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Armor Evens the Odds in Two Urban
Battles
A Tale of Two Cities
Hue and Khorramshahr
LtCol Robert W. Lamont, USMC
This article reviews the role of armor in the urban battlespace with an
eye toward how history can assist in charting the way ahead. In looking at
areas around the globe, beyond the confines of the former Warsaw Pact, 75
percent of politically significant urban areas are located within 150
miles of the sea. These Key factors, proximity to the littoral battlespace
and frequency of conflict, coupled with continued economic growing pains
of a global marketplace, make the Third World urban setting a dangerous
place well into the next century.
Recent discussion on the use of armor in the urban setting highlights
the numerous operational challenges faced by vehicles fighting in this
arena. While the number of vehicles needed in city fighting is reduced,
their ability to contribute to the combined arms team is increased.
History provides many examples of the combat potential of mounted forces
on urban terrain. This article discusses two.
The Battle for Hue – Vietnam War
The Battle of Hue is well known within Marine Corps circles as a tough,
street-to-street fight against a determined foe. The city of Hue had a
population of 140,000 at the time of the attack in January 1968. The city
was divided into two zones. The outer area was suburban in nature and
located south of the Perfume River. The Citadel dominated the north bank
of the river and was traditional built-up, closed terrain. The city
dominated north-south communications by both rail and road along the
littoral strip of South Vietnam. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) each had command posts within
the city.
Following the opening moves by the North Vietnam Army (NVA), Marine
forces were ordered to counterattack and relieve the compounds within the
city. This effort was spearheaded by Captain Batcheller’s Company A, 1st
Battalion, 1st Marines. This marked the first phase of the battle. To get
into Hue and support the MACV compound, the relief column had to cross
enemy-controlled country that varied from open rice paddies to close,
built-up areas. Captain Batcheller’s company linked up with a platoon of
tanks and moved his Marines from trucks to the tanks as he closed on Hue.
This shift provided his column with the mobility and firepower needed to
successfully run the gauntlet of enemy troops and link-up with the MACV
compound and demonstrated that bold maneuver by mounted units can
penetrate through urban areas before the enemy reacts.
The second phase of the battle began after Marine combat power
strengthened to a point where offensive operations could begin. This
effort was highlighted by a counterattack along Le Loi Street adjacent to
the Perfume River. To clear an area of 11 blocks wide and nine blocks
deep, the Marines, now designated Task Force X-Ray, mustered a
battalion-plus of infantry, reinforced with a tank platoon and Ontos
antitank vehicles, which were armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles each.
Tanks provided key support to the infantry during their advance down
the Le Loi. The 90mm main guns of the M-48s dominated the wide street with
direct fire support and responded to requests for support from pinned-down
infantry numerous times. Further, tanks opened a “new” route to the
forward fighting areas by knocking down walls and obstacles, enabling
casualty evacuation under cover. This battle witnessed classic
tank-infantry combined arms cooperation. Tanks led dismounted elements
down the street while the infantry covered the rear of the vehicles
preventing surprise attacks. While the NVA fielded a full array of weapons
to defend the southern bank of the Perfume River, they lacked tanks.
Thew final phase of the Battle for Hue was the taking of the Citadel.
For this phase of the operation, Task Force X-Ray had grown to an infantry
regiment reinforced with both a tank and anti-tank company. The weather
changed to a cold drizzle with low cloud ceiling, and poor visibility
hampered the Marines traditional firepower enhancement of close air
support, and the burden for this firepower requirement shifted squarely
back to the tank and Ontos units.
During this final phase, M-48 tanks and Ontos antitank vehicles were
paired together. This tactic provided an effective combination for
dominating the close-in fighting along the tight streets of the Citadel.
The tank was used for pinpoint fire and to draw-out the enemy. The Ontos
provided an area fire capability as all six tubes unleashed canister shot
at close range. This method forced defenders to ground and negated any
resistance prior to Marine assaults across streets or open areas. This
technique proved so effective that when tank ammunition was exhausted on
17 February, there was a pause in the fighting. Mounted firepower was
critical in sustaining the dismounted assault.
The intensity of the Battle of Hue is reflected in the battle losses
and ammunition usage during the fight. In the 22 days of combat for Hue,
Marine casualties, KIA plus WIA, totaled 1,004. Combined with the 2,184
ARVN casualties, the attacker suffered 3,188 to secure the city. On the
NVA side, actual body count plus POWs was 5,202. During this period, each
tank averaged 200 rounds fired. This translates to a 30 percent higher
ammunition consumption rate when contrasted with those listed for
“heavy-intensity” combat in current planning manuals.
Khorramshahr – The Iran-Iraq War
The Battle for Khorramshahr was fought between Iraqi and Iranian forces
in 1980. This town is somewhat larger than Hue, with a population of
175,000 at the start of the battle. Khorramshahr was the gateway to the
oil terminal at Abadan and the whole of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway.
Control of this city would unlock the approaches to the southern end of
the front.
The lay-down of the town is very similar to Hue, with one key
difference. Both cities have clearly defined suburban areas and a hard
inner-city core. The difference is that in Khorramshahr the city core and
suburban areas are on the same side of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway and not
separated as in Hue. Maneuver in the city core of Khorramshahr is more
constricted than in Hue. Otherwise, the two urban areas are very similar.
As the opposing forces closed on the city, the Iraqi forces enjoyed an
advantage in numbers. This advantage ranged from 3-4 to 1 in infantry
strength and 2.5 to 1 in tanks. This last point is the most noticeable in
contrasting the two line-ups in the battles for Hue and Khorramshahr –
both sides could call on armor strength to contest the urban area. It
would influence the conduct and cost of the battle at hand.
The Iraqi forces made quick strikes for key areas within the city and
penetrated through the suburbs, but stalled when they encountered Iranian
Chieftain tanks. Local counterattacks by tank-infantry teams turned back
the Iraqi forces at several points. The sheer weight of the Iraqi tank
force settled the issue in their favor, but when Iranian armor was
encountered on the defense, it stopped attacks cold. Only repeated
combined arms assaults broke the ability of the Chieftains to dominate the
open areas within the suburban battlespace.
As the fighting moved toward the city core, armor operations were
reduced to a supporting role. Tanks were unable to maneuver in the tight
streets of this older section of town. Support by fire down long streets
was still possible, and tended to control the blocks along the fringe of
the city core. Given the fanaticism of the defending Iranian Basij
Militias, infantry was required to clear the final pockets of resistance
within the city.
The most striking difference between this battle and that for Hue is
the back and forth nature of the contest in the suburban zone. Since the
defender had armor in his formation, he was consistently able to generate
local tactical threats that could only be countered with close combined
arms attacks. The ability of the Iraqi leadership to coordinate such
attacks proved to be beyond their capability at the start of the battle.
By the end of the fighting, through sheer force of numbers and firepower,
they were able to contest the Iranian defenders and secure the city.
The duration of the Battle for Khorramshahr was 25 days, three days
longer than the fight for Hue. The attacking Iraqi forces lost from three
to nine thousand in the process of taking the city. The defending
Iranians, on the other hand, lost from two to three thousand attempting to
hold the city and disrupt the Iraqi attack.
Conclusions
When contrasting these battles two lessons emerge. First, armor can
operate in urban terrain and dominate the action in the suburban
environment. This was demonstrated by the operational patterns of the two
engagements. In Hue, the Marines were able to control the tempo of
operations and apply continuous pressure on the defenders. In Khorramshahr,
the Iranian defenders were able to launch successful counterattacks
disrupting the Iraqi attack.
Second, when armor dominance is achieved on the urban battlefield, it
significantly improves the battlefield performance of the side that wields
this sword. This is evident in reviewing the battle losses for the
attacker and defender in each battle. During the Battle of Hue, the
Marines kept their exchange ratio, attacker to defender, less than one. In
short, a ratio of .61 ensured the Marines were killing more than the
stubborn NVA defenders. Even when the slightly longer duration of the
Battle of Khorramshahr is accounted for, the attacking Iraqi forces
exchange ratio ran between 1.32 and 2.64. They were never able to dominate
their opponent while the defenders held armor on the field of battle.
This outcome is even more striking when one considers the numbers from
the Battle of Hue do not include estimates for NVA wounded but only
confirmed casualty results. If these are modeled along the lines of the
Battle of Khorramshahr, armor dominance in the urban setting translates to
a four to sevenfold increase in the application of combat power in the
close fight.
We must break out of current molds of thinking and look for new ways to
employ armor within the combined arms team on the urban battlefield.
Achieving armor dominance in this demanding environment ensures
significant improvements in combat performance and provides the ability to
control operational tempo. Harnessing the creative energies of our Marines
guarantees success on the uncharted urban battlefields of the next
century.
LtCol. R. W. Lamont is currently assigned as the operations officer for
the AC/S Manpower and Military Human Resources Directorate, MCB Camp
Pendleton, California. His operational assignments include numerous
company-level tank billets, service afloat as the MARDET executive officer
aboard the USS Constellation (CV_64) and the combat cargo officer aboard
the USS Cleveland (LPD-7), and an Exercise Action Officer for Cobra Gold
in Thailand and Tandem Thrust in Australia. He taught both the AOB and
AOAC as a small group instructor. He is a graduate of the Naval
Post-graduate School in Operations Research. While assigned to Studies and
Analysis Division, MCCDC, Quantico, Va., he conducted the Anti-Armor Force
Structure Analysis and was the lead Marine Analyst for the Joint Air
Defense Operations/Joint Engagement Zone Test.
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