MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR DANIEL Q. GREENWOOD, USMC

AY 05-06

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald F. Bittner, Ph.D
Professor of History

Approved: __________________________
Date: __________________________

Oral Defense Committee Member: J. William Gordon, Ph.D
Professor of National Security Affairs

Approved: __________________________
Date: __________________________
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC): A Proposed Framework for Future Counterinsurgency Operations

Author: Major Daniel Q. Greenwood, USMC

Thesis: Development and implementation of a counterinsurgency joint operating concept is necessary to meet the challenges of modern insurgency conflicts in the 21st century.

Discussion: As recent events in Iraq portend, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will increasingly diverge from conventional warfare. Terrorists dispersed throughout the world will continue refining and employing guerrilla tactics using civilian populations as their base of operations. This transnational enemy, maximizing modern technology, weaponry, and media, is highly indiscernible, imbedded in the local culture from which it operates. It is proficient at undermining the interests and credibility of the United States on all levels. It is questionable that conventional military doctrine, tactics, and weaponry can achieve decisive results against this evolving threat. This problem requires a new operational concept of counterinsurgency designed to connect tactical level success with the achievement of strategic objectives. Several historical precedents including the Combined Action Program (CAP) and Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) of Vietnam, the recent CAP application in Iraq, and Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, provide a starting point for innovative adaptation to an insurgent enemy threat. However, they do not reflect the holistic approach required of such a complex operating environment. This study analyzes the characteristics of modern insurgency and historical counterinsurgency methods to propose an adaptable Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC) to provide a conceptual framework for the problem of insurgency. This concept is designed to generate thought, development, experimentation, and training on the execution of COIN operations.

This study first delineates the specific problem presented by future conflicts, defining and analyzing the characteristics of modern insurgency. Second, it summarizes the key lessons from historical COIN operations, including the CAP/CORDS models of Vietnam and Iraq, and the PRT application in Afghanistan, to illustrate the limitations of an unfocused approach. Thirdly, it proposes a framework for an evolved and adaptable Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC) as a viable joint operating concept for future COIN operations. Within this concept, it demonstrates the applicability of a new conceptualization of insurgency as a unifying framework for future responses. It then discusses an alternative to existing planning models for effectively designing future operational-level COIN responses. Lastly, this paper delineates the major capabilities required to make this future joint operating concept viable. This study purposely focuses on the operational level providing the linkage that ties strategic objectives to tactical execution. In concluding, this study will consider the relationship of this proposed CACC with other joint and Marine Corps operating concepts with particular attention to Major Combat Operations (Joint Operating Concept September 2004), and Distributed Operations.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps’ historical application of combined action in counterinsurgency operations provides the starting point for the development of a future concept addressing insurgency in the 21st century. Innovative development and application of the CACC, at the operational level of war, is required to ensure that tactical success on the modern battlefield leads to the attainment of strategic objectives.
# Table of Contents

## DISCLAIMER

## PREFACE

## DEFINING THE PROBLEM: CONCEPTUALIZING THE THREAT
- Insurgency: A Complex Adaptive System
- Clausewitz’s Trinity and Insurgency

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
- Vietnam: Combined Action Program (CAP)/Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS)
- Modern Initiatives: CAP Iraq and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

## THE WAY AHEAD: COMBINED ACTION COUNTERINSURGENCY CONCEPT
- Essential Elements of the Concept
- Conceptual Planning at the Operational Level

## CRITICAL CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
- Establishing a Secure Environment/Isolating the Insurgency Threat
- Instituting a Counter-Ideology
- Re-Establishing Government Legitimacy/Societal Norms

## CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE

## ENDNOTES

## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operational Terms Related to Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Acronyms Related to Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major U.S. Coin Operations During 20th Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Insurgency Model as Complex Adaptive System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Combined Action Program Task Organization: Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vietnam Combined Action Program Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Team Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept Continuum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Joint Operating Concepts Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CACC Critical Capabilities Matrix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FORGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Since 9/11, the United States and the rest of the world have struggled to craft an adequate response to a threat that refuses traditional classifications. Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan portend that conflicts of the 21st century will increasingly diverge from accepted constructs of conventional warfare. Future conflicts will present a highly adaptable and ideologically motivated insurgent enemy. The foe will blend lessons of insurgency from the 20th century with proliferated technology to refine and employ both guerilla and terrorist tactics in pursuit of their political and ideological goals. This highly indiscernible, networked and transnational enemy seeks sanctuary in a local populace, and proficiently undermines the interests and credibility of the United States and its allies on all levels. It is questionable that conventional military doctrine, tactics, and weaponry can achieve decisive results against this evolving threat. It requires a new doctrinal framework for counterinsurgency (COIN) designed to connect tactical level success with the achievement of strategic objectives. Several historical precedents, including the Combined Action Program (CAP) and Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) of Vietnam, the recent CAP application in Iraq, and Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, provide a starting point for innovative adaptation to this evolved insurgent threat. However, these cases do not reflect the holistic approach required of such a dynamic operating environment. Development and implementation of a counterinsurgency joint operating concept is necessary to meet the challenges of modern insurgency conflicts in the 21st century.

Current joint operating concepts promulgate a plethora of operating, functional, and integrating concepts without adequately addressing current or future warfighting requirements, specifically insurgency. This study first delineates the specific problem presented by future conflicts, defining and analyzing the characteristics of modern insurgency. Second, it summarizes

---

1 Paul Van Riper, <vanriper7@cox.net> “Concerns,” 16 December 2005, email to CCJCS (16 December 2005).
the key lessons from historical COIN operations, including the CAP/CORDS models of Vietnam and Iraq, and the PRT application in Afghanistan, to illustrate the limitations of an unfocused approach. Thirdly, it proposes a framework for an evolved and adaptable Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC) as a viable joint operating concept for future COIN operations. Within this concept, it demonstrates the applicability of a new conceptualization of insurgency as a unifying framework for future responses. It then discusses an alternative to existing planning models for effectively designing future operational-level COIN responses. Lastly, this paper delineates the major capabilities required to execute this new concept; this includes certain organizational, training, and equipping considerations to make this future joint operating concept viable.

This study purposely focuses on the operational level, recognizing the importance of strategic vision to COIN but providing the operational linkage that ties strategic objectives to tactical execution on the modern battlefield. Future development and application of COIN doctrine requires a fully integrated civil-military approach. The dynamic problem of insurgency also necessitates a fundamental paradigm shift in the conventional military mindset, from kinetic to non-kinetic, in order to produce an acceptable and employable option. In conclusion, this study recognizes the necessary integration of this proposed Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept CACC with other existing or developing joint concepts.
DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The rise in global instability after the collapse of the bi-polar Cold War system created conditions for increasing regional conflict, local wars, ethnic fighting, popular uprisings, and societal breakdown. It also encouraged various groups across the world to pursue agendas often conflicting with and outside of traditional nation-state diplomacy. Since 9/11, the United States and its allies have faced a growing threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and other locations. Endless literature defines the threat as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), unconventional, irregular, guerrilla, and asymmetric in nature. This obtuse discourse presents a plethora of adjectives and terminology that confuses the true nature of the threat and impedes the

---

2 Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), 16-31. Hammes, William Lind, and others have traced the development of various generations of warfare from the Peace of Westphalia to the present. They describe a new Fourth Generation of Warfare (4GW) as evolving from the tactics of Mao Tse-Tung through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the societal, cultural, and economic changes of the Information Age. First Generation Warfare is generally characterized by the rise of standing professional armies, line and column tactics, and adherence to order on the battlefield. With changes in technology, economic and industrial growth, and transportation, Second Generation Warfare evolved from First Generation Warfare and culminated with the attrition/firepower clashes of World War I. Third Generation Warfare is largely credited to the German Army’s development of maneuver warfare during World War I and its refinement during the Interwar period. Capitalizing on advances in armor, 3GW relied upon mission-type orders, speed, tempo, and non-linear maneuver tactics to achieve decisive results. While Hammes attempts to define the emerging threat as a new generation of warfare, the characteristics accurately reflect elements of modern insurgency. “It uses all available networks-political, economic, social, and military-to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will.” For further discussion of the evolving generations of warfare, see Bill Lind, Gary Wilson, and coauthors article, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” and Hammes’ *Marine Corps Gazette* article from September 1994, “The Evolution of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” For a concise counterpoint and categorization of Fourth Generation Warfare as a fallacy see: Antullo J. Echevarria. II. *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.
development of adequate solutions. Fortunately, initial official attempts to define the threat as terrorism are shifting to the more accurate premise that the threat is a global insurgency attempting to affect change within Islam and world-wide.³

Published Al Qaeda doctrine envisions a global Islamic movement focused on creating disorder and change across the Islamic world, eventually re-establishing the Caliphate.⁴ Al Qaeda fuses insurgent tactics with a radical Islamic ideology that easily transcends borders and socio-economic classes throughout the Middle East. This overarching radical Islamic ideology provides focus and unity of purpose to its widespread, geographically disparate insurgent groups. The insurgency uses large urban population centers as sanctuary for networked, transnational cells to avoid targeting, gain valuable intelligence, and garner both active and passive support. These dispersed groups tailor propaganda messages to unstable local conditions impacted by mounting discontent from globalization, collapse of traditional political orders, ethnic minority rule, perceived corruption, increasing radical ideology, and widespread arms availability. Protracted violence, ambiguity, dispersal, the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization protect insurgents in their bid to alter the existing balance of power in favor of their political agenda.⁵

³ Michael Vlahos, Terror’s Mask: Insurgency with Islam, (Laurel, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics laboratory, 2002), 2-28. Vlahos characterizes Al Qaeda as an insurgency within Islam and differentiates between this and terrorism. He discusses the challenges of a threat that essentially approaches “cultural insurgency” and areas in which the post-9/11 response has fallen short. While Vlahos’ final recommendations for a “hands off” approach contradict the essence of this concept, his characterizations of Islamic insurgency are relevant.


⁵ Steven Metz, and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 24. Metz and Millen offer another compelling argument for defining Al Qaeda as a global insurgency held together by a common overarching ideology.
Islamic insurgents employ widely available material and equipment as weapons and are largely self-sufficient, thus facilitating protracted engagements. Through the inextricable advantage they gain from the sanctuary of a particular population center, this new enemy employs tactics designed not to defeat U.S. forces but to convince the population that the U.S. and its allies cannot provide the security upon which they depend.6 Attacking economic, political, military, cultural, and private targets, these radical Islamic insurgents take a holistic approach to their cause; they use modern technology and the media to undermine Western interests and continually reinforce the spreading radical Islamic ideology that appeals to the disenfranchised people of this region.

Considering traditional categories of insurgency, it is clear that the United States is not at war with a national insurgency but a liberation insurgency based on a radicalized ideology that joins together a multitude of networked and transnational groups.7 Recognizing Al Qaeda and the existing threat as a Global Islamic Insurgency is a vital but only first step; ultimately, a comprehensive COIN strategy is necessary to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).8

**Insurgency: A Complex Adaptive System**

In order to propose a response to insurgency, its characteristics, components, processes, and principles must be further defined. The simple application of past solutions fails to address cultural,

---

6 Metz and Millen, 24-25.

7 John A. Lynn, “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, July-August 2005, 22. Historically, insurgencies have been classified into two broad categories. National insurgencies, those pitting insurgents against an existing national government, may best be exemplified by Mao’s communist struggle in China. Conversely, liberation insurgencies, those waged by insurgents against a foreign power, best exemplified in the de-colonization era by Algeria in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, and more recently by the Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation and the current conflict in Iraq. In both situations, the conflict forms a triangular relationship between the two protagonists and the affected populace. This dynamic is the central element in all insurgencies and drives tactics, propaganda, and other issues that ultimately affect the strategic outcome.

geographical, and ideological differences indicative of a more sophisticated problem. Recent advances in the new sciences enhance existing abilities to understand, conceptualize, and solve military problems. The application of “new sciences” to military art is a relatively recent phenomenon, but it is beginning to greatly expand current understanding of the complexity of modern warfare. The science of complexity theory, non-linear dynamics, cybernetics, and other emerging fields allow for a greater understanding of the character and complexity of warfare. The nature of war remains unchanged. However, new applications increase the ability to understand the dynamics and interaction of conflict, facilitating planning, decision-making, and ultimately response.

Insurgency is an open and complex adaptive system characterized by the non-linear interaction of its subordinate elements. Comprised of many dynamically interacting sub-components, complex adaptive systems exhibit coherent behavior despite their highly-dispersed and decentralized control structure. (See Appendix 4 for a list of characteristics for complex adaptive systems, their definitions, and the relation to insurgency.) The Global Islamic Insurgency possesses a loose and hierarchical/collectivist leadership that provides broad ideological guidance to decentralized elements functioning at the regional and local levels worldwide. These elements adapt to local circumstances and threats to achieve success, while also interacting and providing

---


feedback to adjacent groups and the overall global movement. The aggregate actions of these localized insurgent groups form unpredictable tactical patterns that cannot be anticipated by analyzing each individual component. Newly-spawned groups self-organize within the aggregate system to further compound this characteristic. Modern technology, global communications, and international finances accelerate this process within the Global Islamic Insurgency and magnify its transnational nature.

Insurgencies are energetically open systems dependent upon inputs from their local environment, and the broader global movement. These systems exchange energy and matter across system boundaries with the environment and other rival systems to facilitate growth, development, execution and adaptation. This constant interaction with external forces and the environment induces an adaptive or evolutionary quality to the system and fuels its internal processes. Disenfranchised people, money, weapons, local grievances, ideology, government, infrastructure, and countless other elements contribute to an insurgent system. These critical elements assist and interact with on-going insurgent processes to generate tactical results or outputs. These outputs may be reflected in local tactical success, casualties, social dislocation, media exposure, and public fear. Above all, insurgent systems are influenced by continual feedback mechanisms and external interaction that transform system outputs and processes through functional adaptability. (Appendix 5 provides a graphic depiction of an insurgent complex adaptive system. Complex adaptive systems defy simplistic modeling; hence, this depiction should only be used as a tool to further conceptual understanding.) Co-evolution and adaptation are arguably the most significant

11 Kilcullen, 17.

12 David Kilcullen, “Irregular Warfare-A Systems Assessment,” Canberra, Australia: Royal Australian Infantry, 2004-2005. The concept of inputs and outputs within the insurgent complex adaptive system is drawn from multiple works by LtCol (Dr.) Kilcullen. For greater analysis of the interaction between the components of an insurgent system, specifically nodes, links, boundaries, sub-systems, and boundary interactions, Kilcullen’s two works provide exceptional insights.
features of an insurgency. Thus, insurgency is highly evolutionary, and easily resists rote and one-dimensional responses.

**Clausewitz’s Trinity and Insurgency**

While the adaptive and evolutionary nature of insurgency defies textbook responses, certain fundamental characteristics remain timeless. Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity of war is equally applicable to insurgencies; however, the balance of competing dynamics shifts.\(^{13}\) As an ideologically-driven open system, insurgency’s lifeblood for support and manpower remains the active and passive support of the local population. Insurgency remains a conflict over the control and support of the populace vice direct destruction of combatant forces.\(^{14}\) Extrapolation of Clausewitz’s trinity depicts this struggle for control of the population and appropriately reflects military destruction as a secondary objective in COIN operations.

---

\(^{13}\) Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. Clausewitz characterized war as a phenomenon with competing dominant tendencies that form a paradoxical trinity. This trinity includes primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (reflecting the people); the play of chance and probability (reflecting the commander/military forces); and its subordination as an instrument of policy (reflecting the government/reason). Clausewitz contended that these three elements of conflict or variable in their relationship to each other. He further expounds that fixing an arbitrary value on any element of the trinity conflicts with reality. This analysis is central to the trinity’s application to the character of insurgency. While all three elements are at play within this evolving threat, the interaction of these elements shifts balance from the constructs of conventional warfare.

Furthermore, when the COIN campaign involves the support of an external government, this supporting nation must also maintain the popular support of its own populace.

This ideological struggle for the control of the local populace, and the people of the supporting government, must remain central to any COIN analysis, doctrinal development, or campaign design.

**HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

The danger in adapting to the insurgency threat of the 21st century is relying too heavily on the lessons and responses of past conflicts. History is replete with examples of military forces applying lessons of the previous war without adequately defining a current or future security environment. Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan provide many useful examples in dealing with an insurgent enemy; they also illustrate the limitations of not linking tactical actions to strategic

---


objectives. Furthermore, the divergent cultural, political, and socio-economic environments that shaped each example highlight specific considerations for future application.

The Vietnam War epitomizes a conflict characterized by strategic failure despite repeated, but indecisive, tactical victories.\(^\text{18}\) Fighting a largely rural liberation insurgency, the United States relied upon an overly conventional approach to defeat a nebulous enemy that employed both conventional and guerilla tactics, one that remained steadfastly focused on winning the strategic battle. Synchronizing their operational and tactical objectives with attacks on U.S. public opinion, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) strategic objective ultimately became less about the battlefield success and more about the asymmetric, insurgent fight for popular support and who would endure and pay the cost.

The Marine Corps’ development of the CAP in 1965 represented early recognition that less conventional means would achieve more decisive results. Pairing a Marine rifle squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) Platoon, the Marines integrated into the every day life of their assigned village. (See Appendix 6 and 7 for Task Organization and CAP missions).\(^\text{19}\) Lieutenant General Louis Walt, III Marine Amphibious Force Commander, and Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, both strong advocates of the concept, approved and supervised the program’s

---


\(^{19}\) William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968), 184. The handpicked Marines, after receiving basic language, customs, history, and tactics training, worked with the PF counterparts to accomplish eight specific CAP missions, primarily military training and civic action.
expansion in 1966 as part of the Corps’ larger pacification efforts. The impact was immediately apparent, not just in the villages and hamlets occupied by CAP Marines, but in terms of invaluable information and increased physical security.20

The advantages of the CAP approach extended beyond intelligence collection. Marine leadership understood that the enemy guerilla fighters were dependent upon the local population for food, water, information, and additional recruits. By establishing security for the villages and then civic action programs, the U.S. integrated with the civilian population, isolated the guerillas from their potential safe haven, undermined their propaganda efforts, and infused a positive message concerning U.S. objectives and the South Vietnamese government for the population. Several challenges and concerns from the CAP experience must be considered when discussing future employment of a similar concept. Manpower posed significant concerns because mission success required experienced and highly intelligent Marines, preferably with extensive time in Vietnam, possessing the maturity to operate autonomously. Infantry battalions understandably did not want to give up these high-caliber Marines, hence continuous personnel challenges ensued.21

20 Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War 1966 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1982), 239-240. The author highlights one of the most important assets of the combined action platoons as being their knowledge of the local situation. Colonel Clyde D. Dean recalled that as the S-3 of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines at Da Nang in May 1966 during the political crisis, the combined action platoons provided, “our best on-site intelligence of who was who and where….I personally felt our CAPs were our best eyes and ears around the base.”

21 Oral interview, Colonel John Edson Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Group, 15 December 2005. Multiple sources, including the interviewee, recount the significant personnel challenges that existed to reach critical manning levels and proficiency. When the required personnel could not be gained from across the Corps or through additional deployed forces, the CAP resorted to carefully screened, handpicked volunteers. Surprisingly, the volunteer approach flooded the program with adventurous applicants albeit with disparate levels of experience and training. Initiating a comprehensive cross-training program allowed various occupational specialties to learn the infantry basics required to accomplish the missions. The CAP organization integrated a multitude of Marines with disparate occupational specialties and backgrounds, thus overcoming the challenges of manning and training an ad-hoc organization.
The CAP concept competed with the overarching Army strategy and the parallel CORDS program for assets, support, and unity of effort. CORDS fell under the purview of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), with Robert W. Komer appointed as its head under MACV in 1967. Together with General William C. Westmoreland, he developed an organization that integrated civilian and military planning, operations, logistics, and communications with centralized control down to the district level. The overall program integrated U.S. forces, civilians, Vietnamese police, ARVN forces, and various agencies into a cohesive unit equipped to facilitate civil development projects and pacification within 250 separate districts.\textsuperscript{22} Suitable comparison of the CAP and CORDS concepts is difficult because of the MACV pressure on the Marine Corps to subjugate their CAP efforts for the Army-centric search and destroy tactics, while Komer and the CORDS program resisted integration with districts that possessed CAP units.\textsuperscript{23} The result was two separate programs, both with substantial merits, executed in isolation.\textsuperscript{24} Dissenting viewpoints in a losing counterinsurgency are not surprising but limit intellectual debate and analysis due to the lack of the programs’ operational integration during execution. In actuality, the CAP program made a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, \textit{The Army and Vietnam} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 174-175. Krepinevich describes the confounding Army reaction to the Cap Program as ill-disguised disappointment and disapproval, from the top down. General Harry Kinnard (Commander 1st Calvary Division) was “absolutely disgusted” with the Marines and he, “did everything I could to draw them out and get them to fight, they just wouldn’t play. They don’t know how to fight on land, particularly against guerillas.” Ultimately, however, despite not integrating Army efforts or the CORDS initiative with Marine Corps operations, General Westmoreland acknowledged the CAP initiative’s success; he later admitted, “The Marines achieved some noteworthy results but I didn’t have the manpower to put a squad in every village or hamlet.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
quantifiable and localized impact on the South Vietnamese PF. However, the lack of clearly stated and achievable policy objectives, combined with no unifying COIN doctrine, proved to be strategically disastrous, despite local or tactical successes.

**Modern Initiatives: CAP Iraq and the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

During preparation for OIF II, then Major General James N. Mattis directed the infantry battalions of 1st Marine Division to prepare a platoon-sized element designed to maintain an elevated proficiency of Arabic language and cultural awareness in order to execute combined action operations with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) during the division’s impending deployment. This reincarnation of the CAP concept focused on establishing security and cultivating a relationship with each assigned ISF unit for training and combined operations. Marine CAP units quickly learned that cultural sensitivity, building trusting personal relationships, and patience were the backbone to success with their Iraqi counterparts. By applying these tenets, the new CAP initiative demonstrated the tactical adaptation required to achieve success in the post-conflict environment.

---

25 Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War* 1966, 240. Largely underpaid and under-trained, militia forces for the villages and hamlets of the rural countryside were plagued by desertions and death. Under the CAP, during the last six months of 1966 there were 39,000 PF troop desertions throughout South Vietnam or 25% of the total PF force. However, there were no recorded desertions from CAP units during this period. Similarly, in studies comparing the kill ratios between VC and PF elements during this time frame, the PF working within the CAP held a 14:1 ratio over the VC while those conducting independent operations held only 3:1. While quantifiable data can be misleading in the COIN environment, these combined with the intangible efforts reinforced the belief that an unconventional approach to the conflict was required to provide the security and win the trust of the civilian population.

26 LtCol Philip C. Skuta, “Partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005, 36-39. 1st Lieutenants Jason Goodale and Jon Webre, “The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq: An Old Technique for a New War,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005, 40-45. As an example, BLT 2/7’s CAP trained with the 503rd Iraqi National Guard (ING) Battalion for four months, successfully executing combined missions to recover weapons caches and disrupt insurgent activity. Simultaneously, they conducted weekly training rotations with platoons from different towns that belonged to the 503rd ING, successfully training more than 400 Iraqis and building a core of NCOs capable of conducting training without U.S. support. The CAP elements of 1st Marine Division also included efforts to train local Iraqi police elements within each battalion area.
environment of Iraq. It also faced similar challenges and shortfalls as its historical predecessors. Limited language capabilities, manpower costs for each participating battalion, and most importantly, lack of an overarching combined action approach hindered long-term efforts.

During May 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremmer stood up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq to oversee reconstruction efforts. He immediately established the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), later named the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to train, equip and develop the Iraqi Army forces required to stabilize the security environment in Iraq, and facilitate reconstruction. These organizations contained no civil affairs or intelligence capability to augment training efforts. Further, no direct link existed to operational efforts throughout Iraq preventing any multi-dimensional results. Tactical initiatives, like the Marine CAP, compensated for the lack of integration between reconstruction/civil affairs efforts, training of Iraqi Security Forces, and on-going military operations in Iraq, but could not mitigate the deteriorating security environment and slow pace of reconstruction.

The COIN approach currently being employed in Afghanistan combines aspects of the previous two examples to form a distinctive model. The shocking success of America’s unconventional forces in 2001-2002, including Army Special Forces and the Marine Corps’ Task Force-58, rapidly destroyed the Taliban regime and facilitated the establishment of an interim government and ultimately free elections. In order to facilitate establishment of a secure environment and reconstruction efforts in a country ravaged since the Soviet Occupation of 1979, the United States initiated the establishment of PRTs. Subsequently continued by UN mandate and NATO forces, the PRTs (See Appendix 8) are joint civilian-military teams that focus on security, reconstruction, supporting central governance, and limited relief operations all at the provincial
Despite this integrated approach, the PRTs struggle with several fundamental obstacles resulting from the absence of a clear conceptual approach to the problem. Without any prior planning or coordination, the PRTs experienced considerable internal friction in combining military with civilians from the diplomatic corps and developmental agencies of both the U.S. and participating allies. This friction and the non-permissive Afghani environment spawned contention regarding security for non-governmental organizations (NGO), and the preservation of “humanitarian space” for the non-military entities. Humanitarian organizations, integral to stabilization and reconstruction efforts in an insurgent environment, desire clear delineation between military missions and their proclaimed humanitarian missions.

The lack of a cohesive operational design prevents even the PRT model from realizing the optimal level of coordination, information sharing, and understanding between military and non-military entities prior to execution. Currently PRT efforts focus on the larger, seemingly less dangerous, urban environments where a quick impact can be made by the PRT’s actions. This approach, and lack of shared experience, limits the civilian/NGO results, wastes significant time trying to coordinate efforts, and prevents the PRTs from focusing on the less stable rural regions of Afghanistan where the insurgent elements continue to operate unchecked. (See Appendix 9)

---


28 Michael Dziedzic, and Michael K. Seidl, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” USIP Special Report 147, September 2005, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.htm> (7 January 2005). This distinction between civilian and military missions is critical to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their belief within the PRT construct is that ambiguity in this delineation undermines their objectivity in the eyes of the populace and increases their exposure to insurgent acts of reprisal. While this notion does not account for insurgent terrorist tactics designed to strike fear in those attempting to support the Afghan government and the target populace, it raises an issue that must be addressed in subsequent interagency training and coordination. See also: Andjela Jurisic, “Is the Humanitarian-Military Relationship Moving in Reverse?,” The Liaison, Volume 3 Number 2, 2004.
THE WAY AHEAD: COMBINED ACTION COUNTERINSURGENCY CONCEPT

Clearly, historical responses do not offer the complete solution to current or future conflicts. Today, modern insurgents employ cell-networks for increased secrecy, terror to foster insecurity and to manipulate the population, multifaceted approaches to win the support of the general population, and integrated efforts to undermine and attack a government. 29 These elements highlight the need for a holistic COIN doctrine that recognizes the importance of religious ideology, culture, language, population density, government legitimacy, and a myriad of other factors.

The Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC) is an adaptable interagency approach to COIN operations that recognizes the military as one component of a holistic response. 30 Military intervention and application is scalable and seamlessly integrated with all elements of national power. Because insurgencies are protracted, dynamic contingencies, the CACC is designed along a four-stage continuum consisting of pre-intervention, intervention, stabilization, and

29 Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters, Spring 2004, 23. Robert Tome’s article draws heavily on both David Galula and Roger Trinquier for his foundation of counter-insurgency operations. This is particularly relevant in discussing a broad strategic theory to COIN operations and the integration of military and non-military components for a holistic response to future conflicts. “A confluence of military and nonmilitary operations defeats the insurgent. This requires an organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military elements. For Galula, counterinsurgency efforts require unified command, a single source of direction. This means a ‘tight’ organization, to borrow from Trinquier, directing ‘the operation from beginning to the end’.” Here, Tomes refers to David Galula, the author of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Roger Trinquier was one of the first to advocate the secondary role of the military at the operational level in such conflicts. In his book, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Trinquier espouses the role of the military as secondary to establishing the conditions for the political and other elements of power to win the overarching objectives. The unified command and “tight organization” espoused by Galula and Trinquier encapsulate both organizational and conceptual influences on operational design.

30 The title of this concept, Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept (CACC), is derived from several historical examples of combined action counterinsurgency efforts. The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program in Vietnam and Haiti provided one of many historical perspectives for assessing the principles of COIN operations. Exhibiting human-centric and small unit interaction with the local populace, this became the basis for the title and one of the underlying tenets of this evolved concept.
The interagency response which leverages economic, political, informational, law enforcement, and military power is the critical mechanism for decisive COIN success. Varying degrees of expeditionary preparedness exist within governmental and non-governmental agencies to rapidly respond to an insurgent crisis. Accordingly, the scalable military role is designed to function as an enabling capability with the CACC continuum so as to establish the initial conditions for long-term interagency operations. This conceptual framework, which maximizes military involvement at the front-end of the continuum to establish the conditions for success, requires reorganization, transformation, and training throughout government and non-government enterprises.

**Essential Elements of the Concept**

The CACC is based on five essential elements for success: establishing a secure environment, isolating the insurgent threat, instituting a counter-ideology, re-establishing governmental legitimacy, and re-establishing societal norms. These mutually dependent elements are executed concurrently and continuously throughout the COIN continuum. During pre-intervention, the military role is secondary to diplomatic and information operations. Advisory, training assistance, intelligence efforts, and other actions focus on assisting the host-government to

---

31 Steven Metz, and Raymond Millen, “Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation (IST) Operations: The Role of Landpower in the New Strategic Environment,” *Parameters*, Spring 2005, 41-51. The concept for the CACC continuum evolved from the three-phased continuum proposed by Metz and Millen. The pre-intervention stage added to this concept recognizes the importance of preemption in COIN operations. Early introduction of an interagency response may prevent deterioration and avoid full-scale military intervention. Most notably, Metz envisions the formation of a non-military group of IST experts comprised of and fully-versed in regional specialization, strategic planning, cultural psychology and communications, intelligence, economic and infrastructure development, and other pertinent areas. Additionally, the CACC continuum differs from Metz’s proposal by the fundamental change from transformation to normalization in the final stage. This change highlights the fact that the imposition of western ideals and democracy upon host nations may not always be optimal in the COIN environment. Arguably, the desirable outcome is more aptly captured by normalization or the stable return to pre-conflict conditions within the specific country’s cultural norms.
maintain a secure environment and isolate the insurgent threat from the population. If a
deteriorating situation requires full-scale intervention, a robust conventional capability quickly
establishes these conditions and transitions again to an ancillary role.

Information operations underpin, shape, and support all elements of this concept. An
effective counter-ideology is the critical requirement for attacking the insurgent efforts to control
the populace. Effective local and global information operations reinforce interagency efforts and
mitigate pro-insurgent grievances. Strategically crafted messages also help eradicate logistical
support to the insurgents. Finally, these counter-messages must accurately articulate on-going
efforts to strengthen economic stability and other host-government functions.

The final elements consist of re-establishing host-government legitimacy and societal norms.
Addressing the battle for control of the populace, the CACC’s interagency approach focuses on
bolstering the credibility of the host government. Simultaneously, these interagency elements work
with the host-government to restore critical infrastructure, essential services, and economic systems,
facilitating rapid normalization of the environment. The critical success mechanism for the
restoration of societal norms remains the interagency response. Transformation, or the imposition
of western standards, may be undesirable or generate disdain in the populace.

**CONCEPTUAL PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL**

At the operational level of war, the dynamic complexity of the COIN surpasses current
planning models. The linear, military-centric, step-by-step approaches of the military decision-
making process (MDMP) and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) are exceptional at the

---

32 In the context of failed states, for example Somalia, the re-establishment of societal norms
remains applicable but does not refer to the circumstances that may have contributed to the
insurgency’s inception. Rather, societal norms refers to culturally-based conditions that would
logically receive wide-spread acceptance by the majority of the populace. In a situation involving
the complete absence of a credible host-government, the CACC continuum remains a viable
construct for U.S. involvement. However, in such cases the final stages of the continuum would
involve and an international nation-building effort whose subject exceeds the scope of this paper.
tactical level but fall short in cognitively framing future outcomes in extremely dynamic environments involving the interagency process at the operational level. Brigadier General Shimon Naveh, IDF (Ret.), and a group from the Israeli Defense Force’s Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI), recently developed a methodology for designing operations and campaigns at the operational level of war. Systemic Operational Design (SOD) draws upon the sciences of ontology, epistemology, and systems theory to establish a systemic logic that connects strategic guidance to tactical action through design at the operational level of war. Although in its development stages, the process deserves considerable attention and is currently being examined by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command during Unified Quest 2006.

SOD recognizes the relevance of systems theory as well as the related concepts of chaos theory, complexity theory, network theory, and non-linear dynamics. As a planning model, SOD

33 David Pere, “Systemic Operational Design: Part One,” (Unpublished Manuscript, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2005), 1. Currently TRADOC is reviewing a SOD process study, conducted by Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.) and students at the School of Advanced Military Studies, within its annual Unified Quest experiments.

34 Ibid, 3. Pere provides an exceptional overview for complex adaptive systems (CAS) and further defines them by comparison to the complex systems from which they are derived. CAS can be broken down into structurally complex systems, e.g. a car or airplane, and interactively complex systems, e.g. an ecological system. Structurally complex systems can be analyzed through a reductionist approach of systems analysis, or by breaking it down to its basic elements. However, this method does not work for interactively complex systems as it countermands the very nature of the system which is derived from the aggregate interaction of its component elements. Such a system requires a holistic approach to analysis. This necessity for a holistic approach is compounded when a particular system is both structurally and interactively complex as are most economic or societal systems. Pere states, “Complex systems are generally described as highly-structured systems whose evolution is very sensitive to initial conditions or to small perturbation, one in which the number of independent interacting components is large, or one in which there are multiple pathways by which the system can evolve. Complex systems are open systems. Energy and information are constantly being imported and exported across system boundaries. Because of this, Complex Systems are usually far from equilibrium: even though there is constant change there is also the appearance of stability. The complexity between these systems is created by the relationships between the elements and therefore no element in the system can hope to control the system.” Pere, BGen Naveh and others distinguish Complex Adaptive Systems from Complex Systems by their adaptive nature and the capacity of such systems to change and learn from experience. When considered in terms of military operations, it is clear how the complexity and
requires the senior military leadership to work closely with national leadership to ensure an accurate understanding of their vision and intended strategic objectives. Once accomplished, the combatant commander essentially becomes the architect of the design process by directing the intellectual debate of the design team through continual discourse. By drawing on non-military experts in the fields of government, science, economics, health/medicine, and cultural anthropology, the COCOM ensures a holistic operational campaign design that addresses the problem at hand. Through this conceptualization process, the tactical planners have a framework from which detailed coordination can produce relevant action. The continued development, testing, and integration of SOD are particularly applicable to modern insurgency and anticipated future conflicts. The complexity of such conflicts demands a holistic approach to planning, avoiding a military-centric solution to the particular problem. SOD’s interagency focus and incorporation of non-military elements and expertise facilitates success across the CACC continuum and its five essential elements.

**CRITICAL CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY**

Beyond the interagency process and holistic operational design, many critical capabilities are required to achieve the five essential elements of this concept and focus optimization of force structure, training, equipping, and employment of forces. The emerging security environment requires the U.S. to maintain flexible responses against both conventional and unconventional threats. An unbalanced approach or radical change in force composition will undermine the ability to respond to the full spectrum of conflict. By combining elements of the CAP, PRT model, and developing capabilities, a cohesive CACC can be developed to integrate a multitude of military/non-military assets while meeting all threats. (See Appendix 12 for CACC capabilities)
Establishing a Secure Environment/Isolating the Insurgent Threat

This concept emphasizes a human-centric approach where decentralized and highly dispersed small-units interact continuously with the population, building personal relationships, harvesting valuable information, and maintaining a continual subdued presence. When necessary, dispersed forces must possess the ability to rapidly aggregate to address an enemy threat or react to valuable intelligence. In this regard, CACC is directly linked with the evolving Marine Corps Distributed Operations concept. The CACC seeks to minimize the conventional force footprint, maximizes human interaction and intelligence gathering, and integrates the non-military entities discussed above. However, it recognizes that COIN operations can be manpower intensive during the initial intervention stage. It also requires a mental paradigm shift to prudently resist casualty aversion impulses, and alleviate the massing of forces and large-scale base camps. Instead, arrayed teams integrated with indigenous forces and non-military assets, will generate more decisive results from their direct and continuous human contact with the populace.

Implementing a smaller footprint and less overt U.S. presence for much of the CACC continuum requires counter-intuitive logic but ultimately generates greater operational success and force preservation. During the intervention and stabilization phases, kinetic military force may increase but is rapidly subsumed by more discerning application. The law enforcement model of establishing trust with the local populace to gain and share information while patrolling a particular area must be the standard. The non-kinetic highly-discriminating approach required in the COIN

35 Employment of tactical small units within the CACCC builds directly on the tenets of Distributed Operations. Highly dispersed and networked small units operating autonomously over a disparate battlespace allow leveraging of capabilities against a largely invisible enemy. The diminished footprint and maximum human interaction decreases the threat to friendly forces while directly influencing the populace. For information specific to Distributed Operations, see: www.darpa.mil/DARPATech2005/presentations/ato/tovar.pdf. See also: http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2005/PDF/Ch2PDFs/CP05%20Chapter%202%20Emerging%20Capabilties%20pg%2043_Distributed%20Operations.pdf.

19
environment demands restraint to avoid unnecessary casualties or damage to the local infrastructure. The ability to de-escalate or diffuse contentious situations is imperative and training must focus on developing the judgment, maturity, and responsiveness in our CACC teams to know when escalation is not the appropriate response.  

The scalable employment of military forces in the CACC recognizes the imperative for interagency planning, integration and coordination. In this regard, the military must act as an enabling force for non-military entities, and be prepared to provide assistance as the de-facto lead agency. Equally important, DoD must be prepared to address institutional resistance to these evolving ideas from external agencies. In support of interagency actions, training and integration of civilian experts and OGAs must occur prior to deployment and conflict. Major exercises, experiments, evaluations, and predeployment training that integrate non-military entities would broaden the experience and mindset of civilian-military components and ensure mutual understanding of interagency planning considerations for such missions. Ultimately, DOD does not possess the capability to deal unilaterally with the challenges of modern insurgency. The issue requires institutional acceptance, cooperation, and action by all governmental agencies.

**Instituting a Counter-Ideology**

The ability to develop and implement a focused counter-ideology undermining the impact of insurgent propaganda locally and globally is paramount. This necessitates greater sophistication in crafting positive host-government messages and identifying key features within the insurgent ideology for exploitation. Simultaneous reinforcement of government efforts and erosion of insurgent propaganda will positively impact the civilian populace. Maneuver and fires take an

---

ancillary role to information operations throughout the CACC continuum. Information operations, and efforts to institute a counter-ideology, must accurately, honestly and consistently articulate the mission and moral principles governing the employment of forces from the U.S., host-nation, and allies in the COIN operation. This is vital not only to bolster support for the host government, but to maintain support of the American people.

To enhance the overall CACC, and instituting a counter-ideology in particular, the U.S. must look at improving manning in certain low-density and high-demand military occupational specialties. Specifically, it must develop or expand existing MOS fields to produce the ability to conduct local information operations. Future “information specialists” should be recruited and selected for employment at the Company/Platoon level to undermine local insurgent propaganda efforts.  

This capability also serves as the coordinating mechanism to any US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Command teams operating in close proximity to Marine units. Additional low-density areas such as language specialists/interpreters and civil affairs require attention as well. Recent initiatives in developing language skills, including language and culture training in the Fleet Marine Force, MARSOC, and the Marine Corps University at Quantico, will have significant impacts on overall COIN operations.

---

38 The Marine Corps Recruiting Command employs E-5 Sergeant Marketing/Public Affairs (MPA) specialists at all 48 recruiting stations throughout the nation. Arguably one of the most valuable members of the command, these junior Marines combine their initial public affairs training with imagination, initiative, and hard work to interact with the local population, schools, and the media telling the Marine Corps story. This same approach should be employed at the tactical level within the COIN environment.

39 BGGen Dennis Hejlik, MARSOC presentation at MCU, Training and Education Command, 26 January 2005. Current forming and manning of the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, while benefiting the joint community for the future, will have a negative impact on standard Marine Corps units in the near-term. General Hejlik highlighted this fact during a recent speech and articulated the necessity to reconstitute these capabilities as rapidly as possible. Language and cultural skill sets are vital to the CACC, especially in counter-ideology efforts. An initiate to bolster language capability should be augmented by offering incentives to Officer
Developing technology provides great enabling capability to counter-ideology and all elements of the CACC, but this should not be viewed as a centerpiece for a human-centric conflict. Improvements in technological application at the operational level are needed to facilitate tactical success. Data-mining is a new method of utilizing extensive databases to locate, assess, and apply valuable information in easily understood forms. It may provide valuable operational or cultural assistance during COIN efforts; this includes geographical information, local population trends, internet and cell phone activity, and voting records. Within the Information Operations/PSYOP domain, satellite radio, Direct TV, digital recording equipment, and IPOD technology represent advances largely untapped by military forces. Human imagination is the only limiting factor in the application of new technology. However, it is imperative to remember that the technology remains a secondary enabler to human interaction and sound conventional skills are the primary enablers.

Candidates enrolled in language training throughout four years of college, as well as recruiting incentives to attract the highest caliber individuals skilled in high demand language sets.

40 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 204. Hammes illustrates that strategically the U.S. continues to lead the world in advanced technology and weapons systems. However, despite the technological superiority of the Unites States, he argues that it is often misdirected or poorly leveraged. “True believers in technology see warfare as being reduced to a one-sided contest where the technologically superior side dictates all action. In sum, our position is much weaker than the rosy picture painted by the advocates of advanced technology. Although we have technology superior to that of many of our potential adversaries, we continue to use it to support a third-generation style of warfare.”


42 At the tactical level, the future “Information Specialist” would provide powerful collection and distribution capabilities if armed with readily available devices. Modern insurgents employ digital cameras and equipment to ensure propaganda reaches the airways and internet immediately; CACC units should possess the same capability to historically document all events in a COIN environment. IPOD technology and a portable speaker with thousands of pre-recorded messages would mitigate language deficiencies at the tactical level and maximize the delivery of messages at critical times.
Re-Establishing Government Legitimacy and Societal Norms

All efforts in COIN must reinforce the legitimacy of the host-government. US intervention should demonstrate altruistic support for the host-government and avoid appearances of self-interest. Like instituting a counter-ideology, the issue of legitimacy is paramount across the continuum. Sound strategic objectives coupled with strong pre-intervention efforts may bolster host-government ability to address local grievances, enhancing legitimacy, and prevent the need for full-scale intervention. Additionally, CACC teams involved in COIN operations must possess the ability to rapidly transition purview of local operations to host-government authorities quickly and seamlessly to increase the faith of the local populace.

Forces must possess the ability to conduct initial assessment of key infrastructure and public services to determine shortfalls, engineering requirements, and measures necessary for re-establishment of culturally-based societal norms. This capability falls outside the normal scope of infantry/combat arms proficiency. However, training and task organization can build this basic proficiency into each tactical unit. In the absence of civilian experts, military forces must be educated, trained, and prepared for these assessments in order to maximize progress until transition of responsibility is possible. At a minimum, basic services including electricity, water, trash collection, road infrastructure, and conflict-based destruction of facilities should be logged and integrated with higher-headquarters planning efforts. This lower-level ability ensures an integrated, prioritized response within the interagency response at the operational level.

CONCLUSION

Development and implementation of an adaptable operational level counterinsurgency concept is necessary to meet the challenges of modern insurgency conflicts of the 21st century. The emerging security environment necessitates a human-centric, culturally focused joint operating concept. The Combined Action Counterinsurgency Concept evolved from historical experience; it
blends a new operational planning model with combined action force employment, tailored task organization, innovative technology, and critical civilian integration to maximize results for countering future insurgency threats. The relationship of CACC to the join Major Combat Operations concept and Distributed Operations is advantageous to other options in this realm. The strength of this concept lies in its conceptual framework for insurgency and military-facilitated interagency response. Focused innovation and development of this concept will provide a force capable of stripping modern transnational insurgents of their sources of strength and eroding radical ideological threats. Further transformation of governmental processes and personnel management systems is required to fully realize the potential of the CACC. However, current capabilities support immediate implementation of many elements of this concept. From this, long-term experimentation, training, development, and implementation can progress.


The author, an infantry platoon commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, served as an Iraqi Security Forces Liaison during his second deployment to Iraq. He clearly and accurately captures the requirements, challenges, and obstacles to successfully training the embryonic Iraqi Army. His lessons for advising indigenous forces have direct applicability to future counterinsurgency efforts to develop a secure operating environment.


Dr. Beckerman provides an insightful analysis of the applicability of non-linear dynamics to conflict. A longtime analyst for the U.S. Air Force, her article melds elements of Colonel John Boyd’s work on the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop with stability and adaptability in war. Applying non-linearity, and chaos and complexity theory, she argues that entities evolve along a “fitness landscape” as internal and external factors influence their adaptation in combat. By leveraging dynamic approaches, Dr. Beckerman postulates, a combatant remains unpredictable and alters the “fitness landscape” of its rival system. In doing so, the rival system’s ability to adapt and co-evolve diminishes until it is overcome. Beyond the aspects of non-linearity and new sciences, the article provides an interesting application of Boyd’s work.


The author, writing a student thesis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, discusses the application of Clausewitz’s trinity to insurgency. His analysis of the struggle between government and insurgency forces over control of the populace is compelling. From this article, Figure 1 of this paper was derived.

Colonel Charles E. Callwell’s seminal work of 1906 provides critical analysis and background characterization of small wars, guerilla warfare, and counterinsurgency operations. Applying a Clausewitzian approach to the subject, this work provided critical definitions and analysis as background to this paper. Most importantly, Callwell captures the timelessness of the topic in a work written over a century ago.


The author, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provides a broad overview of the current situation in Iraq. While useful as background information, Cordesman does not present detailed analysis applicable to this paper. He maintains a more strategic view of the conflict and proposes that the best course for certain insurgencies is resisting being drawn into such a conflict. Several more recent works by him hold more merit for the topic.


This is a more updated and thorough analysis of the counterinsurgency problems facing the United States today. Cordesman captures the insurgent tactics at play, as well as the issues of complexity, uncertainty, and risk. Its value lies in the accurate discussion of the limitations of historical models to include “ink spot” tactics and other approaches employed in past conflicts. He summarizes the requirements for success in counterinsurgency and clarifies that success may not always be the same thing as victory in a conventional conflict. His analysis of trends, methods, and limitations provided exceptional analysis for the scope of this paper.


Colonel Corson’s controversial book recounts many of the successes and failures associated with the Vietnam War. An intelligence officer in the Marine Corps, he commanded a Marine tank battalion in 1966 during the Vietnam War. In 1967 he took command of the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program. His role in this capacity served as the genesis for much of this renowned work. Although emotional, controversial, and largely contested, historical accounts of the CAP efforts are easily substantiated by other documentation. Through the eyes of this disillusioned leader, this source captures the disappointment and frustration of someone intimately associated with counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam.


Echevarria is the Director of Research, Director National Security Affairs, and Acting Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. This work focuses on rebutting the proposed and developing ideas pertaining to Fourth Generation Warfare. (4GW) By attacking the concept with historical evidence and sound operational theory, Colonel Echevarria defines how the idea of 4GW is a hollow attempt to characterize the evolution and essence of warfare. Further, he discusses the impact such unfounded assertions have on obfuscating the discussion of warfare and wasted intellectual efforts. While beyond the scope of this paper, his work helps define the essence of future warfare and the continued relevance of the Clausewitzian trinity.


The authors, writing for a United Kingdom civilian humanitarian assistance organization, provide the best available overview of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently being employed in Afghanistan. Written from the civilian perspective, the essay highlights the strengths and shortfalls of this model as well as highlighting the friction points inevitably encountered between civilian and military personnel in a dangerous environment. Most important are the recommendations made to better prepare both sides for future execution and the integration of the civilian-military efforts to achieve success.


Colonel John E. Greenwood, USMC(Ret) served two tours in Vietnam as an infantry battalion commander and as the Commanding Officer, 4th Combined Action Group. He later served as the editor, Marine Corps Gazette for twenty years. His personal insights into the application of the combined action approach provided a valuable perspective on its successes and limitations. Greenwood’s particular emphasis on the personnel requirements and individual challenges placed on each Marine injected reality into the analysis of this concept. Additionally, his overview and perspective provided background to the subject from both his experiences and those authors with whom he maintained a professional editorial relationship.


Colonel Hammes, USMC, provides a thorough description of the controversial development of Fourth Generation Warfare. Having studied the subject for more than 10 years prior to this work, Hammes joins William Lind and others in espousing the evolution of a new generation of warfare. While disagreeing with the premise of his book in this paper, Hammes’ characterization of modern insurgency is invaluable. His incisive description of a networked, transnational, and ideologically
motivated enemy is one of the best characterizations uncovered during the research associated with this paper.


   The author, a Combined Action Platoon commander with the 505th Iraqi National Guard battalion, provides unique insights and techniques into operating a combined unit with indigenous forces. This article captures both intangible and intangible requirements for success while proposing methods for execution. Iscol provides an excellent summarization of current CAP procedures in Iraq. Of particular interest are several vignettes depicted the real-world performance of the combined action in Operation Al Fajr.


   Kilcullen wrote this study of counterinsurgency while serving in the S01 Land Warfare Concepts Branch of the Australian Army Headquarters. An infantry officer with a background in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, he earned his Ph.D from an analysis of Indonesian insurgent and terrorist groups and counterinsurgency methods. This study, and his subsequent work on irregular warfare, draws heavily on the study of complexity theory and complex adaptive systems. His research and interpretation of the new sciences provided critical insights into understanding insurgency as an open and complex adaptive system. Through his understanding of the inputs, processes, outputs, and rival system interactions for this insurgent system, a basis can be gained for developing adequate solutions. Kilcullen was more recently instrumental in the development and drafting of Complex Warfighting, the operational concept for the Australian Army.


   The author, currently the Executive Direction of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, had a distinguished career in the U.S. Army and continues public service in his current role. Renowned for providing focused and unequivocal analysis of military trends, requirements, and shortfalls, Krepinevich’s work on Vietnam remains a mainstay for scholars today. Highlighting the shortfalls of the U.S. strategy that ultimately led to failure during the Vietnam
War, he assesses the combined action program, its conflict with Army leadership, and the lack of integration between Army and Marine efforts in dealing with an unconventional threat.


In this analytical look at what is needed to win in Iraq, Krepinevich combines analysis from other articles with new suggestions for winning the counterinsurgency war there. Of particular value to this topic is the discussion to accurately map and assess tribal allegiances within the indigenous population. Further, his suggestions to develop better metrics are critical for assessing success or failure in particular initiatives. Overall, an excellent source of analysis for the topic regarding potential methods for improved results in Iraq.


The is the first article in a three-part series by the author. It discusses the criticality of establishing security and strong intelligence to beat an insurgent threat, thus is an excellent source in researching the requirements for defeating insurgency. From a historical perspective, he delineates the nature of the insurgent environment and proposes necessary steps to ensure success in Iraq or future conflicts.


The second article in a series, Krepinevich continues to expound on the nature of insurgency/counterinsurgency operations. He specifically addresses the parallels between Iraq and the Vietnam experience. His analysis provided valuable insights for this paper with its evaluation and comparison of the Vietnam War’s Combined Action Program and future models for counterinsurgency.


This history by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret.) addresses the history, tradition, challenges, and monumental developments of the Marine Corps during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. In the scope of this paper, it is the author’s experience as the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific during the Vietnam War that is so illuminating. As the major proponent of the Combined Action Program, General Krulak’s insights, recollections, and analysis provided invaluable insights into the Corps’ counterinsurgency efforts. This source also addresses the friction and operational disagreements between key Marine and Army leaders over the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign.

The interviewee, currently the J-3 Operations at U.S. Central Command, provided background on the situation in early 2005 in Iraq and expanded on the need for continued integration of non-military organizations to enhance the counterinsurgency efforts. Fine as a source for background information.


Dr. Steven Metz, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, and Raymond Millen, the Director of European Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, highlight the characteristics of historical insurgencies, motivating characteristics of the belligerents, and propose potential responses. Their analysis of the differences between national and liberation insurgencies was particularly useful. Metz and Millen’s assessment regarding the resources vital to insurgents facilitated a thorough analysis of potential counterinsurgent operations.


Metz and Millen develop a model for future U.S. intervention in nation-building scenarios. This article provided much of the impetus for this paper and the requirement for a more integrated approach to counterinsurgency. Their continuum of intervention-stabilization-transformation provides the best conceptual framework for such operations, as of this date.


This is the source document for current U.S. strategic policy providing a roadmap to victory in Iraq. The strategy provides background information for the thesis concerning the holistic leveraging of national power against threats in Iraq. It serves well in providing the basis for analysis and comparison of the interagency process and current counterinsurgency efforts with other sources in this bibliography.


BGen Shimon Naveh, IDF (Ret.) is the direction of the Israeli Defense Forces Operational Theory Research Institute. This book provides an exceptional overview of the development and applicability of operational theory. While its overall theme is beyond the purview of this paper, it provided the basis for Naveh’s recent development of Systemic Operational Design at the OTRI. In order to grasp SOD, this book and several others dealing with complexity theory and chaos theory provide an excellent base of understanding.


Peterson, a veteran of two tours with the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, provides excellent background on this program, its evolution, and its application. As a background source on the most definitive historical application of the combined approach to date, he summarizes the task organization, challenges, missions, and lessons learned. This book provided an excellent overview of the topic, with detailed information beyond that required by the scope of the thesis.


Mr. Rosen, an Associate Professor of Government and Associate Director at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, presents an insightful analysis of innovation in the modern military experience. Providing the characteristics for innovation and analyzing historical examples during peacetime, wartime, and technological innovation, he provides characteristics and methods required for future innovation. This work provided exceptional framing of the subject during the research of this paper. Combining rapid technological advances with the on-going war in Iraq, Rosen’s perspective illustrates the challenges of developing a new concept for counterinsurgency.


Sepp, an assistant professor at the Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, reviews historical examples of insurgency to summarize the most relevant practices for counterinsurgent responses. This article’s applicability to the subject centered on summarizing background information, reiterating proven methods for countering insurgents, and concisely proposed those that may be applicable for future success in Iraq.

The author of this well-known Vietnam War analysis discusses the successes and shortfalls of the Vietnam War. Its scope is beyond the subject matter in this paper, but it was helpful and providing context to the strategies employed by U.S. forces.


Robert Tomes, the Senior Advisor to the NGA Technical Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), re-asserts the principles and characteristics of counterinsurgency drawing heavily on several very significant historical works. His evaluation of the theories of Roger Trinquier, David Galula, and Frank Kitson provides the reader an exceptional and concise overview of insurgency and low-intensity operations. Tomes’ article was valuable in making comparisons between the other authors mentioned above and encapsulating those characteristics of counterinsurgency relevant to Iraq and future conflicts.

Van Riper, Paul. <vanriper7@cox.net> “Concerns.” 16 December 2005. Email to CJCS (16 December 2005).

Lieutenant General Van Riper’s email addresses specific concerns towards the joint concept development process, specifically highlighting the need for the clear use of terminology and the development of concepts to address specific problems. Writing to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Army Chief of Staff, Van Riper reflects on his military experience and focuses on future innovation to highlight areas that require DOD focus. It’s usefulness to this paper resided in reaffirming its themes and the relevance of the issues raised.


Major Schmitt, the author of FMFM-1 Warfighting for the Marine Corps, joins with Lieutenant General Van Riper in developing this insightful briefing on a potential concept for counterinsurgency. The concept provided particular insights into insurgency as a complex adaptive system and provided the idea for the expanded application of Clausewitz’s trinity to reflect the dynamics of counterinsurgency supported by an external government. Lieutenant General Van Riper provided this non-published brief for the specific research of this paper and his verbal discussions and insights furthered its overall application.

Operational terms related to the CACC concept

Appendix 1

Antiterrorism (JP 1-02, FM 101-5-1, MCRP 5-12A) — Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (See also antiterrorism awareness; counterterrorism; proactive measures; terrorism) See FM 31-20 and 100-20.

Civil affairs (DOD, JP 1-02) Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations.

Civil affairs (FM 101-5-1, MCRP 5-12A) - The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civilian authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military operations. (Army) — 1. Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area, usually occurring in time of hostilities or other emergency, and normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied. 2. Military government: the form of administration by which occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory. See FM 41-10.

Civil-military operations (DOD, JP 1-02) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; operation.

Civil-military operations (FM 101-5-1, MCRP 5-12A) The complex activities in support of military operations embracing the interaction between the military force and civilian authorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. See FM 41-10.

Counterguerrilla warfare (DOD, NATO) Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas.

Conventional forces (DOD) 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.

Counterinsurgency (JP 1-02, FM 101-5-1, MCRP 5-12A) — Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (See also called COIN. See also stability and support operations.) See FM 31-20 and 100-20.
**Counterterrorism** (DOD, JP 1-02) Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism.

**Counterterrorism** (FM 101-5-1, MCRP 5-12A) — Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. See FM 19-1, 34-1, and 100-20.

**Foreign internal defense** (JP 1-02) — Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. See FM 100-20.

**General war** (JP 1-02) — Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. (See also conflict, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and stability and support operations (SASO).)

**Guerrilla warfare** (JP 1-02, NATO) — Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or Hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. (See also unconventional warfare (UW).) See FM 90-8, 100-12, and 100-20.

**Humanitarian and civic assistance** (JP 1-02) — Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (See also humanitarian assistance (HA).) See FM 8-42 and 100-20.

**Insurgency** (JP 1-02, NATO) — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (See also counterinsurgency.) See FM 90-8 and 100-20.

**Internal defense and development** (JP 1-02) — The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (See also foreign internal defense (FID).) See FM 100-20 and 100-25.

**Irregular forces** (JP 1-02) — Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. See FM 100-20 and 100-25.

**Military operations other than war** (JP 1-02) — Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before,

**Paramilitary forces** (JP 1-02) — Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

**Peace building** (JP 1-02) — Postconflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. See FM 100-23 and JP 3-07.
**Peace enforcement** (JP 1-02) — Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See FMs 100-20, 100-23, and JP 3-07.

**Peacekeeping** (JP 1-02) — Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See FMs 100-20, 100-23, and JP 3-07.

**Peacemaking** (JP 1-02) — The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it. See FMs 100-20, 100-23, and JP 3-07.

**Peace operations** (JP 1-02) — A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. See FMs 100-20, 100-23, and JP 3-07.

**Postconflict activity** — Those stability and support operations which are conducted in the period following conflict termination.

**Private voluntary organizations** (JP 1-02) — Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. PVOs are normally US-based. "Private voluntary organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organization." (See also nongovernmental organization (NGO).) See FM 100-20 and JP 3-07.

**Revolutionary** (JP 1-02) — An individual attempting to effect a social or political change through the use of extreme measures. (See also antiterrorism (AT).) See FM 100-20.

**Stability and support operations** (Army) — The use of military capabilities for any purpose other than war. (See also counterdrug, counterinsurgency, domestic emergencies, humanitarian assistance (HA), military operations other than war (MOOTW), and peace operations.) See JP 3-07 and FM 100-20.

**Subversion** (JP 1-02) — Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (See also unconventional warfare (UW).) See FM 100-20.

**Terrorism** (JP 1-02) — The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (See also antiterrorism (AT) and counterterrorism (CT).) See FM 100-20.

**Terrorist** (JP 1-02) — An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result. See FM 100-20.

**Unconventional warfare** (JP 1-02) — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (Army) — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. UW includes guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct action missions, and other operations of a low-visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of UW may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed
in varying degrees by an external source during all conditions of war or peace. (See military operations other than war (MOOTW).) See FM 100-20.
Operational Acronyms and Abbreviations Related to Counterinsurgency

APPENDIX 2

A
AT antiterrorism;

C
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
CONUS continental United States
CT counterterrorism
CUWTF Combined Unconventional Weapons Task Force

F
FID foreign internal defense
FMF Fleet Marine Force

G
GW guerrilla warfare

H
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance

I
IDAD internal defense and development

J
JCATF joint civil affairs task force
JFC joint force commander
JIB Joint Information Bureau
JIC joint intelligence center
JPOTF joint psychological operations task force
JTF joint task force

M
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MarDiv Marine division
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MEF(FWD) Marine expeditionary force (forward)
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MIST military information support team
MOOTW military operations other than war (joint only)

N
NCA National Command Authorities
NGO nongovernmental organizations
NIST national intelligence support team

P
PDB PSYOP dissemination battalion
POG psychological operations group
POTF PSYOP task force
PSE PSYOP support element
PSYOP psychological operations
PVO private voluntary organizations

S
SF special forces
SFOB special forces operations base
SFOD-ABC special forces operational detachment Alpha/Bravo/Charlie
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOF special operations forces
SOP standing operating procedures

T
TF task force
TPT tactical PSYOP team
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

U
US United States
USMC United States Marine Corps
UW unconventional warfare
# APPENDIX 3:
## SELECTED 20TH CENTURY INSURGENCIES

**Chart 1. Selected 20th-Century Insurgencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippine Insurrection</strong> (United States [U.S.] vs. Filipino nationalists, 1899-1902 [1916]).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab Revolt</strong> (Ottoman Turkey vs. Arab rebels, 1916-1918).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq 1920</strong> (U.K. vs. Iraqi rebels, 1920).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France, World War II</strong> (Germany vs. French resistance and Special Operations Executive [SOE]/Office of Strategic Services [OSS], 1940-1945).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans, World War II</strong> (Germany vs. Tito's partisans and SOE/OSS, 1940-1945).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesian Revolt</strong> (Netherlands vs. Indonesian rebels, 1945-1949).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>French Indochina</strong> (France vs. Viet Minh, 1945-1954).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruguay</strong> (Uruguay vs. Tupamaros, 1963-1972).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mozambique</strong> (Portugal vs. Front for the Liberation of Mozambique [FRELIMO], 1964-1974).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombian Civil War</strong> (U.S. and Government of Colombia [GOC] vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] and National Liberation Army [ELN], 1964-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Ireland</strong> (U.K. vs. Irish Republican Army [IRA], 1968-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong> (Spain vs. Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna ETA [Basque fatherland and liberty], 1968-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong> (Germany vs. Baader-Meinhof/Red Army Faction [RAF], 1970-1982).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong> (PI) vs. New People's Army [NPA] and Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF]/Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF], 1970-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sri Lanka</strong> (Sri Lanka vs. Tamil Tigers [TNT], 1972-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestine</strong> (Israel vs. Palestine Liberation Front [PLF] et al., 1973-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rhodesia</strong> (Rhodesia vs. Zimbabwe African People's Union [ZAPU] and Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algerian Revolt</strong> (France vs. National Liberation Front [FLN], 1954-1962).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cuban Revolution</strong> (Cuba's Batista regime vs. Castro, 1956-1959).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong> (France vs. Secret Army Organization [OAS], 1955-1959).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venezuela</strong> (Venezuela vs. urban-based Armed Forces for National Liberation [FALN], 1956-1963).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemalan Civil War</strong> (Guatemala vs. Marxist rebels, 1961-1999).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Angola</strong> (Portugal vs. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA], 1991-1974).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>[ZANU]</strong>, 1974-1980).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Sahara</strong> (Morocco vs. Western Sahara Freedom Movement [POLISARIO], 1975-1991).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kashmir</strong> (India vs. Kashmiri Muslim separatists, 1989-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Algeria</strong> (Algeria/National Liberation Front [FLN] vs. Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]/Armed Islamic Group [GIA], 1992-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somalia Humanitarian Relief Mission</strong> (U.S. and UN vs. armed factions, 1992-1994).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chechnya</strong> (Russia vs. Chechen separatists, 1994-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nepal</strong> (Nepal vs. Maoists, 1996-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong> (U.S. and GoA vs. Taliban, 2001-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong> (Government of Iraq [GoI] and U.S.-led coalition vs. jihadists and insurgents, 2003-present).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property of Complex Adaptive Systems</th>
<th>Scientific Definition</th>
<th>Application to Insurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonlinear Interaction</td>
<td>The output of a particular system or model is not directly proportional to the input. A system whose behavior is not expressible as the sum of its elements. Dissipative nonlinear dynamic systems are capable of exhibiting self-organization and chaos.</td>
<td>Insurgent Groups composed of many nonlinearly interacting parts; feedback mechanisms provide ability to adapt and evolve to enemy actions, decision-making process, and chance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence/Nonreductionist</td>
<td>The appearance of higher-level properties and behaviors of a system that while obviously originating from the collective dynamics of that system's components are neither to be found in nor are directly deducible from the lower-level properties of that system. Emergent properties are properties of the &quot;whole&quot; that are not possessed by any of the individual parts making up that whole. The number of interactions between components of a system increases combinatorially with the number of components, allowing for new types of behavior to emerge.</td>
<td>The overall capability and behavior of the insurgency is not the simple aggregate of its individual combatants or localized insurgent groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical Structure</td>
<td>A system structure such that every entity in the organization, except one, is interrelated or subordinate to a single other entity.</td>
<td>Insurgent groups connected, even loosely, by a command and control hierarchy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized Control</td>
<td>Naturally-occurring, usually self-regulating systems which often function without an organized center or authority.</td>
<td>No central leadership directing the action of local groups or individual insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Organization</td>
<td>A process in which the internal organization of a system, normally an open system, increases in complexity without being guided or managed by an outside source. Self-organizing systems typically display emergent properties.</td>
<td>Seemingly “chaotic” action at the individual and local level creates a long-range order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonequilibrium Order</td>
<td>The chaotic state of a system, often related to entropy, that results in seeming disorder and randomness.</td>
<td>Insurgency, like most conflict, moves from equilibrium to non-equilibrium or chaos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>The ability to evolve or cope with environmental pressure and stresses. Often similar to natural selection. Any change in the structure or function of an entity (i.e. a biological organism) that allows it to survive and reproduce more effectively in its environment.</td>
<td>Insurgency is characterized by the ability to adapt to the local environment, enemy actions, and countless external factors, thus exhibiting a Darwinian evolutionary quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivist Dynamics</td>
<td>The behavior of the system or larger entity being more important than the individual.</td>
<td>Continual feedback between the localized insurgent groups (Iraq) and global insurgency leadership (Al Qaeda) allows for adaptation, self-organization, and unity of effort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Processes influencing development of the insurgency model include:** training & indoctrination, intelligence collection, information operations, logistical and financial support, insurgency operational success/failure, and counterinsurgency operations conducted against both the local system and global systems.
• Clear Viet Cong from Sector.
• Provide security for local villages.
• Protect government officials.
• Guard lines of communication through operating area.
• Conduct combined operations.
• Conduct psychological operations.
• Conduct civic actions.
• Train Popular Forces (PF).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PRT/CDR</strong></th>
<th><strong>PRT Task Organization</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC 3/3</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Afghan Ministry of Interior Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO/ETT</td>
<td>Liaison Officer/Embedded Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Personnel Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Plans, Operations and Training Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Logistics Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Emergency Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THT</td>
<td>Tactical Humint Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Military Police Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICS</td>
<td>Medical Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 9: PRT LOCATIONS
CACC CONTINUUM
APPENDIX 10

PRE-INTERVENTION  INTERVENTION  STABILIZATION  Normalization

ECONOMIC
INFORMATION
POLITICAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT
SOCIAL

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Establish Secure Environment
Isolate Insurgent Threat
Counter-Ideology
Re-establish Government Legitimacy
Re-establish Societal Norms

- Military Advisors
- Mobile Training Teams
- Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)
  - Intelligence Operations
  - Covert Special Operations

- CONVENTIONAL COIN FORCES
CACC CRITICAL CAPABILITIES
APPENDIX 12

CACC Essential Element #1: Establish a Secure Environment
CACC Essential Element #2: Isolate the Insurgent Threat
CACC Essential Element #3: Institute a Counter-Ideology
CACC Essential Element #4: Re-establish Governmental Legitimacy
CACC Essential Element #5: Re-establish Societal Norms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CACC CRITICAL CAPABILITY</th>
<th>RELATED ESSENTIAL ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ability to conduct interagency training, planning, and execution of COIN operations.</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to conduct holistic operational design in support of complex contingency</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to simultaneously attack the components, processes, and feedback mechanisms</td>
<td>1,2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of an insurgent system using all interagency components of national power.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to leverage military power in a scalable manner to establish/maintain a</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secure environment and facilitate isolation of insurgent elements from the host</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to plan, coordinate and manage battlespace along cultural, religious and</td>
<td>1,2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sectarian divisions vice traditional geographic boundaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to develop and implement a focused counter-ideology undermining insurgent</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>propaganda locally and globally.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to conduct pre-intervention COIN actions designed to maintain a secure</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environment, undermine initial insurgent efforts, and bolster host-government ability to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>address local grievances.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to conduct early assessment of key infrastructure and public services to</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>determine shortfalls, prioritize engineering requirements, and re-establish culturally-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based societal norms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ability to develop a counterintuitive operational/tactical approach to COIN</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operations focused on dispersed, small-unit employment, discerning use of force, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human contact.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>