of forces and tactics employed, scope of violence and destruction, degree of political control over military organizations, and extent of arms flows—sources, type and quantity of weapons supplied.

Characterize the nature of the population’s support for the military factions. Describe the intensity of popular support to the military among the factions. Outline how these indigenous military factions recruit, train and equip troops for use in the conflict.

Assess the threats to the civilian population by ongoing military operations. Discuss the scope of violence carried out against civilian groups and communities and the likely perpetrators of this violence. Identify the potential military requirements for protection of civilians in the armed conflict as specified in UNSCR 1265 (1999) in the event of international peacekeepers or “green helmeted troops” are deployed in the countryside.

3.3.4 Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Situation
Assess the potential for use of WMD in the conflict. Discuss the types, numbers, and locations of weapons of mass destruction. Determine whether there is effective command and control of all WMD systems. Assess current measures to safeguard their security. Describe recent and expected movements of WMD systems. Determine points of leverage to be exploited to deter the use of WMD throughout the crisis. Determine requirements for neutralizing WMD and their related platforms. Assess the potential for use of WMD during the operation and assess possible consequences of WMD use. Identify planning requirements (contamination, humanitarian toll, environmental impact, etc.) for consequent management operations.

3.3.5 Economic Drivers of Conflict Situation
Assess the economic underpinnings of the conflict. Determine the country’s GDP dependence on the export of a primary commodity (e.g., diamonds or other gems, valuable minerals, narcotics, timber, etc.)—clarify whether this dependence exceeds 25% of GDP, a threshold that is linked to continued conflict. Identify the primary spheres of economic activity that are controlled by each warring faction, and discuss how each faction’s leadership and its security forces control and exploit these economic spheres. Given the financial requirements of a soldier’s pay and the costs of arms & equipment, summarize how the opposing armed groups rely on these and other valuable commodities to muster financial support for military operations. From a regional perspective, explain how the armed groups use the conflict for economic gain or profit. Explain how the warring factions exploit weak state border control capabilities with organized private or semi-official networks in the region to exploit economic spheres of interest.

Determine external and internal sources of financing for each warring faction. Externally, assess the scale of financial and weapons support provided by foreign sources—large wealthy Diaspora’s in the U.S., Europe, or the Middle East, and / or international patron states—to each armed faction. Internally, explain how each faction’s military operations are supported financially by prized domestic sources—export of a prime commodity such as diamonds, predatory operations against major businesses, pillaging and plundering of civilians, extortion and hostage-taking, banditry, trading with the enemy, organized private and semi-official corruption, theft and black-markets, labor exploitation, manipulating contracts, stealing relief supplies, etc.  

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Assess how the related economic factors of low income and economic decline further support continued internal conflict. Evaluate whether economic risk factors such as a large population of unemployed males, poor educational level, and rising youth populations contribute to continued conflict. Determine the extent to which the country’s limited economic opportunities and wealth is controlled by one dominant ethnic group (e.g., 45-90% of the population) at the expense of minority ethnic groups involved in the conflict.

3.3.6 Terrorist Threat Situation
Assess the threat of terrorist groups operating in the conflict area. Identify the terrorist groups, the nature of their activities and their political aims. Identify the internal and external sponsors of these terrorist groups and the degree of control the sponsors exercise over the group’s activities. Outline the direct and indirect threats these terrorist groups pose to the international mission. Assess the counter-intelligence capabilities of the terrorist group.

Determine requirements for an integrated counter-terrorist strategy as well as requirements for force protection of the mission. Assess the capabilities of foreign governments in the region and elsewhere to curb terrorist activities. Determine the nature and effectiveness on sanctions on individuals, groups and sponsors. Outline opportunities for law enforcement, military operations and financial controls to curb, disrupt or destroy the terrorist threat.

3.4 Assessment of the Crisis Operating Environment

3.4.1 Humanitarian Emergency Situation
Assess the nature of the humanitarian emergency. Describe recent population movements, location and numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Discuss the level and nature of humanitarian suffering. Assess the threats of further ethnic violence. Explain the distribution of the suffering by region, by class, or by groups. Identify relief requirements for water, food, sanitation, shelter, medical services, heating supplies, household kits, farm tools, or other humanitarian needs. Assess the potential for outbreaks of disease. Identify the most threatening diseases and the capacity to treat them. Assess stockpiles of urgently needed relief supplies in the region and the capability to get them to affected populations. Discuss current and projected activities of the international relief community in the region. Determine the level of coordination among relief groups. Outline support provided by neighboring states to the operation. Specify transportation requirements for emergency relief efforts. Outline any religious or ethnic restrictions or requirements that could affect relief operations.

3.4.2 Landmine and Unexploded Ordinance Threat Situation
Determine the extent and nature of the landmine and unexploded ordinance (UXO) problem in the country. Locate mined and other dangerous areas in the vicinity of key installations and cities. Assess whether mine and UXO awareness training is needed. Determine current level of demining capacity. Determine the current level of UXO response capacity. Suggest clearance priorities.

3.4.3 AIDS & Other Contagious Disease Situation
Assess the threat of AIDS or other contagious diseases to the country’s population and to the personnel operating in the international coalition. Identify specific populations that are currently infected and the expected rate of growth. Assess whether the government has recognized the threat of AIDS and has taken effective action to deal with the pandemic. Outline the extent of ongoing international involvement in country to assist the government. Assess the nation’s medical capacity to treat those already infected as well as the nation’s capacity to control the spread of the disease to the uninfected personnel. Clarify the threat of the disease to international personnel operating in the country. Outline specific protective measures that should be taken by international personnel to prevent the further spread of the disease.

3.4.4 Destruction of Infrastructure and Physical Environment Situation
Assess the scale of destruction on the country’s infrastructure and discuss the impact of the conflict / natural disaster on the country’s physical environment. Assess the condition of power generation and transmission systems. Outline the condition of the country's available infrastructure such as railway systems, airports, roads, bridges, communications, utilities etc. For each port (sea, air, rail, and river), determine the size and type of vessels (including containerized cargo) to be received and the port’s capacity for storage and its related support systems. Describe the potential effects of the physical environment, climate and terrain on the operation. Specify requirements for additional assets or facilities to conduct anticipated operations.

3.4.5 Lawlessness, Civil Order & Public Security Situation
Assess the level of indigenous and trans-national crime, banditry and anarchy within the country. Assess the threat of bandits and criminal gangs against international operations. Discuss the structure, types and missions of host country law enforcement forces, amount of police corruption, degree of enforcement of law and order, the nature, scope and acceptability of police activities, and degree of host country political control of police forces. Discuss the nature of police human rights practices and relationships with the community. Identify specific organizational and operational strengths and weaknesses.

3.4.6 Border Security and Control Situation
Assess the nature and level of destabilizing or illegal cross border activity—arms shipments, military sanctuary, illegal trade and trafficking, population movements, etc. Determine the major points of entry (land, air and sea) and discuss the host country’s degree of control over these points. Describe the capabilities of host country border security forces as well as its customs units, the level of security and control in key areas of concern, and the degree of enforcement of customs law and current sanctions. Assess the amount of border police corruption as well as the nature, scope and acceptability of border police enforcement efforts. Assess the need to strengthen current sanctions regimes. Assess the threat of armed groups, criminal gangs, terrorists, and bandits against any international border monitoring, security and control operation.

3.4.7 Collapsed State / Local Civil Administration Situation
Assess the scale of state failure. Since the lack of state capacity places great demands on an international mission, determine the nature and depth of effective civil administration within the country. Summarize the host country’s existing administrative structure as specified in its constitution and outline the legal framework for the exercise of routine domestic governance. Describe generally how civil administration and public services are provided to the population. Outline the scale and nature of deterioration of essential public services—power, sanitation, health care, education, etc. Determine the current capacity for public services, the number of public service employees and annual expenditures for the following areas of public administration: emergency services, electrical power, oil and gas; transportation, communications, water and waste treatment, trash disposal, and education; health care, housing, human services, employment services, consumer affairs, business activities, agricultural activities, natural resource management, export and trade services, banking and financial services, postal services, and environmental management. Assess critical civil administration needs and the host nation's capacity to meet these requirements. Determine requirements for providing advice and assistance to the local civilian administration.

3.4.8 Rule of Law & System of Justice Situation
Assess the system of justice and existing rule of law. Determine to what extent the functioning system of justice and rule of law contributes to further internal conflict. Discuss the cultural aspects of the nation’s legal system and its basic structure down to the local level. Specify the nation’s existing applicable law used in the legal system, clarify whether it is in dispute, assess whether the country’s legal code incorporates all relevant international norms, including those related to human rights and due process. Determine where domestic capacity exists (and where it does not). Evaluate the effectiveness of courts and administration of justice mechanisms as well as the quality of the penal system (prison facilities, personnel, resources and management, human rights practices and treatment of citizens).
Assess whether the rule of law is non-existent, out of practice, or subject to intimidation by armed elements. Determine whether judicial officials command respect for their professionalism and objectivity. If the judicial system does not command respect, determine whether key groups deemed to be victims of injustice reject the prevailing law, or the justice system, or the judicial officials. Discuss the scale and nature of legal corruption among the professional judiciary.

Explain how the ruling elite or a powerful faction takes advantage of the weak legal and justice system to exploit whatever legal or enforcement vacuums that may exist. Explain to what extent these ruling elite’s or factions are involved in illicit activities or transnational criminal activity. Also, clarify how the penal system is used by the ruling elite to advance its agenda.

Given the current state of the country’s system of justice and rule of law, what is a potential role for the international community in establishing effective rule of law. Determine requirements—professional staff, administrative skills and expertise, language, legal training, resources, intelligence support, etc.—for the international mission to assist in establishing a transitional system of justice and rule of law to support the international community’s mandate. Highlight initial requirements for the international mission, particularly the early-deploying military force, to jumpstart judicial processes early on in the mission. In the longer run, specify initial actions needed to be taken by the civilian component of the international mission to establish effective rule of law in the country early on.

3.4.9 Official Corruption, Organized Crime & Security Force Extortion Threat Situation
Discuss the economic motivations of the conflict. Discuss how each ruling elite, their security forces and organized crime syndicates are married for continued control of local economic spheres. From a regional perspective, explain how officials of the ruling elite and their armed groups use the conflict for economic gain or profit. Specifically outline their illicit business activities – drug trade, trafficking in abducted women, smuggling of stolen goods and vehicles, arms shipments, or other illicit operations.

Assess the nature and extent of organized crime operations in the region. Identify the illegal business interests of each faction and ruling elite. Outline the geographic footprint of organized crime including sources, pipelines, border crossing points, transfer points, distribution centers, and recipients. Name front companies and their associates. Clarify how money flows and is laundered. Explain how customs fees and tax laws are evaded. Given the state of play, identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the international community to control organized crime operations in the host country.

Assess the nature and extent of official corruption. Name key leaders and other public officials—political, military, police, justice, business—who control illicit operations. Assess the “depth of control” these officials exercise over their criminal networks. Determine the scale of economic gain these public officials’ benefit from these illicit operations. Explain how they would sustain their economic gains by continued fighting. Explain how the political leadership manipulates illegal funds and avoids prosecution. Explain how they employ indigenous security forces to control, intimidate, and extort victims so as to preserve their illicit business interests. That said, outline the vulnerabilities of these officials have to loss of influence, to apprehension by police authority, and especially to conviction for past wrongs. Explain how the peace process threatens their power and these economic benefits—who loses what and why?

Assess the region’s and host nation’s capacity to control or eradicate official corruption and organized criminal activities. Assess whether the country’s current laws can be used to deal with official corruption and organized crime. Discuss the quality of the host nation’s customs, police, investigators, prosecutors and witness protection capabilities for dealing with official corruption / organized crime. Discuss the scale of corruption within the judiciary and how accused officials avoid accountability. Explain the role of the media in limiting (or supporting) official corruption / organized crime activity.
In bringing the conflict to an end, discuss the compelling economic agendas that are at play for each warring faction leader / kingpin / warlord. How can these economic rewards for continued fighting be controlled or reduced—such as through economic sanctions, through denial of access to natural resources, through alternative markets, or through criminal apprehension and prosecution. How could the rewards for peace and stability, if any exist, be put into play in the near term? How could a peace process accommodate the interests of the rebel leadership? If demobilization is being considered as part of the peace process, what realistic economic incentives, given the local economy, could be considered for ex-soldiers to offset the economic benefits of continued fighting? What threats of punishment could be put into place by the government to deter further conflict for economic benefit? Also, explain how the intervention force, civilian relief effort, and other civilian activities could adversely change the local economy.

3.4.10 Foundations of Economic Activity Situation
Assess the foundations for local business activity. Evaluate the viability of gov’t currency, monetary and exchange rate policy, the current banking, payments and settlements system, public finance capacity, revenue generation capacity, trade regime and export sectors, legal framework regarding commercial, property, and privatization, and other factors of economic activity. Assess the threat of corruption to establishing and maintaining legitimate economic activity. Assess the state’s ability to collect taxes, control budgets and pay public employees and military personnel. Assess support of government bureaucracy to private businesses, effectiveness of the government’s domestic business law and judicial system, extent of government graft and corruption in licensing, and quality and effectiveness of government economic policy.

Describe the level of general economic decline—per capita income, GNP, debt, poverty level, trade revenue, foreign investment, value of national currency, and inflation rates. Discuss factors critical to economic development—unemployment, distribution of wealth, types of natural resources, principal agricultural commodities, level and nature of production and trade, effect of sanctions (if appropriate). Discuss the availability of electrical power, quality of the workforce, level of international investment, degree of financial market activity, degree of privatization.

3.4.11 Local Media, Public Information & Communications Situation
Assess the capabilities of the existing public communications assets within the host country—television, radio, newspapers, etc. Determine whom—which faction—controls each of the public information systems. Define the ownership/political orientation of local media and the content of its broadcasts or publications. Judge the impact of on-going media efforts by friendly nations or organizations. Discuss the use of media by ruling elite’s to promote ultra-nationalistic political rhetoric. Assess the impact of “hate radio” broadcasts. Identify cultural or religious institutions and practices that could be leveraged to facilitate popular support to the international mission—focus on structures of authority in ethnic groups and related institutions. Identify key opinion leaders and their willingness to support operations. Identify broad-based groups of residents at the village, community, and regional level that should be consulted concerning proposed activities. Identify storylines and key points that have impact on the population regarding the operation.

3.4.12 Human Rights Abuses / Atrocities / War Crimes Situation
Assess the scale of atrocities and identify the probable victims. Identify the scale of ethnic violence and possible genocide. Assess the degree and nature of arbitrary application of rule of law by authoritarian, dictatorial, or military against ethnic or minority groups. Describe the nature of gross and systematic human rights abuses and possible war crimes. Name the likely perpetrators. Name the officials who are likely responsible for gross and systematic human rights abuses. Determine who is compiling atrocity reports and describe the system for victims and witnesses to make such reports. Determine what refugee populations are likely victims and potentially have evidence of atrocities. Locate possible sites and outline how data collection and maintenance is being accomplished. Assess requirements for forensic teams and equipment. Assess protection requirements. Assess the impact of “hate radio” broadcasts and other activities to harm minority populations. Determine if amnesty has been given and its potential impact on the future success of the
mission. Determine the need for witness protection programs. Clarify what measures, if any, have been taken by the international community to bring the perpetrators to justice.

3.4.13 Prisoner & Abductee Situation
Assess the nature and scale of detainees, prisoners and abductees in the conflict area. Discuss the motivations and intentions of the warring factors or the host government for such action. Assess potential threats to these persons that could result either from international inaction or intervention. Should these persons be released or freed, what would be required for their vetting and debriefing as well as their safe return and reintegration.

3.5.14 Community Socio-Cultural Considerations
Assess key aspects of the country’s culture, language, traditions, and social institutions that bear on the success of the operation and should be respected. Identify key opinion leaders (community, tribal, clan, religious, or ethnic) and their willingness to support international activities or operations. Identify broad-based groups of residents at the village, community, and regional level that should be consulted concerning proposed activities. Highlight religious prohibitions or ethnic dietary restrictions that could affect humanitarian assistance operations or human rights monitoring. Identify available coping mechanisms used by the population to cope with the crisis situation—extended family, armed militia groups, tribal support & security, hoarding, corrupt or abusive practices, migration, etc. Identify cultural institutions and practices that could be leveraged to facilitate popular support for the international mission—focus on structures of authority in ethnic groups and related institutions.

3.5 Assessment of the Proposed Peace Settlement

3.5.1 Suitability of the Framework for Peace Process & Settlement
Review recent peacemaking efforts and the willingness of the factions to support mediation objectives. Outline each faction’s willingness to sign the peace agreement. Identify any group that has remained outside the negotiations and could become an obstructionist to full agreement implementation.

Assess the settlement's objectives. To be fully comprehensive, the "signed settlement" should address four key issues: 1) the cessation of hostilities in a way that reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party against another; 2) an acceptable plan to integrate previously warring factions into one ruling government; 3) provisions to build an interim system government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties; and 4) the creation of a new non-partisan national military and police forces. Assess also whether the settlement reflects (or least does not go against) the history, traditions, culture, and values of the peoples involved.

Assess the inherent quality of the desired political framework (if one is negotiated) to mitigate further conflict. The political framework for resolving or mitigating further armed conflict will normally result in a UN Security Council resolution that governs the international operation. Such a political framework imbedded in the peace settlement provides the context in which international mission will operate.

Assess the realism of the peace process as called for in the signed settlement. A "peace process" is defined here as the steps that are taken to address the war aims of the parties. Limited agreements that only include terms for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops, or amnesty are not considered comprehensive peace process since they do not attempt to deal with difficult political issues such as governance, ethnic minority rights, economic opportunity, or self-determination. Ceasefires are better described as temporary measures to halt the fighting.

Assess the settlement's provisions to empower the international community to implement the agreement. From the perspective of the implementation force, the key factors within an agreement include: 1) incentives to insure compliance by the parties; 2) mechanisms to resolve disputes; 3) procedures for peaceful change; and 4) authority of the UN SRSG or the force commander to take action to interpret and facilitate implementation.
3.5.2 Degree of Consent and Commitment of the Parties
Assess the ripeness of the conflict for resolution. Identify the parties to the conflict and the degree of consent for supporting the operations of the international force and related civilian activities. If entering into negotiations, assess the presence of critical conditions to support success of this activity: 1) long duration of the fighting, 2) high number of battle deaths, 3) territorial integrity of the state is not challenged, and 4) strong religious backing of armed groups.

If transitioning from negotiations to signing, assess the presence of critical conditions to support success: 1) the conflict is in a military stalemate, 2) territorial goals are met, 3) mediation efforts are credible and effective, 4) acceptable power-sharing arrangements are included in the bargain, and 5) there are credible third party guarantees to verify compliance of the security provisions.

If transitioning from signing to full implementation of the agreement, assess the presence of critical conditions to support successful implementation: 1) credibility of the peacekeeping force to verify security of the factions after disarmament, and 2) the power-sharing arrangements (post-election government of national unity) avoids fatal political risks of the faction leaders. Overall, assess the level of trust, cooperation on solving implementation problems, and confidence in the third party implementation effort.

3.5.3 Diagnosis of Spoilers to the Peace Process
Assess the likely spoilers or obstructionists to the peace process. Assess the perspectives of each of the potential spoilers involved in the conflict to identify how they will likely support (or hinder) implementation of key elements of the settlement. For each spoiler: determine if the spoiler is inside or outside the peace process; if the spoiler's type is limited, greedy, or total all or nothing; and if the spoiler's source of power is controlled at the top or originates from the group’s population. Characterize each spoiler: What demands will the spoiler make? What are his intentions? What leverage exists to shape the actions of the spoiler? Explain why the commitment of any one spoiler may be problematic. Assess how the spoiler uses neighboring states or a major power to split the international coalition and gain sanctuary, support and cover for his operations. Assess whether our policy options to deter one spoiler will empower other spoilers.

3.5.4 Scenarios for Possible Failure of the Peace Process
Outline possible "what if scenarios", however unlikely, which could occur in a way that would essentially bring an end to the peace process and lead to further internal conflict. The "what if scenarios" may forecast the rise of a new government leader who rejects the peace process; collapse of the DDR process; public rejection and rioting due to refugee returns; dramatically new ethnic violence; splintering of a warring faction or an extreme militia group; expanded support by a neighboring state, or the failure of the international community to perform its responsibilities. These scenarios may include ploys and adverse actions by the warring factions.

3.6 Assessment of Host Nation Cooperation and International Support

3.6.1 Cooperation of the Host Government
Assess the level of cooperation by the host government with anticipated operations. Specify the host government’s intent in supporting the operation. Outline what is needed to achieve and maintain host government support. Assess the host government’s level of planning and capability to work with the military, police, relief, and other civilian mission areas of the international operation. Verify that we have negotiated a SOFA for the coalition force. Assess the host government’s administrative capacity to provide support the operation. Assess what it would take to gain the host nation’s support and cooperation if the government’s support is ambiguous at best.

3.6.2 Cooperation of Neighboring States
Assess each neighboring State’s willingness to help (or hinder) the success of the international mission. Determine if each neighbor is actively committed to reinforcing the mission including its specified tasks that could include border controls, arms control, refugee return, sanctions, demobilization, elections, basing rights, transit fees, logistic support, hate radio broadcasts, etc. Verify which neighboring States will (and those that will not) take constructive measures to support the operation.

Describe neighboring state support (or opposition) to the host country’s government and political leaders. Explain the degree and nature of military and paramilitary engagement in the internal affairs of the host country by neighboring states that affect the regional balance of power and subsequent resolution of the conflict.

3.6.3 Cooperation & Support of Regional and International Organizations
Outline the key regional and international actors and their interests at stake with the success of the operation. Identify any alignments with the warring factions, if any. Assess the unity of purpose among regional organizations regarding the operation, and consensus within the Security Council. Outline the extent of the current international presence in country. List what UN peacekeeping forces, relief operations, or other NGO/PVO activities are operating in the host country and in the region. Discuss the activities of private international business interests in the area and how those business interests affect the key players in the conflict.

3.6.4 Cooperation on Enforcement of International or Regional Sanctions
Assess the scope and extent of international or regional sanctions that have been imposed on one or more of the parties to the conflict. Determine whether the sanctions have been well enforced and outline the key factors associated with the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement. Assess the quality of the current “monitoring mechanism” to manage sanctions implementation as well as the adequacy of capabilities in the local area to stop the flow of illegal goods and arms. Assess the level of sanctions cooperation and support by neighboring states. Assess the impact of the sanctions on the targeted group(s). Determine whether the sanctions would affect the performance of the international mission during its anticipated duration. If the sanctions impair the performance of the international mission, clarify what provisions in the UN mandate should be made to avoid problems with sanctions enforcement.

If new sanctions elements are being considered for adoption, assess the following: the nature and scope of the armed group’s activities in the element, the nature of the pressure (e.g. the benefits) that would be applied to the armed group, what implementation measures would be required to ensure the element would be effective, the nature of potential adverse or unintended consequences on others, and the willingness of key states to meet their obligations.

3.6.5 Cooperation & Participation of a Major Power & Lead Nation
Assess the role of the major powers in continuing the conflict or bringing about its resolution. Determine whether an interested regional or major power supports ending the conflict and sees this result in its national interests. Assess the government’s will to invest substantial political resources, financial support and personnel casualties to bring about desired results over the long run.

Determine what regional or other international states have the capacity to serve as a capable lead nation of an international coalition:

- A long-standing disposition for non-interference & non-intervention within the region
- Strong domestic public support to make long-standing commitments
- Political and military diplomacy sufficient to mobilize the Security Council and key troop contributors
• Effective long-standing relationships with other major powers to rapidly fill critical gaps in capabilities
• Previous arrangements for defense cooperation to readily open doors to further military cooperation
• The professional competence of the country’s military forces to lead a coalition operation
• The capacity to gather intelligence, both political and military, in the area of operations
• Strong financial management capacity and resources to aid financially strapped countries
• A responsive information management capacity to address day-to-day media issues
• A reputation as a major or middle-range power for peaceful leadership and regional cooperation

3.6.6 Specific Reactions by Key States
Briefly outline the likely reaction of key states to a robust international response in the region and clarify the degree of probable support for a combined regional / U.S. military response against the threat to peace and security. Specifically, forecast the degree of support and likely response of key nations:

• NATO Allies
• Security Council Members
• Major Trading Partners
• Major Regional Powers
• Leading Troop Contributors and Donors
• Regional Organizations
• Neighboring States

3.7 Assessment of the Risks of Crisis Expansion or Escalation

3.7.1 Scenarios for Possible Expansion or Escalation of the Conflict
Outline several “what if scenarios”, however unlikely, which could occur in a way that would substantially expand the scope of the conflict or escalate the nature of the fighting and violence. The ”what if scenarios” may call for expanded participation in the conflict by a neighboring state or a regional power; escalation of the conflict to include chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; increased human suffering and atrocities; a major environmental disaster; massive civilian rejection of U.S. actions; increased terrorism against key U.S. personnel or facilities; or expansion of the conflict into the "unrestricted warfare" domain of non-military warfare. These scenarios may include ploys and adverse actions by the host nation, warring factions, neighboring states, a regional power, or a major power.

3.7.2 Potential Risks and Adverse Threats in the Region
List the risks and potential adverse threats that could emerge as the crisis unfolds, such as:

• Local attacks against (or hostage-taking) of international relief personnel and equipment
• Covert operations against a U.S. personnel and friendly regimes in the region
• Terrorist attacks against a friendly state, the United States, or influential outside powers
• Missile attacks against a regional state or U.S. activities in the region
• Direct attacks against commerce in the region
• Mining of international waters
• Use of expensive conventional weaponry in retaliation by regional state
• Threats or actual use of nuclear WMD.

3.7.3 Potential Unintended Consequences in the Region
Briefly list the range of unintended consequences of an international military and non-military coercion as the crisis unfolds, such as:
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- Compelling allied and friendly nation requests for NEO from the host nation
- UN and International NGO requests for evacuation
- Urgent regional requests for air defense capabilities against air and missile threats
- Regional requests for assistance to deal with emergency water and food shortages
- Regional requests for protection of civilian population from chemical and biological attacks
- Regional requests for environmental clean-up
- Regional requests to deal with civilian displacements and civilian casualties
- GCC requests for consequent management following a WMD attack
- International economic apprehension and financial failure

3.8  Assessment of Major Geo-Strategic Discontinuities

Identify the major discontinuities in the theater-strategic environment that could emerge during the unfolding of the crisis, a dramatic turn of events that would require a full and complete reassessment of the Administration’s policy aims and its strategy in responding to the crisis. Some potential discontinuities are identified here:

- A leading regional power withdraws its support for the operation
- Chaos & civil war erupts in the host country
- Another small scale contingency breaks out in the region
- A regional state employs nuclear WMD
- A permanent member of the Security Council vetoes the mission’s mandate

3.9  Summary of the Initial Situation--Immediate Entry Conditions

- State of Fighting – status of the fighting and immediate threats to deploying forces
- Presence / Evacuation of Americans – current American presence & requirements for evacuation
- Humanitarian Needs – size and locations of affected population and immediate relief needs
- Atrocities and War Crimes – size and locations of war crimes sites and victims
- Economic Drivers – primary funding sources for armed groups, economic predatory operations
- Coalition Participants – the lead nation and other contributors
- Agreement (Cease-fire) Compliance – degree of compliance by the parties to a cease-fire
- Spoiler Threats / Countermeasures – likely actions by the spoilers to hinder initial deployments
- Threats to Forces / Force Protection – threats and risks to deploying forces, including terrorist threats
- Threats to Civilians—requirements to protect civilians in armed conflict as per UNSCR 1265
- Condition of Key Bases – condition of power, transportation, and communications
- Public Awareness and Support – degree of indigenous public support for the operation
- Host Nation Support – extent of support for the operation and provision of capabilities
- Regional Support – support by neighboring states and key regional powers
- Major Power Participation – participation and leadership provided by a lead nation
4.0 STRATEGIC PURPOSE, MISSION, END STATE & OBJECTIVES

This section clarifies the overall broad strategic purpose for the response, the mission statement for the operation, and the desired political-military end state that will strengthen regional stability and bring about durable peace in the country. It also outlines the important political-military objectives that the mission will strive to achieve as the operation unfolds. Since these elements constitute the foundation of the pol-mil plan, all other sections of the plan must be consistent with this section and be judged against it.

This section links logically with Section 2.0 which clarifies U.S. interests at stake in the crisis (what we are concerned about in the emergency) and U.S. policy aims (what we seek to accomplish realistically as we go forward). With a tight linkage to these aims, a top-to-bottom rationale can be developed that ties together U.S. interests, policy aims, broad purpose in responding to the emergency, mission of the operation, desired endstate and mission objectives. A pol-mil plan calls for coherence among these paragraphs. Accordingly, the NSC should obtain interagency consensus, and as appropriate resolve interagency disagreements, on these issues as the Advance Planning Process proceeds.

4.1 U.S. Strategic Purpose
Identify the broad overriding purpose for responding to the crisis—what far-reaching results do we hope to realize in conducting the operation. This broad desired result helps planners prioritize many other outcomes to ensure the most important ends are achieved. For example, a broad purpose for responding to a crisis could be:

- Maintain access to vital mineral and energy resources
- Safeguard ongoing rapprochement with a major power
- Prevent or contain the spread of regional conflict
- Avert or mitigate a major humanitarian disaster
- Stop ethnic violence, end human rights atrocities, and terminate genocide
- Eradicate a terrorist group and its base of operations
- End a civil war with the implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement
- Restore democratic government and assist in establishing civil order and justice

4.2 Mission Statement
Present a clear and concise statement of what type of operation the international coalition will undertake. The mission statement should include:

- Who is conducting the mission (U.S., UN, NATO, OSCE, or an ad hoc coalition, etc.)
- What type of mission will be conducted (e.g., coercive diplomacy and preventive deployment, protected humanitarian relief, peacekeeping observer mission of a cease fire, peace implementation mission, peace enforcement mission, an enforcement mission, transitional administration, or post-conflict peace-building mission.)
- When and under what conditions is the mission expected to occur and its expected duration
- What shape, size and composition of the follow-on mission, if any

For example, here is a mission statement that was prepared for a limited military intervention to protect freedom of navigation and maintain access to vital energy resources:

“At the direction of the President the U.S. government shall neutralize the threat to commercial shipping in the region, remove threatening military forces that currently occupy disputed territory and pose dangers to
international shipping lanes, and restore rightful sovereign control of the host government as quickly as possible. Associated with this combined civilian-military mission, the U.S. government shall assist states in the region by providing adequate defensive protection from threats emanating from rebellious military forces, by supporting the internal stability of friendly countries during and after the crisis, and by providing technical expertise, support and relief supplies in the event that dire emergencies arise as a result of hostilities. Upon favorable conclusion of the crisis, the U.S. government shall seek a permanent settlement of the disputed territory through regional peacekeeping activities, set in place new confidence-building measures among regional states, and turn over security responsibilities to appropriate national, regional and international entities. Ultimately, once the threat to international peace and security is neutralized, the U.S. government shall return to the implementation of U.S. theater engagement and mission performance plans consistent with State Department’s overall Regional Strategy, with a particular emphasis on developing closer bilateral relationships with key states in the region.”

### 4.3 Desired Political-Military End State

Clarify the vision for a stable region and a durable peace in the host country. Normally, war-torn societies have lost any practice or custom for dealing with internal political confrontations by means other than war. Further, the warring parties have no mechanisms or processes available for addressing political disputes other than through hostilities. State institutions are usually weak or ineffective, and the warring factions are fully prepared for continued fighting. Recognizing that political confrontations are normal to civilized societies, a durable peace exists when competing groups do not resort to violence in resolving their disputes.

Accordingly, the key to establishing a durable peace in the near term normally includes implementing the following tasks in the midst of an often bitter, violent and bloody conflict:

- Negotiating an acceptable political solution that resolves further political disputes peacefully
- Addressing current political and social grievances to the satisfaction of the group leaders
- Deploying a credible international mission to impose guarantees and protect against insecurity
- Removing the military option to opposing groups through demobilization and reintegration
- Transforming the armed groups into effective, non-violent entities
- Removing ready financial resources for competing groups to buy arms and support military operations
- Reinforcing just civil society, trusted public security, and legitimate rule of law

The desired end state embodies a feasible political solution to the conflict, one that the parties will accept and implement. In failed states or war-torn societies, the central task is to craft an acceptable political-military framework that the parties can agree to and support—one that will encourage political accommodation and military stability in a way that mitigates future conflict among ethnic groups / warring factions for several years ahead.

Possible options for a political solution to be embodied in a peace agreement include the following: 1) partition such as in Eritrea-Ethiopia or East Timor, 2) autonomy such as in Kosovo or Palestine, 3) group based power sharing such as in Lebanon or Bosnia, 4) integrative power-sharing such as in South Africa or Northern Ireland, or 5) majority rule democracy such as in El Salvador, Haiti or Mozambique. What is essential for the international peacemakers is to help the warring factions design a post-conflict political solution that enables the parties to live together peacefully and resolve their disputes through political means rather than war.

In this context, define a realistic, durable and desirable political arrangement that would be acceptable by the parties—one that mitigates further conflict over the next five years, at least. This is the most decisive component of any negotiated settlement, and is called the “desired end state”— a preferred political-military arrangement that the parties agree (or are pressured) to implement. Given the realities of the conflict, this

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**CLASSIFICATION**

Section 4.0 U.S. Purpose & Objectives
endstate represents a durable political bargain that brings about an acceptable political solution coupled with a stable military balance.

In some cases it is only possible to gain consent to a limited agreement that only addresses military security matters (e.g., such as a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign troops, or amnesty of combatants) but does not resolve the underlying political conflict. A cease-fire is merely a temporary halt in the fighting—not a stable and lasting transformation of the political confrontation. A cease-fire agreement is not a comprehensive signed settlement since it does not attempt to deal with difficult political issues such as governance, ethnic minority rights or self-determination. Such cease-fire agreements are better described as temporary measures to halt the fighting.

To successfully end the conflict, a signed comprehensive settlement must address six critical elements that constitute a durable desired end state. These peacemaking elements include:

1) Cessation of hostilities in a way that reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party against another;
2) Acceptable political solution to integrate previously warring factions into one governing state;
3) Demobilization of troops and transformation of armed groups into political parties;
4) An interim system government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties;
5) Removal of financial support to armed groups to buy weapons and support operations, and
6) Creation of a new non-partisan police force, rule of law and civil society.

These six conditions of a stable political-military end state dominate all other desired conditions, and early attention should placed on determining what the parties will accept for these arrangements.

A comprehensive settlement should establish new political and military mechanisms and practices that give incentives to the warring factions to mediate their differences rather than resorting to fighting to resolve future confrontations. The settlement's military arrangements (cessation of hostilities, confidence-building arrangements, arms control regime, demobilization, military balance, etc.) should support military stability and give security to all parties to the conflict. Security guarantees will require outside intervention by a credible peacekeeping force along with a long-term effort to reorganize the country’s indigenous military and police forces. The comprehensive settlement should include provisions that give incentives, rewards, or penalties to the political leaders to moderate divisive ethnic themes and to persuade their group members to support moderation, bargaining, and reciprocity among ethnic groups rather than armed conflict.

4.4 Political-Military Objectives
List the key objectives that the operation will seek to achieve—the range of comprehensive civilian-military objectives that are derived from the U.S. government’s mission statement written above. These pol-mil objectives extend beyond military deployments and actions in the field to address all aspects of successful mission accomplishment. Note that the pol-mil objectives link to the U.S. Intent for each Major Mission Area presented in Section 8.0 of this plan. These pol-mil objectives normally would encompass the following mission areas:

- Diplomatic Engagement
- Military Security and Regional Stability
- WMD Deterrence and Control
- Demobilization and Armed Group Transformation
- Political Transition & Democratization
- Counter-Terrorism
- Humanitarian Assistance
- AIDS & Contagious Diseases
- Infrastructure Restoration

CLASSIFICATION
Consequence Management
Public Security and Civil Order
Border Control and Customs
Civil Administration Restoration
Rule of Law & Administration of Justice
Counter Official Corruption / Organized Crime / Security Force Extortion
Primary Commodity Regulation and Economic Rehabilitation
Employment Generation, Commercial & Business Development
Public Diplomacy and Education
Human Rights Abuses / War Crimes
Civil Society and Community Rebuilding
National Reconciliation

4.5 Lead Agency Responsibilities
Assign lead agency responsibility to different USG agencies and international organizations to accomplish the pol-mil objectives outlined above. These lead agency assignments are necessary for holding senior agency political appointees, usually Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries, accountable for accomplishing mission area tasks as planned. These lead agency assignments are determined though interagency discussions. In some cases, clarify assigned mission area tasks that may fall outside an agency’s normal area of responsibility.

- NSC Staff
  - Regional Directorate
  - Functional Directorates
- Intelligence Community
  - National Intelligence Council (Warning, Region and Global)
  - Office of Transitional Issues (CIA)
- State Department
  - Regional Bureau including U/S (P)
  - Functional Bureaus (IO, PM, PRM, INL, DRL, EB, L, FMP, S-WCT, SCT, L, S/RPP, R, etc)
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
  - Regional Office (ISA Regional Office)
  - Functional Offices (PK/HA, SOLIC, etc)
  - Special Defense Agencies (DISA, DSWA, etc)
- Joint Staff (Strategic Plans and Policy (J5))
- USAID (OFDA, BHR, OTI)
- Justice (ICITAP, OPDAT, INS, DEA, FBI)
- Treasury (International Affairs, Customs, IRS, ATF, Financial Enforcement, Foreign Assets Control)
- Transportation (USCG)
- Energy (Emergency Response Program)
- Agriculture (Food for Peace, Food for Development)
- Commerce (International Programs)
- HHS (Center for Disease Control)
- EPA (Contamination & Consequence Management)
- OMB
5.0 **POLITICAL – MILITARY STRATEGY**

This is perhaps the most important section of the pol-mil plan. It describes the strategy for achieving a policy success at the end of the day. A pol-mil strategy is NOT just a list of actions to be completed—instead it is a carefully crafted approach to mobilizing and wielding power against rival forces to achieve desired ends. Accordingly, an effective political-military strategy should be a comprehensive and robust approach designed to nurture and use power along many competing lines of effort simultaneously. A strategy such as this is not easy to sort out, but interagency planners—based on the best assessment information available—must craft one that is realistic, workable and minimizes risks of failure. Ideally, a pol-mil strategy consists of (first) an overall strategic approach that presents a range of options to policy-makers consistent with our policy aims to deal with a wide range of circumstances that are likely to arise during the crisis, and (second) a number of component strategies that address how power is to mobilized and wielded to achieve specific ends.

**OVERALL STRATEGIC APPROACH**

5.1 **U.S. Strategic Approach**

Describe the overall policy direction and strategy for the mission. The strategic approach explains the “way” (i.e., our approach) through which the Administration will achieve desired “ends” using available “means” to protect U.S. interests at risk in the crisis. The intent of a *U.S. Strategic Approach* is to establish coherence among U.S. interests at stake, the difficulties posed by the uncertain crisis environment, and the available U.S. political will, resources and capabilities so as to achieve realistic policy aims. It lays the foundation for using both military and non-military means together in harmony to ensure the U.S. response unfolds on our terms to achieve desired results on the ground. The point of these combined efforts is to bring about decisive political and psychological pressure on key actors in the crisis. In this context, if some measures are not timely, or cannot be integrated, or are not effective in influencing the key actors in the crisis, these measures should not be employed.

The strategic approach explains how the Administration will advance U.S. interests as well as those of the international community while undermining any opposition to mission success in the long run. As a document produced as part of the Advance Planning Process, the U.S. Strategic Approach is normally an NSC paper written for Principals / Deputies consideration before the interagency begins writing a pol-mil plan. Once approved, the U.S. Strategic Approach is summarized in the pol-mil plan for the operation at the beginning of this section. Here are some key elements of a strategic approach paper:

- **Administration policy guidance for U.S. engagement** in the region that drives current commitments and potential response efforts.
- **Assessment of key antagonists and actors** involved the crisis including their motivations, goals, commitment, intentions and capabilities.
- **Possible crisis scenarios** that would threaten U.S. interests. Include in scenarios paths to crises as well as possible termination scenarios.
- **Policy objectives** in responding to the crisis, including U.S. aims regarding the country in crisis as well as those in the region and elsewhere.
- **Desired political results** with respect to the key actors, given their motivations, goals, commitment, intentions and capabilities. As these key player’s goals become more threatening to U.S. interests, our desired political results will likely become more intrusive, coercive and compelling.
• Concept for managing down the crisis on our terms, normally through coercive diplomacy or peacemaking, backed up by leverage that ultimately could involve military intervention.

• Expected duration and momentum for bringing a satisfactory end to the crisis as U.S. response efforts unfold. Likely worse case scenarios should be highlighted.

• Major lines of effort that will likely need Deputies policy oversight and management day-to-day as the crisis unfolds. These lines of effort may include:
  – Achieving maximum diplomatic effect on key players
  – Making U.S. and international capabilities more effective
  – Maintaining regional support for U.S. efforts
  – Neutralizing obstructionists to the effort
  – Sustaining coalition cohesion
  – Implementing a comprehensive peace settlement
  – Providing persuasive messages in our public diplomacy
  – Integrating military and civilian efforts
  – Containing the spread and escalation of conflict

• Conceptualization of what success means and the likely needs for follow-on efforts to consolidate a “victory” for U.S. policy.

• Policy options that include diplomatic, political, military, informational, economic and other useful measures to strengthen the U.S. position to act, to contain the confrontation and respond to the crisis successfully. These options can best be arranged in packages shown below:
  A core approach with options that would strengthen our current position to act on our terms;
  A crisis prevention approach with options that would to prevent continued hostilities.
  A crisis response approach with options that would apply coercive diplomacy and force, if necessary, along with other means to rapidly bring an end to hostilities on our terms.
  An escalation control approach with options that would keep the crisis from expanding in the region, increasing to higher levels of violence against non-combatants, or escalating to weapons of mass destruction.

And last, hedging strategies are identified for major strategic discontinuities that would require a full reassessment of U.S. policy and the Administration’s approach in dealing with the crisis.

• Recommended immediate actions for intelligence collection, diplomacy, interagency coordination and management, advance political-military planning, lead agency assignments, and guidelines for agency preparations in the region.

COMPONENT STRATEGIES

5.2 Strategy for Applying Coercive Diplomacy
Present the strategy that outlines how dialog, negotiation and diplomacy will be backed by coercive measures—military force coupled with non-military coercive measures—in a timely fashion to achieve decisive political results and advance regional policy objectives. Based on crisis scenarios calling for the use of force, the aim of this strategy is to clarify how focused diplomatic efforts will be backed by military means to advance along a path that will successfully garner sufficient international legitimacy and support, bolster political cohesion in
the coalition cohesion, strengthen regional cooperation, isolate unwanted patrons, and weaken opposition efforts.

Elements of this strategy of negotiation and coercive diplomacy should include actions for building consensus among our allies for coercive action, making the legal and moral case for international collective action, advancing a public information campaign for both domestic and international audiences, gaining necessary agreements and resolutions for authorizing use of force, conducting diplomatic communications to regional powers and organizations, negotiating with unwanted patrons, and employing measures to weaken the opposition’s power. This strategy should also take into account possible outcomes, both promising and adverse, as a result of these activities. This strategy links to all other component strategies especially those that require international intrusion and coercion to compel compliance with all obligations set forth in the peace process (or as set forth in an ultimatum delivered to an adversary).

5.3 Strategy for Mobilizing Regional Support
Present the strategy for mobilizing regional support for the international mission. The aim of this strategy is to leverage each neighboring state’s attitude toward supporting the coalition’s mission and gaining firm commitments from front line states to assist in the success of the mission. The strategy should present a regional gameplan that appropriately synchronizes all relevant state action so as to decisively concentrate all aspects of power in the region against any opposition to the international mission.

Consequently, the strategy needs to be sufficiently detailed to outline specific desired actions expected of each regional state to take constructive measures to support the operation. Expectations include concerted regional support for Security Council fact-finding missions, report recommendations and resolutions; regional diplomatic pressure and isolation of obstructionists; imposition of international law; restrictions on patron states; intelligence sharing; Blue and Green regional military operations; troop and police contributions; assets freezes of private and semi-official bank accounts; sanctions enforcement; border controls; arms control; refugee return; demobilization; elections; basing rights; transit fees; logistic support; hate radio broadcasts; restrictions on trafficking in arms, diamonds, drugs, and other illicit operations; adverse media attention; apprehension of war criminals and support of tribunals; and making financial donations. The scope and intensity of regional support is limited by the political will of regional leaders. This strategy guides other strategies that are outlined below and, if implemented successfully, lays a foundation in the region for mission success.

5.4 Strategy for Building an International Coalition
Present the strategy for establishing an effective and credible international coalition for getting the mission accomplished over the next 2-3 years of the mission. The aim of the strategy is to put together a group of nations and organizations that is seen as credible by the opposition. The international coalition will likely be multidimensional in character including multinational and multilateral participants, civilian and military organizations, and regional and international players and donors.

Realistically, success requires a “federation” in the broadest terms, including several “coalitions-of-the-willing” that shoulder major responsibilities—often called “pillars”—such as political, military, humanitarian, public security & rule of law, economic recovery, and financial support. The strategy should address the political foundations of the overall coalition as well as the structural elements of the coalition’s leadership, composition and structure. Specifically, the strategy should clarify the coalition’s lead nation and other major participants. It should identify potential weaknesses in coalition solidarity, how the coalition leaders should guard against any fragmentation among partners, and what measures to be taken to strengthen the coalition’s credibility, since the decisive characteristic of a successful coalition is whether the parties involved in the conflict see it as credible. This strategy supports the other component strategies because it brings together the national leadership, troops, police, NGOs, financial support and other capabilities to get the job done right.
5.5 Strategy for Neutralizing the Adversary & Terminating Hostilities
Present the strategy for neutralizing the adversary and bringing an end to hostilities. The aim of this strategy is to decisively break the adversary’s will, deny him the capability, and weaken his staying power to do harm in the region. If the Administration crosses the threshold to use offensive military force in conjunction with other non-military coercive measures, the Principals’ Committee must be resolved to effectively use this concentrated power to compel the adversary to back down and surrender.

Once the Administration crosses the threshold of using force, the United States must win the contest of wills against the adversary. Then, should hostilities ensue, there would be several coercive efforts largely in the non-military domain that are already in place to bolster the use of military power for maximum political and psychological effect on the adversary. Together, these non-military and military coercive measures would be implemented day-by-day throughout this crisis. Once the adversary relents or is defeated, the strategy would outline how hostilities would be brought to an end to stabilize the region and place the country on a path toward reintegration into a new framework for regional peace, security, and economic growth.

5.6 Strategy for Deterring and Controlling Escalation of Conflict
Present the strategy for deterring and controlling the spread or escalation of conflict, particularly if the plan calls for a military intervention. Assuming that an adversary or a potential antagonist has WMD capability to escalate the crisis, the aim of this strategy is to deter the adversary from using WMD at all in the crisis. His use of WMD would likely create such adverse consequences in the region that the intent of the escalation control strategy is to deter its use from the outset. The logic of this strategy is straightforward:

- The catastrophic consequences on mission success of just one WMD attack by an adversary are so severe that we must be totally assured that all his WMD systems are completely destroyed in any initial attack of his capabilities.

- However, we do not have the capability to completely destroy all his WMD systems at the outset, and therefore the probability that we could destroy all of his WMD systems is near zero.

- Even partial success in destruction of his WMD systems risks greater fragmentation of control of his WMD systems. Greater fragmentation creates even more serious problems for us to deter the further use of WMD systems by unknown actors in the region.

- Therefore, if we cannot take his WMD systems completely down with 100% assurance at the outset, then we must affect his behavior decisively to deter him from using WMD in the crisis (while at the same time ensure he does not lose control of the WMD systems to unknown actors).

If the adversary mounts WMD attack, the strategy must seek to ensure that the resulting catastrophic damage is mitigated and retaliatory actions do not escalate or expand the crisis, or in some way create a fragmentation of control over the remaining WMD systems in the region.

5.7 Strategy for Conducting Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Present the strategy for transitioning from armed hostilities to durable peace. The aim of this strategy is to help people rebuild their country, in the most extreme case, in the wake of violent conflict. The strategy should also help the international community to conceptualize, prioritize, and organize response efforts. This strategy involves at least three phases—initial emergency response, internal transformation to durable peace, and then self-sustaining peace and growth. Elements of this strategy vary from one crisis to another, but usually involve at least four major lines of effort—political transition and governance, security, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being.
5.8 Strategy for Peacemaking and Crafting a Durable Political Solution
Present the strategy for resolving continued armed conflict among the parties in a way that enables them to resolve future political confrontations through acceptable political mechanisms rather than armed conflict. The peacemaking strategy begins with an analysis of the faction’s needs for political control of important domestic issues, for military security against surprise attack, and for economic satisfaction. The strategy also conceptualizes a political solution (i.e., some kind of power-sharing arrangement) that has the greatest potential for acceptance by the warring faction in resolving future political impasses among the factions.

The strategy then outlines the plan for negotiations—participants, secrecy, issues to be negotiated, parameters for resolution, and possible guarantees from the international community.

The peacemaking strategy envisions a realistic transition from bloody war to imposed stability under international supervision, and then finally to a durable peace with appropriate political mechanisms in place to resolve further confrontations among the factions. It then outlines a possible roadmap for the transition, a “peace process” and key elements of this peace process necessary to bring about permanent change. The peace process includes key provisions in the peace agreement needed to address the sources of conflict: cessation of hostilities in a way that reduces the threat of surprise attack by one party against another; an acceptable political solution to integrate previously warring factions into one governing state; demobilization of troops and transformation of armed groups into political parties; an interim system government capable of accommodating the interests of the parties; removal of financial support to armed groups to buy weapons and support operations, and the creation of a new non-partisan police force and rule of law.

The agreement also should empower the international community citing the obligations of the parties in implementing the peace process, authorities of the international community, and mechanisms such as joint commissions or committees necessary for effective and timely implementation. This strategy precedes other component strategies outlined below and accordingly, it must open the door for their implementation down the road.

5.9 Strategy for Dealing with Spoilers
Present the strategy for dealing with spoilers to the peace process / success of the international mission, based on the diagnosis of each potential spoiler—his goals and degree of commitment (limited, greedy or total all-or-nothing). Each spoiler type poses different problems for successful implementation of the peace process. In the recent past, the international community has pursued three basic strategies—1) inducement, or giving the spoiler what he wants; 2) socialization, or changing the spoilers behavior to a set of established norms; and 3) coercion, or punishing spoiler behavior or reducing his capacity destroy the peace process. Although the spoiler strategy should employ a combination of measures, what is crucial is to ensure the strategy matches the spoiler type. Avoid an unrealistic spoiler strategy by underestimating the will of the opposition and intent of the spoiler, thereby relying on measures that are weak, ineffective, and foolish.

5.10 Strategy for Dealing Opposition Countermoves
Present the detailed strategy to deal with possible negative responses or countermoves by regional and international obstructionists states and organizations that could be employed in collaboration with key spoilers, extremists, and other adversaries that would thwart the mission. These opposition countermoves are likely to be multi-dimensional and asymmetric in character. For each possible countermove, the strategy should present a menu of options that could be used to deter, preempt, or deal with the actions perpetrated by obstructionist states involved.

5.11 Strategy for Demobilizing and Transforming Armed Groups
Present the strategy for permanently removing the military option to opposing groups through demobilization of troops and reintegration of ex-combatants in society and transforming the armed groups into effective, non-violent entities. This strategy integrates both security and political transitions.
On the military side, the strategy should impose military security in the conflict area to reduce the threat of surprise attack; demilitarize key areas or zones as outlined in the agreement; implement a weapons control regime; demobilize or reduce military units and armed groups; assist in the re-integration of ex-combatants; conduct military search and destroy operations for non-compliant armed groups; and mount an effective spoiler strategy to deal with hidden weapons caches and provocations to resume fighting.

On the political side, the strategy should diminish popular support for obstructionists; empower, protect and assist moderate leaders and their supporters in transforming their organizations to political entities; promote the establishment of moderate party offices, communications and cross-faction networks; ratify only moderate, cross-faction political parties and their activities; and dismiss and isolate national and local officials who impede moderate political efforts.

On the democratization side, the strategy should establish elections only after moderate political parties are established and functioning country-wide; design electoral rules to reinforce moderate, cross-faction political parties; empower only moderate leaders through legitimate democratization processes who represent cross-factional coalition in the country; and remove obstructionist leaders from office. This strategy ties in with other component strategies including those addressing peacemaking, spoilers, rule of law, and regulating financial support to the parties to the conflict.

5.12 Strategy for Regulating Primary Commodities and Financial Support
Present the strategy for removing the economic underpinnings of the conflict. Key to this strategy is going control of the country’s primary export commodity (e.g., diamonds or other gems, valuable minerals, narcotics, timber, etc.) and other spheres of economic activity that are controlled by each warring faction. From both a country and regional perspective outline how the international community will constrain the warring factions in exploiting weak state border control capabilities by organized private or semi-official networks in the region. Outline how the international community will limit external and internal sources of financing for each warring faction. This strategy links to other component strategies including those dealing with peacemaking, demobilization, spoilers and official corruption.

Present the combined regional and country strategy for controlling and eliminating political corruption, organized crime, and security force extortion in support of implementing the peace process and bringing an end to the conflict. Outline how the compelling economic agendas of the faction leaders and ruling elite’s will be controlled, reduced and progressively brought under legitimate civil authority. Based on their vulnerabilities, explain how corrupt political leaders / kingpins / military & police officials will be apprehended and brought to justice.

Outline reform priorities for the new rule of law, justice system, police force, customs force, military forces, tax collection, and key initiatives for eradicating organized crime from the country. Discuss initiatives that are to be undertaken with neighboring states and within the region. Discuss how international and regional organizations and expertise will be brought to bear on the problem. Explain how the range of legal and other international tools—through sanctions, through arms control, through denial of natural resources, through alternative markets, or through war crimes apprehension and prosecution—will be used to fight official corruption / organized crime. Outline the threats of punishment that are to be used by the government to deter further official corruption and illegal criminal activity. Also, explain how outside intelligence services, the international military, police, custom and other special forces, the international civilian reconstruction and development effort, and civilian legal activities will be used to best advantage to eliminate corruption and organized crime throughout all phases of the operation.

5.14 Strategy for Transitioning & Handing-off Continuing Activities
Present the transition / handoff strategy that is linked to the realization of the conditions or achievement of our goals leading to the desired end state over the various phases of mission duration. Obviously, this transition or “hand-off” strategy is multi-dimensional in character, focusing on tasks needed to be completed for a hand-off of responsibilities to a follow-on international entity such as the UN or to the Host Nation. A transition strategy requires the integrated efforts of both civilian and military officials within the USG and the international community. Management of a key transition for the mission is an interagency effort. It should be coordinated by an interagency working group, which would advise the ExComm or Deputies Committee on the status of transition strategy planning and coordination within the USG and at the UN. The interagency working group would be composed of appropriate USG officials having political, humanitarian, military, regional, and UN expertise regarding operations in the region.

5.15 Hedging Strategies for Dealing with Major Geo-Strategic Discontinuities
Present hedging strategies to address the important major geo-strategic discontinuities and wildcards that could occur that would call into question the Administration’s policy and strategy for dealing with the crisis. External discontinuities include possible negative actions by a friendly ally, neighboring state, an influential regional power, UNSC members, or another major power. Wildcards include random or events or designed activities in the region or elsewhere that could completely undermine our ability to achieve success. For each external variable and wildcard scenario outline a hedging strategy that we could use to counter such activity.
6.0 MISSION ORGANIZATION, CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION & FINANCING

This section takes an operational-level focus. Based on the policy guidance outlined in Section 2.0 and the mission statement & objectives outlined in Section 4.0, this section describes the political and structural foundations of the overall mission, the concept of how the operation will be implemented through time, and how the mission will be financed over its duration—a period often about three years or more. A complex contingency mission is normally a robust partnership in the broadest terms, including several “coalitions of the willing” involving contributing nations and organizations that shoulder major responsibilities—often called “pillars”—such as political, military, humanitarian, public security & rule of law, economic recovery, and financial support. This section of the pol-mil plan provides the organizational framework for these interconnected “coalitions” so they can work together and build cohesion to achieve mission success.

6.1 Mission Arrangements and Authorities

Describe the overall broad partnership of nations and organizations that constitute the mission. Specify whether the mission is a UN operation or a regional effort. Name the lead nation and major participating nations. Define how policy oversight of the mission, such as a core steering group, will be carried out. Clarify where the headquarters for the mission will reside and who will be its chief spokesperson. Outline specifically the authority under which the mission is created and clearly state the range of activities that the mission will perform. Briefly describe how the mission will exercise operational control of key mission area tasks, including military operations.

6.2 Mission Structure and Deployment Posture

Portray the organizational structure of the mission and its deployment posture in the region and within the host country. Although the mission structure is normally portrayed by a “wiring diagram” and the deployment posture shown by a map depiction contained in Appendix C of this plan, this section should describe in words the basic structure and deployment footprint and give the rationale for these arrangements.

In addition, it may be useful in aiding transparency to define, if such information is available, the following mission subcomponents:

- Mission Organization for Control and Coordination of all Components
- Humanitarian Relief Organization in Theater
- Military Organization in Theater
- Civilian Police Organization in Theater
- Rule of Law Organization in Theater
- Economic Recovery Organization in Theater
- Information / Public Affairs Organization in Theater

6.3 Concept for Mission Implementation

Mission accomplishment calls for the timely integration of efforts within several mission areas: diplomatic engagement, military security, humanitarian relief, political transition, and economic restoration, among others. The pol-mil concept of operation / implementation for the mission typically has several phases, each of which will require priority efforts within many of the mission areas noted below:

- Phase I (Interagency Assessment and Preparation): The initial phase calls for a comprehensive interagency assessment, including deployment of assessment teams to gather information from all sources on the situation. Key agencies prepare appropriate organizations and forces for deployment to the crisis area.
Objectives for Phase I: List the pol-mil objectives for this phase.

Task Priorities for Phase I: Identify the critical mission area task priorities for Phase I (see listing of mission areas in para 5.0):

- Diplomatic Engagement Priorities:
- Military Security and Regional Stability Priorities:
- WMD Deterrence and Control Priorities:
- Demobilization and Armed Group Transformation Priorities:
- Political Transition & Democratization Priorities:
- Counter-Terrorism Priorities:
- Humanitarian Assistance Priorities:
- AIDS & Contagious Diseases Priorities:
- Infrastructure Restoration Priorities:
- Consequence Management Priorities:
- Public Security and Civil Order Priorities:
- Border Control and Customs Priorities:
- Civil Administration Restoration Priorities:
- Rule of Law & Administration of Justice Priorities:
- Counter Official Corruption / Organized Crime / Security Force Extortion Priorities:
- Primary Commodity Regulation and Economic Rehabilitation Priorities:
- Employment Generation, Commercial & Business Development Priorities:
- Public Diplomacy and Education Priorities:
- Human Rights Abuses / War Crimes Priorities:
- Civil Society and Community Rebuilding Priorities:
- National Reconciliation Priorities:

Potential Policy Issues Associated with Phase I: Identify the potential policy issues that will likely arise as the mission undertakes the tasks outlined in Phase I.

Trigger Conditions for Phase II: List the conditions necessary to initiate the next phase.

- Phase II (Rehearsal, Pre-positioning of Enablers, Strategic Deployment, and Civilian and Military Activity Build-up in the Region): This phase calls for multi-agency planning and rehearsals, pre-positioning of enabling capabilities for deploying units and organizations, strategic deployment of civilian and military assets and activities, and the establishment of local security, communications, airheads, logistic bases, and transportation systems in-country and/or in neighboring states.

  - Objectives for Phase II: List the pol-mil objectives for this phase.
  - Task Priorities for Phase II: Identify the critical mission area task priorities for this phase (see listing of mission areas in para 5.0).
  - Potential Policy Issues Associated with Phase II: Identify those likely to arise the phase.
  - Trigger Conditions for Phase III: List the conditions necessary to initiate the next phase.

- Phase III (Initial Entry Operations--NEO/ Initial Entry/ Emergency Relief): This phase may be executed nearly simultaneously with Phase II above, depending on the mission.

- Phase IV (Stability, Political Transition, and Restoration Operations): This phase constitutes the longest part of the operation, requiring unity of effort between civilian and military organizations.
6.4 Concept for Financing the Mission (Three-year Mission Funding Requirements)

Describe how the mission’s requirements will be funded over the long run. In multidimensional complex contingency operations, successful implementation will usually require millions of dollars in the first three years, with more required in the outyears depending on the nature of the post-conflict environment and the ambitions of the international community. This section outlines the financial strategy to meet these substantial requirements for funding. The section clarifies the myriad of financial needs and associated funding mechanisms to pay for implementation during the first two years. Normally, a complex contingency operation, will be mandated to accomplish several military and civilian tasks (see Section 8.0) that will entail undertaking many humanitarian, governance, institution-building, security, development and human rights activities. Most of these activities will cost a substantial amount, especially in the first three years.

**Major Funding Components**

- **The UN Mission (Civilian Components & “Blue Helmeted” Peacekeeping):** Funds are needed to pay for the mission’s civilian staff, the international civilian police, and UN peacekeeping force. This component will be funded by UN assessed contributions. While these UN assessments can pay for UN mission's internal activities, these funds cannot be used to pay for "nation-building" and other non-peacekeeping type activities that the UN mission will supervise—these funds must come from other sources such as voluntary contributions.

- **Regional or National “Green Helmet” Military Support Operations:** Funds are needed to pay for the use of “Green Helmeted” troops whether they are part of a UN mission, a regional coalition, or an on-call ready reaction force. Funds pay for bilateral train and equip activities, deployment costs, and operations in the area.

- **Humanitarian Operations:** Funds are needed to pay for humanitarian relief operations and restoration of basic services. Activities in this area are funded by normal humanitarian assistance program funds of relief organizations such as UNHCR, WFP and ICRC as well as voluntary contributions and in-kind relief provided by NGOs.

- **Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DD&R):** Funds are needed to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as the transformation of existing military organizations of the parties. A trust fund would need to be established and supported by bilateral voluntary contributions, perhaps led by nation interested in supporting and organizing the country's newly established long-term security force.
- **Demining / Removal of Unexploded Ordinance**: Funds are needed to support operations to remove mines, booby-traps, and unexploded ordinance. Funding for demining is provided though designated agency demining sources. Funding for removal of unexploded ordinance is undefined.

- **Human Rights Investigations and War Crimes Tribunal**: Funds are needed to support investigations of atrocities and war crimes by a Security Council-mandated War Crimes Tribunal. These activities are normally funded by assessed contributions. In addition, in the past tribunal activities have been complimented by human rights investigations that have been supported by voluntary contributions of interested nations.

- **Local Civil Administration**: Funds may be needed to pay for the day-to-day operations and salaries of several thousand persons of the Host Country's civil administration. This workforce includes firemen, police, teachers, hospital workers, civil servants and so forth. This requirement will be funded, at least initially, by bilateral voluntary contributions from interested nations. In the long run, self-generating revenues, such as customs, sales taxes, fees, and so forth, are the primary source of funding for civil administration.

- **Counter Official Corruption / Organized Crime / Security Force Extortion Activities**: Funds are needed to support international, regional and host nation efforts to control and eliminate illegal activities of the ruling elite, organized crime and security forces designed to exploit their illegal economic spheres of influence. These counter-corruption activities are normally funded by donations and in-kind contributions from interested nations and appropriate international organizations. While the costs of these activities will vary depending the nature and scope of the corruption problem, one could expect such activities to cost in the range of $5-$40 million annually.

- **Local Institution-building (Police, Justice, other)**: Funds are needed to invest in the establishment of institutions such as local police forces, a justice system, penal system, public information and free media, democratization, and branches of government. A collection of funding sources will be needed including a UN trust fund supported by bilateral voluntary contributions; bilateral nation-building development programs; and UN specialized agency programs to support institution-building efforts.

- **Elections & Democratization Processes**: Funds are likely needed to pay for the democratic transformation and related political processes and activities to ensure power-sharing arrangements called for in the agreement are fully implemented. Funds are also needed to pay for elections at the local and province level. This requirement is normally funded by bilateral voluntary contributions from interested States and NGO’s.

- **Reconstruction/Development**: Funds are needed to invest in the reconstruction and development. This effort will be funded through a UN or World Bank Trust Fund supported by World Bank, a regional Development Bank and bilateral voluntary contributions. Also, bilateral development programs, some already working in the territory, will continue to sponsor in-country projects.

### 6.5 Concept for Soliciting Donors and Managing Contributions
Since considerable funding is needed to support a myriad of tasks, a credible financial strategy should seek to tap into all potential sources of funds over a long period of time. These funding sources include UN peacekeeping assessments, voluntary financial contributions from Member States, program funds from UN specialized agencies and international organizations, in-kind support provided by NGOs, and revenue generation by the Host Country's public administration.
Present a campaign strategy, consistent with the financial gameplan outlined above, to secure adequate contributions from donors. In collaboration with the UN Secretariat and the World Bank, outline the plan to organize donor events and, where appropriate, actions to target specific donors to take the lead in supporting key activities, particularly in the areas of civil administration, institution-building and reconstruction.

Obviously, the UN or the World Bank will have to establish a Trust Fund to collect donor contributions, and the UN mission will have to administer funds in a legally sufficient, transparent, and effective manner to ensure continued support by Member States. Note that measures must be taken to ensure that corruption and bribery from within the Host Nation does not imperil effective and legal use of these funds by the international community.

The lead nation of the mission will have to establish a financial management capability and a budget for supporting the operations of the host country's civil administration. The UN or the World Bank will also need to establish an appropriate Trust Fund or other mechanism to encourage donors to provide funding as soon as it is needed.
7.0 **Preparatory Tasks**

This section lays out specific preparatory tasks to be undertaken by the interagency before the operation begins—these include such tasks as consulting with multilateral entities, recruiting troop contributors, verifying legal requirements, funding the operation, conducting congressional consultations and notifications, and coordinating U.S. media relations. For each task noted below, there should be a discussion of the facts bearing on successful accomplishment of the task, requirements for action, agency responsibilities, and milestones for implementation. Each sub-section below (7.1, 7.2, etc.) is usually drafted by a lead agency and coordinated with all other interested agencies.

7.1 **Legal Justification for Operations** (NSC lead w/ all agencies)

Specify the legal authority, both domestic and international, for conducting the operation. The nature of a mission may call for both domestic and international legal justification, particularly if the use of military force is contemplated. Should the use of force not comport with traditional international legal principles, this fact would not by itself preclude the President authorizing the mission as a matter of domestic law.

7.1.1 Domestic Legal Justification: Absent statutory restrictions, the President’s authority to use force depends on his constitutional authority balanced with Congress’ authority to declare war. In a complex emergency the President would have the authority to use force at the time when he determines it to be vital to the protection of U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and such use of force is limited in duration and scope that it does not amount to “war” in the constitutional sense. In a complex emergency there are a number of factors that are important to a credible justification including the risk of significant casualties, the scope and duration of hostilities, and whether the United States would be drawn into an extended, dangerous conflict in the region. Serious questions would arise, for example, should a mission involve extensive ground combat operations. Regardless, there will likely be challenges to the President’s authority to use force in any case, especially if military operations were to result in casualties.

7.1.2 International Legal Justification: Under widely accepted principles of international law, a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military forces would be necessary in a complex emergency absent other evidence of an attack on the United States. In extreme crises, a UN Security Council will normally recognize that the emergency is a threat to international peace and security and therefore the Security Council would, under either Chapters VII or VIII of the UN Charter, authorize interested states to “use all necessary means” to restore peace and security to the region.

Absent a UN Security Council resolution, a state (or a regional organization such as NATO) can use force against another state only if acting in individual or collective self-defense. Whether such a basis exists in consideration of the specific hostilities against a regional state or some other entity will depend on the facts at the time the President orders the mission. Given the facts on the ground in the specific emergency, we should expect the use of force, without a sufficiently worded Security Council resolution, in response to hostilities in the region to be sharply questioned as violating international law.

7.2 **Advance Multilateral Diplomatic Consultations** (State lead w/ USUN, OSD, Energy, Transportation, etc)

Specify the necessary multilateral diplomatic consultations with key international and regional organizations such as the UN Security Council, or international relief agencies such as the ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, etc, or international human rights organizations such as the UNHRC, international AIDS prevention groups such as UNAIDS, or the atomic energy organization IAEA, or energy response organizations such as the International Energy Agency, or the Breton Woods financial organizations including the World Bank. Name the
international body, its headquarters location, members, and role in this emergency. Outline specific goals sought in our diplomatic consultations with these entities.

7.3 **Advance Peacemaking Negotiations** (State lead w/ USUN, OSD)
Consistent with the strategy for peace negotiations presented in Section 5.0 above, outline immediate steps for political negotiations with the parties to the conflict. These measures outline the plan for continuing (or ending) negotiations prior to and during the initial operation—immediate objectives, issues to be discussed, parameters for resolution, and possible guarantees from the international community.

7.4 **Advance Regional Organization Arrangements** (State lead w/ USUN, OSD)
Consistent with the strategy for mobilizing regional support presented in Section 5.0 above, outline immediate steps for diplomatic negotiations within the appropriate regional organization such as NATO, EU, OSCE, The Arab League, ASEAN, the OAU, The African Union, SADC, or ECOWAS. State the desired role of the regional organization and the specific goals sought in the consultations.

7.5 **Advance Coalition Arrangements and Leadership** (State lead w/ OSD, JCS, OSD, and USUN)
Determine the organization and lead nation for the coalition. Prepare a charter for the Steering Group to provide policy control over coalition operations. Make provisions for both military and civil command and control. Establish coalition-planning staffs for military and civilian activities.

7.6 **Recruitment of Coalition Participants—Troops / Police / Civilian Experts** (State lead w/ OSD, Joint Staff, Justice and USUN) Consistent with the strategy for building an international coalition, determine the coalition force structure and identify force requirements. Identify potential troop contributors and plan for soliciting participation. Clarify progress in on-going recruitment efforts.

7.7 **Recruitment of Financial Donors** (State lead w/ OSD, Justice, AID and Treasury)
Determine overall financial requirements and identify potential donors. Establish a fund to receive contributions. Prepare appeals in consultation with relevant parties. Organize donor conferences. Collaborate with UN agencies, international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.), development banks, NGO’s and bilateral donors.

7.8 **Intelligence Support Preparations** (Intelligence Community lead)
Describe how the IC will provide intel reports on the crisis and early warning of flashpoints to interagency policy-makers. If appropriate, outline requirements for and make arrangements to have damage assessments developed and provided to the interagency. Discuss guidelines for sharing of information with coalition partners, other participants from the international community, or regional organizations in the operation.

7.9 **Strategic Deployment and Logistics Arrangements** (State lead w/ OSD and Joint Staff)
Determine the coalition’s requirements for overflight rights, basing, and bed down. This will require the establishment of an IWG (NSC, State-P, State-Regional Bureau, State-PM, OSD-ISA, Joint Staff, DATTs, and the CINC) led by State-PM to coordinate making arrangements through political-military channels.

7.10 **Current Fiscal Year Funding of Agency Operations & Activities** (OMB lead w/ State, OSD, and AID):
Discuss the estimated USG cost of the operation, potential USG sources and adequacy of funding, interagency burden sharing—which USG agencies will pay for what, relevant funding authorities, and Congressional actions required for the expenditure of USG funds.

7.11 **Legal Authority for Supporting Operations** (All Agencies)
Identify agency legal requirements for supporting the operation. These requirements may include a SOFA, drawdown authority for train and equip activities, economy act provisions, human rights vetting requirements,
INS restrictions, FMS restrictions, sanctions enforcement, or cross-servicing agreements, among others. e accord, if appropriate, the U.S. legal authority for providing support to the operation, and the status of SOFA arrangements.

7.12 Congressional Consultations & Notifications (NSC lead w/ all agencies):
Outline the strategy for gaining Congressional support for operation, the requirements for consultation/reporting to Congress, plan for dealing with key Members.

7.13 U.S. Public Relations and Media Affairs (NSC lead w/ State, OSD, JS, and USUN):
Describe the overall strategy for telling the story, the rules of road for media once operations begin, key themes and critical events, and key media outlets/people.

7.14 International Public Diplomacy (State lead w/ NSC, OSD, Joint Staff, USUN, AID):
Describe the overall strategy for conducting the public information campaign abroad. Efforts will be coordinated by the International Public Information (IPI) working group.

7.15 AIDS Prevention and Other Protective Preparations (CDC and All Agencies)
Determine the requirements for AIDS prevention and/or other protective measures for personnel, equipment, and supplies. Collaborate with other nations and international organizations on AID prevention measures.

7.16 Non-combatant Evacuation and Precautionary Arrangements (State lead w/ NSC, OSD, Joint Staff)
Outline measures to evacuate non-combatant personnel and protect U.S. personnel and facilities.

7.17 Homeland Security and National Protective Measures (NSC lead w/ all agencies):
Outline the plan for coordinating agency and intergovernmental preparations throughout the crisis as outlined in current presidential directives as well as multi-agency memorandum of agreement.

7.18 Activities for Final Countdown and Onset of Operations (NSC lead w/ all agencies):
Outline the timeline and activities (for use in a “Playbook”) to be completed during final countdown and onset of operations. These may include legal notifications, warning messages, evacuation of personnel, POTUS activities, final diplomatic notifications, final coalition activities, congressional briefings, domestic public affairs and press operations, and international public information releases.

7.X Other preparatory tasks may be added as appropriate
8.0 **MAJOR MISSION AREA TASKS**

This section draws upon the interagency “mission analysis” which is usually completed during an earlier phase of the Advance Planning Process, well in advance of the actual writing of the Pol-Mil Plan. Later, once the Principals or Deputies Committee decides that an interagency Pol-Mil Plan for a complex contingency operation shall be written, the previous ‘mission analysis” is then updated for the anticipated operation and applied here in this section.

In this generic plan, the inventory of the major mission area tasks that could be undertaken as part of the complex contingency operation is presented in detail below. Although the content of this section in an actual plan may vary significantly from one operation to another, there are many common mission area tasks that are undertaken by most missions and they are listed below.

In writing a Pol-Mil Plan, each mission area (e.g. 8.1 Diplomatic Engagement) will normally be tasked by the NSC to a specific lead agency (such as the State Department in this example) for planning purposes in coordination with other interested agencies. Note that within in the inventory itself, the specific agency normally designed as lead is shown for each mission area.

Mission area tasks are identified to address urgent major challenges that, left unresolved, could lead to further hostilities, expansion of the conflict, or a return to fighting. As such, the mission area tasks listed below are distinct from normal, long-term development tasks, where the possibility of a return to hostilities is often remote.

Note also that the overriding criteria for the establishment of task priorities are largely political-military considerations, consistent with the USG strategic purpose and mission statement. These criteria offer a useful way for deciding whether, for example, an admirable humanitarian project fits in with the USG purpose and mission of the operation.

Since the set of mission area tasks undertaken for any given crisis will vary from operation to operation, this inventory presents a list of tasks that **may** be undertaken—not all tasks will be applicable to every complex contingency operation. Other important aspects of this inventory are highlighted below:

- The selection of mission area tasks undertaken for a particular operation will have to account for the USG strategic purpose and mission, the scope and requirements of the peace process, the extent of cooperation by the host government and the parties involved, and the resources available to do the job.

- This inventory of mission area tasks is illustrative rather than prescriptive. The inventory only identifies tasks that are usually undertaken as part of a complex contingency operation. Accordingly, the inventory can be used as a menu of potential tasks, based on lessons learned, to spur agency planners to consider the range of likely tasks appropriate for a given operation.

- Effort has been made to list tasks within each mission area in some chronological sequence of execution, however, this sequence should not be interpreted rigidly. Indeed, in an actual operation, most mission area tasks will be undertaken simultaneously with others, resulting in a very complex endeavor.

- The inventory does not specify which entity within the USG, or the United Nations, or a regional organization such as NATO, OSCE, OAU, or ASEAN will lead and manage the completion of the task. These assignments will normally be developed as part of the overall pol-mil planning process.
In writing this portion of the Pol-Mil Plan, agencies should prepare an brief, executive-level overview that is two to three pages in length following the general outline below:

**Mission Area Task (Lead and Supporting Agencies)**
- Current Situation
- Deputies Committee Intent / Desired Results
- Mission Area Objectives
- Strategy and Concept of Operations
- Key Implementation Tasks by Phase of the Operation
- Mission Area Funding Plan
- Supporting Authorities/Mandates/Policy Statements
- Unresolved Policy Issues, Anticipated Challenges & Difficulties

### 8.1 Diplomatic Engagement Tasks (State, USUN, OSD, Justice, Treasury)
- Consult with the host nation
- Consult with neighboring states and regional powers
- Consult with regional organizations
- Collaborate with the UN Secretariat
- Consult with supporting international organizations (UNHCR, Red Cross)
- Establish a “Friends Group” or a “Peace Implementation Council”
- Appoint a Special Envoy
- Determine the political and security needs of the parties to resolve the conflict
- Conduct peacemaking negotiations between the parties of the conflict
- Support mediation efforts / negotiations with the parties
- Isolate diplomatically the adversary, strongmen, de facto warlords and spoilers
- Persuade governments to meet their obligations on sanctions, terrorism, etc
- Formulate UNSC resolutions for collective action
- Gain basing and over flight rights
- Build an effective multinational / multilateral coalition
- Collaborate with troop contributing nations
- Impose or lift sanctions / arms embargo
- Maintain compliance with the peace accord milestones and conditions
- Gain diplomatic recognition of a new government

### 8.2 Military Security and Regional Stability Tasks (OSD, Joint Staff, State, Justice, AID, CIA)
- Conduct non-combatant evacuation operations
- Conduct intrusive military operations to achieve policy objectives
- Meet U.S. commitments to our allies and friends in the area of operations
- Assess, train and equip coalition forces
- Establish a military observer or an international peacekeeping mission
- Enforce a ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and separation of combatants
- Supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces
- Enforce freedom of movement conditions for international military, police and relief groups
- Conduct constabulary operations until civilian policing capabilities are functional
- Conduct counterinsurgency / counter-terrorist operations

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Section 8.0 Major Mission Area Tasks

- Provide temporary / interim criminal justice capabilities as needed
- Protect civilians in the midst of armed conflict as per UNSCR 1265
- Protect critical infrastructure, key public institutions and specified sites
- Seize and secure strategic minerals / conflict diamonds / economic centers of gravity
- Enforce arms sanctions to stop the flow of illegal arms and seize caches of former-combatants
- Provide border security and coordinate with local host nation customs officials
- Ensure freedom of navigation
- Deter further hostilities and armed attacks and be prepared to overcome threats of escalation
- Deter belligerents from using safe areas, refugee camps, etc. as bases of operations
- Provide intelligence support to the civilian mission and its police component
- Remove unexploded ordinance
- Support civilian implementation in a range of key activities
- Implement confidence-building and security measures
- Provide special security for counter corruption operations
- Professionalize / restructure military forces
- Establish mil-to-mil programs
- Coordinate NATO (or Major Power) in extremis support to the operation
- Provide security assistance to the host nation
- Conduct transition planning, hand-off, and military drawdown
- Develop U.S. position on compensation / payments for collateral damage
- Establish a regional framework for post-conflict regional stability

8.3 WMD Deterrence and Control Tasks (OSD, Joint Staff, State, DSWA)
- Prevent the sale, transfer, or migration of WMD systems and technical knowledge
- Deter at all costs any use of WMD by any party or any neighboring state of the conflict
- Prepare war crimes indictments in case WMD is used against any non-combatants
- Assure positive command and control (C2) of all WMD systems, avoid fragmentation of WMD C2
- Control / neutralize / remove WMD threat capabilities
- Safeguard / secure / dismantle WMD research personnel, records, facilities, etc
- Prepare to support consequence management operations

8.4 Demobilization and Armed Group Transformation Tasks (State, AID, OSD, Joint Staff, World Bank)
- Implement a regional strategy for containing arms flows and cross-border military support
- Clarify the mission’s security goal—control violence, or build stability, or terminate war completely
- Field a credible military peacekeeping force with robust backup response capabilities
- Impose military security in the conflict area to reduce the threat of surprise attack
- Demilitarize an area, zone, or region as outlined in the agreement
- Design and implement a weapons control regime
- Collect, secure and destroy confiscated weapons and ammunition
- Disarm, demobilize, or reduce military units and armed groups
- Constitute of non-military “National Protection Corps” to employ former combatants
- Assist in the re-integration of ex-combatants to civilian society
- Conduct military search and destroy operations for non-compliant armed groups
- Mount an effective spoiler strategy—find and destroy weapons caches
- Isolate extremist leaders and deny them financial support for their activities
- Quell hate radio broadcasts and prevent inflammatory propaganda
- Diminish popular support for obstructionists
- Empower, protect and assist moderate leaders and their supporters
Section 8.0 Major Mission Area Tasks

8.5 Internal Political Transition & Democratization Tasks (State, AID, Justice, USUN)
- Conceptualize an acceptable internal political framework (e.g., a power-sharing arrangement)
- Negotiate a “comprehensive political settlement” with provisions for:
  - Implementing the power-sharing arrangement among all factions
  - Securing the warring factions from surprise attack
  - Establishing an interim government with participation by the factions
  - Gaining control of the country’s primary commodity and natural resources
  - Creating a non-partisan police force and imposing rule of law
  - Addressing humanitarian, human rights and other divisive issues
- Determine realistic “peace process” milestones over the next 24-36 months
- Constitute a national consultative council to steer implementation of the peace process
- Secure participation of key indigenous leaders in the consultative council
- Prepare to wield credible inducements and sanctions on key indigenous leaders
- Promote voices of moderation and regular dialogue among former disputants
- Create confidence-building measures among warring factions
- Focus local media on moderation, factional cooperation and progress
- Conduct a referendum on a new state constitution
- Promote development of local self-governing institutions
- Develop staffing and funding for the interim or transition government
- Create consensus-building mechanisms—national commissions, etc.
- Release and assist political prisoners
- Determine a timeline for elections
- Assist in the conduct of free and fair elections
- Assist in informing and educating newly-elected political leaders
- Offer advisory assistance to political leaders
- Monitor and report on corruption by political officials

8.6 Counter-Terrorism Tasks (State, CIA, Justice, FBI, OSD, Joint Staff, Treasury, and Transportation)
- Conduct an assessment of the terrorist threat to the mission and the peace process
- Establish an interagency working group to manage counter terrorist activities of the mission
- Determine protective measures to protect U.S. and international interests in the operation
- Mobilize intelligence assets to support counter terrorist efforts
  - Fuse information among agencies (intel, law enforcement, military, financial, etc.)
  - Detect terrorist plots and provide early tactical warning
  - Investigate terrorist attacks and determine perpetrators
  - Conduct intel liaison with foreign gov’ts and local authorities
- Undertake diplomatic efforts to control possible terrorist activity
  - Encourage foreign gov’ts to provide adequate protection to U.S. interests
  - Collaborate with foreign gov’ts on curbing terrorist threats to the mission and the peace process
Section 8.0 Major Mission Area Tasks

- Establish bilateral cooperation agreements and coordinating mechanisms
- Apply sanctions on state sponsors
- Pass a UNSC resolution or sanctions to impair terrorist activity

- Conduct military operations as part of a counter-terrorism campaign
  - Protect key U.S. interests
  - Rescue hostages
  - Deter terrorist acts and potential supporters of terrorist groups
  - Retaliate for terrorist attacks and destroy terrorist bases and networks
  - Disrupt planned terrorist activities or attacks

- Apply law enforcement (host nation, U.S. and international) capabilities
  - Work with foreign gov’ts on sharing information, conducting investigations and enforcing local law
  - Merge intelligence collection and dissemination efforts
  - Investigate, pursue, arrest and prosecute terrorists
  - Apply extraterritorial jurisdiction

- Control and diminish financial support for terrorist groups
  - Investigate and track financial operations of the terrorist threat
  - Impose targeted financial sanctions on individuals, groups and sponsors
  - Freeze financial assets belonging to individuals, groups and sponsors
  - Educate and train foreign gov’t officials on financial and legal tools
  - Criminalize the provision of funding and support to the terrorist threat
  - Deter the international Diaspora from providing financial support
  - Shut down terrorist business fronts, charitable NGO fronts, etc.
  - Reach understandings with foreign gov’ts on their international obligations

- Conduct detainee operations for captured terrorists

8.7 Humanitarian Assistance Tasks (State, AID, OFDA, Justice, OSD)

Humanitarian Relief
- Pre-position humanitarian relief stocks
- Provide emergency humanitarian relief—water, food, shelter, medical supplies
- Organize humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas
- Coordinate non-government and private organization activities
- Restore damaged potable water sources, storage facilities, and distribution systems
- Provide access to winterized accommodations and shelter
- Repair sanitary latrines and capabilities for sewage disposal
- Assist in restoring local health delivery services
- Rehabilitate damaged food production capacities
- Provide special assistance to vulnerable groups
- Provide basic training and education in preventive measures

Refugees
- Avoid generation of additional population movements from home towns
- Open refugee / IDP camps with adequate support facilities and protection
- Establish a registration and identification system
- Repatriate or resettle refugees and displaced persons as soon as possible
- Provide incentives for returning people such as security, housing and public services
- Organize food-for-work efforts (demining, road repair, security, etc.)
Demining and Unexploded Ordinance Removal Operations
- Assess the landmine clearance and unexploded ordinance problem
- Conduct emergency demining and unexploded ordinance removal operations
- Solicit financial support for clearance and removal operations
- Create a landmine clearance authority and conduct removal operations
- Train and equip indigenous demining units
- Organize landmine and unexploded ordinance removal operations
- Conduct training for the local population on mine and unexploded ordinance awareness

8.8 AIDS & Contagious Disease Prevention Tasks (State, HHS, CDC, AID, USUN, OSD, Joint Staff)
- Conduct an assessment of the AIDS / contagious disease threat in country
- Provide for early warning of widespread AIDS / contagious disease transmission problems
- Assist the host nation in building capacity to respond in local areas
- Undertake prevention efforts to control AIDS / contagious disease transmission
- Support a broad public information campaign
- Assist the host nation in its mitigation efforts to deal with the heavy loss of life
- Anticipate security threats to the host country’s internal stability
- Mobilize international support and assistance

8.9 Infrastructure Restoration Tasks (State, AID)
- Restore basic services
- Restore food supply and rehabilitate agricultural capacity
- Reconstitute energy supplies
- Restore facilities for power generation and transmission. Fuse power grids
- Repair transportation facilities and systems
- Restore communications systems

8.10 Consequence Management Operations (State, AID, HHS, Energy, OSD, Joint Staff, EPA, Justice)
- Establish agency planning response cells
- Deploy a Consequence Management Support Team (CMST) to the U.S. Embassy
- Constitute a military JTF-CM for consequence management operations
- Stand-up host nation consequence management capabilities and a coordination center
- Prepare an emergency response plan and recruit participants
- Conduct emergency training for first responders
- Identify appropriate lab support requirements and position lab support personnel strategically
- Mark affected areas and deploy agent detection and monitoring systems
- Deploy decontamination and medical response personnel
- Conduct emergency operations and decontaminate areas
- Transition to humanitarian assistance / disaster response activities

8.11 Public Security and Civil Order Tasks (State, Justice, Treasury)
- Determine public security, civil order and law enforcement mission needs, authorities, and requirements
- Establish an international CIVPOL mission
- Provide advisors to indigenous police organizations
- Assist in investigations, forensics work, anti-organized crime operations, community relations
- Provide capabilities to deal with civil disturbances
- Eradicate corruption in the law enforcement community
Section 8.0 Major Mission Area Tasks

- Combat organized international crime activity and corruption
- Safeguard government institutions and key leaders
- Reform or disband existing police forces
- Establish a national police service academy
- Establish a new police force and pay for its operations
- Provide equipment and conduct police training for reformed national police forces
- Recruit and train qualified civilian police officers / monitors
- Exchange information between police and military forces
- Track performance of reformed police operations

8.12 Border Control and Customs Tasks (State, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, OSD and Joint Staff)
- Determine international border monitoring mission needs, authorities, and capability requirements
- Coordinate border control functions among ground, air and sea entities
- Establish an international border police and customs mission
- Provide advisors to the border customs organization
- Monitor and assist in control of all points of entry for ground, air and sea avenues
- Eradicate corruption in border police and customs organizations
- Reform or disband existing border customs and police forces
- Establish a new border police force and pay for its operations
- Provide equipment and train indigenous border police and customs personnel
- Recruit qualified border police officers / monitors
- Exchange information between border police, civilian police, and military forces
- Prevent trafficking in gems, arms, narcotics, black-market goods, stolen property, and persons
- Regulate immigration and emigration
- Track performance of reformed border and customs operations

8.13 Civil Administration Restoration Tasks (State, Justice and AID)
- Determine international mission needs, authorities, and capability requirements
- Reform or disband existing civil administration
- Develop structure and staffing needs for an interim civil administration
- Extend a responsive interim civil administration throughout the country
- Establish national customs and border police capacities
- Provide advice, supplies, and equipment to conduct local civil administration
- Recruit qualified international civil administration experts
- Constitute consensus-building mechanisms for local issues—education commissions, etc.
- Establish guidelines to prevent discrimination
- Educate new civil administration officials
- Monitor and report on corruption by government officials
- Transfer control of administrative functions from UN to host nation officials

8.14 Rule of Law & Administration of Justice Tasks (State, AID, Justice)
- Determine international administration of justice / rule of law needs, authorities, and requirements
- Resolve the question of applicable law
- Deploy a temporary transitional justice capability (police, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, etc.)
- Assist in establishing an indigenous legal system
- Reform or disband old, ineffective, or corrupt judiciary
- Rebuild the criminal justice system
- Establish a legal infrastructure—courts, legal libraries, bar associations, law schools, etc.
- Provide capabilities to conduct trials and other legal procedures
- Establish a court monitoring activity
- Establish a judicial code of conduct
- Provide legal aid through NGO’s and other groups
- Educate the local population on the new judicial system
- Recruit qualified international legal experts
- Share intelligence for apprehending and trying criminals
- Assist in establishing humane prison system
- Combat influences of organized international crime activity and corruption
- Safeguard government institutions and key leaders

8.15 Counter Official Corruption / Organized Crime / Security Force Extortion Tasks (State, CIA, Justice, FBI, Treasury, Customs, OSD, and Joint Staff)
- Assess the threat of official corruption and organized crime to the peace process and political objectives
- Constitute an interagency sub-working group to develop a campaign plan for the Deputies Committee
- Task the intelligence community on revised priorities and collection efforts
- Agree upon an interagency MOU to share interagency responsibilities of the campaign plan
- Appoint a Special Advisor to plan, coordinate and implement a counter corruption campaign plan
- Establish appropriate UNSC mandate authorities for appropriate international legal action
- Establish links on the ground to non-U.S. international organizations
- Constitute related UN political, economic and legal mandates on sanctions, war crimes, etc.
- Deploy an interagency Task Force in country to carry out operations
- Support the interagency Task Force with intel, planning, communications and logistics
- Provide legal advice on local laws, procedures and processes to control corruption
- Pass new laws promoting anti-corruption and reform the criminal justice system
- Revise government procurement procedures
- Reform business law, accounting and reporting practices
- Constitute codes of conduct and provide professional standards education to new officials
- Remove corrupt officials from office and place them in custody for prosecution
- Protect and support non-corrupt government officials, military leaders and justice officials
- Establish a witness protection program
- Constitute non-corrupt police, border, customs, tax collection forces and units
- Deploy specially trained forces to hot spots and key nodes of criminal activity
- Build and support local media efforts to undermine official corruption
- Energize regional efforts to control illegal activities in neighboring states
- Leverage international capacity to support counter corruption efforts
- Mobilize the international business community to end support of illegal commercial activity

8.16 Primary Commodity Regulation & Economic Rehabilitation Tasks (State, AID, Justice, Treasury)
- Reduce the economic rewards and benefits for continued fighting
- Impose sanctions on spoilers and armed groups that plunder dominant resources and local populations
- Freeze financial assets of non-compliant armed groups
- Support efforts to gain legitimate gov’t control over the nations valuable natural resources
• Create legitimate government institutions to provide access to markets for national resources
• Deny armed groups the access to international markets for pilfered resources and illegal goods
• Provide realistic and attractive economic incentives to ex-soldiers
• Reduce Diaspora funding to armed groups and non-compliant movements
• Restrict international patrons in providing funding, arms and other support to armed groups
• Reduce popular support for predatory armed groups and their leaders
• Replace old, corrupt gov’t institutions with new, honest, and trusted agencies
• Diversify the nation’s GDP to reduce dependence on a primary commodity
• Redistribute & share among rival factions national wealth generated by trade in primary commodities
• Narrow economic disparities between rival ethnic groups
• Target international aid to reinforce new, or revised national economic policies
• Provide long-term economic policies to support long-term economic growth

8.17 Employment Generation, Commercial & Business Development Tasks (State, AID, Treasury)
• Establish banking and payments system and a stable currency
• Create economic opportunities for young males
• Create opportunities for employment of non-combatants
• Encourage private enterprise in legitimate business activities
• Revive legitimate commercial activity among formerly rival groups
• Implement micro-development programs in key areas of the economy
• Establish mechanisms for public finance
• Restore opportunities for employment and private ownership
• Assist in economic integration and cooperation
• Streamline government administration and licensing for economic activity
• Divest government businesses to honest private-managed / publicly-owned businesses
• Eliminate official corruption
• Initiate privatization under market economy
• Assist in effective natural resource management
• Mobilize domestic and foreign investment capital
• Facilitate and exploit legitimate international trading opportunities

8.18 Public Diplomacy and Education Tasks (State, OSD, Joint Staff)
• Promote popular understanding of the mission
• Conduct internal public diplomacy (e.g. PSYOPS operations)
• Conduct public opinion research
• Promote emergence of a free and independent media
• Assist in establishing open broadcast networks
• Discourage “hate radio” broadcasts and extremist voices
• Promote understanding of civic values, rule of law, and citizen responsibilities
• Sponsor journalist training and professional standards
• Conduct public education and media training programs

8.19 Human Rights Abuses / Atrocities / War Crimes Tasks (State, Justice)
• Engage the UN Human Rights Commission and establish a Commission of Inquiry
• Deploy a human rights monitoring mission
• Provide human rights training to military, police and judicial officials
• Monitor human rights practices and promote human rights standards
• Vet indigenous security forces for human rights abuses
• Establish a clearing house for information and evidence
• Constitute an office in the mission to address war crimes issues
• Train military mission personnel on war crimes investigation support
• Gain access to refugee camps and conduct interviews
• Set up an atrocity reporting system and compile atrocity reports
• Locate and protect possible sites of atrocities
• Maintain data on sites—digital pictures, maps, witness reports, etc.
• Deploy forensic teams with equipment to conduct investigations
• Provide protection to the sites, witnesses, and investigation personnel
• Establish the jurisdiction and mandate of an international tribunal / court
• Develop an effective witness protection program
• Seek removal of possible abusive police and law enforcement officials
• Consult on appointing a UN Special Reporter to advise on human rights matters

8.20 Civil Society and Community Rebuilding Tasks (AID, State, Justice)
• Assess priorities for a functioning society in local areas
• Identify key local officials, social and religious leaders, and their influence on the local population
• Avoid empowering corrupt leaders, police or other local tyrants
• Establish coordinating mechanisms between the international mission, local leaders, and NGO’s
• Design community development programs (returns, food security, housing, health, utilities, education,)
• Fund quick impact projects
• Restart schools for all children
• Provide for localize counseling of victims
• Integrate local community rebuilding programs with area and national efforts

8.21 National Reconciliation Tasks (State, AID, Justice)
• Assist in establishing a Truth & Reconciliation Commission or international tribunal
• Seek legislation for amnesty of ex-combatants
• Determine reparations and resolve compensation issues
• Establish a public information effort to promote reconciliation
• Resolve the whereabouts of missing persons
• Strengthen mechanisms to ensure government accountability
• Establish civil affairs operations in local areas
• Arrange for travel and reunion of families

8.X Other mission areas may be added as appropriate
9.0 **INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT**

9.1 **ExComm Management Structure**  
Outline the interagency structure to manage the operation, including the establishment of an ExComm under the Deputies Committee to be responsible for interagency policy development, coordination, planning and assessment throughout this crisis. Usually, the ExComm supports the Deputies Committee in its day-to-day management of crisis response.

Specify the co-chairs of the ExComm, normally one from the Regional PCC (State) and the other from the Contingency Planning PCC (NSC). Outline the DAS-level agency regional and functional representatives from the PCCs as well as DAS-level representatives from other agencies that have been added to the ExComm for this crisis. All designated departments and agencies will normally participate fully in the ExComm’s activities throughout the crisis. The ExComm is also supported by the NSC Emergency Planning Team on a full time basis under the direction of the NSC Contingency Planning PCC Co-chair.

Normally, the ExComm will constitute sub-working groups as needed to deal with specific multi-agency mission areas. For example, a short listing of some multi-agency sub-working groups are shown below:

**Sub-Working Groups of the ExComm**

1. *Policy Planning Sub-group* (NSC lead with State, OSD, Joint Staff, VP, and the NIC)
3. *Consequence Management Sub-group* (State-PM lead with AID, OSD, Joint Staff, EPA, and HS)
4. *Post-Conflict Recovery Sub-group* (AID lead with State, OSD, Justice, Treasury & Commerce)

The ExComm is also normally supported by several standing Policy Coordinating Committees as shown below to deal with specific multi-agency mission areas:

**Standing PCC’s that support the ExComm**

1. *Regional PCC*
2. *Contingency Planning PCC*
3. *Non Combatant Operations PCC*
4. *International Organized Crime PCC*
5. *Counter-terrorism Steering Group*
6. *Humanitarian Assistance PCC*
7. *International Operations PCC*

9.2 **Interagency Crisis Management Activities**  
Outline the set of interagency activities for participating agencies in order to ensure effective daily oversight, information exchange and policy management for the operation. Consistent with these efforts, all agencies normally make arrangements for conducting 24/7 operations both in Washington and in the region. (Agencies should account for particularly confusing time-zone differences between Washington and key capitals abroad.)

For example, agencies normally constitute internal capacities to participate fully in the following interagency crisis management activities:
• **Agency Policy TF**: Agencies normally establish (virtual, on-call, or standing) an internal “Task Force” consisting of the agency’s regional, functional and intelligence experts in Washington to better coordinate agency policy planning, coordination and assessment. The leading DAS-level official of the agency’s “Task Force” is a member of the ExComm. All agencies normally circulate phone lists of their agency task force members (including office, cell and emergency phone numbers) to all other agency task forces.

• **Agency Response Cell**: Agencies normally establish an agency “Response Cell” within their situation centers to assist in communications and reporting the 24/7 basis. Agencies establish secure communications to all other agency Response Cells across the government. Agency response cells in Washington normally have communications capability with agency officials at the operational level or within the region.

• **Agency Daily Situation Reports**: Agency Response Cells normally circulate agency situation reports twice daily at 6:00 AM and 3:00 PM to all other agency response cells. Classification of the agency situation reports is normally no higher than SECRET level.

• **Intel Updates**: The IC regularly circulates intelligence updates as part of the normal daily intel distribution process, appropriately adjusted for special requirements of some agency officials.

• **Daily SVTS**: The NSC normally chairs a daily SVTS each morning before 1000 AM.

• **ExComm Meetings / Sub-working Group Meetings**: The ExComm normally meets at the call of the co-chairs in the afternoon at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building in support the Deputies Committee’s policy planning needs. Sub-working Group meetings take place as necessary at the call of the sub-working group chair.

### 9.3 Interagency RED-BLUE-GREY Strategy Games

Outline how the interagency will conduct strategy games involving RED vs. BLUE players along with other GREY players who represent influential actors in the region and abroad. These exercises focus on the implementation of the pol-mil plan’s strategy as outlined in Section 5.0 above. Using experts with extensive knowledge of the key actors in the crisis, these “war games” are designed to play out RED, BLUE and GREY decisions on strategy as the operation unfolds to identify likely responses and counter-moves.

In conducting these strategy games, BLUE players rely on the strategies outlined in Section 5.0 to deal with possible RED negative responses or countermoves as well as those actions by GREY regional and international actors. These RED negative responses to our decisions could be employed in collaboration with key GREY patrons and other adversaries who would thwart the mission. These RED and GREY countermoves are likely to be multi-dimensional and asymmetric in character. For each possible RED and GREY countermove, the BLUE pol-mil strategy should present a menu of options for the Deputies Committee that could either deter, preempt, or deal with these negative actions taken by RED or GREY players involved.

### 9.4 Interagency Rehearsals

Initially, the interagency will normally conduct two rehearsals of this pol-mil plan prior to D-DAY. First, the ExComm will complete its rehearsal about 20-30 days prior to D-DAY, and then the Deputies Committee will conduct its rehearsal about 3-7 days prior to D-DAY. At a later date, the ExComm will consider whether to conduct a follow-on rehearsal in anticipation of a major transition in the operation such as a termination of hostilities in the region and transition to post-conflict activities.
9.4.1 The ExComm Rehearsal: The ExComm Rehearsal of the pol-mil plan will normally be conducted about 20 days prior to D-DAY for the purpose of clarifying policy aims and harmonizing key mission area efforts throughout each stage of the mission.

The agenda of the ExComm Rehearsal will be shaped around realistic vignettes that capture the essence of each of the stages of the mission. During each vignette, participants will clarify agency responsibilities to ensure operational success. In addition, the ExComm will identify gaps and disconnects in agency plans for immediate corrective action. Specific details of the ExComm Rehearsal are normally as follows:

- Host: OSD / Joint Staff
- Date & Location: TBA in the Pentagon
- Duration: Half day
- Participants: ExComm DAS-level principals plus two
- Agenda: Several vignettes, one for each stage of the mission (see Section 6.0 above) that address mission area task implementation as outlined in Section 8.0 of the pol-mil plan.

9.4.2 The Deputies Committee Rehearsal: The Deputies Committee Rehearsal of the pol-mil plan will normally be conducted about 3-7 days prior to D-DAY for the purpose of clarifying policy issues attendant to the key decisions associated with the mission as it unfolds over time.

The agenda of the Deputies Rehearsal is often shaped around key decision points in the implementation of the pol-mil plan as outlined in Section 2.0 above. Unresolved policy planning issues, likely information gaps, and potential implementation disconnects in the pol-mil plan will be identified for immediate action by the ExComm. Specific details of the Deputies Rehearsal are normally as follows:

- Host: NSC
- Date & Location: TBA in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building
- Duration: Half day
- Participants: Deputies Committee principals plus two
- Agenda: Key policy decisions of the mission as outlined in Section 2.0 above.

9.5 ExComm Assessment of Mission Progress

Outline how the ExComm will review and assess progress in accomplishment of mission area tasks as outlined in Section 8.0 of this pol-mil plan. On a regularly scheduled basis, designated lead agencies for each mission area – for example the State Department is normally the lead agency for the mission area International Diplomatic Engagement – will submit a mission area progress report to the ExComm on task implementation. All collaborating agencies within each mission area will contribute to the lead agency’s mission area progress report. At its periodic “mission area progress review,” the ExComm will identify weak or slow progress in all mission areas and take corrective action. The ExComm’s mission area progress review will also identify new requirements and policy issues as the events unfold through each stage of the mission.

This section should present the plan for measuring mission effectiveness and progress in achieving U.S. policy objectives that are outlined in Section 4 above. Clarify what mission areas need to be monitored at the policy level and establish metrics that will evaluate progress toward achieving the desired results of the operation.

First, outline the key mission areas of effort (diplomacy, military stability, humanitarian relief, public security, etc) and the metrics, both objective and subjective, to evaluate the level of effort completed by the mission: the number of troops deployed, number of police stations under control, or number of disarmament camps open for operations. Obviously, these metrics define only inputs, or the level of effort put forth by the mission, but they are useful in managing resources and anticipating new requirements in the future for each mission area.
Next, in evaluating progress toward desired ends as outlined in Section 4.0, specify the metrics to be used to evaluate progress toward mission success—describe the interim goals for each major stage or phase of the operation that the mission will need to accomplish before the operation transitions to a follow-on phase (e.g., from imposed peace to durable peace). The nature of these goals can be either objective (e.g., number of weapons turned in by combatants) or subjective (e.g., public opinion survey data indicating local support for nationally elected officials). Depending on the policy objectives for the mission, the scope of these goals will likely involve several mission areas—as for example, the mission statement could include such key specific tasks for the operation such as gain territorial access, provide military security, demobilize armed groups, reform the civilian police, eliminate official corruption, build civil order and justice, conduct humanitarian relief, and resettle refugees among others.

Because success in one mission area (e.g., military security) usually affects success in another (e.g., humanitarian relief), the metrics used to measure progress in the several mission areas should help coordinate military and civilian dimensions of the operation in a manner that encourages successful mission progress for a major stage or phase of the operation. In addition, these interim goals or desired conditions should be understandable and realistic among military and civilian officials—for example: "Establish a suitable security environment that permits relief operations to be conducted by NGO XXX in Province YYY."

Policy-makers, contributors and donors want to know whether progress is being made, and they need to inform, educate and persuade others to continue support for the mission. Consequently, these interim goals and their associated measures of progress should help senior officials understand and describe mission performance as persuasively as possible. Note that one should be clear as to whether the intended audience would desire a change in conditions on the ground (e.g. newly elected officials gain political control in all provinces) or simply the completion of a task (e.g. free and fair elections were conducted in all provinces). Either may be appropriate for the audience, depending on how ambitious policy-makers want to be in communicating progress made in the mission, while recognizing the limits on availability of political cohesion, financial support, and will to risk casualties in the operation.

9.6 Advance Planning Lessons Learned & After Action Review

Explain how the Contingency Planning PCC will issue instructions to its members outlining systematic activities to capture lessons learned and best practices regarding the interagency Advance Planning Process and its associated policy development, planning, coordination and assessment activities in this crisis. Normally, the Contingency Planning PCC will also sponsor an interagency after action review upon completion of major stages of the mission. The process of institutionalization of lessons learned and best practices is an important effort in improving interagency pol-mil planning, coordination and assessment in future crises.
10.0 AGENCY PLANS

This section outlines important agency plans that are to be written by USG or UN agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation. For each critical mission area task noted in Section 8.0 above, the ExComm will normally task USG agencies to write an agency plan for implementation (note below some of the common plans required for a complex contingency). The ExComm normally determines, in consultation with NSC staff, which agency plans will be written for the complex contingency operation.

The format for these plans should follow a standard pattern for consistency and common understanding. Agency plans should at least discuss:

- Purpose of the plan
- Background on how the plan supports the overall operation
- Planning assumptions
- Current situation on the ground
- Operational mission and objectives
- Desired operational end state and measures of success
- Concept of operations--how the activity will unfold and timelines
- Organizational structure for the activity and its chain of command
- Lead agency and other supporting agencies involved and their roles/responsibilities
- Local institutions involved and their roles/responsibilities
- Other international actors/organizations involved
- Financial, personnel, asset management, administrative, and logistical instructions
- Unresolved issues, risks and anticipated challenges/difficulties

The interagency policy-level steering group (e.g. usually the ExComm) will normally review each of these plans to identify areas of interdependence between agencies (e.g., AID cannot do x until DoD does y), areas of disagreement (e.g., two agencies each think the other should pay for x), and the degree of consistency between agency plans and the overall pol-mil plan. The ExComm review will normally take place off-site at NDU or Carlisle and will include office director participation or higher. In addition, the Deputies Committee will conduct an interagency rehearsal as outlined in Section 9.0 to review the Pol-Mil plan and supporting agency plans prior to commencement of operations. Depending on mission requirements, here are some common major mission areas that will require an agency plan for a complex contingency operation:

10.1 Military Operations (Joint Staff)
10.2 Humanitarian Relief Operations (AID)
10.3 Refugee Return (State, AID)
10.4 Civilian Police Equip and Train (State, Justice)
10.5 Rule of Law & Administration of Justice (Justice, State)
10.6 Restoration of Basic Services (AID)
10.7 Establishment of Foundations of a Legitimate Economy (Treasury, State, AID)
10.8 Counter Official Corruption & Organized Crime (Justice, Treasury, State, Defense)
10.9 Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization of Forces (OSD, AID)
10.10 Apprehension and Prosecution of War Criminals (State, Justice)
10.11 International Public Diplomacy (State, OSD, AID, Justice)
10.10 Election Support & Democratization Activities (State, AID)
APPENDICES

A – Regional Map
Provide a regional map of the area of operations. Include in this appendix relevant overprinted maps with key information, such as the location of refugee camps, areas of military control by the factions, locations of mines, religious sites, etc, road and rail networks, airfields, or economic spheres of influence.

B – Intelligence Assessment
Provide the fully classified version of the intelligence assessment for the mission.

C – Mission Organizational Structure and Footprint
In graphic form, portray the civilian and military organizational structure of the mission. Also, using a map picture, depict the geographic footprint of the key elements of the mission to be deployed on the ground.

D – International Coalition Participants (National and Multilateral)
Summarize the list of all coalition participants—contributors, actors, supporters and donors of the operation, both military and civilian components of the mission. This list should be available for use in both diplomatic and public information activities.

E – Pol-Mil Strategic Timeline for Mission Start-up
On a matrix, outline the timeline of key strategic events for mission start-up. Key pol-mil aspects usually include regional diplomatic activities, Security Council decisions, military coalition build-up, deployments of military and relief activities, and public information efforts.

F – Phases of the Military Operation
As provided by the Pentagon, outline the phases of the military operation over the next six-nine months.

G – Pol-Mil Operational Synchronization Matrix
(See para on concept of operation in section three above): On a matrix, outline the timeline of key operational events for mission progress over the next six-nine months. Key pol-mil aspects usually include political, military, relief, and return efforts as a minimum.

H – Playbook for Final Countdown
On a short timeline covering the last few days and hours leading up to and following H-Hour, outline the key activities (as outlined in Section 4 above) within the USG to be taken at the outset by the White House and other agencies to ensure coordinated implementation of mission.

I – Summary of Key Decisions
In graphic form, provide on a timeline the key policy decisions that the Principals or Deputies will likely have to address as the operation unfolds over the next six-nine months.