Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

16 June 1995
The range of military operations, first established in Joint Pub 3-0, described military operations extending from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations — other than war.

This publication describes the basic tenets of MOOTW — from a general description of all types of operations to planning considerations necessary for effective execution. It serves as the springboard into a series of publications on tactics, techniques and procedures that provide additional detail on the more complex MOOTW.

Participation in MOOTW is critical in the changing international security environment. Although the goals and endstates may not be crystal clear, you should spare no effort in planning and executing MOOTW. Your support of national security interests in today’s challenging environment is as crucial as it is in war.

You should become familiar with the information contained herein — our Nation and its independence may depend upon your knowledge.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1. Scope

This publication explains how military operations other than war (MOOTW) differ from large-scale, sustained combat operations. It addresses purpose, principles, types of operations and planning considerations. A doctrinal basis is provided for related joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) publications which address specific types of MOOTW.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and guidance ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.
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Military operations other than war (MOOTW) encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. 

**General**

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar in action, **MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace** while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary player. More restrictive rules of engagement and a hierarchy of national objectives are followed. MOOTW are initiated by the National Command Authorities and are usually, but not always, conducted outside of the United States.

**Political Objectives**

All military personnel should understand the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also of changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. One goal of MOOTW is to deter war through intervention to secure US interests. **Overseas presence** activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and...
access. Crisis response may include employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities.

Range of MOOTW

When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability. This is a risk that may result in a combat situation. Should deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance in the form of strikes, raids, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants. The use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, some nation assistance, foreign internal defense, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. Noncombat MOOTW often can be a simultaneous operation with combat MOOTW.

Basic Principles

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. Application of these principles helps ensure success and minimize losses by focusing on aspects of MOOTW that deserve careful consideration. They are as follows: 1. Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. 2. Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose. 3. Security is always important and depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. 4. MOOTW may require restraint in order to apply appropriate military capabilities prudently. 5. Perseverance allows for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. 6. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, where applicable.
The types of operations are extensive and represent MOOTW in which US forces may be involved.

These operations include: arms control; combatting terrorism; Department of Defense support to counterdrug operations; enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations; enforcing exclusion zones; ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; humanitarian assistance; military support to civil authorities; nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency; noncombatant evacuation operations; peace operations; protection of shipping; recovery operations; show of force operations; strikes and raids; and support to insurgency.

Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war.

The mission analysis and command estimate are vital in MOOTW. Of particular importance in the planning process is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation for all potential threats. Commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. Unit integrity allows for quick deployment and continued operations. Intelligence and information gathering needs to be multi-disciplined and utilize fused intelligence from all sources within the military including spaced-based intelligence, human intelligence, counterintelligence, and mapping, charting and geodesy. Multinational operations need special attention and require increased liaisons and advisors. Command and control are overseen by the joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates and should remain flexible to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Public affairs, including media reporting, influences public opinion and may ultimately be a principle factor in the success or failure of the operation. Civil affairs may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various outside groups. Psychological operations provide a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to, and influencing selected target groups. Coordination with nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations and interagency operations allows the JFC to gain greater understanding of the situation and the society involved. MOOTW may present unique legal issues. The logistics element may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Medical operations support MOOTW to protect US personnel and enhance mission capability. MOOTW
may require reserve units and individuals not found in the active component or may require deployment of more units or individuals possessing a capability than are available in the **active component forces**. A commander’s campaign plan should include a **transition from wartime operations to MOOTW** to ensure that desired political objectives continue. The **termination of operations** includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. Such actions encompass transitioning to civil authority, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, redeploying forces and numerous other actions depending on the specific operation.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services and combatant commands to prepare for and conduct MOOTW. It describes those military operations and provides general guidance for military forces in the conduct of joint MOOTW.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victory requires a continuing US role and new strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Military civic action can, in concert with other elements of US strategy, be an effective means of achieving US objectives around the globe.”

General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.
US Army, Retired

1. Purpose

This publication supports Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” by providing basic concepts and principles to guide the Services and the combatant commands to prepare for and conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW). It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military forces in the conduct of joint MOOTW. Detailed information on planning for and employing forces in MOOTW is provided in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) publications within the Joint Pub 3-07 series and other joint and Service publications.

2. Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war.

a. War. When instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

b. Military Operations Other Than War. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. As Figure I-1 indicates, MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and noncombat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war situations. MOOTW involving combat, such as peace enforcement, may have many of the same characteristics of war, including active combat operations and employment of most combat capabilities. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than in war. As in war, the goal is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. However, the purposes of conducting MOOTW may be multiple, with the relative importance or hierarchy of such
purposes changing or unclear; for example, to deter potential aggressors, protect national interests, support the United Nations (UN) or other regional organizations, satisfy treaty obligations, support civil authorities, or provide humanitarian assistance (HA). The specific goal of MOOTW may be peaceful settlement, assistance rendered to civil authorities, or providing security for HA. The Department of Defense (DOD) is often in a support role to another agency, such as the Department of State (DOS) in HA operations. However, in certain types of operations DOD is the lead agency, such as in peace enforcement operations (PEO). These operations usually involve interagency coordination and may also involve nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Finally, although MOOTW are generally conducted outside of the United States, some types may be conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities consistent with established law.

3. **Primacy of Political Objectives**

   Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. **First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions.** Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. **Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.** These changes may not always be obvious.
However, commanders should strive, through continuing mission analysis, to detect subtle changes which, over time, may lead to disconnects between political objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in political objectives early may lead to ineffective or counter-productive military operations.

4. Strategic Aspect

MOOTW contribute to attainment of national security objectives by supporting deterrence and crisis response options. These contributions are shown in Figure I-2 and discussed below.

a. **Deterrence.** In peacetime, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter potential aggressors from using violence to achieve their aims. Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Although the threat of nuclear conflict has diminished, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional advanced technology weaponry is continuing. Threats directed against the United States, allies, or other friendly nations — ranging from terrorism to WMD — require the maintenance of a full array of response capabilities. Various MOOTW combat options (such as peace enforcement or strikes and raids) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve to use force when necessary. Other MOOTW (such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability.

![MOOTW CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ATTAINMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES](image)

**DETERRENCE**
Potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences

**FORWARD PRESENCE**
Demonstrates commitment, lends credibility to alliances, and enhances regional stability

**CRISIS RESPONSE**
Responding rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises

*Figure I-2. MOOTW Contributions to the Attainment of National Security Objectives*
Chapter I

b. Forward Presence. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support and military-to-military contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first which the combatant commander commits to MOOTW.

c. Crisis Response. US forces need to be able to respond rapidly either unilaterally or as a part of a multinational effort. Crisis response may include, for example, employment of overwhelming force in peace enforcement, a single precision strike, or emergency support to civil authorities. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate MOOTW options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, MOOTW may often be planned and executed under crisis action circumstances.

Presence is a military mission option on the lesser end of the application of force spectrum and is common in military operations other than war situations. Between 1981 and 1983, a series of US maneuvers in Central America allowed the US to further its interests without involving US troops in direct combat. This indirect application of US military power manifested itself in the establishment of US military presence in Central America, particularly in Honduras, and thereby maintaining steady pressure on the belligerent Sandinistas across the border in Nicaragua.

The United States conducted a series of military exercises to establish a presence in Central America that could not escape the notice of Nicaragua. Beginning with the relatively low-key HALCON VISTA, in Oct. 1981 and ending with a large exercise, BIG PINE II in Aug. 1983, the United States evaluated US-Honduran ability to “detect and intercept hostile coastal incursions,” using a range of techniques from the combined/joint movement of small numbers of forces in support of the Honduran Army to more extensive exercises including drills in naval interdiction, aerial bombings, airlifts, amphibious landings and counterinsurgency techniques. The approved exercise plans did not envisage any immediate combat role for United States forces, but called for making preparations so that American forces could be swiftly called into action if necessary. As a result, the exercises also included improving runways and providing for access to several key airfields in Honduras.

The threat of US military intervention played on the Sandinistas’ acute fear of the US military. This psychological pressure has been described as “perception management.” It recognizes the truth of Ambassador Gerald Helman’s observation that “it is very difficult and I think probably mistaken to separate the military from the political from the psychological in low-intensity conflict.” This relationship is apparent in an American official’s description of BIG PINE I: “a substantial feint” designed to convince the Sandinistas “that they will be finished if they do not bend to the general line adopted by Washington.”
US efforts to this end were very effective. America’s military power relative to Nicaragua’s was unquestionably superior, but this alone was not enough. To be of value, a resource must be both mobilized in support of foreign policy objectives and made credible. Recognizing this, the National Security Council stated, “No threat should be made [without] willingness to follow through [with] military force.”

Daniel Ortega was in fact convinced of this willingness. At the height of BIG PINE II in November 1983, just days after the successful US invasion of Grenada, the Nicaraguan government mobilized the population to defend the country. Thousands of Nicaraguans were pulled from their jobs to participate in emergency militia training, causing production to come to a standstill. The government ordered citizens to dig air-raid shelters, and 1,000 Cuban advisers were ordered back to Cuba “to remove any pretext for an invasion.” Ortega was obviously worried, and these actions diverted scarce Nicaraguan resources and manpower from economic and social programs to defense.

The pressure brought on by increased US presence in the region and the invasion of Grenada had a marked impact on Nicaraguan politics. The government announced an amnesty program for certain Miskito Indians who had taken up arms against the Sandinistas and a “safe conduct” program for the other members of the armed opposition. The senior Salvadoran guerrillas in the Managua area maintained a substantially lower profile, and Nicaragua canceled plans to airdrop logistic support to guerrillas in the Olancho area of Honduras. There was a temporary relaxation of press censorship, and Bayardo Arce Castano (coordinator for the political committee of the Sandinista National Liberation Front) cited US pressure as a reason for the scheduling of the 1984 Nicaraguan elections.

It should be noted that the US achieved these results in a very cost-efficient manner. Some say that if the United States invaded Nicaragua it would have taken months of relatively high-intensity fighting and years of US military occupation to pacify the Nicaraguan country side. This almost certainly would have cost thousands in American casualties and untold amounts of dollars. However, by establishing a US military presence by means of combined exercises, coupled with the careful use of perception management, the same objectives were realized without firing a shot.


5. Range of Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, and promoting peace (see Figure I-1). These operations provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a wide range of possible response options, ranging from noncombat operations such as HA to combat operations such as peace enforcement and strikes and raids.

a. Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force

• In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When
other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The focus of US military operations during such periods is to support national objectives—to deter war and return to a sustainable state of peace. Such operations involve a risk that US forces could become involved in combat.

**• Combatant commanders**, at the direction of the NCA, may employ US forces to deter an adversary’s action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of strikes, raids, and other contingency operations. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, some foreign internal defense (FID), enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants.

**• The use of force introduces the fear, physical strain, and uncertainty which are among the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Although there are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and military operations other than war, there exists a singularly important threshold which may be crossed by use (or threat of use) of military force of any kind.** In the range of military operations, this threshold marks the distinction between noncombat and combat operations.

b. **Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force.** Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict or war and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include HA, disaster relief, some nation assistance, FID, most support to counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants in a permissive environment, and peacekeeping. Such operations are inherently joint in nature. Although these operations do not normally involve combat, military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to changing situations.

c. **Simultaneous Operations.** MOOTW often involve simultaneous operations. Noncombat MOOTW may be conducted simultaneously with combat MOOTW, such as HA in conjunction with PEO. It is also possible for part of a theater to be in a wartime state while MOOTW is being conducted elsewhere within the same theater. For example, during the final stages of Operation DESERT STORM, US Central Command conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Somalia. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing the effects and activities of their operations with US ambassadors, DOS, and other agencies. Furthermore, whenever a possibility of a threat to US
forces exists, even in a noncombat operation, commanders should plan for and be prepared to either transition to combat operations or leave the area.

6. Duration of Operations

Many MOOTW may be conducted on short notice and last for a relatively short period of time (for example, strikes and raids). On the other hand, some types of MOOTW may last for an extended period of time to achieve the desired end state. For example, the United States has been a partner with ten other nations in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai since 1982. Short duration operations are not always possible, particularly in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for years or where conditions are such that a long term commitment is required to achieve objectives.

7. Conclusion

MOOTW include a wide range of challenging operations for which US forces need to be prepared. It is expected that Armed Forces of the United States will increasingly participate in these operations. However, commanders must remember that their primary mission will always be to prepare for, fight and win America’s wars. This is the US military’s most rigorous task and requires nothing less than top priority when training and equipping our forces.
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CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

“Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire-support operations center.”

LtGen A. C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF

1. General

MOOTW encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including: supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining US influence in foreign lands, and supporting US civil authorities consistent with applicable law. Support of these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting. The principles of war, though principally associated with large scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. Strikes and raids, for example, rely on the principles of surprise, offensive, economy of force, and mass to achieve a favorable outcome. However, political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles described in this chapter. MOOTW that require combat operations (such as some forms of peace enforcement, or strikes and raids) require joint force commanders to fully consider principles of war and principles of MOOTW.

2. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War

Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine For Joint Operations,” delineates six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. While the first three of these principles are derived from the principles of war, the remaining three are MOOTW-specific. These principles are shown in Figure II-1 and discussed below.

a. Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

- JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. As an example, excessive US casualties incurred during a peacekeeping operation (PKO) may cause abandonment of the operation.
## PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

### OBJECTIVE
Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective

### UNITY OF EFFORT
Seek unity of effort in every operation

### SECURITY
Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage

### RESTRAINT
Apply appropriate military capability prudently

### PERSEVERANCE
Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims

### LEGITIMACY
Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable

**Figure II-1. Principles of Military Operations Other Than War**

- Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so to keep US forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions.

- The political objectives which military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military end state. JFCs should, therefore, translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of common terminology.

- Change to initial military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective. These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment
is not made, the military objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.

b. **Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effort in every operation.**

- This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for **ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose.** However, in MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs, or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.

- While the chain of command for US military forces remains inviolate (flowing from the NCA through the combatant commander to the subordinate joint force commander (JFC)), **command arrangements among coalition partners may be less well-defined** and not include full command authority. Under such circumstances, **commanders must establish procedures for liaison and coordination** to achieve unity of effort. Because MOOTW will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels understand the informal and formal relationships.

c. **Security. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.**

- This principle enhances **freedom of action** by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.

- The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. This protection may be exercised against...
virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation: for example, terrorists, or looters after a civil crisis or natural disaster. **JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation.** All personnel should stay alert even in a non-hostile operation with little or no perceived risk. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to plan for and posture the necessary capability to quickly transition to combat should circumstances change.

- In addition to the right of self-defense, **operations security is an important component** of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation inherent in many MOOTW, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that operations security be an integral part of the operation. **Operations security planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.**

- **Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations.** The perceived neutrality of these protected elements may be a factor in their security. Protection of an NGO or PVO by US military forces may create the perception that the NGO or PVO is pro-US. Therefore, an NGO or PVO may be reluctant to accept the US military’s protection.

d. **Restraint.** Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

- A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, **judicious use of force is necessary.** Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. **Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved,** thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

- **Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes.** Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. **ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war,** consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. **ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary.** Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

e. **Perseverance.** Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to **assess possible responses to a crisis** in terms of each option’s impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive
military action, but frames that action within the larger context of strategic aims. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.

f. Legitimacy. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.

- In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the US public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of responsibility/joint operations area (AOR/JOA), or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of psychological operations (PSYOP) and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs assists in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.

- Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. The perception of legitimacy by the US public is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.

- Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate.

3. Principles in Action

The following discussion applies the principles of MOOTW against the backdrop of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the 1991 operation which provided humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds. Subsequent to Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi Government directed its military to brutally put down Kurd insurgencies and drive the Kurds from their homes into the mountains. World reaction to this indiscriminate brutality and oppression prompted aid for the Kurds. The UN passed Security Council Resolution 688 condemning Iraq’s oppression of the Kurds and appealed for HA efforts. This appeal prompted the US to establish operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The following discussion, along with the illustration in Figure II-2, demonstrates the principles of MOOTW in action during an actual operation.

a. Objective. The US Commander in Chief, Europe established Joint Task Force (JTF) PROVIDE COMFORT in April 1991 to assist Kurds suffering from hunger, disease, and exposure to harsh elements. The initial objective was to provide HA by airdropping food and other necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and
improving sanitation and medical care. Later the operation expanded to returning the Kurds from temporary shelters to their previous homes. This expanded the HA operation to include providing protection from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s oppressive actions.

b. Unity of Effort. Relief supplies were distributed throughout the ravaged region by a unified, multinational, and nongovernmental effort. US leadership effectively orchestrated the multinational and civilian-military consensus through mutual trust, cooperation, and coordination of common interests. Unity of effort was enhanced through US efforts to ensure that all the multinational partners agreed to the mission’s objectives. Diplomatic efforts, established political objectives, and US European Command developed clear military objectives to support political objectives. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT exhibited unity of effort in the joint, multinational and interagency arenas.
**Principles of Military Operations Other Than War**

- **US military forces included**: Special operations forces (SOF), US Army infantry and attack helicopter battalions, an Amphibious Ready Group with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, combat support units, combat service support units, and US Air Force (USAF) airlift units.

- **Multinational cooperation** was demonstrated when 11 countries increased operations. US leadership and command efforts established informal agreements with many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries working toward the operation’s common purpose.

- **Interagency consensus building efforts** were exemplified by interaction between DOD and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), as they jointly managed the Kurdish relief and relocation effort. OFDA’s Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed and managed Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere and International Rescue Committee camp management and food distribution. Furthermore, civilian-military liaison, cooperation, and consensus building efforts were enhanced by establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC). The CMOC provided a mechanism for maintenance of military, governmental, NGO or PVO coordination and consensus building to improve unity of effort.

- **Security.** As operations expanded and became more complex, Commander, JTF (CJTF) PROVIDE COMFORT formed two subordinate JTFs. JTF Alpha provided the HA, while JTF Bravo provided the security required for the operation. As part of JTF Bravo, US and coalition ground combat and combat support units provided area security. They were joined by multinational air forces operating from Incirlik, Turkey, that established and maintained air deliveries and enforced an air exclusion zone. JTF Bravo capitalized on the experience of Royal Marines, directly out of Northern Ireland, for expertise in patrolling urban areas. This introduced relevant experience into a challenging environment, and provided resources necessary for security. Additionally, the psychological effect of this force helped deter aggression against PROVIDE COMFORT participants. The presence of a capable, disciplined force was an effective deterrent.

- **d. Restraint.** Restraint kept a potentially explosive situation with Iraqi armed forces in check. US forces adhered to strict ROE which went into effect when the ground exclusion zone was expanded in concert with the air exclusion zone, allowing the Kurds to return home from temporary shelters. As the security zone expanded, US forces demonstrated increased readiness, but used restraint when confronting the Iraqi forces. ROE were balanced between the need for security and restraint.

- **e. Perseverance.** US perseverance has been demonstrated by the continued provision of HA and security to the Kurds. JFCs developed and executed plans that enabled US forces to continue the mission indefinitely. By forming subordinate JTFs when needed, CJTF PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the flexibility to adjust operations as required to achieve overall mission success.

- **f. Legitimacy.** Legitimacy of the operation can be perceived from numerous points of view. The international community initially deemed the operation legitimate in the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688. The US public believed the operation to be
Chapter II

legitimate based on the perceived threat posed by Iraq’s actions. The Kurdish population welcomed the assistance and security provided by the operation. The forces involved in the operation also perceive it as legitimate. As a further evidence of legitimacy, continuation of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT is endorsed by the Turkish parliament every six months. Perceptions by the various elements involved are interdependent. Three factors contribute to the overall sense of legitimacy: a consistent demonstration of restraint, risk to US personnel has been kept to the minimum essential for mission accomplishment, and tangible evidence of successfully aiding the Kurds. Furthermore the role of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force in legitimizing the military effort in Northern Iraq through well-planned and executed information management was an instrumental element of national power projection. Aggressive information management on the international level is absolutely necessary in influencing world political opinion and legitimizing US efforts in MOOTW.

4. Conclusion

MOOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. Embodied in these principles is the dominance of political objectives at all levels of MOOTW. Application of these principles helps ensure success and minimize losses by focusing on aspects of MOOTW that deserve careful consideration. When these principles are ignored, JFCs increase the risk to their forces and the possibility of failure.
CHAPTER III
TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

“There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peace-keeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.”

Brigadier M. Harbottle, UN Forces, Cyprus

1. General

The following discussions on types of MOOTW are listed in alphabetical order. Generally, these 16 types of operations (see Figure III-1) are integrated into the series of JTTP supporting this publication.

2. Types of Operations

a. Arms Control. Arms control is a concept that connotes any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement. Arms control governs any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistic support arrangements, and any related intelligence gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament). Additionally, it may connote those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play an important role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD (nuclear, biological, and chemical or conventional); escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or...
Chapter III

disposing of weapons and hazardous material. **All of these actions help reduce threats to regional security.** Other examples include military support for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty by conducting and hosting site inspections, participating in military data exchanges, and implementing armament reductions. Finally, the US military’s implementation of Vienna Document 1992 confidence and security building measures such as unit/formation inspections, exercise notifications/observations, air and ground base visits, and military equipment demonstrations are further examples of arms control.

b. **Combatting Terrorism.** Combatting terrorism involves **actions taken to oppose terrorism from wherever the threat.** It includes **antiterrorism** (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and **counterterrorism** (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). See Figure III-2.

- **Antiterrorism programs form the foundation for effectively combatting terrorism.** The basics of such programs include training and defensive measures that strike a balance among the protection desired, the mission, infrastructure, and available manpower and resources. The US Government may provide **antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries** under the provisions of Chapter II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTP for Antiterrorism,” provides detailed guidance on this subject.

- **Counterterrorism provides response measures that include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations.** Normally, counterterrorism operations require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. **DOD provides specially trained personnel and equipment in a supporting role to governmental**
Counterterrorism is a principal special operations mission (see Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”). DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation), or the Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically the Federal Aviation Administration) receive lead agency designation according to terrorist incident location and type. DOS is the lead agency for incidents that take place outside the United States; DOJ is the lead agent for incidents that occur within the United States; and DOT is the lead agent for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the special jurisdiction of the United States. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation of lead agency or responsibilities.

c. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations. In counterdrug operations, DOD supports federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to DOD:

- Act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States by emphasizing activities in the cocaine source countries, streamlining activities in the transit zone, and re-focusing activities in the US to concentrate on the cocaine threat at critical border locations;

- Integrate the command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States;

- Approve and fund State governors’ plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies. In addition, the 1993 DOD Authorization Act added the authority for the DOD to detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of certain surface traffic within 25 miles of the US boundary inside the United States. Other DOD support to the National Drug Control Strategy includes support to law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) and cooperative foreign governments by providing intelligence analysts and logistical support personnel; support to interdiction; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; and research and development. An example of DOD support to counterdrug operations was the establishment of JTF 6, in 1989, to provide counterdrug support along the Southwest border of the United States. Joint Pub 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug Operations,” provides detailed guidance concerning counterdrug operations.

d. Enforcement of Sanctions/ Maritime Intercept Operations. These are operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military objective is to establish a barrier which is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to
enter or exit. Depending on geography, sanction enforcement normally involves some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications compatibility. An example of sanctions enforcement is Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY conducted off the coast of Haiti beginning in 1993.

e. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. The measures are usually imposed by the UN, or other international bodies of which the United States is a member. However, they may also be imposed unilaterally by the United States. Exclusion zones are usually imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant abuse of international law regarding the conduct of states. Situations which may warrant such action include: (1) the persecution of the civil population by a government; (2) to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force. The sanctions may create economic, political, military, or other conditions where the intent is to change the behavior of the offending nation. Examples of enforcement of exclusion zones are Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993.

f. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of navigation is a sovereign right according to international law.

• International law has long recognized that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same manner that it can exercise sovereignty over its own land territory. International law accords the right of “innocent” passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is “innocent” as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.

• Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of airspace control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal measures to rectify the situation. These norms are developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization. An example is the Berlin air corridors that existed from 1948 until 1990, allowing air access to West Berlin. The ATTAIN DOCUMENT series of operations against Libya in 1986 are examples of freedom of navigation operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra.

g. Humanitarian Assistance (HA). HA operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. HA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration;
it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides assistance when the relief need is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond. See Figure III-3.

- **The US military can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and achieve order in austere locations.** US forces can provide logistics; command, control, communications, and computers; and the planning required to initiate and sustain HA operations.

- **HA operations may be directed by the NCA** when a serious international situation threatens the political or military stability of a region considered of interest to the United States, or when the NCA deems the humanitarian situation itself sufficient and appropriate for employment of US forces. **DOS or the US ambassador in country is responsible for declaring a foreign disaster or situation that requires HA.** Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the overall responsibility for developing the military policy for international HA operations.

- **HA operations may cover a broad range of missions.** An HA mission could also include securing an environment to allow humanitarian relief efforts to proceed. US military forces participate in **three basic types of HA operations:** those coordinated by the UN, those where the United States acts in concert with other multinational forces, or those where the United States responds unilaterally.

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**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

- To relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions
- Limited in scope and duration
- Supplements or complements efforts of host nation
- May cover a broad range of missions

**TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS**

- Coordinated by the UN
- US acts in concert with other multinational forces
- US responds unilaterally

Figure III-3. Humanitarian Assistance
Examples of humanitarian assistance are Operations SEA ANGEL I, conducted in 1991, and SEA ANGEL II, conducted in 1992, to provide assistance in the aftermath of devastating natural disasters in Bangladesh.

OPERATION SEA ANGEL

Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature’s favorite targets. Tornadoes, cyclones, and monsoons occur with alarming regularity in this country, which contains the world’s second largest delta region at the confluence of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Magma rivers. While this tremendously fertile region supports over 120 million people, damage from natural disasters is often severe, mainly due to the low terrain, the high density of the population, and a poorly developed infrastructure.

Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the evening of 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between 15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless. Over 1 million cattle (essential for pulling plows and providing transportation) died. Crops on 74,000 acres of land were destroyed; another 300,000 acres of cropland were damaged, and fields were covered with salt water, contaminating the soil and corrupting the drinking water.

Infrastructure destruction was widespread. Bangladesh’s major port, Chittagong, was severely damaged and was nonoperational for several days. Damaged/sunken ships, many of them belonging to the Bangladesh Navy, blocked the port. Several key bridges, including the main bridge to Chittagong, were washed out or otherwise damaged. Throughout the storm-affected area, sea walls collapsed, jetties disappeared, dirt roads were flooded, buildings were ravaged, and transportation was virtually destroyed.

For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have come at a worse time. After years of military rule, Bangladesh had installed its first civilian government, under Prime Minister Zia, less than two months earlier. Therefore, the young, inexperienced government, sensitive to appearing weak or incompetent and struggling domestically to develop bureaucratic cohesion, faced serious problems in reacting to the cyclone.

Strangely, one of the problems was not one of relief supplies availability. Adequate emergency supplies existed either in government storage houses, called “Go Downs,” or stored and owned by nongovernmental organizations (NGO) such as Cooperative American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Red Crescent. The GOB, however, was hindered by the lack of cooperation from the NGO, which remembered martial law and were wary of the new regime. Further, the bureaucrats that controlled the grain in the “Go Downs” were similarly reluctant to hand over control to other agencies.

Notwithstanding these political hurdles, the most serious problem was one of distribution. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure and the havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for several days. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB...
virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coast where needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarian assistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force (CJTF) was immediately formed under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole, commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based in Okinawa. A US Navy Amphibious Task Force (ATF) returning from the Persian Gulf war was redirected to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh citizen, spotting the ATF approaching from the water, allegedly called them “Angels from the Sea.” Regardless of whether this incident ever occurred, news of it spread and Operation Sea Angel had begun.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenous GOB forces and the international and local NGO, several countries joined the United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply ship with four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India, Pakistan, and China also provided assistance.

Two days after the President’s order, LtGen. Stackpole arrived with a small CJTF element. A Special Operations Forces (SOF) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived later that day. The next day five UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters arrived from Hawaii, along with a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit. Other joint assets continued to flow into the area, as required. Fifteen soldiers of B Company, 84th Engineer Battalion, already deployed to Bangladesh to construct schools, were diverted to Chittagong. The bulk of US forces were from the ATF consisting of the 4,600 Marines of the 5th MEB, 3,000 sailors of Amphibious Group 3, and 28 helicopters. The MEB also brought four Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) vehicles, which proved invaluable in delivering aid to isolated islands.

Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole began an assessment of the situation, and identified three critical concerns: First, the intelligence needed to adequately assess the situation was unavailable; Second, the problem of distribution quickly became apparent, and was considered the most pressing by the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff; Finally, the issue of Bangladeshi sovereignty required that the GOB be clearly viewed by the populace as being “in charge”.

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week) entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take complete control of all relief efforts.

The distribution problem clearly was the most demanding task and it’s accomplishment was most critical to the success of the operation. There were two aspects: first, supplies had to be moved from Dhaka to Chittagong; second, these supplies then had to be moved to the devastated islands. The
decision was made to fly supplies by fixed-wing to Chittagong, then via helicopter to the islands. The MC-130 aircraft that brought the special operations forces provided the fixed-wing capability until Air Force C-130s arrived. A JTF augmentation cell (including the five Blackhawk helicopters) was dispatched from Hawaii. The 5th MEB and its helicopters and LCACs arrived three days later.

In the final analysis, Operation Sea Angel proved to be unique in several respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than 500 service members on shore at night. It was conducted in a benign environment; no weapons were carried by US forces, except for some sidearms carried by guards of cryptographic materials. It was also the first time that a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was used as a joint task force nucleus. Finally, a unique effective command and control structure was used to synchronize the efforts of US, British, Bangladeshi, and Japanese non-governmental organizations, and other organizations such as the US Agency for International Development (AID) and a Chinese assistance element.


h. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). These operations provide temporary support to domestic civil authorities when permitted by law, and are normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the capabilities of the civil authorities.

- Support to civil authorities can be as diverse as temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers and postal workers during strikes, restoration of law and order in the aftermath of riots, protection of life and federal property, or providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Authority for additional support to law enforcement officials is contained in DOD Directive 5525.5, “DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,” and permits such support as loan of equipment, use of facilities, training, and transfer of information. Support is constrained in some instances by the Economy Act (31 US Code Section 1535) which may require the requesting agency to provide reimbursement.

- Limitations on military forces in providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, US Code Section 1385--Use of Army and Air Forces as Posse Comitatus. This Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to enforce or otherwise execute laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act which allow active duty military members to respond to civil disturbances are included under Title 10 Sections 331 to 333: Request from a State (331), Enforcement of Federal Law (332), and Protection of Civil Rights (333). Additional important exceptions to Posse Comitatus are found in Title 10 Sections 371-380.

- Examples of military support to civil authorities are disaster relief provided during Hurricanes Andrew in Florida and Iniki in Hawaii in 1992, and deployment of troops during a civil disturbance in California in 1992.
Under DOD Directive 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” the Secretary of the Army is designated the Executive Agent for MSCA.

i. Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.

Nation assistance operations support an HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and HCA (see Figure III-4). All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan.

- **Security Assistance.** Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.


  • Security Assistance Surges. Security assistance surges accelerate release of equipment, supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an imminent military threat. Security assistance surges are

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**NATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS**

**SECURITY ASSISTANCE**

A group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services.

**FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE**

The total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency.

**HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE**

Provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. Must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefits to the local populace.

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Figure III-4. Nation Assistance Programs
An example of nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency was Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in 1990, following Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.

“The severity of human suffering in Somalia caused commanders to try to alleviate the situation on their own. Units were deployed to the field to provide security for the humanitarian relief agency convoys of food. Upon seeing the appalling conditions, and realizing they were not tasked to give food or provide direct support to the population, local commanders took it upon themselves to try to arrange for or speed up relief supplies. While well-intended, this activity diverted the commanders’ attention from their primary mission.”

Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, 93-8.

• Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are provided under Title 10 US Code Section 401. This assistance is provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under HA operations, HCA programs generally encompass planned activities in the following categories:

  • Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;
  • Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
  • Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and,
  • Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
j. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). These operations normally relocate threatened noncombatants from a foreign country. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may also include selective evacuation of citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries.

- NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation.

- NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces penetrating foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment and the security of the force and the extraction and protection of evacuees.

- Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for guarding their property. This order also directs the DOD to advise and assist the DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US Ambassador, or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist implementation of Emergency Action Plans is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander.

Selected Haitian noncombatants board a US C-130 bound for safe haven camps in Panama during Operation ABLE MANNER.
Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty. Evacuation operations may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented political or military relationship with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster. Joint Pub 3-07.5, “JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” provides detailed guidance.

Examples of NEO are EASTERN EXIT, conducted in 1991, when US and foreign national personnel were evacuated from Somalia, and QUICK LIFT, also conducted in 1991, when personnel were evacuated from Zaire.

k. Peace Operations (PO)

PO are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Additional types of MOOTW (e.g., HA and NEO) may complement peace operations. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.

Peacekeeping Operations. PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982. Joint Pub 3-07.3, “JTTP for Peace Operations,” (in draft) provides additional information on peacekeeping.
**Peace Enforcement Operations.** PEO are the *application of military force,* or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or cease-fire. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO are Operation POWER PACK conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993.

**Relationship of Peace Operations to Diplomatic Activities.** US military peace operations support political objectives and diplomatic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. In addition to PO, the military may conduct operations in support of the following diplomatic peace activities:

**Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of a preventive deployment. An example is Operation ABLE SENTRY, where US Forces deployed in 1993 to Macedonia in support of the UN effort to limit the fighting in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

**Peacemaking.** Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military relations and security assistance.
Peace Building. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace building may include, for example, units rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or the training of defense forces.

Protection of Shipping. When necessary, US forces provide protection of US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. With the consent of the flag state this protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law. Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, countermeasures operations, and environmental defense, in addition to operations on the high seas. It requires the coordinated employment of surface, air, space, and subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat, and a logistics base. Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations, either land-based or sea-based, are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which to attack friendly or allied shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against offending bases or facilities. Threats not neutralized by area operations must be deterred or addressed by escort operations. Other recovery operations may be conducted in friendly areas, particularly when the HN does not have the means to provide technical assistance in conducting the recovery. An example of a recovery operation is Operation FULL ACCOUNTING conducted to account for and recover the remains of US service members lost during the Vietnam War.

Show of Force Operations. These operations, designed to demonstrate US resolve, involve increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that if allowed to continue may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.

- US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to US promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate its resolve to use military force if necessary. In addition, the NCA order shows of force to bolster and reassure.
friends and allies. **Show of force operations** are military in nature but often serve both political and military purposes. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests as well as international law.

- A show of force involves the **appearance of a credible military force** to underscore US policy interests or commitment to an alliance or coalition. **Political concerns dominate a show of force.** Military forces conduct these operations within legal and political constraints. The force coordinates its operations with the country teams affected. A show of force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint US military or multinational forces. Additionally, a show of force may include or transition to joint or multinational exercises.

- As an example of a show of force, Operation JTF-Philippines was conducted by US forces in 1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt against the Philippine government. During this operation, a large special operations force was formed, USAF fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air bases, and two aircraft carriers were positioned off the Philippines.

**p. Support to Insurgency.** An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. US forces may provide logistic and training support to an insurgency, but normally do not themselves conduct combat operations. An example of support to insurgency was US support to the Mujahadin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion.

**3. Conclusion**

The operations discussed in this chapter are representative of the wide range of MOOTW. Although each type of operation has unique aspects that influence planning, there are some considerations that are applicable to most MOOTW. These planning considerations, along with education and training requirements for MOOTW, are addressed in Chapter IV, "Planning for Military Operations Other Than War."
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CHAPTER IV
PLANNING FOR MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

“British troops getting ready for duties in Northern Ireland and Nordic soldiers preparing for deployment to Macedonia are specifically retrained to use minimum force rather than maximum force to deal with threats they face.”

Special Warfare, April 1994

1. General

Key planning factors are addressed in this chapter, along with education and training implications of MOOTW.

2. Planning Considerations

Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war. The mission analysis and command estimate processes are as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats. Oftentimes the threats may be unique and disproportional or have the appearance of being asymmetrical to the US operations being conducted. For this reason, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment package. Although the possibility of combat may be remote in many types of MOOTW, commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuate. Additionally, when conducting noncombat operations, commanders must consider the feasibility and means of redeployment, possibly to another theater, to conduct other operations.

a. Unit Integrity. Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue to operate under established procedures, adapting these to the mission and situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an ad hoc force is less effective and takes more time to adjust to requirements of the mission. This not only complicates mission accomplishment, but may also have an impact on force protection. Even if political restraints on an operation dictate that a large force cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select smaller elements for deployment that have established internal structures and have trained and operated together. Additionally, when deploying into a situation which may involve combat operations, commanders should deploy with appropriate joint force combat capability, including elements that have had the opportunity to train together and develop common operating procedures. In order to provide JFCs with needed versatility, it may not be possible to preserve unit integrity. In such cases, units must be prepared to send elements which are able to operate independently of parent units. Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. Units not accustomed to having attachments may be required to provide administrative and logistic support to normally unrelated units.
b. Intelligence and Information Gathering

- MOOTW requires **multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence**. A single source approach cannot support all requirements.

- **Manned and unmanned aerial intelligence sensors**, to include space-based, can provide valuable information where other intelligence infrastructure is not in place. **Remote sensing systems** can provide information on terrain, weather and other environmental factors essential to MOOTW. **Data from space systems** can be used to update antiquated maps and provide up-to-date locations of facilities and obstacles. **Sensors on space and aerial platforms** can also monitor terrestrial force movement and assist in treaty verification. In addition, **communications systems using space-based resources** can provide secure, reliable dissemination of intelligence and other information where there is little or no existing communications infrastructure.

- In MOOTW conducted outside the United States, **human intelligence (HUMINT)** may provide the most useful source of information. However, a HUMINT infrastructure may not be in place when US forces arrive; therefore, it needs to be established as quickly as possible. **HUMINT can supplement other intelligence sources** with psychological information not available through technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may graphically depict the number of people gathered in the town square, it cannot gauge motivations or **enthusiasm of the crowds**. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas belligerent forces may not rely heavily on radio communication, denying US forces intelligence derived through signal intercept. **HUMINT is required to supplement signals intelligence and overhead imagery** which we typically rely upon to produce the most accurate products.

- **Specific essential elements of information** which drive collection management process in MOOTW may differ in focus from those targeted in war. In war, intelligence collection includes an entire range of factors with a major emphasis on the enemy’s military capability. **Intelligence collection in MOOTW**, however, **might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors** that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must often address **unique and subtle problems** not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervenor can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy and assure that actions intended to be coercive, do in fact have the intended effect. In addition, **intelligence collection must focus quickly on transportation infrastructure in the AOR/JOA**, to include capabilities and limitations of major seaports, airfields, and surface lines of communications.
• In MOOTW involving in-depth coordination or interaction with NGOs and PVOs and most UN operations, the term “information gathering” should be used rather than the term “intelligence.” The term “information gathering” is also appropriate in peacekeeping operations because peacekeepers must be overt, neutral, and impartial. Non-military organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence. These organizations may perceive that US forces are seeking to recruit members of their organizations for collection efforts, or turn the organizations into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. NGOs and PVOs, by the very nature of what they do, become familiar with the culture, language, and sensitivities of a populace. This information is very valuable to military commanders as they seek to accomplish missions which focus not on destroying an enemy, but on providing aid and assistance to the populace of a foreign country. By using the term “information gathering,” military forces may be able to foster better communications with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge. 

• Counterintelligence (CI) operations are as important in MOOTW as they are in war. Even though there may not be a well-defined threat, protection of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded. In MOOTW, this is particularly pertinent in countering belligerent HUMINT efforts. Members of NGOs and PVOs working closely with US forces may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with the mission. Members of the local populace often gain access to US military personnel and their bases by providing services such as laundry and cooking. The local populace may provide information gleaned from interaction with US forces to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents. JFCs must consider these and similar possibilities for compromise of operational information, and take actions to counter this compromise. CI personnel can develop an estimate of the threat, and recommend appropriate actions. Equally important is their critical role during multinational MOOTW in establishing procedures and safeguards regarding the protection, handling, and release of classified or sensitive information to coalition partners, allies, and supported elements. Because of the possibly tenuous relationships between the US and coalition partners during a particular MOOTW, JFCs must be alert to the possibility that covert intelligence operations may be conducted against them by a coalition partner. CI planning and operations must deal with this contingency, but in a uniquely sensitive way.

• Additionally, the importance of mapping, charting, and geodesy should not be overlooked. This is particularly true in multinational operations, where it is essential that maps, charts and support data (to include datum and coordinate system to be used) are coordinated in advance. The accuracy, scale, and currency of foreign maps and charts may vary widely from US products. Additionally, release of US mapping materials may require foreign disclosure approval.
c. Multinational Operations

Multinational operations planning should take into account the considerations shown in Figure IV-1.

- JFCs should plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners. Interoperability of equipment and coordination of different logistic support systems must be considered in assigning missions and areas of operations. Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained and equipped to overcome these detractors. Although commanders may not normally provide a liaison team to a particular unit, in multinational operations deployment of a team may be critical to effective coordination and mission accomplishment. SOF-unique capabilities in language and cross-cultural training, their regional orientation and forward deployment, and focus on independent small unit actions make them one of the principal forces of choice to complement and support multinational operations objectives. Chapter VI of Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine For Joint Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations” (under development), provide guidance for multinational operations. Effective options for command and control of multinational forces are covered below.

d. Command and Control (C2). No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of...
Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation.

- In US unilateral operations, C2 arrangements may vary based on necessary coordination with US civil authorities, or federal, state, and local agencies involved in domestic and foreign operations. For example, C2 arrangements during support to US civil authorities must be planned with unity of effort in mind, and provide communications links to appropriate US agencies. In a disaster situation, routine communications may be disrupted. Civil authorities might have to rely on backup communications systems, or if civilian backup systems are disrupted, the military may have the only communications equipment available. Military leaders should be prepared to establish communication linkages with these authorities. Outside the United States, even when US forces operate unilaterally, some communications links will be required with local civil authorities or international agencies, depending on the situation. Additionally, communications planning must consider the termination of US involvement in MOOTW and the transfer of responsibility to another agency such as the UN or an NGO. Systems may have to be left behind to support the ongoing effort. This must be addressed early in the planning effort.

- There are several options that may be employed for the C2 of multinational forces; however, planners must be prepared to extend a communications umbrella over the multinational force. Effective options for C2 of multinational forces include:

  - In the lead nation option, a nation agrees to take the lead in the accomplishment of an international mandate. The lead nation generally provides the preponderance of forces and the commander and basic staff to control operations. Other nations place forces under the operational control of the lead nation’s military commander and augment the staff of the controlling headquarters. This simplifies unity of command, and allows the lead nation to set military objectives in cooperation with other military forces, approve the composition of the force, and assure mutual understanding of the mandate by all partners.

  - The parallel option allows multinational partners to retain greater operational control of their forces. The mandating organization (e.g., UN) selects a commander for the force. A staff, proportionally representing all contributing nations, is assembled on an ad hoc basis. The force commander has operational control of forces of the multinational partners, but generally to a lesser degree than that exercised in the lead nation option.

  - The regional alliance option depends on the ability of regional nations to lead a coalition effort. Regional alliance C2 approaches may also hinge on the influence exerted by a nation in a regional leadership position. Existing alliances may serve as a basis for C2 of forces involved in MOOTW. For example, the C2 structure of NATO was designed for war, but may also be effective in MOOTW.
Chapter IV

e. Public Affairs

- The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for public affairs more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact. Media reporting influences public opinion, which may affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and ultimately influence the success or failure of the operation. The speed with which the media can collect and convey information to the public makes it possible for the world populace to become aware of an incident as quickly as, or even before, JFCs and US Government decisionmakers. JFCs should develop a well-defined and concise public affairs plan to minimize adverse effect upon the operation and include their public affairs officer early in the planning process.

- Public affairs plans should provide open and independent reporting, respond to media queries which provide the maximum disclosure with minimum delay, and create an environment between commander and reporters that encourages balanced coverage of operations. An effective plan provides ways to communicate information about an operation and fulfills the US military’s obligation to keep the American public informed. Additionally, a public affairs plan enhances force protection through security at the source and operational security awareness, to include the possibility of media attempts to acquire and publicly disseminate classified information. Public affairs plans must also anticipate and pre-plan response to possibly inaccurate media analysis and promulgation of misinformation by US, coalition, and other media sources. Joint Pub 1-07, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations” (under development), provides further guidance.

f. Civil Affairs (CA). CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements. CA units may provide assessments of the civil infrastructure, assist in the operation of temporary shelters, and serve as liaison between the military and various NGOs and PVOs. Establishing and maintaining military to civil relations may include interaction among US, allied or coalition, host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and PVOs. CA forces can also provide expertise on factors which directly affect military operations to include: culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and host-nation support capabilities. CA may also include forces conducting activities which are normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments. Selection of CA forces should be based upon a clear concept of CA mission requirements for the type operation being planned. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” provides specific guidance on the principal special operations missions, and Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,” provides specific guidance for employment of CA forces.

g. Psychological Operations. PSYOP forces can provide significant support in MOOTW. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected target groups. The messages conveyed by military PSYOP are intended to promote particular themes that can result in desired attitudes and behaviors. This information
may include safety, health, public service, and messages designed to favorably influence foreign perceptions of US forces and operations. Although Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” provides specific information regarding employment of PSYOP forces, JFCs should be aware that successful MOOTW may hinge on direct control of or direct influence over the operational area mediums of mass communication (radio and television).

h. Coordination With NGOs and PVOs. In MOOTW, JFCs should be prepared to coordinate civilian and military actions. One method to build unity of effort and conduct this liaison is to establish CMOC. There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size and composition depend on the situation. A doctrinal layout of a CMOC organization can be found in the Handbook for CMOC Operations, published by the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Members of a CMOC may include representatives of US military forces and US Government agencies, other countries’ forces involved in the operation, HN organizations (if outside the United States), and NGOs and PVOs. US Army civil affairs personnel are ideally suited and trained for CMOC duties. Civil affairs teams should be considered by the JFC to establish the core of the CMOC. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the JFC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of NGOs and PVOs and how they influence mission accomplishment. Although formal agreements are not always necessary, such agreements between military and civilian organizations may improve coordination and effectiveness. Such agreements can take the form of memorandums of agreement or understanding as well as terms of reference.

i. Interagency Operations. MOOTW will often involve other departments and agencies.

- Within the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency normally leads the response to a natural disaster, while the DOJ or DOT could be expected to lead in a counterterrorist operation. Effective liaison with the lead agency enables the JFC to effectively support the political objectives of the operation.

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**EARTHQUAKE IN ALASKA**

One hundred and sixteen persons lost their lives in the 27 March 1964, earthquake in south central Alaska, and property damage was over $300 million. The affected communities included Anchorage, Seward, Valdez, Kodiak and Whittier, with Anchorage being the largest of these.

The Alaska earthquake resulted in one of the most extensive involvements of the military in a civilian disaster in the history of the United States. The military operation which was labeled “Operation Helping Hand,” involved principally the Army and Air Force of the Alaskan Command, and the Alaska National Guard. Headquarters for the Alaskan Command is located just outside of Anchorage at Elmendorf Air Force Base. This large air base is also the headquarters for the Alaskan Air Command. Headquarters for the United States Army, Alaska is at Fort Richardson, adjacent to Elmendorf Air Force Base. At the time of the disaster, some 25,000 military personnel resided
in the Anchorage area. Described here is the involvement of the military in the Anchorage area, its participation in disaster operations in the other communities notwithstanding.

Since Elmendorf AFB and Ft. Richardson are in such close proximity, the military is well integrated into the community of Anchorage. The military in Anchorage, for example, played an important role in the economic life of the city and was interwoven with civilian organizations and groups in many ways. The wives of military personnel stationed in the Anchorage area taught in the Anchorage schools, and their children attended school in the city. The military and civilian organizations cooperated with one another in numerous ways; for example, Anchorage area fire departments had mutual aid agreements with military fire departments. Also, upon retirement from active military life, former military personnel sometimes assumed positions in Anchorage organizations. Thus, there was a spirit of cooperation and interdependence between the military and civilian communities of Anchorage prior to the 1964 catastrophe. It was not surprising then that the military provided considerable assistance to the community in its hour of need.

The earthquake occurred around 5:30 p.m., and about 6:30 p.m. the first contact was made between the military and civilian officials. At this time, the Army Provost Marshal from Ft. Richardson—who had been sent into the city to see if military assistance would be needed—made initial contact with civilian authorities at the downtown Public Safety Building, which became the emergency operation center for the city. Throughout the period, the provost marshall acted as the Army liaison officer between the Army headquarters, the city police department and the Anchorage Civil Defense with the function of coordinating requests for assistance. At 8:00 p.m., the police requested Army troops to assist in securing Anchorage against possible looting and to control the movement of people in the affected areas. Because of the magnitude of the earthquake, officers at the base had anticipated the need for assisting the civilian community; thus they were well mobilized when the official request was received. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the first contingent of troops departed from Ft. Richardson for Anchorage. From this initial point of involvement, the assistance from the military in the disaster-struck community of Anchorage expanded considerably.


- For MOOTW outside the United States, the lead agency will normally be the DOS and the US Ambassador will coordinate US activities through an established Country Team with representation from all US departments and agencies in that country, including DOD. In countries which lack US embassies, a special Presidential Envoy may be designated to direct the operation.
- That a non-DOD agency may have the lead on a given operation does not alter the military chain of command established in the appropriate order issued by the NCA.

j. Legal Requirements. MOOTW may present unique legal issues. In addition to traditional skills necessary in military justice, legal personnel may require expertise in areas such as those shown in
Planning for Military Operations Other Than War

Figure IV-2. Commanders should ensure that their supporting Staff Judge Advocate, or civilian legal counsel, has the resources available to respond to the variety of complex international and operational legal and regulatory issues that may arise during MOOTW. HN legal personnel should be integrated into the command legal staff as soon as practical to provide guidance on unique HN domestic legal practices and customs.

k. Logistics

- In MOOTW, logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks; planners must be aware that overextending such forces may jeopardize their ability to support combat operations. Logistics elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed. Logistics personnel may be deployed to a foreign nation to support either US or multinational forces. Logistics forces may also have continuing responsibility after the departure of combat forces, in support of multinational forces or PVOs and NGOs. In such cases, they must be familiar with and adhere to any applicable status-of-forces agreement to which the US is a party. Logistics personnel must also be familiar with and adhere to any legal, regulatory, or political restraints governing US involvement in the MOOTW. The commander must be alert for potential legal problems arising from the unique, difficult circumstances and the highly political nature of MOOTW such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. Logistics planners should analyze the capability of the HN economy to accommodate the logistic support required by the US or multinational forces and exercise care to limit adverse effects on the HN economy. Logistics units, like all other units, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.

- Early mission analysis must also consider transportation requirements. Airfields and ports must be assessed, particularly those in
underdeveloped countries where status will be in question. Delay in completing the assessment directly impacts the flow of strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support forces may be required to build supporting infrastructure. This impacts follow-on force closure as well as delivery of humanitarian cargo. Also procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield slot times with other participants in the operation. Availability of fuel and other key support items may impinge on transportation support.

- Fundamental logistics principles apply across the range of military operations. Refer to Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,” for additional specific guidance regarding logistics.

1. Medical Operations

- There is usually a requirement to provide medical support to US forces engaged in MOOTW. Medical operations teams brought by US forces are intended to support those forces. The US military has unique, rapidly deployable, mobile medical personnel and units which are frequently called upon to provide a large portion of the medical support. Rapid and early integration of preventive medicine units and practices is perhaps the most important medical operation that must be planned. Medical support operations protect US personnel and enhance mission capability by reducing the threat of uncontrolled disease problems. Planning to provide medical services for US forces and designated individuals should include hospitalization, preventive and veterinary medicine, medical logistics, blood, medical regulating, and aeromedical evacuation planning. For a complete discussion of medical planning, refer to Joint Pub 4-02, “Joint Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”

A deployed US medical specialist examines an X-ray in support of efforts to reduce the spread of tuberculosis and identify preventative medicine requirements.
• When planning for MOOTW, the potential to treat the HN indigent population or allied military personnel must be considered. The respective capabilities of allied, civilian relief, or other supporting medical forces should be considered prior to finalizing the medical support concept.

• Medical examination of indigenous and coalition personnel and their environments will frequently provide unique operational insights to the JFC during MOOTW. Presence and use of drugs, threat development of WMD, and other critical evidence are often first identified or verified through this valuable intelligence source. Continuous coordination is necessary between the medical and intelligence elements.

m. Active/Reserve Mix. MOOTW may require units and individuals not found in the active component or may require deployment of more units or individuals possessing a capability than are available in the active component. Examples of these types of units are shown in Figure IV-3. Mobilization of any reserve component units may be difficult if war is not imminent or declared. Consequently, most reserve component participation will be through volunteer support. To take advantage of volunteers, planners should select roles and tasks for reserve forces that can be supported by a rotational force -- tour requirements in excess of three weeks will discourage and limit volunteers. If time permits, planners should determine what reserve component capabilities are required, and how long it will take for the units to be trained and ready for deployment. Planners should also review personnel and equipment authorizations for reserve component units to ensure compatibility with active forces. For example, a reserve unit equipped with commercial cargo vehicles would not be able to operate as well in rough terrain as an active unit equipped with tactical vehicles. On the other hand, use of active forces, especially in functional areas heavily reliant on the reserve component, may impact on those forces’ ability to respond to their wartime taskings in the near term because of the time needed to redeploy and repair or replace equipment.

n. Transition from Wartime Operations to MOOTW. A commander’s campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operation to MOOTW. Commanders plan for this transition at the very outset of hostilities. This ensures desired political objectives continue to be pursued after the cessation of wartime operations. Figure IV-4 shows post-conflict activities.
• JFCs may need to realign forces or adjust force structure to begin post-conflict operations. The JFC’s planning and continuous development of the estimate of the situation will reveal the nature and scope of these activities and the forces required. These forces may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from reserve components.

• As post-conflict operations progress, military forces may largely be in support of other US and international agency efforts. Post-conflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.

• Typical post-conflict activities include transition to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, CA support to reestablish a civil government, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and continuing logistic support from engineering and transportation units.

o. Termination of Operations

• As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. These actions depend on the specific operation and may include the items listed in Figure IV-5. The manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation, and application of this principle of MOOTW requires careful planning for this phase. Additionally, proper accountability of funds and equipment facilitates disbursement of funds and reimbursements against any outstanding claims.

• Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical for maintaining readiness for
future operations in either the primary role of fighting the nation’s wars or deploying for subsequent MOOTW. Forces that have been performing noncombat types of MOOTW, such as PKO, may be degraded in combat proficiency. If the MOOTW tasks are significantly different from their combat tasks, forces may require proficiency training prior to being deployed as warfighters.

b. The second prong is the training of individuals, units, and staffs. The focus of this training is to ensure that individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given MOOTW, and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation. Depending on the anticipated operation, predeployment training could include individual skill training, situational training exercises, field training exercises, combined arms live fire exercises, mobility exercises, command post exercises, and simulation exercises to train commanders, staffs, and components. If there is sufficient time prior to actual deployment for an operation, units should culminate their predeployment training in a joint training exercise based on the anticipated operation. The unit tasked for the operation should participate in the exercise with the

3. Education and Training

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force.”

LTG T. Montgomery, USA
SR MILREP to NATO

Readying forces for MOOTW requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces -- to fight and win the nation’s wars. For most types of MOOTW, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. However, for some MOOTW (for example, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations) warfighting skills are not always appropriate. Therefore, to be effective in these types of MOOTW, a mind set other than warfighting is required.
Chapter IV

**Supporting Units**

Supporting units with which it normally deploys, and if possible, with the next higher headquarters for the actual operation. Once deployed, and if the situation allows, **military skills training at individual and unit level** may occur. Training following redeployment should again focus on the unit’s wartime missions.

c. There will most likely be insufficient time to train for a specific operation, which is why a two-pronged approach to preparing for MOOTW is critical. A well-trained force can adapt to MOOTW under the leadership of officers and NCOs educated in the principles and types of MOOTW. The lack of opportunity to train for a specific operation is in large part overcome by military leaders who have a solid foundation of MOOTW provided through the military education system.

**4. Conclusion**

In MOOTW, commanders should rely on their knowledge of warfighting and training doctrine, but must understand the demands of MOOTW and be prepared to tailor warfighting skills to meet the MOOTW situation. Forces engaged in noncombat MOOTW should always prepare for transition to combat. Finally, success during MOOTW is founded in professional, skilled, trained, educated, and disciplined Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

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**MOOTW EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

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<th>GOALS</th>
<th>METHODS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OFFICERS AND NCOS</strong></td>
<td>Ensure all leaders understand the objectives, principles, and characteristics of MOOTW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUALS, UNITS, AND STAFFS</strong></td>
<td>Ensure individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given MOOTW and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation</td>
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</tbody>
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Figure IV-6. MOOTW Education and Training
An 11 year-old Haitian girl comforts her younger sister during operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. US forces must be prepared to deal with a spectrum of situations when engaged in Military Operations Other Than War.
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1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

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The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director, J-5, Strategic Plans and Policy.

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   FROM: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/J7-JDD/

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTTP</td>
<td>joint tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSAC</td>
<td>military support to civil authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>peace enforcement operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>private voluntary organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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arms control. A concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and. b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

DOD support to counterdrug operations. Support provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

end state. What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude — both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

ensuring freedom of navigation. Operations conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate air or sea routes. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

exclusion zone. A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military operations other than war. Encompasses the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
military support to civil authorities. Those activities and measures taken by the DOD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Also called MSCA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve US citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Also called NEO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

nongovernmental organizations. Refers to transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundation, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-US organizations. Also called NGO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace building. Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace enforcement. Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
preventive deployment. The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peacekeeping force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

private voluntary organizations. Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally US-based. “Private voluntary organization” is often used synonymously with the term “nongovernmental organization.” Also called PVO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force by US warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of US flag vessels and aircraft, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons consistent with international law. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

recovery operations. Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel or human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

sanction enforcement/maritime intercept operations. Operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

show of force. An operation, designed to demonstrate US resolve, which involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation, that if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

strike. An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

support to counterinsurgency. Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

support to insurgency. Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-07 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: