Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti

Executive Summary

• Peacebuilding is not merely a technical exercise — it is highly political. In a combustible political atmosphere as in Haiti, effective peacebuilding requires careful and sustained management.

• The importance of a long-term approach cannot be overestimated. In Haiti, the international community was successful in restoring the constitutional government, improving the respect for basic human rights, and initiating economic development. However, for these efforts to take hold and lead to a self-sustaining democratic process, continuous international engagement in Haiti is vital. From this perspective, the cutback in the UN involvement in February 2001 was premature.

• An effective peacebuilding strategy must be based on a deep understanding of the country in question, its history, society, and culture. In the initial stages of the international involvement, knowledge of Haiti was quite poor among delegations and personnel at UN headquarters. This led to strategies that were occasionally naïve and ill-conceived. The UN and other international actors need to reach out to area and issue experts — including local ones — for advice.

• National ownership is a key component for the peacebuilding process to be sustainable. Therefore close collaboration and a clear division of labor between international and national actors are essential. A forum for information sharing and dialogue would support this effort while helping to overcome disputes. The international community further needs to balance its relations with the national government and NGOs. The tendency in Haiti to circumvent recalcitrant or corrupt government officials in favor of NGOs must be balanced against the need for national institution building.

• Recognizing that the rule of law is essential for economic and social development, international actors in Haiti attempted to improve accountability and sustainability in the judicial system. The police
force in particular was infused with resources and training. However, narrowly focused and contradictory donor programs hampered results. Additionally, in a nation with little in the way of a law and order tradition, many efforts to improve the rule of law were diluted by the premature suspension of aid. Consequently, the judicial system was never significantly reformed.

- Economic development in Haiti has been slow due to inadequate national institutions and little sense of national ownership of economic programs. Conditionalities on foreign assistance did little to mitigate — and may in fact have exacerbated — economic hardship. Weak national economic leadership represents not just a local Haitian challenge but a systemic one and requires much further reflection among the international financial institutions, the UN, and individual donor countries.

- This report focuses on actions and omissions of the international community in Haiti. However, participants mostly agreed that the performance of Haitian political actors — including President Aristide — in meeting international actors halfway in the joint endeavor of peacebuilding fell short of expectations. This was further aggravated by the political strife in the country.

Introduction

On 23-24 January 2002, the International Peace Academy, in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, organized a “lessons learned” seminar on peacebuilding activities in Haiti. The seminar was sponsored by the governments of Norway and Canada and took place at the Canadian Mission to the United Nations in New York. Participants included key actors in the various international missions in Haiti, senior personnel from the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and national capitals, as well as academics and other experts. The seminar benefited greatly from the contributions of Haitian practitioners and leading Haitian scholars. For a day and a half participants discussed the international involvement since the elections in Haiti in 1990 to extract lessons for future international peacebuilding activities in Haiti and elsewhere. The conversations were frank and sober, even grim. This report aims to reflect the main issues and conclusions of the seminar.

Background

Haitian history has been tumultuous tale, and the past decade is no exception. After the termination of the brutal Duvalier dictatorships and subsequent military governments, the democratically elected Jean Bertrand Aristide was inaugurated as president in 1991. Eight months later, he was overthrown in a military coup and forced to flee. Turmoil followed, including a mass outflow of refugees, economic sanctions mandated by the OAS and the UN Security Council, an aborted UN mission, failed mediation attempts, and finally, a UN-sanctioned, US-led multinational military intervention in 1994 to restore Aristide to power.

International Actors

A determined UN-led attempt at peacekeeping and peacebuilding was pursued, involving numerous international actors. The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), jointly organized by the UN and the OAS investigated allegations of human rights abuses and

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1 For earlier IPA work on Haiti, see for example Building Peace in Haiti, IPA Occasional Paper Series, by Chetan Kumar, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); “Project on Policy Advocacy and Facilitation in Haiti” IPA Facilitation Report by Chetan Kumar and Marlye Gelin-Adams, September 1999; and Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, edited by Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
monitored the human rights situation between 1993 and 2000. In 1995 (with planning elements from 1994), the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was mandated to provide a secure environment following Aristide’s restoration, and to train a new police force. Following UNMIH, a succession of UN missions attempted to institutionalize peacebuilding measures and coordinate action among key international parties. These successors to UNMIH include the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), and the General Assembly mandated International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH). The latter departed in February 2001.

The “Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti” (consisting of the United States, France, Canada, and Venezuela, later joined by Argentina and Chile), an influential group of countries with interests in promoting Haitian democracy and development, joined the UN, the OAS and other external actors such as the World Bank and the IDB in the Haitian theatre. In addition, several UN specialized agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)2 played an important role, as well as various international NGOs.

Outcomes of Intervention

The intervention in Haiti led to some successes. The international community managed to stop the flood of political violence engulfing the country, demobilized and reintegrated former soldiers, created a new police force, monitored the human rights situation, and started a process to integrate marginalized sectors and communities into the economy.

However, despite these achievements, self-sustaining democratic institutions and economic development never took hold and petty and organized crime has soared. According to several participants, Haiti, in early 2002, can no longer be considered in a post-conflict phase but should rather be seen as in a pre-crisis or full-fledged crisis mode. Given the tremendous effort and significant resources expended on Haiti since 1994, this is disappointing. Learning from past experiences is thus vital to avoid repeating the same mistakes, in Haiti and elsewhere.

Peacebuilding Strategies in Haiti

The goals of the UN in Haiti were to anchor a democratic system through the construction or consolidation of key institutions of the state, in essence to create a polity in which the parlous strain of violence was removed through reform of criminal justice, economic, and social infrastructure. Thus, peacebuilding objectives in Haiti included the construction of a new security sector centered on the Haitian National Police, judiciary reform, economic rehabilitation, and the promotion of participatory democracy and human rights.

Local Knowledge

It was not always clear, however, if the role of the international community was to take charge of the peacebuilding process or advise on and facilitate Haitian initiatives. The relationship between international and domestic actors was ill defined at the outset and a viable working partnership failed to materialize. This was partially due to reluctance by the government and other local actors to take charge and make necessary compromises in order to achieve results. But it was also due to a deficit of coherence and consistency on the part of the international community, stemming from assumptions not anchored in the realities of Haiti. Existing forms of political and social organization need to be reckoned

Attempts to replicate a West European political and economic system are neither realistic, nor necessarily desired by the country in question.

Haitian society is marked by entrenched social fissures and sharp political and ideological divisions. In the early stages of the international involvement, there was significant lack of knowledge of Haiti at the UN headquarters in New York, where much of the international strategy was hammered out. This led to donor driven strategies and projects that were not sensitive to the political culture or adequately took into account the situation on the ground. This ignorance not only complicated interaction with the Haitian government, but also led to the elaboration of goals that were far too optimistic. Moreover, it led to a lack of confidence in the mission among many Haitians. An effective peacebuilding strategy thus needs to be based on a deep understanding of the root causes of the conflict and knowledge of the country, its history, and culture.

Efficacy of the early peacebuilding attempts could also have been enhanced by a deeper knowledge of Haiti among UN staff on the ground before the onset of operations. Much of the staff deployed had no previous experience in the country; many did not speak French, let alone Creole. However, limited efforts were made to provide a crash course on the knowledge needed. A success in this regard was the training program MICIVIH provided for its human rights monitors which included education in Haitian society and religion by Haitian teachers, classes in Creole, interviewing technique and report writing, as well as prison visits. Due to its beneficial effects, this program has been partly emulated in other UN missions.

**Long-Term Perspective**

Participants further emphasized the importance of a sustained long-term perspective. An ethos of “fix it fast” pervaded many of the internationally sponsored projects (some participants pointed specifically to the US in this regard). While “quick impact” projects such as road repair or garbage collection are important to provide the population with hope and an incentive to continue participating in the peacebuilding process, they must be coupled with a realistic long-term strategy. Peacebuilding takes time; participants emphasized that “you cannot have a one-year solution to a ten-year problem”. Some argued that in Haiti, the focus on returning Aristide to power overshadowed the main goal of anchoring democratic institutions. It was further thought that the UN reduced its involvement in Haiti too early, cutting the last mission (MICAH) short in February 2001 due to frustration with the performance of the Haitian government in implementing programs. MICAH was just getting operational when it was withdrawn.

In UN operations, more attention needs to be given to the management of transition; the transfer of program administration to local actors, as well as the gradual shift to the next stage of an intervention, do not always proceed in a fluid manner. This was evident in Haiti. The transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping and on to peacebuilding did not flow seamlessly. For example, after cantoning the military (which had served the dual function of national defense and policing), a vacuum was created that destabilized the peace process. Harmonized strategies are needed, especially in the transition from security to development activities. A more effective continuum between these two essential pursuits could have been created by a closer relationship between the various UN missions, UNDP, other international actors, and national partners. This transition could further have been facilitated through increased flexibility, allowing actors to react quickly to emerging needs in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases.

It could be argued that the intervention lacked an overarching vision and commitment to Haitian transforma-
tion. Two impulses were present: an unrealistic desire to quickly establish a political climate based on western liberal democratic traditions, and a wish to cut and run in face of the many incidents undermining this goal.

**Coordination and Collaboration**

In a large, complex intervention such as the one in Haiti, "unity of effort" and close collaboration between all parties are vital. This includes coordination at the international, national, and local levels, as well as between these levels.

**Among International Actors**

A piecemeal approach leads to contradictions that not only damages the goals of an operation, but also create confusion and ultimately undermine credibility. Participants highlighted the importance of a strong Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the consolidation of authority in the mission. In Haiti, the UNDP Resident Representative was appointed deputy to the SRSG, an innovation participants thought very positive in improving planning and enhancing accountability (although it was recognized that interpersonal chemistry is important as well).

The UN system as a whole has repeatedly demonstrated inadequate attention to effective coordination. This created problems in the transition phases between UN missions in Haiti, when strong leadership was in flux. Furthermore, it sometimes complicated efforts to bridge the gap between civilian and military components of the intervention. A large degree of information sharing and joint reporting was taking place at higher levels of management but closer collaboration lower down would have contributed to a tighter, more unified approach.

Coordination between the UN and OAS in the joint mission MICIVIH worked effectively overall. This was the first close UN-OAS collaboration with a fully integrated human rights mission, which included joint work in the humanitarian field and election monitoring. For the UN, this was a positive relationship and even though MICIVIH was a small mission, this should be seen as an example of how, with a clear mandate and a sensible division of labor, the UN can work well in partnership with regional organizations in the future.

**Between International and Local Actors**

Taking advantage of homegrown initiatives is vital for peacebuilding efforts to be sustainable. In Haiti, coordination between international and national actors was poor. The UN strategy probably focused too heavily on Aristide at first, and may later have too greatly circumvented deadlocked and recalcitrant institutions of the national government in favor of international NGOs. This was damaging to capacity and institution building efforts. The difficulty in identifying appropriate interlocutors further increased the distance between national and international actors, which contributed to distrust.
Coordination with local NGOs worked well in some fields, such as human rights monitoring, but overall the relationship was characterized by a lack of commitment on the part of the international community and suspicion on the part of local NGOs regarding the intentions of the former. Moreover, the political strife in Haiti hindered any effective collaboration among various local and national actors. Some parties refused to talk to each other and attempted to use contact with the UN as a means to further political ends through the manipulation of international personnel.

To improve coordination in future UN missions, a forum for information sharing and dialogue between and among all actors would be advantageous. This forum could contribute to bridging divisions, providing outreach to a larger constituency, and enabling an effective division of labor — prerequisites to the incubation of a new political culture that prioritizes partnership and collaboration while giving a greater role to civil society and NGOs.

Human Rights

The joint OAS-UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), seen by many as the most successful of the missions, started out as a human rights observation mission in 1993-1994 to address instances of extrajudicial killings, torture, and threats. The mandate then evolved to include police training, human rights promotion, civic education, and election monitoring following the return of the constitutional government. MICIVIH departed in 2000.

Successes of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti

As discussed above, one of the reasons MICIVIH was considered a success was due to the effective collaboration between the UN and OAS; another reason was the close relationship MICIVIH established with local communities, organizations, and individuals. The constant interaction between MICIVIH field officers and the population, including its engagement with victims of human rights abuses (such as obtaining legal and medical assistance) enabled MICIVIH to pursue its mandate and encourage popular support. Furthermore, the adaptable framework of the mission increased its capacity to change with developments on the ground (or as described by one participant: “we made it up as we went along” — not always a bad thing).

Partly a result of MICIVIH’s work, instances of human rights violations went down significantly, and local NGOs and grassroots organizations were empowered in their efforts to address human rights abuses. Additionally, the mission contributed considerably to institution building in the form of training of police and judiciary officers in human rights. Prison reform and the introduction of police and prison registers followed. However, some of these measures were not maintained over the long-term, due in part to the short mandates the mission was working under. Institutional culture is often resistant to change and reform requires a sustained involvement.

Lessons from the International Civilian Mission in Haiti

Lessons from MICIVIH include the importance of integrating human rights aspects with other parts of the international involvement from the start. Cooperation with the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) had a slow start but proved useful in improving police-community relations through facilitation and training. Results could have been maximized with earlier coordination of activities. In supporting and training local NGOs in human rights monitoring, it is also important from the outset to take into account their particular circumstances and not attempt to mold and create organizations on western models. At the same time, it is imperative to educate the population at large about human rights and explain to the public why and how institutions are changing in order to avoid confusion.

Several participants criticized the MICIVIH involvement in direct election monitoring as it drew energy away
from other activities. More importantly, election monitoring was seen as overstepping the MICIVIH mandate and potentially compromising the objectivity of the mission, an attribute vital to human rights monitoring. Instead, some participants argued that a larger involvement in economic and development activities should have been prioritized, something that has been addressed in later human rights missions.

**Rule of Law**

The UN strategy in Haiti was largely centered on the creation of an independent, professional, and competent Haitian National Police as a vital part of a fair judicial system and an overall secure environment. Without respect for the rule of law, maintained by accountable and sustainable policing, economic and social development quite simply cannot be generated.

In organizing a civilian police force — as in any peacebuilding process — a key factor is being realistic about the timeframes involved. Building a new culture of peace and respect for the rule of law takes many years, perhaps generations. The process should start with a commitment to a long-term, sustained international presence through the deployment of UN Civilian Police. Assistance can then shift to training and “accompaniment” where each police officer is paired up with a CIVPOL officer for some time.

**Problems in Police and Judiciary Reform**

In Haiti, the UN suffered from unrealistic expectations stemming from a lack of understanding of the complexities in training a new police force. Once CIVPOL was deployed, initial pressure to act quickly led to the elimination of certain aspects of the program such as the practical training and the education of a supervisory force. The abolition of these components contributed to the police force essentially adopting an uneven record, peppered with corruption and unruliness.

Coordination and cooperation efforts among international actors were inconsistent at best — especially in implementation of programs — which complicated security sector reform. Approaches tended to vary according to the donor. For example, bilateral actors had very different ideas in regards to community policing and funded divergent programs. The disjuncture was exacerbated by policing reform being addressed mostly in isolation without looking at the justice system as a whole. Planning for prosecutors, magistrates, and courts was conducted separately. In short, law and order were seen as two separate provinces.

Today, corruption and human rights abuses are the rule rather than the exception among police officers in Haiti. They are involved in drug trafficking and summary executions of presumed criminals. As a whole, there are less than 3,000 police officers, an absurdly low number in a country of over 7.5 million people. In the nine months preceding the seminar, there had not been a single recruit to the police academy.

The situation is not much different in the judiciary system. There is no internal disciplinary mechanism for judges and of those trained during the UN involvement, many are not working due to low pay and cronism. Of those who remain, many are corrupt. Additionally, incarceration rates remain very high and pre-trial detention times are long in Port-au-Prince, although they have been shortened outside the city.

**Addressing the Problems**

Despite this catalog of expectations not met, some programs were successful in Haiti and should be studied for future judicial and police support operations. These include the “train the trainer” program run by the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the UNDP police technical assistance program, the UNDP prison program, and MICIVIH’s diligent monitoring of the police, court, and prison officers. During the UN involvement, police officers were also paid a living wage, which is a prerequisite in reducing corruption.
In order to achieve accountability in the police force and the judicial system as a whole, it is vital to promote a system of meritocracy and respect for human rights. The international community should expect strong resistance, but shying away from these principles would scotch any hope that Haitians could develop trust in their government. Strong political commitment to change is required and many participants argued that “building a non-political police force is a very political task”. In a judicial system with no tradition of protecting individuals, this will necessarily take time; a long-term commitment on the part of the international community is needed to ensure institutional reform.

An overall framework, taking the needs of the local population as a starting point, should be developed in collaboration and consultation with all actors. Efforts to develop a new police force require integration with the larger institution building strategies that include an encompassing democratization process and significant legal and judicial reforms. As one participant put it, “after some time building the police and ignoring other institutions, you will get a police state”.

**Economic Development**

Sustainable economic development never materialized in Haiti. The Haitian economy remains vulnerable and Haitians remain very poor. Already one of the poorest countries in the world a decade ago, real per capita income has decreased each year since the mid-1990s. A low literacy level, worsened by low school enrollment along with a major public health crisis, is making it impossible for a large proportion of the population to improve their situation. Infrastructure, where it exists, is in shambles and the environment devastated. The economy is dependent on direct foreign aid, remittances from the large Haitian diaspora, and money from drug trafficking.

**Conflicting Approaches**

From the start, President Aristide and the international community entertained divergent development models. While the international financial institutions insisted on privatization and structural adjustment policies, Aristide, influenced by Latin American liberation theology and socialist thought, resisted. The economic liberalization programs had no support in the Haitian parliament and private investors shied away from Haiti. Despite aid coordination and a relatively large international involvement, programs by international lending institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have had an unusually low output.

This bifurcated approach not only puts into question the universality of liberal economic development policies but it also underlines the importance of national ownership of the development process. It is the government that is ultimately responsible to its people and needs to carry out sound economic and social policies. In Haiti, poor governance undermined economic development at a stage where efforts to improve macroeconomic management were vital. And without strong cooperation...
between international and national actors, it became very difficult to transform aid programs into sustainable economic development.

The strategies used by the international financial institutions in Haiti in the 1990s included funding for programs to rebuild the infrastructure, poverty alleviation, human resource development, private sector support, and institution building. The international community however, ultimately recoiled from the latter, more difficult task. As mentioned above, Haiti’s political strife remained a major obstacle and long-term governance improvements and institution building did not materialize. As a result, development assistance in Haiti never spawned a sustainable process of economic and social development.

The imposition of conditionalities in Haiti has been an issue of debate. Several participants asserted that conditions on foreign assistance have had a perverse effect in Haiti — instead of leading to a change in government behavior, they have given the president and parliament leverage vis-à-vis international actors who are forced into a constant negotiation process. One participant argued, “we are negotiating instead of doing development, and in the process, we are propping up the government”. Furthermore, structural adjustment policies that were used as a stick before are now used as a carrot so that, in effect, public investment is withheld. Meanwhile, the local economic elite continues a behavior of preying on the population.

**Stimulating Economic Development**

As part of the now well-rehearsed argument for sustained engagement, there are several measures the international community could pursue in Haiti at this stage. Economies thrive in a political environment of sound governance, respect for the rule of law, and access to accurate information. International actors should work more closely with the government to pursue such an environment. Encouragement of government-NGO cooperation could further be facilitated through post-conflict grants. Shifting development assistance overall to grants rather than loans might be beneficial since the donor then has more direct control and can perhaps better prevent money from disappearing into the wrong pockets.

New approaches that were suggested at the seminar include the more systematic engagement of the Haitian diaspora in economic development. Due to the large number of overseas Haitians, Haiti has become a “transnational state” with close contacts being maintained thanks to modern information technology and remittances being funneled back to relatives in Haiti itself.

A robust public health system must be considered part of the rubric of economic development. The same is true for education: a serious investment in basic education with specific attention being given to the education of girls, should be part of any peacebuilding strategy.

In addition, more effective macroeconomic management is possible through greater statistical knowledge. At present, statistics are very thin; nobody even knows exactly how many Haitians there are. Only 50% of the population has birth certificates — a document key to entitlements and proof of land ownership. Statistics are also vital in fighting communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

Dr. Beatrice Pouligny
Conclusion

The seminar was sobering. However, the nature of a “lessons learned” exercise is to focus on the aspects of the intervention that were poorly conceived or coordinated. Tales of success tend to take second stage. The report does not suggest that the international community should have left Haiti to fight its own battles. It is true that Haiti today is facing serious problems. But without international involvement, the situation would have been worse. The international community put a halt to mass killings and reduced impunity.

Nevertheless, a sustained effort to build upon these earlier achievements is vital in order to get the country back on its feet. To abandon Haiti now would undermine all earlier progress. Realistic goals, based on a deeper understanding of the challenges facing the country, coupled with a long-term commitment, must form the bedrock of any future strategy.

Currently, the OAS is engaged with local Haitian actors in an attempt to resolve the political crisis in the country. OAS leadership was welcomed by all participants. Despite prodigious challenges, a distinct advantage the OAS effort has over earlier attempts is hindsight. In addition to some of the groundwork being done, there is now an accumulation of knowledge stored by the international community that can be extracted in future engagements. Hopefully, the lessons learned from this seminar can contribute to that process.
MEETING AGENDA

Wednesday, January 23

9:15 AM - 9:30 AM  Welcoming Remarks

Ambassador Michel Duval, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Introduction by Co-chairs

Ms. Angela Kane, Director, Americas and Europe Division, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations
Dr. David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

9:30 AM - 11:00 AM  Panel I - UN Strategy in Haiti

Panelists

Mr. Michael Sheehan, Assistant Secretary-General for Logistics, Management, and Mine Action Services, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations
Ambassador Enrique ter Horst, Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti
Professor Michel S. Laguerre, University of California at Berkeley and Massachusetts Institute of Technology

11:15 AM - 12:45 PM  Panel II - Coordination and Collaboration

Panelists

Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, Assistant Secretary-General, Organization of American States
Ambassador Colin Granderson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trinidad and Tobago
Dr. Beatrice Pouligny, Research Fellow, Center for International Studies and Research (CERI - Sciences Po) Paris

12:45 PM - 2:15 PM  Lunch

2:15 PM - 3:45 PM  Panel III - Security Sector Reform: the Haitian National Police

Panelists

Mr. Robert Manuel, Former Secretary of State for Public Security, Preval Government, Haiti
Ms. Janice M. Stromsem, Deputy Director, International Programs, National Center for State Courts
Ms. Anne Fuller, Consultant, Open Society Institute and Vera Institute of Justice
Superintendent Jean St-Cyr, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
4:00 PM – 5:30 PM  Panel IV - Rule of Law: Human Rights, Judiciary Reform and the Penal System

Panelists

Ms. Sandra Beidas, Former Chief, Human Rights Section, UN International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti

Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, Head, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States

Mr. Patrick Gavigan, Deputy Chief of Mission, UNHCHR, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Mr. William G. O’Neill, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, International Peace Academy

Thursday, January 24

9:00 AM – 10:30 AM  Panel V - Economic Reconstruction and Development

Panelists

Mr. Cristian Ossa, Senior Advisor, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations

Dr. Orsalia Kalantzopoulos, Country Director, Haiti, World Bank

Professor Alex Dupuy, Professor of Sociology, Wesleyan University

Mr. Gerard Johnson, Representative in Haiti, Inter-American Development Bank

10:45 AM – 12:15 PM  Panel VI - Wrap-up: Lessons for Future Peace-Building Missions

Professor Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Ms. Angela Kane, Director, Americas and Europe Division, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Dr. David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

12:15 PM – 1:30 PM  Lunch
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