

Operation Stabilise: U.S. Joint Force Operations In East Timor

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Subject Area Operations

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Title: OPERATION STABILISE: U.S. Joint Force Operations in East Timor

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Thesis: While U.S. involvement in the Australian-led East Timor mission has been widely commended, it uncovered some inherent weaknesses in U.S. military doctrine. These issues mandate a review of procedures for joint and coalition operations to ensure U.S. forces are better prepared to support similar operations in the future.

Discussion: Since the end of Cold War over a decade ago, the armed forces of the United States have faced an uncertain international situation that has resulted in an increasing American intervention in humanitarian crises. As a result, the services have found themselves involved in operations from peacekeeping to food distribution in such diverse areas as Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and, most recently, East Timor. East Timor represents a paradigm shift for humanitarian intervention on the part of the U.S. Consistent with the engagement element of the U.S. National Security Strategy, U.S. **support** to the Australian-led United Nations effort in East Timor demonstrates a willingness to play a very **new and unfamiliar supporting role** in definitively “regional” issues. Associated with this involvement is a tacit willingness to **assume a subordinate role** in a military coalition.

As an unfamiliar role, U.S. policymakers and strategists struggled with the type and amount of support they could provide to East Timor, and, once defined, military planners wrestled with assembling a force to provide the necessary capabilities. The problem involved Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) doctrine that, throughout a half-century of development, had never considered anything other than a leading role for the U.S. Consequently, in preparation for the East Timor contingency, joint planners and service components struggled to identify and provide an immediate response, and U.S. unique support, as they muddled through headquarters, staff, and force composition issues.

The most significant problem faced was the designation and composition of the force. Accustomed to Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters that often exceeded 300 personnel, U.S. forces in East Timor were limited by the National Command Authority to a total force of 250. As a result, U.S. Pacific Command opted not to designate the force a JTF, which caused the Joint Force staff and the subordinate service components to define new relationships while concurrently seeking to accomplish the mission.

Conclusion: The challenges endured by U.S. forces in East Timor—a multi-faceted mission, broadly defined objectives, an austere staff headquarters, and a paradigm shattering force designation—demonstrate the strength and versatility of the U.S. military. While joint operations have developed considerably since receiving the formal Congressional attention of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, operations in support of East Timor identified doctrinal, organizational, training, and equipment issues that require refinement to ensure the continued success of the U.S. armed forces in future endeavors of this nature.

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Preface

U.S. involvement in the U.N. chartered International Force East Timor (INTERFET) poses many interesting lessons for the politician, diplomat, and military professional alike. For the first time in recent history, the U.S. committed its forces to a subordinate and supporting role in a multi-national coalition. Because of this shockingly unfamiliar role, U.S. policy makers and military strategists struggled to shape a new paradigm for involvement in small-scale regional contingencies.

While deployed with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) in support of the Australian-led operation, I experienced first-hand some of the issues and confusion involved with executing this unfamiliar role of supporting a coalition. This paper examines in detail this supporting role and its impact on decision-making at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It also explores the future of U.S. involvement in regional conflicts and poses doctrinal, organizational, training, and equipment recommendations based on its implications.

As an ongoing operation, much of the information currently available on military operations in East Timor has yet to be compiled due to security classifications. Consequently, this paper relies heavily on personal interviews with the individuals most closely associated with U.S. decision making of the time either by virtue of rank, billet, or circumstance. While a number of Australian sources were consulted throughout the research endeavor, it is nonetheless decidedly

American in focus. I must thank LtCol Steve Tulley, Maj Chris Field, and Maj John Blaxland, all of the Australian Army, for their insight and support throughout this project.

Time and space do not allow me to personally thank everyone who helped me complete this project, but I would be remiss not to mention a particular few. I would first like to acknowledge the prophetic guidance of two particular individuals. Dr. Donald F. Bittner, Professor of History, and LtCol J.R. Atkins, USAF, were instrumental to focusing my research from the outset. Their candid advice and comments allowed me to sort through a myriad of issues on this contemporary topic. I would also like to thank the many senior military officers and government officials who graciously gave of their time to make this project possible. BGen J.G. Castellaw, USMC, was candid and forthcoming with his recollection of the issues that challenged U.S. forces in East Timor. He also provided access to additional sources that may not have been available without his assistance. Colonel Steve Ball, USA; Mr. Gene Christy, Department of State; Mr. Bob Scher, Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtCol Laurent Baker, USMC; and LtCol Kenneth Beutel, USMC, all freely offered their time and experience during personal interviews without which this research would not have been complete. Maj Dimitri Henry, USMC, graciously provided extensive research support that ensured the originality of each element of the project.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge Denise, Jordan, Tyler, and Adj (my wife and children) for their patience and support throughout this project. Only they know the sacrifices that have made this paper possible.

PROLOGUE - Supported or Supporting

Since the end of the Cold War over a decade ago, the armed forces of the United States have faced an uncertain situation both domestically, in their funding, and abroad, in their employment. One trend that has emerged during this period has been increasing American intervention in “humanitarian crises.” As a result, the services have found themselves involved in operations from peacekeeping to food distribution in such diverse areas as Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and, most recently, East Timor. East Timor represents a paradigm shift for humanitarian intervention on the part of the U.S. Consistent with the engagement element of the U.S. National Security Strategy, U.S. **support** to the Australian-led United Nations (U.N.) effort in East Timor demonstrates a willingness to play a very **new and unfamiliar supporting role** in definitively “regional” issues. Associated with this involvement is a tacit willingness to **assume a subordinate role** in a military coalition. There are examples from each of the World Wars of American military forces effectively subordinated to their coalition counterpart for a particular operation, such as General Patton’s Seventh Army working for the British General Alexander in Sicily during 1943, but in most instances the chain of command had an American General at its apex.¹

¹ In the case of the cited example, General Eisenhower, U.S. Army, was the theater commander to whom General Alexander answered.

Since that time, however, there have been no instances of U.S. involvement in any coalition, from U.N. operations in Korea in 1950 to the Persian Gulf War in 1991, where the U.S. was not the lead agent in a military coalition. In an unfamiliar role, U.S. policymakers and strategists struggled with the type and amount of support they could provide to East Timor and how it would be funded. From the National Command Authority (NCA) to the military theater commander, diplomatic and military channels worked daily to define the U.S. role.

Once defined, military planners wrestled with assembling a force to provide the necessary capabilities. The problem involved Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) doctrine. Throughout a half-century of development such doctrine had never considered anything less than a leading role for the U.S. Consequently, in preparation for the East Timor contingency, joint planners and service components struggled to identify and provide an immediate response, and U.S. unique support, as they muddled through headquarters, staff, and force composition issues.

With the Cold War behind them and the threat of a major theater conflict minimal, the U.S. military embraced the future of U.S. military operations as joint.² In the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint planning, exercises, and operations had evolved to the point that the U.S. armed forces grasped the fundamentals of joint operations and formulated standard service contributions to support them. Joint doctrine, likewise, developed along the same lines based on U.S. experiences and lessons learned throughout a decade of increased involvement in contingency operations. These developments seemed to support future military operations until such time as the U.S. military was committed to East Timor. From individual service mindsets to the physical formation of a joint task force (JTF), U.S. experience until the fall of 1999 had only been as the lead agent in a military coalition. While U.S. involvement in the Australian-led

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998) 236, defines joint as activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.

East Timor mission has been widely commended, it did uncover some inherent weaknesses in U.S. military doctrine. As a result, U.S. military forces that supported operations in East Timor, while they performed admirably, struggled with force structure, staffing, deployment, and redeployment. East Timor mandates a review of joint and coalition operations to ensure U.S. forces are better prepared to assume a similar position in the future.

This paper explores in detail the unfamiliar role of supporting, rather than leading, a coalition and both the internal and external friction and confusion it caused. It also examines the decision to not designate U.S. forces in East Timor as a JTF (instead titled a “*joint force*”), its resultant impact on efficiency, and the doctrinal, organizational, and training implications for the future.

Chapter 1

BACKGROUND

First colonized by the Portuguese around 1520, the island of Timor was formally divided into eastern and western colonies after successive colonization attempts by the Spanish, British, and the Dutch. In 1859, a treaty defining the boundary between Dutch-controlled West Timor and Portuguese-controlled East Timor was signed. During World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army occupied the island of Timor, but following the war Portugal resumed its colonial hold over the eastern half of the island. In 1949, Indonesia's civil war culminated with a Dutch concession to Indonesian independence that effectively, but not formally, made West Timor part of Indonesia. Simultaneously, the people of East Timor waged a similar struggle that was bitterly suppressed by Portugal who continued to regard East Timor as a province until 1975. At that point, a radical change in government in Portugal led to the eventual fulfillment of a decolonization policy that left East Timor to decide its own fate. Amidst the formation of political parties, the discussion and process became confused and violent, and a civil war ensued.³

Rather than reassert herself for the sake of peace, post-colonial Portugal left the three largest fledgling political parties to sort out the chaos. The Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT) favored gradual independence while maintaining a privileged relationship with Portugal. The

³ Refer to Appendix C for a complete Chronology of Events in East Timor.

Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) advocated complete independence and a Marxist overhaul of the entire social and economic structure of East Timor. The Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI) called for a unification of East and West Timor and favored integration with Indonesia. The situation came to a head in the midst of civil war in November 1975 when FRETILIN issued a unilateral declaration of independence and proclaimed the establishment of a Democratic Republic of East Timor. The other political parties followed suit but advocated integration with Indonesia. In December 1975, Indonesia capitalized on the unstable situation by forcibly taking control of East Timor and subsequently annexed it as its 27th province in 1976.



Figure 1. The Southeast Pacific Theater

Source: Department of Defense, *INTERFET Handbook: East Timor* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program, October 1999), 3.

Its obvious regional interests aside, Australian ties to East Timor extended back to 1942 when Australian commandos received the willing support of the Timorese people as they resisted Japanese occupation. Despite this history of collaboration, and notwithstanding a 1976 U.N. Security Council resolution demanding Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, Canberra acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty over the island in 1985. Indonesia, in the meantime, imposed its will on its newest province, forcing migration of indigenous Timorese to remote parts of the island to exploit the island's fishing, farming, and forest resources. In December 1989, Indonesia and Australia signed the Timor Gap Treaty that enabled Australian undersea oil exploration activities in the area.

A considerable separatist movement emerged in East Timor as a result of the blatant exploitation of resources. Its size and popularity increased over the years as repeated incidents of human rights violations by the Indonesian military were reported. Forced integration and resettlement, as well as gratuitous killing by Indonesia's occupation force in an effort to quell the separatists, contributed to the further disenchantment of the East Timorese population with its Indonesian rulers. In 1999, with tens of thousands of East Timorese killed or missing as a result of the continuous conflict, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie yielded to international pressure and offered the people of East Timor the option of autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or complete independence. In June of that year, the U.N. Security Council, with Resolution 1246, agreed to oversee the "process of ascertaining the desires of the people of East Timor concerning their sovereignty" and established the United Nations Mission East Timor (UNAMET).⁴ More than 78 percent of East Timor's voting population opted for independence despite widespread terror campaigns by pro-Indonesian militia groups. The election's impact was far-reaching as

⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1246(1999)*, S/RES/1246 (1999), 11 June 1999, URL: <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1246.htm>>, accessed 8 January 2001.

other Indonesian provinces, such as Aceh, began to show inclinations toward sovereignty. Adding to the turmoil, the Indonesian government failed to quell post-election violence by pro-Indonesia militia groups in East Timor that resulted in nearly a quarter-million refugees, many of whom fled to western Timor.




Figure 2. East Timor

Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section, “Region of East Timor,” map (United Nations Map No. 4117 Rev. 2, January 2000).

The potential for a massive humanitarian crisis finally coerced Indonesia to concede to international pressure to halt the violence. Djakarta agreed to allow U.N. peacekeepers into East Timor to restore order and distribute food and supplies. On 15 September 1999, the U.N.

Security Council, under Resolution 1264, unanimously authorized the establishment of a Chapter 7 multi-national peace enforcement force to enter the territory as soon as possible.⁵

As a regional leader and member state, Australia was asked by the U.N. to build and lead this multi-national force that became known as International Forces East Timor (INTERFET). The role of INTERFET, under the command of Australian Defense Force Major General (MGen) Peter Cosgrove, was three-fold:

- Restore peace and security in East Timor.
- Protect and support the already present UNAMET.
- Within its capabilities, facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.⁶

The first elements of the force arrived in the East Timor capital of Dili on 20 September 1999.

On that same day, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) deployed forces to Australia and East Timor in support of INTERFET. Their mission was to provide unique U.S. capabilities support to the Australian-led peace enforcement operation. In so doing, the U.S. was but one of twenty nations that provided troops, aircraft, ships, and other assets to the international effort. Designated as U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFORINTERFET), the U.S. contingent's charter entailed supporting the Australian Operation STABILISE with:

- Logistics- including C-130 aircraft and heavy lift helicopters.
- Intelligence- including Trojan Spirit II, electronic surveillance, counter-intelligence, and analytical personnel.⁷

⁵ Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations addresses “actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” or peace enforcement. This differs with Chapter 6 of the same charter that addresses peacekeeping, or the “peaceful settlement of disputes.”

⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1264(1999)*, S/RES/1264 (1999), 15 September 1999, URL:<<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1264.htm>>, accessed 8 January 2001.

⁷ Trojan Spirit II uses satellite communications as a link to major U.S. intelligence systems thereby providing expeditionary access to all-source intelligence.

- Communications- including tactical satellite terminals, long-haul satellite communications, data networks, and voice switching.
- Civil Affairs- civil-military affairs operations center (CMOC) training, support, and operations.⁸

On 25 October 1999, the U.N. Security Council, with Resolution 1272, further established the United Nations Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET) as an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence.⁹ The turnover from INTERFET to UNTAET was completed in February 2000.

In summary, years of turmoil had boiled over in East Timor. Not surprisingly, it occurred at a time when the fledgling nation attempted to make a democratic transition under trying economic and social conditions. The unrest that challenged the democratic ways of this island state captured the attention of the U.N. and, subsequently, the world. As a Security Council member, the U.S. now consolidated its policy and established a strategy to deal with the situation.

⁸ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, Subject: "Operation STABILISE Executive Overview," March 2000, 1.

⁹ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1272(1999)*, S/RES/1272 (1999), 25 October 1999, URL:<<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1272.htm>>, accessed 8 January 2001.

Chapter 2

US POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR EAST TIMOR

The onslaught by pro-Indonesia militias against the people of East Timor kindled, yet again, the debate in the United States over humanitarian interventions. Humanitarian situations warranting external support had resurfaced regularly since U.S. involvement in Somalia in 1993. By the time growing concerns over events in East Timor peaked in September 1999, balancing the moral imperative against national interests had repeatedly confronted U.S. foreign policy makers. As early as 1996, President Clinton had said, "Let us lead. There are still times when America, and America alone, can and should make the difference."¹⁰ Circumstances in areas such as Rwanda, Bosnia, and, most recently, Kosovo had begged for, and received, international assistance, but the same policy that committed U.S. support to these areas questioned the need of East Timor.

The U.S., despite some initial hesitance, could not turn its back on the systematic murder and mass expulsion of an ethnic minority on the other side of the world.¹¹ At the policy level, the concerns of the National Command Authority (NCA) centered on U.S. intervention options, ongoing U.S. involvement in other humanitarian situations such as Bosnia and Kosovo, and the

¹⁰ Richard Benedetto, "Clinton: 'Let Us Lead'," *USA Today*, 14 February 1996, URL: < <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/nov95/nbos085.html> >, accessed 10 March 2001.

¹¹ The U.N. Security Council had unanimously decided to send a multi-national force to intervene, and, as a voting member, the U.S. had obligated itself to support that decision in some form.

possible overextension of U.S. military capabilities.¹² U.S. foreign policy experts also concerned themselves with the diplomatic and economic impact of a clash with Indonesia. Congress was similarly divided between a moral obligation to intervene in a situation that could be quickly improved by a U.S. presence and a growing disdain for a vague policy of intervention that had evolved out of the National Security Strategy. Concurrent with this situation was ongoing discussion of the recently passed Helms-Biden Act mandating reimbursement for direct military support of U.S. forces to the U.N. Amidst the debate, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke and Secretary of Defense William Cohen advocated a measured and cautious approach.¹³ An opportunity to invoke exactly such an approach evolved from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1264 establishing INTERFET under the auspices of Australia. The White House quickly followed suit with President Clinton's 16 September 1999 announcement:

After consulting closely with Congress and with the government of Australia on the best way for the United States to support this operation, and on the recommendation of Secretary Cohen and my national security team, I have decided to contribute to the force in a limited, but essential, way – including communications and logistical aid, intelligence, air lifts of personnel and material and coordination of the humanitarian response to the tragedy.¹⁴

East Timor embodied a politically charged affair with a powerful Congressional lobby.¹⁵ The guarded concern of the National Security Council (NSC) reflected the uncertainty of the situation. The challenge of humanitarian crises had traditionally been assessed by the degree to which they represented national interests and in what ways U.S. intervention could alleviate the situation. With his statement, the President categorized East Timor within the purview of U.S.

¹² Jonathan Landry, "New Tug at America's Conscience: East Timor is Now the Latest Test of When to Use Military Might." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 September 1999, 22.

¹³ Colonel Steve Ball, USA, Joint Staff J-5 (Plans/Policy) for Southeast Asia, interview by author, 11 December 2000.

¹⁴ William J. Clinton, U.S. President, "The President's Statement on Texas Tragedy and East Timor," remarks delivered on 16 September 1999, URL: <http://www2.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990916_1.html>, accessed 29 November 2000.

¹⁵ Ball interview, 11 December 2000.

national interest and also described the manner he felt the U.S. could best support. Contained within his statement were also several implied tasks for American strategists.

At the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff level, the overwhelming desire was to send a strong military message of commitment to the success of the effort while concurrently balancing the sensitive political concerns.¹⁶ The specified support of U.S.-unique logistics, intelligence, communications, and civil affairs support quickly became a limiting factor in the military planning as Congressional debate peaked. On one side of the aisle was a desire to please a political ally (Australia) with the appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military support. On the other was the adjustment to assuming a supporting role and defining the requirements requested by her.¹⁷ Congressional conviction soon dictated that the number of personnel committed to the mission, combined with a clearly defined endstate for involvement, would define the legitimacy of American policy toward East Timor.

The necessity of defining an endstate and exit strategy reflected the lessons learned from Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1984), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), and UNISOM (Somalia, 1993). In this case, the political endstate seemed apparent at the NSC level--provide the identified support to the Australians until such time as they turned over control to the U.N.¹⁸ For the strategists, however, it was not quite as clear. Who would define when U.S. forces had met their commitment to the Australians in terms of both the level and duration of their support? Thus surfaced the first of many questions concerning command relationships for U.S. forces in a supporting role. Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Defense tackled the task of defining the number of military personnel required to provide the aforementioned support. While intended to “define the legitimacy” of the

¹⁶ Robert Scher, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Asian-Pacific Affairs, interview by author, 6 December 2000.

¹⁷ Ball interview, 11 December 2000.

¹⁸ Scher interview, 6 December 2000.

U.S. effort, a 250 person requirement briefed to the NSC became a limit, or “cap”, to the number of U.S. personnel in East Timor.¹⁹

Just as the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz proffered in the early 19th century, the effect of political influence on this policy decision had far-reaching implications at the operational level. From the Pentagon to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the requirement to convey a strong military message while simultaneously conveying a cautious political approach involved commanders and staff alike. The challenge became most apparent in the U.S. military force structure in support of INTERFET.

USCINCPAC, Admiral Dennis Blair, USN, designated U.S. forces for deployment to Darwin, Australia and Dili, East Timor to provide the identified support capabilities to the Australian Defense Force (ADF). For the first time, U.S. forces assumed a strictly supporting role for an actual contingency. Designated Commander USFORINTERFET, Brigadier General (BGen) John G. Castellaw, USMC, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) Deputy Commanding General/Commanding General 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, was issued the following mission: “When directed, COMUSFORINTERFET will provide unique U.S. capabilities to COMINTERFET in order to facilitate INTERFET operations to restore peace in East Timor.”²⁰

Operational planning began with matching the breadth of the mission with the constraints within which it had to be executed. A decade of experience in peace operations would not be enough to address all the issues that would arise.

¹⁹ Scher interview, 6 December 2000.

²⁰ John G. Castellaw, BGen, USMC, “East Timor: Breaking New Ground,” unpublished article for *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 7 June 2000, 5.

Chapter 3

OPERATIONAL PLANNING: JOINT FORCE or JOINT TASK FORCE?

Joint Force: a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander.²¹

Joint Task Force: a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.²²

Though being geographically separated from the Australian command headquarters complicated both mission analysis and force structure, it was apparent U.S. support to Australian forces would be comprised of a military force representing two or more military departments. The Joint Task Force (JTF) had become the norm for employment of U.S. forces not tasked along strictly service lines. From JTF UNISOM in Somalia to JTF *Shining Hope* in Kosovo/Albania, combatant commanders had organized and employed JTFs for just about every contingency involving U.S. personnel during the previous decade. Eventually, the designation of USFORINTERFET as a joint force versus a JTF caused considerable consternation and was not as easy a decision as it may have been. U.S. experience in peacekeeping and humanitarian

²¹ Joint Pub 1-02, 239.

²² Joint Pub 1-02, 247.

operations did not account for the leadership of another nation. The difference lay in the new, and unfamiliar, role as a subordinate force in a coalition.

JTFs to date had all been given the latitude to determine the size and composition of the force necessary to accomplish the mission. The overriding strategic concern with East Timor was not with the ability to accomplish the mission, but rather with exceeding the limit on personnel briefed to the NSC and Congress. Historically, JTFs in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all had headquarters larger than the total force allowed for East Timor, which reinforced USCINCPAC's concern over the designation of the force; at the same time, they represented U.S.-led contingencies. The JTF concept had also been used with such regularity it served as the common baseline for service components.²³ Training, equipment, staffing, and, to a degree, service doctrine all reflected this JTF framework for joint operations.



Figure 3. US Forces INTERFET Joint Area of Operations

Source: Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, Subject: "Operation STABILISE Executive Overview," March 2000, 27.

On 10 September 1999, while deliberating the issue, Adm Blair designated the *USS Mobile Bay* (CG 53) and the *USNS Kilauea* (T-AE 26) as Joint Task Force-Timor Sea

²³ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 16.

Operations (JTF TSO).²⁴ They were tasked with escorting commercial and military transports in the vicinity of East Timor and served as “lily pads” for helicopters transiting between Australia and East Timor. Concurrently, CINCPAC dispatched the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to assist the Australian planning effort.²⁵

Ultimately, concerns that a “traditional” JTF headquarters (JTF HQ) alone would exceed the number of personnel briefed at the NSC/NCA level prevailed. Adm Blair and BGen Castellaw, cognizant of the political and strategic sensitivities, agreed the contingent would not be designated a *joint task force*; rather, its composition and mission would remain a *joint force*.²⁶ They agreed the force should start as small as possible and grow based on identified requirements. In other words, the staff and operating force should be of specific size and composition to meet the unique mission assigned, or task-organized.²⁷

The definitions at the beginning of this chapter from Joint Pub 1-02 offer a vague delineation between a JTF and a joint force (JF). The conclusion of the joint force definition references a joint force commander, further defined as “a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or a joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command or operational control over a joint force.”²⁸ Consequently, by definition, a joint force commander, as a general term, must exercise control over the assigned forces through one of the three types of commanders identified. In other words, BGen Castellaw, as neither a combatant commander nor a subunified commander, should have been the commander of a JTF. Other concerns overrode this doctrinal fact, however, and he was not designated a JTF

²⁴ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 3.

²⁵ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 3. The DJTFAC is a small group of planners designated from the CINC’s staff to reinforce a JTF headquarters to facilitate the efficiency of the planning process.

²⁶ BGen John G. Castellaw, USMC, Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, telephone interview by author, 29 November 2000.

²⁷ Joint Pub 1-02, 449. Task-organizing is defined as “the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistics package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.”

²⁸ Joint Pub 1-02, 239.

commander. The JTF/JF debate in this case highlights a problem with existing U.S. doctrine, joint training, and joint education.

Throughout PACOM, however, there existed physical, not just conceptual, differences related to the force designation. Until then, previous joint training and operations had been conducted based almost exclusively on US-led JTFs. Each service, over time, developed an individual concept of the equipment and personnel contributions they would make to a “generic” JTF. As a result, the joint force designation (not a joint task force) caused confusion throughout PACOM, and internal to USFORINTERFET, as they initiated their crisis response planning. It persisted as a source of friction with higher headquarters and supporting agencies as the operation matured. Succinctly stated by BGen Castellaw, “The thought was that if you weren’t a JTF, you had to operate differently.”²⁹ Fortunately, while the joint force designation caused problems initially, and also contributed to the friction of the retrograde phase as administrative and logistical procedures were “reinvented,” it was not a hindrance during the pivotal phases of execution of Operation STABILISE.³⁰

The problems experienced by USFORINTERFET during the build-up and drawdown phases were, however, self-induced and significant. Foremost amongst the issues was the unforeseen impact of the higher headquarters’ imposed personnel constraints on the construct of the USFORINTERFET staff. BGen Castellaw’s designation as COMUSFORINTERFET gave him latitude to build the staff, and he realized that no staff member would enjoy the luxury of functioning solely as a single functional area expert. He adeptly sourced much of the staff from the headquarters with which he was most closely associated, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). As a Marine staff, it reflected the expeditionary nature of its title and was familiar with

²⁹ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

³⁰ Operation STABILISE is the Australian designation for operations conducted by INTERFET. The naming convention was adopted by the member nations that comprised INTERFET.

task-organization. The principal staff consisted entirely of Marines from III MEF with the exception of the J-3 (Air Force Colonel Robert Martin from PACAF). The familiarity of the staff paid immediate dividends as the reporting and information demands from higher headquarters resembled those imposed on a JTF staff despite a significant difference in the number of personnel.

The 35 person USFORINTERFET staff adopted the familiar joint structure (J-1, J-2, J-3, etc.), but, for several reasons, it functioned quite differently. Every staff section was given at least an advisory, if not a supervisory, role over another functional area. According to BGen Castellaw, “This forced the staff to focus where the fire was hottest.”³¹ For example, an Army Major whose principal duty involved current operations also functioned as the force protection officer. Monitoring several functional areas was further hindered by the requirement to split the staff between East Timor proper, the Australian theater command headquarters in Sydney, and the intermediate staging base in Darwin, Australia.³²

While operations, intelligence, and communications adapted to the situation, other functional areas were more adversely affected by the unfamiliar joint force designation. All forces assigned to USFORINTERFET were under the operational control (OPCON) of the commander and were subsequently designated as tactically controlled (TACON) by INTERFET (with the noted exception of all US forces afloat which remained under COMUSFORINTERFET).³³ The OPCON relationship, excluding administrative and logistical

³¹ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

³² Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

³³ Operational Control (OPCON) is defined by Joint Pub 1-02, pg. 325, as, “the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It does not include the authoritative direction over administration and logistics that is inherent in combatant command (COCOM).” Tactical control (TACON) is defined by Joint Pub 1-02, pg. 442, as, “command authority that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in OPCON.”

control by definition, exacerbated the situation by confusing the joint force command relationships and legal responsibilities.³⁴ One result was that BGen Castellaw was the sole non-judicial punishment authority for all Marine forces. Seemingly insignificant, this forced both the commander and his staff to unnecessarily deal with minor disciplinary issues and reflected the cumbersome administrative hurdles that were also routinely addressed.

Combat service support developed in an inefficient, and similarly, sequential manner. The distance over which U.S. supplies traveled demanded an intermediate support base (ISB) within the theater. Darwin, Australia, ultimately served as the ISB, but it evolved slowly as the demands on the under-strength USFORINTERFET logistics section forced significant prioritization of its efforts. With no standing logistics agreements amongst the coalition, the




Figure 4. The Capital City of Dili, East Timor

Source: Department of Defense, *INTERFET Handbook: East Timor* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program, October 1999), 6.

³⁴ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 17.

joint force, or its sourcing components, the J-4 developed them from scratch while concurrently implementing a receiving, processing, and distribution plan for supplies.³⁵ Gradually, USFORINTERFET J-4 innovatively developed a manageable logistical architecture to provide the necessary support.

The development of the force was no simpler a task. With a preconceived notion of what they would contribute to a JTF, the service components occasionally resisted supporting or granting due authority to USFORINTERFET. This was done based on the fact the HQ was not that of a JTF.³⁶ For example, Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (ARPAC) was accustomed, through experience and planning, to contributing a Brigade-size force to a JTF. Because of the misconceptions associated with the joint force designation, Colonel Randy Strong, USA, a Brigade commander, arrived at USFORINTERFET to conduct planning and preparations designated as an officer-in-charge (OIC) rather than the Army forces component commander. The implication was that future Army forces designated to support USFORINTERFET might not fall under a single service component commander. The potential for a muddled chain of command was apparent to BGen Castellaw, and he acted decisively to overcome the bureaucracy. Colonel Strong was “triple hatted” with designations as the Deputy Commander USFORINTERFET forward in Dili, the U.S. ground forces commander, and the Army component commander.³⁷

Every service had to overcome its preconceptions and adopt a more expeditionary approach to force structure. Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) gradually adjusted its contribution, which began as a squadron commander and three C-130 aircraft that happened to be supporting the President’s visit to New Zealand. The “footprint” ultimately reflected a task-

³⁵ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 20.

³⁶ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 16.

³⁷ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

organized air expeditionary group (AEG) that could support the identified heavy lift, airborne intelligence, and airborne command and control requirements. For the Navy, the transition was more fluid because its presence began early with two ships designated as JTF-TSO, and they maintained a similar presence throughout the operation.

There were still other problems associated with the joint force designation that unnecessarily troubled the USFORINTERFET staff. Sourcing components attempted to “pad” the staff to protect their interests and tended to intervene when “their” resources, people, and material were used outside service-specific doctrine.³⁸ Distraction and inefficient staff functioning were the end-result of all the problems; the situation demanded the allocation of precious time to the resolution of issues internal to the force. The USFORINTERFET staff solved problems horizontally and vertically by developing and disseminating service-specific agreements pertinent to each functional area. The demand on the contributing forces was no less stressful. They were required to provide essential support outside of their service-designated role. The underlying challenge remains doctrinally and organizationally preparing forces to support small-scale operations.

One aspect of the “standard” JTF paradigm that supported coalition operations well was the DJTFAC. Originally designed to serve as a liaison cell between the CINC and JTF headquarters, CINCPAC’s DJTFAC deployed before USFORINTERFET had been designated and “jump-started” the planning process with the Australian HQs.³⁹ Without the CINCPAC DJTFAC, USFORINTERFET would have had to allocate staff officers from its under-strength staff to initiate liaison and planning. Integrating with the INTERFET staff in Australia, they facilitated a more effective mission analysis and a smoother integration of bilateral planning.

³⁸ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 17.

³⁹ LtCol Laurent Baker, USMC, Assistant Operations Officer for US Forces INTERFET, interview by author, 15 September 2000.

This was imperative because of the inherent lack of common doctrinal language within the coalition.

As a “lesson learned,” PACOM identified the utility of the DJTFAC concept and has endeavored to establish a Combined DJTFAC (CDJTFAC). The intent is to establish a multi-national cell of planners that would facilitate the planning process and decrease friction in the early stages of coalition building.⁴⁰ This capability would be regularly exercised in support of combined exercise planning throughout the PACOM area of responsibility.

The majority of the lessons learned during the planning phase centered on developing a JTF/JF. Organization and designation of the force under BGen Castellaw was a relatively controversial issue as an old paradigm was shattered. In developing a template for supporting a JTF, service components went beyond establishing planning relationships with the higher headquarters and subordinate units likely to be tasked. Instead they committed entire units (at least on paper) and, when called upon to support otherwise, were unprepared.⁴¹ Clearly, a JTF carries with it considerable connotations that were not previously realized. Despite the existence of a joint definition, the flexibility and adaptability of the JTF were compromised by the experiences of the previous decade.

The U.S. Marine Corps provides a good model for building doctrinal and organizational flexibility into a military force. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a task organized, combined arms team tailored to “custom fit” each mission. The success of task organization within the U.S. Marine model lies in the establishment of habitual relationships. The expectation is some element of the parent unit will be tasked to support the MAGTF headquarters, and the existing relationship between the two will foster familiarity and

⁴⁰ Castellaw, “East Timor: Breaking New Ground,” 11.

⁴¹ See Appendix B for a complete listing of units assigned to USFORINTERFET.

understanding. Each service would be better able to support the JTF concept if it examined its organizational structure and ability to support these task organization fundamentals.

Chapter 4

EXECUTING THE PLAN

After forging through its internal issues, USFORINTERFET established itself in Australia and East Timor respectively. In the process, it quickly relearned the value of movement control as forces and equipment flowed into theater occasionally without the cognizance of the joint force HQ. U.S. joint doctrine and planning had, since the inception of the joint operation planning and executions system (JOPES) nearly 25 years earlier, realized the relevance of time phased force deployment data (TPFDD). However, no such process existed in this coalition environment. Despite the fact that from JCS to CINCPAC, USFORINTERFET received as much attention as any JTF ever had, the need for a coalition TPFDD had not been considered because the U.S. had led every other coalition it had been involved in and established its own priorities.⁴²

Support for each of the functional areas identified by the Australians proved U.S. influence could indeed impact beyond the sheer number of personnel committed. From the communications and intelligence support of an EP-3 to the satellite communications support of the MSQ-126, execution of the plan provided the necessary reinforcement to the INTERFET headquarters.

⁴² Ball interview, 11 December 2000.

In the eyes of the American and Australian commanders, the biggest single impact on the mission was the presence of the Marine Expeditionary Unit and Naval Amphibious Ready Group (MEU/ARG) off the coast of Dili beginning on 5 October 1999.⁴³ Conditions in East Timor improved daily after the arrival of INTERFET forces. MGen Cosgrove assessed the decisive point of the occasionally violent pro-Indonesia militia to be the porous border between East and West Timor. He sought to secure the border but was concerned about spreading his reinforced Brigade-size force too thin.⁴⁴ The arrival of the 31st MEU/ARG represented a significant increase in capability that underwrote the Australian plan and, by its offshore presence alone, was the impetus for MGen Cosgrove to implement his plan and secure the border sooner than anticipated. While remaining OPCON to BGen Castellaw, the MEU/ARG was effectively an operational reserve afloat that possessed more firepower than was already on the ground.



Source: Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, Subject: "Operation STABILISE Executive Overview," March 2000, 29.

Figure 5. A view of Dili Harbor looking North with Komoro Airfield in the foreground

Success bred success as the 31st MEU's departure paved the way for the arrival of the 11th MEU/ARG on 26 October 1999 and a U.S. Marine Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) embarked aboard the *USS Juneau* (LPD 10) on 26 January 2000. The flexible capability of the MEUs allowed them to support a myriad of missions throughout the day and recover all

⁴³ Castellaw, "East Timor: Breaking New Ground," 9.

⁴⁴ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

personnel each night. By recovering MEU forces daily, USFORINTERFET never exceeded its force limit from a reporting standpoint. Furthermore, each MEU reinforced the USFORINTERFET staff with additional functional area expertise.

The OPCON relationship of all U.S. forces with their higher headquarters, as well as the TACON of assets to INTERFET as required, worked well. The functional area of logistics, however, continued to challenge the OPCON relationship during execution as it had throughout planning. While previously more of a doctrinal issue, in execution logistics were complicated by the small size of the theater and the rather extended supply lines. Inordinate amounts of support equipment had to be used by each service to fulfill their responsibilities to support their relatively small contribution of forces. Pragmatism prevailed and, while service components maintained responsibility for logistical support, receipt and distribution were centralized under the J-4.⁴⁵

Civil-military affairs blossomed under the cognizance of USFORINTERFET. With Gen Zinni's twenty lessons learned as the commander of the JTF in Somalia, and eight years of additional experience, American civil military affairs expertise had increased significantly and was highly sought after.⁴⁶ From the outset, U.S. civil-military affairs personnel conducted training with INTERFET personnel to enhance effectiveness. Additionally, civil-military affairs played a pivotal role in the daily coordination of efforts with an ever expanding non-governmental organization (NGO)/private volunteer organization (PVO) population.

The only significant limiting factor to the effectiveness of civil-military affairs was an ongoing concern over the size and security of American forces in East Timor. Most of the

⁴⁵ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 17.

⁴⁶ Center for Naval Analysis, *Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy Conference Proceedings*, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1995). As the commander of the JTF in Somalia (Operation RESTORE HOPE), LtGen Zinni's "twenty lessons learned" were, and still are, some of the most insightful concerning humanitarian assistance operations. Gen Zinni, USMC (Retd.), retired in 2000 after serving as CINC U.S. Central Command. For a detailed listing of Gen Zinni's twenty lessons see Appendix D.

intermittent violence that occurred in East Timor took place in the outskirts of Dili at night. Consequently, an overriding concern for the security of any personnel that remained overnight in East Timor constrained the deployment of forces to areas of East Timor where they could be most effective. Forces approved to remain overnight did so within the confines of a secure compound in Dili. As a result of this force protection/anti-terrorism regulation, civil-military affairs personnel could not conduct operations any further from Dili than they could ensure they would return to its relatively safe confines by dusk.⁴⁷

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272, approved in October 1999, paved the way for the transition between INTERFET and UNTAET. UNTAET's charter established its purpose:

- Provide security and maintain law and order.
- Establish an effective administration.
- Assist the development of civil and social services.
- Insure delivery of humanitarian and developmental assistance.⁴⁸

UNTAET's focus as of January 2001 was establishing a local defense/police force. Applying experience from similar endeavors in central Africa, the challenge remains to build a force large enough to control violence but small enough to not threaten the authority of East Timor's government.⁴⁹ INTERFET, and with it USFORINTERFET, withdrew from East Timor in February 2000.

A U.S. presence, however, has not gone away entirely. USCINCPAC maintains approximately twenty military personnel in East Timor designated as U.S. Group East Timor

⁴⁷ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1272(1999)*, S/RES/1272 (1999), 25 October 1999, URL:<<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1272.htm>>, accessed 8 January 2001.

⁴⁹ Art Crosby, "Policing Timor Lorosa'e," *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 29, no. 3-4 (May-August 2000): 4.

(USGET).⁵⁰ Considered by most to be a success, USGET's mission is to maintain American presence in the country, coordinate activities with UNTAET, and oversee additional support of the U.S. military to East Timor. Since its establishment, USGET has coordinated the visit of two additional MEU/ARGs and one Marine SPMAGTF to East Timor.⁵¹ USGET, which is maintained and funded by CINCPAC, minimizes the U.S. role within UNTAET where currently three American military personnel are posted.⁵²

The endstate still remains the elusive aspect of U.S. military involvement in East Timor. As mentioned in Chapter 2, "presence" and "engagement" are defined differently within each agency of the U.S. government. As long as this is the case, the challenge to military leadership lies in maintaining short-term objectives that accomplish the aforementioned criteria. It is encouraging to note, however, that during the latter half of 2000 three interagency deputies meetings were held within the Clinton administration; the focus of each of these conferences was a review of American "presence" in East Timor.⁵³

⁵⁰ Gene Christy, Department of State, Asian Affairs Desk, telephone interview by author, 28 November 2000.

⁵¹ All U.S. forces that have visited East Timor under the auspices of USGET have remained afloat and provided prearranged humanitarian assistance.

⁵² Christy interview, 28 November 2000.

⁵³ Christy interview, 28 November 2000.

Chapter 5

A NEW PARADIGM

*If this is a new model then define it. Otherwise be careful because this is much, much more than 'someone else lead.'*⁵⁴

--Colonel Steve Ball, USA, Joint Staff

There is little doubt East Timor was a successful venture for the U.S. in particular and for the international community at large. With a sustained contribution of around 300 military personnel, the U.S. satisfactorily supported the 4,500-man Australian contingent that, over the course of five months, established peace and security through a credible and deterrent security presence.⁵⁵ As the trend toward humanitarian crises continues to increase, the U.N.'s assumed and expanding obligation to provide assistance that encourages international stability will continue to place additional demands on the military forces of its member nations.

The supporting role of the U.S. in INTERFET contradicted nearly thirty years of American experience. Touted as a new paradigm for regional crises, the unique demands associated with this intervention option are worthy of analysis by politicians, diplomats, and military professionals alike.

There were many aspects of INTERFET that made it politically alluring to U.S. policy makers. First, it advocated a U.S. presence in support of an ally without the encumbering

⁵⁴ Ball interview, 11 December 2000.

⁵⁵ Only forces "on the ground" and "remaining overnight" were included in the calculation of total personnel. This precluded the inclusion of MEU/ARG personnel that would have drastically exceeded the restrictions of the NCA.

international leadership role associated with managing a coalition. It possessed the additional advantage of not requiring a complex exit strategy, something Congress and the American public had grown to demand. It did, however, require the careful monitoring of both Australian and American political, military, and, most importantly, public perceptions of U.S. support.

As a relatively small force, the economic advantages were obvious. Costs associated with involvement carried considerable weight in light of ongoing U.S. operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Funding the operation was the most contentious issue faced. The Helms-Biden Act of 1999 required the reimbursement of costs associated with direct U.S. support to a U.N. operation. The U.N., on the other hand, would not even consider reimbursement while the U.S. was in arrears of over \$1 billion.⁵⁶ This issue deepened the rift within Congress over U.S. involvement.

The U.S. military role in INTERFET carried with it many implications. Not in decades had the U.S. military been a subordinate partner in a coalition, and its effect was felt as early as deployment planning. Some of the significant tactical and operational issues that have arisen as a result of U.S. military involvement in East Timor have been previously assessed. However, several overarching issues warrant further comment.

Within the U.S. military establishment, tactical and operational flexibility and interoperability, as demonstrated in support of USFORINTERFET, are not at the level required to support joint operations across the spectrum of conflict. The tendency to revert to what is most comfortable, such as past U.S.-led JTF experiences and MOOTW contingencies, must be overcome. If the U.S. military is to achieve the “full-spectrum” dominance advocated by Joint

⁵⁶ “Helms: U.S. will make massive dues payment to U.N.,” CNN.com, 9 January 2001, URL: <<http://cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/09/un.debt/index.html>>, accessed 10 January 2001.

Vision 2020 (JV2020), then organizational flexibility and interoperability must extend down to the lowest tactical level.

The operational implication of U.S. involvement in a multi-national force led by someone other than itself is evident: The U.S. military must extend its trust and confidence to include the regional leaders of tomorrow. With Australia, the U.S. enjoyed unique military relations founded on exactly the trust necessary for it to be comfortable subordinating its forces to another nation. Australian officers have attended the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College since World War II, likewise U.S. Marines at the Australian Staff College, and military forces of the two nations have fought as allies in three major 20th century wars.⁵⁷ Not surprisingly, MGen Cosgrove and BGen Castellaw had participated in operations, eaten dinner, and even played golf together long before they became commanders of their respective forces.⁵⁸ This close personal relationship fostered the cooperative effort of the combined force to overcome the mutually unfamiliar role each side played in resolving this crisis.



Source: Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, Subject: "Operation STABILISE Executive Overview," March 2000, 24.

Figure 6. MGen Cosgrove, ADF, COMINTERFET, and BGen Castellaw, USMC, COMUSFORINTERFET

Australia and the U.S., allies of many decades, share cultural and social traditions that may not be as readily available with future coalition partners. For U.S. military involvement in

⁵⁷ Australia and the U.S. fought as allies in World War I, World War II, and the Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm).

⁵⁸ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000. MGen Cosgrove is a 1978-79 graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, VA.

East Timor to serve as a model for future intervention, such relationships must be fostered within each region. This experience reinforces the notion that preexisting relationships can contribute significantly to the success of any coalition.

Command relationships are an age-old problem warranting particular consideration within a coalition. As the U.S. learned in Beirut, the chain of command must be planned, streamlined, and clearly articulated. Subordinating U.S. forces to the command of another nation has always been difficult; INTERFET proved, however, that clearly defined control relationships can make any arrangement work. East Timor operations were executed utilizing a parallel coalition command structure that allowed all participating forces the comfort and convenience of maintaining their traditional chains of command along with a separate structure that extended to the Australian HQ. The U.S. military could ascertain the benefits of a variety of command structures by examining the relationships it established with its previous coalition partners in similar situations where it maintained the leading role.

The integration of national, theater, and tactical intelligence assets into a cohesive collection plan is a daunting task within any joint operation. INTERFET highlighted the additional issues associated with intelligence planning, collection, and dissemination within a coalition. The sensitive nature of some national intelligence assets coupled with the reluctance of coalition partners to share information can combine to the detriment of intelligence operations. This, unfortunately, was the case within INTERFET as coalition forces lacked a comprehensive integrated force intelligence architecture.⁵⁹ Just as no two JTFs are the same, neither may the solution to this problem, but it begins with the development of multinational standard agreements

⁵⁹ Castellaw, "East Timor: Breaking New Ground," 11.

that define access to information. Additionally, such agreements should endeavor to standardize a basic level of interoperability between intelligence networks.⁶⁰

Given the task of supporting the ADF, mission analysis demanded immediate staff synthesis to develop courses of action that would initiate the task-organization of the force. The ongoing American internal confusion over the joint force designation detracted from the planning process. Fortunately, there was ample experience amongst the staff to initiate the process, but their efforts were diffused by the multitude of issues facing them. Ultimately what was needed was a planner from each service component that, after conferring with the Australians, could translate requirements and timelines back to their respective commands. This would have served as a warning order to the service component headquarters of the impending message traffic containing formal tasking.

Full-spectrum dominance, as outlined in JV2020, carries with it a connotation that dominance can be achieved through something other than the lone application of massed forces. The concerns of Congress over the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in support of INTERFET provides insight to the unforeseen challenges future military operations may encounter. Much has been made of massing the effects of military personnel and equipment, and USFORINTERFET demonstrated that this capability is already in demand.

The nations involved in INTERFET enjoyed the luxury of a relatively low-threat, geographically confined crisis that allowed them time to work through all of these issues. Had the situation been worse, or had it quickly escalated, they would have been ill prepared to handle it in an efficient manner.

⁶⁰ Castellaw, "East Timor: Breaking New Ground," 12.

Chapter 6

THE FUTURE

*This very well may be a template for Africa, but we must recognize this model for what it is—modest and unique.*⁶¹

—Robert Scher, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Asia-Pacific Region

The likelihood the U.S. will remain “engaged” in regional conflicts is high. The modern global economy thrives on a stable marketplace, and regional issues are the crux of maintaining the necessary stability. The success of INTERFET also makes it likely that U.S. operations in East Timor will serve as a model for future involvement in regional crises. Peacekeeping and nation-building have been instrumental to maintaining stability in the last decade, and the U.S. military can expect to continue to play a role in such activities.

The issues associated with U.S. involvement in East Timor were not insurmountable, and certainly the asymmetry of national interests in similar crises in the future encourages the active participation of a regional leader. The diplomatic implications were best expressed by Gene Christy, the State Department’s Southeast Asia regional representative, who commented, “There are, certainly, more appropriate lead agencies or nations for some of these regional issues.”⁶²

⁶¹ Scher interview, 6 December 2000.

⁶² Christy interview, 28 November 2000.

That being the case, the U.S. military can apply the lessons of INTERFET to improve doctrine, training, organization, and equipment to prepare for the next “East Timor.” Clearly, a JTF has connotations to each unified command and service. As a result of differences in service culture and experience, these perceptions may always exist, but joint doctrine should establish a common way of thinking about the organization and employment of JTFs. Reinforced with credible training, such doctrine would ensure future JTFs, regardless of size, are organized to efficiently and effectively accomplish the assigned tasks. Operations such as STABILISE reinforce the need to ensure that the joint task force commander is vested with both the authority and ability to organize and employ the forces designated as he deems necessary. The future of joint operations should ensure that true task-organization is built around familiar relationships.

DOCTRINE

Joint operations rely on a single, unified planning and execution framework capable of translating individual service terminology and operational policies into a commonly understood language and standard operating procedures. **It must be fundamentally established that the JTF is the force structure of choice for small-scale contingency operations.** A JTF should be tailored to meet the requirements of the mission; size and composition must be determined by the task assigned. The first step in building this framework is to establish one standard operating procedure (SOP) for a JTF. While a “standard” JTF organization does not exist, the purpose of the document should be to establish a central reference for organizing and operating a JTF. The recent establishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) provides the structure to develop, publish, train, and evaluate future JTF HQ using such an SOP.

The SOP should define the authority and responsibility of the commander of a JTF (CJTF) and describe the relationship between the CJTF and the establishing authority. Other recommended issues for inclusion in such a SOP include relationships between the CJTF, service, and functional component commanders, as well as providing descriptions of the typical functions and responsibilities for JTF staff sections and subordinate coordinators and agencies. It is imperative that the SOP emphasizes the CJTF authority to organize the JTF staff in any manner necessary for mission accomplishment.

The JTF SOP should be inherently flexible enough to be applicable across the spectrum of conflict. Each crisis develops in its own particular way, but, regardless of whether it involves wartime operations or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the responsibilities and authority of the CJTF should remain the same. The size of the headquarters staff, on the other hand, may vary depending on the mission, with certain elements reduced in size or omitted entirely.

The final essential element of the SOP is a timeline for the designation and development of a JTF, its staff, and its forces. In accordance with Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), establishment of a JTF must occur in stages. The initial designation of a JTF should facilitate planning only. Rather than link a single event to a requirement to establish a JTF, the CINC should ensure that JTF designation is timely enough to permit a full evaluation of the assigned mission and potential courses of action. Subsequent to course of action selection, forces supporting the JTF concept of operations may be designated.

Doctrine should help, not hinder, both planning and operations. The lessons of USFORINTERFET provide a good example of the axiom “the meaning of words does matter.” The designation of a joint task force implies merely that it is organized to accomplish the task;

the difficulty then lies in defining that task. Articulating measures of success, rather than placing restrictions on the size of the force, will contribute significantly to the success of the next “East Timor.”

ORGANIZATION

Each U.S. military service must review its existing headquarters and force structure to ensure they are capable of providing forces prepared for employment as, and with, a JTF of any size. East Timor suggests each service could begin with evaluating their support options and expeditionary capability. The predictions for future contingency operations necessitate the availability and preparedness of specially tailored JTF headquarters. A range of options is available, but the choice made will significantly impact the planning and executions of the operation.

The first option for organizing a JTF HQ is the establishment of standing headquarters on a regional basis. While this would provide a permanently organized element capable of addressing the doctrinal and interoperability issues that typically plague joint operations, it consumes the two most precious assets in the modern military--people and money. Additionally, a permanent headquarters, though it could develop its own standing contingency plans, does not capitalize on the operational expertise of existing service and functional component staffs.

An alternative is to form a JTF HQ from elements of existing major and unified command staffs. Effectively task-organizing the staff, this option draws from the expertise of every major staff and is the least burdensome with regard to personnel to any one headquarters. The unfamiliarity of the personnel, however, imposes the challenge of establishing common

operating procedures. The burden of building baseline functional staff proficiency could prove detrimental to the planning process during its early, and most critical, stages.

Designating an existing headquarters as the JTF HQ and augmenting it as necessary to provide the full spectrum of joint expertise is a third alternative. While this poses the challenge of integrating augmentees into an already familiar and cohesive staff, it provides an advanced level of staff functioning not present in the previous two options. When compared with the first option, it is far more reasonable in terms of both people and money but could create a situation where the designated headquarters is “dual-hatted” as a service or functional component headquarters as well as a JTF HQ. The remaining issue with this option is whether to use one staff to perform both functions or create a separate staff within the existing staff to handle the separate and distinct responsibilities of the JTF.

No single alternative outlined above is without its challenges. With these alternatives clearly outlined in a JTF HQ SOP, however, service and functional component headquarters would be able to better understand and prepare to support a CINC and JTF as a headquarters, force provider, or both.

In support of the JTF HQ, the development of a service component-level DJTFAC capability is also recommended. In much the same way the DJTFAC works for the CINC, engaging in the planning process early and remaining as a liaison cell, a similar service-level capability would support JTF planning by providing estimates of supportability to the CJTF throughout the process. It would also establish an early and enduring relationship between the JTF and service component commanders and their staffs thereby facilitating teamwork.

Similar to the headquarters, the joint task force, to be truly effective, must be capable of organizing for the assigned mission. Future crises may not require the deployment of an entire

air expeditionary group, but they may need two brigade-size ground combat elements. Indeed, a JTF scheme of maneuver will determine the composition of the force and each service must be prepared to unhesitatingly support the requirement. This undoubtedly demands a more expeditionary mindset on the part of force providers.⁶³ Future contingency operations will require forces supporting a JTF to be inherently flexible not only in their structure but in their tasking as well. For example, East Timor operations saw U.S. Air Force C-130 security personnel intermittently augmenting ground security missions, and this trend will continue in the future. As BGen Castellaw commented to each USFORINTERFET unit, “Leave your union cards at home!”⁶⁴ The force of choice for a JTF commander should be the one most capable of accomplishing the mission and most able to adapt to an evolving situation along the spectrum of conflict.

The logistical support for lesser regional contingencies is often times more difficult than that for a major theater war. The ad hoc nature of a JTF, coupled with the exclusion of logistical control inherent to an OPCON relationship, makes logistics planning and execution an integral part of any joint operation. In the case of USFORINTERFET, the J-4 effectively functioned as the theater support command; this posed a daunting challenge to the III MEF G-4 as it had never been accomplished before. The relatively small logistical requirements of the force allowed this arrangement to work, but it also reinforces the need to consider the establishment of a Joint Force Logistics Component Commander in support of future joint operations.

⁶³ Joint Pub 1-02, pg. 164, defines expeditionary as, “An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.”

⁶⁴ Castellaw interview, 29 November 2000.

TRAINING

The suggested changes in doctrine and organization carry with them the obligation to train the force and regularly exercise their capabilities. The establishment of USJFCOM set the conditions to implement a comprehensive JTF training plan. The existing joint training program consists of six categories that span from interagency training to individual and service-level training. JTF, or category 3, training is accomplished through three or four UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercises each year. This JTF training effort should be expanded to include every unified command and should be of sufficient detail to include subordinate commands in the training.⁶⁵ For example, annually a unified CINC-level exercise within each region should incorporate the unannounced establishment of a JTF to such a degree that the JTF HQ is established and the planning process executed. Ideally the planning would be carried out with both the CINC's and the service/functional component commanders' DJTFACs. The missions for the JTF should vary from wartime operations to MOOTW, and their roles should shift from the supported command to a supporting one. The benefits for the CINC, the designated JTF, and the service and functional component commanders and staff would be infinite. At every level, establishing and exercising the command relationships, as well as the JTF SOP, would breed the familiarity necessary to ensure efficiency when faced with the next contingency.

EQUIPMENT

American military equipment has been at the forefront of military technology for nearly a half-century. As such, the demand for it has been high, and this continues during an era of stagnant defense budgets since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. dilemma that has emerged is

⁶⁵ Currently U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command do not receive USJFCOM JTF training due primarily to their location with respect to USJFCOM.

many of its key military capabilities are long on demand but short in supply. These assets, known as low density/high demand or LD/HD, are defined as “force elements consisting of major platforms, weapons systems, units, and/or personnel that possess unique mission capabilities and are in continual demand to support worldwide joint military operations.”⁶⁶ The functional areas designated by the President and supported by the military during operations in East Timor highlight this issue. The most prevalent demands are requirements of U.S. forces training and operating throughout the world. Increasingly, however, the needs of U.S. allies present an emerging, and often competing, requirement. An issue yet to be confronted is how the U.S., particularly when its forces are providing direct support to an ally, will balance competing requirements. Coalition operations also present unique equipment security and interface issues that rarely have a pre-negotiated agreement.

Satellite communications, electronic warfare, and intelligence systems are but a few of the systems continually in demand. With these come the associated personnel who, coincidentally, require extensive technical training that can open doors to lucrative careers outside of military service.

At the root of the issue is balancing a vision of future warfare against the defense budget. As JV2020 looks to increasingly innovative, decisive, and technological ways of dominating the battlespace, it must also define an appropriate number of assets to support the vision. Likewise, the resources must be made available to the services to acquire adequate numbers of these high-demand systems crucial to their unique advanced warfighting capabilities.⁶⁷ The skill set for LD/HD equipment and personnel in a contingency operation is similar to that of a major theater

⁶⁶ Robert P. Haffa, Jr. and Barry D. Watts, “Brittle Swords: Low Density, High Demand Assets,” *Strategic Review* 28, no. 4 (Fall 2000), 42.

⁶⁷ Haffa and Watts, 48.

war, and defense leaders must match density to demand for the sake of the operator, the equipment, and the multiple missions at hand.

CONCLUSION

*I think this is exactly the right thing to do when you have an ally close to the situation, that has a strong interest in seeing it solved, has the people and the planning ability to take the lead, for the other nations in the region and those of us from outside the region who have an interest like the United States, to do the kind of mission that's involved in East Timor.*⁶⁸

--Adm Dennis Blair, USN
Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Pacific Command

The U.S. military has accumulated a wealth of experience in contingency operations such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement over the last decade. In every case except this one, however, the experience has been as the leader of a domestic or international effort. In the ever-changing post-Cold War world, similar interventions will become more prevalent, and the U.S. will find itself challenged by decisions similar to those faced with regard to East Timor.

As the U.S. military undergoes its “transformation” as envisioned by JV2020, the lessons of USFORINTERFET provide a reliable framework upon which to build. The experience of serving in a strictly supporting role within INTERFET presents new options for the U.S. to continue to encourage global stability through limited engagement in regional issues. Operation STABILISE is not, however, the panacea for every small-scale contingency. A set of conditions

⁶⁸ Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, 24.

that were born from the special trust and confidence of two very close allies heavily influenced U.S. support to INTERFET. Every effort to develop a similar trust and confidence with future coalition partners should be made today.

The challenges endured by USFORINTERFET—a multi-faceted mission, broadly defined objectives, an austere staff headquarters, and a paradigm shattering force designation—demonstrate the strength and versatility of the U.S. military. The JTF is the force of choice for operations that are not organized strictly along service lines; it can assume the size, shape, and composition required to effectively and efficiently accomplish the assigned mission. Implementation of the identified doctrinal, organizational, training, and equipment recommendations will ensure the U.S. armed forces are prepared for continued success in future endeavors of this nature.



Figure 7. East Timor Government and Administrative Centers

Source: Department of Defense, *INTERFET Handbook: East Timor* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program, October 1999), 38.

Appendix A

USFORINTERFET KEY PERSONNEL

COMMANDER, INTERFET

- Major General Peter J. Cosgrove, Australian Army

COMMANDER, USFORINTERFET

- Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, USMC

DEPUTY COMMANDER, USFFORINTERFET

- Colonel Randolph Strong, USA/Colonel Michael Williams, USMC

CHIEF OF STAFF, USFORINTERFET

- Colonel Robert Herkenham, USMC
- Lieutenant Colonel Richard Ballentine, USMC

PRINCIPAL STAFF, USFORINTERFET

- Lieutenant Colonel Keith Hulet, USMCR, J-1
- Lieutenant Colonel (Sel) John M. Farley, USMC, J-2
- Colonel Robert Martin, USAFR, J-3/Colonel Richard Mingo USMC, J-3/
LtCol Laurent Baker, USMC, J-3
- Lieutenant Colonel Richard Balletine, USMC, J-4
- Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Beutel, USMC, J-6
- Lieutenant Colonel Leo Falcam, USMC, Air Officer
- Commander Jeffrey Yund, USN, Preventive Medicine
- Major Richard Long, USMC, Public Affairs Officer
- Major Eric Kleis, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate
- Captain Chris Abate, USAF, Comptroller

US OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO INTERFET

- Colonel Richard Mingo, USMC, Deputy Air Component Commander
- Lieutenant Colonel Michael Thyrring, USMC, C5 Plans Officer

Source: Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, Subject: "Operation STABILISE Executive Overview," March 2000, 33.

Appendix B

LIST OF UNITS ASSIGNED TO USFORINTERFET

- JTF Timor Sea Operations, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet
 - USS MOBILE BAY (CG 53), CJTF TSO (CAPT Edward Rogers, USN)
 - USNS KILAUEA (T-AE 26)
 - USNS SAN JOSE (T-AFS 7)

- EP-3 Detachment

- CINCPAC Planning Team

- USF Australian Logistics Planning Staff, Brisbane and Sydney (Colonel George Borowsky, USA, and later Colonel Mark Dean, USA)

- Civil-Military Affairs Operation Center, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, US Army Special Operations Command (Lieutenant Colonel Jose Uson, USA)

- MSQ-126, Pacific Fleet (Chief Warrant Officer Scott Griffin, USN/Major Charles Peabody, USMC)

- 613th Air Expeditionary Group, 13th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces (Colonel Robert Sheekly, USAF)

- TROJAN SPIRIT II, Intelligence Brigade, US Army Pacific (1st Lieutenant Jason Farrell, USA)

- USS BELLEAU WOOD Task Element, Amphibious Squadron Eleven, Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Lee Touchberry, USN)
 - USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA 3), Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Thomas Parker, USN)

- 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, III MEF, Marine Forces Pacific (Colonel David Fulton, USMC)

- USS PELILEU Task Element, Amphibious Squadron One, Amphibious Group Three, 3rd Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain William Hopper, USN)
 - USS PELILEU (LHA 5), Amphibious Group Three, 3rd Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Larry Watson, USN)
- 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, I MEF, Marine Forces Pacific (Colonel Thomas Moore, USMC)
- C-12 Detachment, Marine Corps Bases Japan (Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Houser/Lieutenant Colonel William Grace/Lieutenant Colonel Sam Collins)
- Task Force Thunderbird, 11th Signal Bde, Army Signal Command (Lieutenant Colonel Michael Yarmie, USA)
- USS JUNEAU (LPD-10), Amphibious Squadron Eleven, Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Joseph Miller, USN)

Source: Commander, U.S. Forces INTERFET, Subject: "Operation STABILISE Executive Overview," March 2000, 34.

Appendix C

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- Around 1520 - Island of Timor first exposed to Portuguese colonization.
- 17th century - Successive colonization attempts of the island of Timor by the Spanish, British, and Dutch.
- 1859 - Formal boundary established by treaty defining Dutch-controlled West Timor and Portuguese controlled East Timor.
- 1896 - East Timor governed as part of the colony of Macau until this time, then becomes a separate Portuguese colony with its own Governor.
- 1941-1945 - During World War II, the Japanese army controls all of the island of Timor.
- 1949 - Following World War II, Indonesia becomes embroiled in a civil war which culminates in a Dutch agreement to its independence. West Timor, as part of the agreement, becomes part of Indonesia. During this same time, the people of East Timor wage a similar struggle that is bitterly quelled by Portuguese military forces.
- 1974 - Portugal's government is overthrown in a military coup, and all Portuguese colonies are given authority to exercise democratic freedom over their future.
- August 1975 - As East Timor's newly formed political parties vie for a place in the new government, one party, FRETILIN, issues a unilateral declaration of independence that sends the young nation headlong into civil war.
- December 1975 - Indonesia capitalized on the unrest, forcefully takes control of East Timor, and establishes a Provisional Government for what it views as a new province.

- July 1976 - Indonesian President Soeharto formally declares East Timor as Indonesia's 27th Province.
- May 1999 - Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, after over a decade of separatist war in East Timor, gives the people of East Timor the option to select autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty or complete independence.
- August 1999 - In a United Nations administered vote more than 78% of East Timorese elect for independence.
- September 1999 - Post-election violence by pro-Indonesia militia groups results in nearly a quarter-million refugees.
- 15 September 1999 - U.N. Security Council authorizes Resolution 1264 establishing International Force East Timor (INTERFET).
- 20 September 1999 - D-day; INTERFET forces land in East Timor. U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFORINTERFET) staff arrives in Darwin, Australia.
- 27 September 1999 - COMUSFORINTERFET Dili, East Timor established.
- 5 October 1999 - *USS Belleau Wood*/31st MEU arrive.
- 10 October 1999 - MGen Cosgrove accelerates timeline and moves INTERFET forces to the inter-Timor boarder.
- 19 October 1999 - Indonesia recognizes East Timor's independence.
- 25 October 1999 - U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 establishes U.N. Transitional Authority East Timor. U.N. Mission East Timor (UNAMET) concludes.
- 26 October 1999 - *USS Pelileu*/11th MEU(SOC) arrive; *USS Belleau Wood*/31st MEU depart.
- 26 November 1999 - *USS Pelileu*/11th MEU(SOC) depart.
- 26 January 2000 - Transition from USFORINTERFET to United States Group East Timor (USGET) begins.
- 1 February 2000 - USGET assumes control of U.S. operations in East Timor. USFORINTERFET disestablishes.

Appendix D

GENERAL ZINNI'S TWENTY LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOMALIA (Operation RESTORE HOPE)

1. The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.
2. Start planning as early as possible, and include everyone in the planning process.
3. If possible, make a thorough assessment before deployment.
4. In the planning, do a thorough mission analysis. Determine the center of gravity, end state, commander's intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, cost-capturing procedures, and estimated duration.
5. Stay focused on the mission and keep the mission focused. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid mission creep; allow for mission shift.
6. Centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation.
7. Coordinate everything with everybody. Set up the coordination mechanisms.
8. Know the culture and the issues.
9. Start or restart the key institutions early.
10. Don't lose the initiative/momentum.
11. Don't make enemies. If you do, don't treat them gently. Avoid mind-sets.
12. Seek unity of effort/command. Create the fewest possible seams.
13. Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each individual/group involved.
14. Encourage innovation and nontraditional approaches.

15. Personalities are often more important than processes.
16. Be careful whom you empower.
17. Decide on the image you want to portray, and stay focused on it.
18. Centralize information management.
19. Seek compatibility in all coalition operations: political compatibility, cultural compatibility, and military interoperability are crucial to success.
20. Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training for nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness training and understanding.

Source: Center for Naval Analysis, Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy Conference Proceedings, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1995).

Appendix E

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- APODETI - Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor
- CMOC - Civil-military Affairs Operations Center
- DJTFAC - Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
- FRETILIN - Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente
- INTERFET - International Forces East Timor
- JF - Joint Force
- JTF - Joint Task Force
- NCA - National Command Authority
- NSC - National Security Council
- PACOM - United States Pacific Command
- UDT - Uniao Democratica Timorese
- UNAMET - United Nations Mission East Timor
- USCINCPAC - United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific
- USFORINTERFET - United States Forces, International Force, East Timor
- USGET - United States Group East Timor
- UNTAET - United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor

Annotated Bibliography

Allard, C. Kenneth. "Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 9 (Autumn 1995): 105-109.

This article is a summary of a larger book of the same name. It focuses on joint doctrine and how it has been applied in Operations Other Than War up to and including Somalia. Particularly noteworthy is its lack of discussion of other potential joint doctrine applications and associated problems, as displayed in Operation STABILISE.

Baker, Laurent, LtCol, USMC. Assistant Operations Officer for US Forces INTERFET. Interview by author, 15 September 2000.

Personal interview of LtCol Baker, a 1995 graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and 1996 graduate of the School of Advanced Warfighting. LtCol Baker was initially a US Forces INTERFET planning liaison officer to Australian Army Headquarters, and later served in the dual role of assistant G-3 and the G-5 for US Forces INTERFET. As such, his insight into the development of the situation in East Timor, as well as his knowledge of the functioning of the planning process within USFI, is invaluable.

Ball, Steve, Col, USA. Joint Staff J-5 (Plans/Policy) for Southeast Asia. Interview by author, 11 December 2000.

Currently assigned to a fellowship program at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Col Ball served on the Joint Staff throughout the entire East Timor crisis. His involvement in Joint Staff decision-making, as well as his frequent interaction with other government agencies, provided another enlightening perspective, particularly with regard to policy and strategy.

Benedetto, Richard. "Clinton: 'Let Us Lead'." *USA Today*, 14 February 1996. URL: < <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/nov95/nbos085.html> >. Accessed 10 March 2001.

In this 1996 speech, President Clinton appealed to tradition, compassion and morality as he outlined his plan for ending the Bosnian war and halting the killing of "innocent civilians and children." He urged the nation to "choose peace" over war and support his decision to send 20,000 troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO peacekeeping force. This speech laid the groundwork for arguments that resonated in the halls of Congress concerning U.S. involvement in a number of humanitarian crises including East Timor.

Beutel, Kenneth, LtCol, USMC. G-6 for US Forces INTERFET. Email interview by author, 5 October 2000.

LtCol Beutel is currently the G-6 for III MEF. His position during Operation STABILISE, coupled with the fact that he is still part of the command that provided the bulk of the USFI staff, made him invaluable to this research. He is currently part of a PACOM Joint force seminar that is investigating other ways to man and employ joint forces and their headquarters.

Castellaw, John G., BGen, USMC. Commander, US Forces INTERFET. Telephone interview by author, 29 November 2000.

During this nearly 90-minute telephone interview, the Commander of U.S. Forces in East Timor candidly answered the direct questions of the author. Subjects discussed included, but were not limited to, whether designation of the force made any difference at all, what factors he considered in the construction of his staff, and if he were to do it all over again what would he do differently. This interview is the centerpiece of the research.

_____. "East Timor: Breaking New Ground." Unpublished article for *Joint Forces Quarterly*. 7 June 2000.

BGen Castellaw, in this draft article intended for *Joint Forces Quarterly*, explores East Timor operations as a template for US involvement in regional conflicts. He examines some of the lessons learned by US forces in East Timor. This article reinforces the personal interview conducted by the author and was of great value in determining areas of friction in forming and functioning as a Joint Force.

Center for Naval Analysis. *Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy Conference Proceedings*. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1995.

The conference proceedings include the keynote remarks of then LtGen Anthony Zinni. During his remarks, Gen Zinni identifies twenty lessons for supporting humanitarian aid and peace operations based on his experience as the JTF commander in Somalia. Also included in the proceedings are the comments of other speakers concerning Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. These lessons still serve as a guide for U.S. military planning for humanitarian operations.

Christy, Gene. Department of State, Asian Affairs Desk. Telephone interview by author, 28 November 2000.

Mr. Christy began his current assignment in July 2000. While he was not an active participant in State Department briefings prior to and during the existence of INTERFET, he has been intimately involved in decision-making regarding the ongoing “presence” of American military forces in East Timor. This interview was the first one conducted by the author and formed the basis for further interviews concerning the strategic situation.

Clinton, William J., U.S. President. “The President’s Statement on Texas Tragedy and East Timor.” Remarks delivered on 16 September 1999. URL: http://www2.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990916_1.html, accessed 29 November 2000.

Commander, US Forces INTERFET. Subject: “OPERATION STABILISE: East Timor Executive Overview.” March 2000.

This Executive overview was written and published under the cognizance of the Commander, USFI, to summarize US involvement in East Timor operations. The document establishes a foundation of the chain of command and provides a chronological summary of why and how US forces were involved in executing and supporting a variety of operations.

Crosby, Art. “Policing Timor Lorosa’e.” *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 29, no. 3-4 (May-August 2000): 1,4,25.

Mr. Crosby, a Canadian, acted as the civilian advisor to the U.N. Transition Authority East Timor Civilian Police Commissioner. His article, published in this Canadian international relations journal, details the challenges of recruiting, training, and managing the new civilian police force for East Timor.

Department of Defense. *INTERFET Handbook: East Timor*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program, October 1999. DOD-2630-ID-001-00.

This country handbook is published under the auspices of the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program, with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity designated as the Executive Agent for the country handbook program. The handbook serves as a basic reference on East Timor, including information on geography, history, government, military forces, communications, and transportation network. It was consulted extensively for historical information as well as its quality maps and graphics.

Haffa, Jr., Robert P. and Barry D. Watts. "Brittle Swords: Low Density, High Demand Assets." *Strategic Review* 28, no. 4, Fall 2000.

This article discusses the issues associated with low density, high demand military equipment and personnel. While it does not talk to the specific equipment required by US Forces INTERFET, many of the considerations and implications are similar and applicable.

"Helms: U.S. will make massive dues payment to U.N." CNN.com, 9 January 2001.

URL: <<http://cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/09/un.debt/index.html>>.

Accessed 10 January 2001.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1998.

Landy, Jonathan S. "New Tug at America's Conscience: East Timor Is Now the Latest Test of When to Use Military Might." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 September 1999.

This three-page article speaks directly to the issue of US involvement in regional issues. From Somalia to Kosovo and now East Timor, it categorizes the question of humanitarian intervention as the most difficult question facing American foreign policy. The piece also suggests that the US role in East Timor encourages other nations to share the burden of ensuring global stability.

Priest, Dana. "Standing Up to State and Congress." *Washington Post*, 30 September 2000, Final Ed., A1.

This is the last in a three article series on US regional commands, the commanders, and the role they play in US foreign and military policy. This particular article addresses the role that Admiral Blair played in re-opening military relations with Indonesia after a fall-out over conditions in East Timor.

Ross Jr., Blair A., Maj, USA. *The Joint Task Force Headquarters in Contingency Operations*. Monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1993.

Maj Ross, in his monograph for the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, postulates that the joint military command and control structure must be re-engineered if it is to be prepared for the post-Cold War environment. The paper is valuable in its suggestions for alternative Joint Task Force headquarters structures that may support contingency operations of the future.

Scher, Robert. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Asian-Pacific Affairs. Interview by author, 6 December 2000.

Mr. Scher is the SE Asia regional expert for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and was extensively involved in the decision making for East Timor. He is one of very few individuals who continue to work on the East Timor situation, and his candid insight into the process, its factors, and its effects was invaluable.

United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. URL: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>. Accessed 8 January 2001.

United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1246(1999)*, S/RES/1246(1999). 11 June 1999. URL: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1246.htm>. Accessed 8 January 2001.

United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1264(1999)*, S/RES/1264(1999). 15 September 1999. URL: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1264.htm>. Accessed 8 January 2001.

United Nations Security Council. *Resolution 1272(1999)*, S/RES/1272(1999). 25 October 1999. URL: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1272.htm>. Accessed 8 January 2001.