

Infantry War Fighting Conference (IWFC) 2009


“Security Force Assistance: A Change in Mindset”

LTG William B. Caldwell, IV

Columbus Ironworks – Columbus, GA

Thank you for that kind introduction. It’s good to be back home, if only briefly. I am honored to be here and be a part of the 2009 Infantry Warfighting Conference. You have a fantastic line up for this week’s discussion, “Training Adaptive Leaders for Counterinsurgency Operations.”

In beginning my remarks, I’d like to highlight some pieces of GEN McChrystal’s counterinsurgency guidance.



The slide is titled "COM ISAF COIN Guidance" in blue text at the top. Below the title is a small photograph of a man in a military uniform speaking at a podium. To the right of the photo is the text: "Changing our mindset. We need to think and act very differently to be successful." Below this is a paragraph of text: "Partner with ANSF at all echelons. Our job is to hold them accountable for performance in serving the Afghan people and protecting them from harm. Build their capacity to secure their own country. Foster ownership – their success is our success. Live and train together, plan and operate together. Share the same battle-rhythm and information. Integrate your command and control structures. Put them in the lead and support them, even before they think they are ready. Coach them to excellence, and they will amaze you with how quickly they take charge." Below the paragraph is the phrase "This is a battle of wits" underlined. At the bottom left is the CAC logo, and at the bottom right is the name "LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General" in small text.

He requires us to “change our mindset.” He asks us “to think and act very differently to be successful.” He expects us “to partner with the ANSF at all echelons.” He reminds us that we must “build [the Afghans] capacity to secure their own country.” In doing so, the intent is to foster ownership, with the clear implication that “their success is our success.” In brief, we must “live and train together, and plan and operate together.” Our job, according to General McChrystal, is “to share the same battle-rhythm and information.” In the end, we have to understand that “this is a battle of wits.”

This is a battle of the minds at every level...

- it is a battle of the mind for us to change our mindset
- it is a battle of the mind for those we assist

- it is a battle of the mind for the populace to support their government and security forces
- it is a battle of the mind for the enemy...above all, we must match—or better yet--over-match wits with the enemy. The enemy must be persuaded to return to the fold or exit the battlefield.

How to change our mindset? Last month, GEN (Ret) Anthony Zinni was at Fort Leavenworth to address our newest CGSC Class. His answer? “You have to view yourself now not as an Infantry Officer, an Aviator or Foreign Service Officer...think of yourself as a problem solver.”

GEN Zinni reminds us that we need problem solvers in this battle for minds in this uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. The true problem solver understands that answers are situational-dependent and not derived in rote fashion from doctrine. Doctrine is our touchstone, but not our cookie cutter. We need to understand our doctrine and how it applies, but we cannot afford to let doctrinal molehills become impassible mountains. We need to display that flexibility of mind that allows us to anticipate, transition, and stay ahead of changing environments. Complex situations require nothing less.



I heard a story from a Soldier who was in Afghanistan a few years ago...he shared with me that he would go out on patrol to local villages and talk with the villagers about why they are still “sitting on the fence”...the locals would tell him that hours before he had come, the Taliban were there. The Taliban knew when they were coming and would melt away before the US force arrived. When we departed, the Taliban would return. They told the villagers “we are keeping a list of which families are supporting the Americans and it may not be tomorrow, it might not be next year, but the Americans will leave – maybe in 10 years, we’re going to still be here and we’re going to kill everyone of you.” As the young Soldier looked at the mountainous terrain, he knew there would never be enough Soldiers to hold all the terrain. The only way to sway these villagers

would be through the persistent presence of a viable Afghan National Security Force, trusted by the people, and backed by a legitimate government.

As this Soldier and all of you know, success in the overall campaign is tied directly to successful Security Force Assistance. Last week, we witnessed Senate confirmation hearings for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During various exchanges, the Armed Services Committee Chairman, Chairman Levin, and Admiral Mullen consistently talked about the importance of developing the Afghan Security Forces. Additionally, Chairman Levin told us of the memorable words he heard from a local village elder in Helmand province. He said, “the United States should stay until the minute you make our security forces self-sufficient. Then you will be welcome to visit us not as Soldiers, but as guests.”

As practical problem solvers, we have to know what this version of success looks like on the ground. What are the conditions that have to be established for the desired end state for successful security force assistance? Our doctrine does give us a fair idea of what trained foreign security forces should be able to do.

Conditions for a Desired Endstate...

-  **Be able to provide reasonable security**
-  **Be founded on a rule of law**
-  **Be sustainable**

 LTC William B. Caldwell III, Commanding General

Be able to provide reasonable security: The Foreign Security Force needs to be able to provide this reasonable security...not us. Their ability to provide reasonable security will go a long way in creating trust with the people they protect. The people need to see their security force providing security.

Be founded on a rule of law: The key in this bullet is “a” rule of law. This rule of law may not look exactly like ours and it probably shouldn’t. The cultural context will have an impact on what this looks like and how it applies, however; their ability to counter corruption will be tied to long term success and legitimacy of the government.

Be sustainable: In getting to this doctrinal “Point B” from the “Point A” of here-and-now reality, it is ultimately the Afghans...who must win the fight. We cannot and should not defeat the Taliban for them. It has been said, “we have the watches...the Afghans have the time.” Time is not on our side. If we fail, the Afghans will have to live with the consequences. Therefore, it is imperative for us to develop the Afghan security forces with sufficient capability to protect their people, their government, and their borders.

We must leave the Afghan people with an enduring capability and force generation capacity for security, or they will lose the means to resist when we leave. In the end, it is not how well we can secure them for the short term. Rather, it is how well their government can secure them in the long term that will ultimately make the difference.

We’ve talked about what the end state should look like...now let’s look at what security force assistance should look like.

In defining such assistance, we must first highlight three functions common to viable security forces, the need for the assisted force, the Afghan National Security Force in this case, to be able to generate, employ, and sustain – functions that every security force must do to accomplish their mission.

To do this requires a mindset change on our part. We should not generate, employ, and sustain them...instead, we must develop their ability to generate, employ, and sustain themselves.

This requires us to work by, with, and through the ANSF to achieve their national objectives, not ours.

By, With, and Through

U.S. assists other countries to achieve their objectives

By doing the work for the supported nation

In conjunction with the supported nation

Through development of the supported nation so they can do it themselves.

 LTC William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General


We must internalize the significance of the words, “By, With, and Through.” They mean doing everything in YOUR power to make the Security Force Assistance more

capable...more self-sufficient. As GEN McChrystal said in his guidance, “their success is our success.”

I am purposefully choosing to emphasize the “YOU” in YOUR power to highlight the significance of the more generalized “YOU.” If you think developing security forces is just for MiTT guys or those assigned to a Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance...you’re mistaken.

Developing foreign security forces should be a priority in every deployed unit’s mission. It is a fact of life that holds relevance for everyone, just as full spectrum operations is a fact of life.

In the January 2009 edition of Foreign Affairs, Secretary Gates said, “...over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.” He goes on to say, “the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.” Our doctrine and our Army are changing to meet this challenge.



The slide is titled "Essential Tactical Doctrine" and lists five key doctrinal elements, each accompanied by a small image of the corresponding document or webpage. The items are:

- **FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency** (Image: FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency book cover)
- **FM 3-0, Operations** (Image: FM 3-0 Operations book cover)
- **FM 3-07, Stability Operations** (Image: FM 3-07 Stability Operations book cover)
- **FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance** (Image: FM 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance book cover)
- **Wiki ATTP 3.07.20, Modular Brigade Augmented for SFA** (Image: Wiki ATTP 3.07.20 webpage screenshot)

In the bottom left corner is the CAC logo (Central Army Center). In the bottom right corner, it reads "LTC William B. Caldwell III, Commanding General".

I know everybody in this room has read or is aware of the book “Three Cups of Tea” by Greg Mortenson. When you read it, you gain an appreciation of the importance of cultural understanding and realize although there are many differences in cultures that must be taken into account there are also many similarities we have as human beings. As a village elder in Pakistan told Greg Mortenson “Here, we drink three cups of tea to do business...” As with anything else, to be successful in that part of the world, you have to have T.E.A. : Train, Equip, Advise...three of the most basic tasks in security force assistance. Sounds simple doesn’t it.



As you examine these three elements, T.E.A, there are no surprises, but the challenge comes with the complexity of the unique culture and reality on the ground. It's easy to write and talk about it...but much harder to do.

Let's talk about the “T” in T.E.A. for a minute, with “T” being to Train first...



When thinking of security force assistance and training, most of us think, primarily, about training the security force. In order to set the conditions for success, we have to put effort into each of these aspects.

Let's take a brief look at each 3T element in turn:

As our doctrine and our requirements on the ground indicate, we are a Full Spectrum Army. We had some discussions recently with COL Pete Newell and COL Phil

Battaglia about some of the things we need to keep in mind as we train ourselves for security force assistance. Let me share with you some of their critical points:



This is a mission that requires a change in mindset: This is not a design. The BCT is an agile and flexible organization that brings strong leaders and trainers. It provides the commander with a diverse organization that can be adapted to specific missions – security force assistance is just one of those missions.

No two Brigades Augmented for SFA or AABs will be identical: Nor should they be. No two situations in Iraq or Afghanistan are identical. This is a people centric mission – the people we are assisting to become a security force and the people they are trying to protect. Our ability to establish institutional agility to provide the commander with the personnel augmentation, equipment and training he needs will be key.

“Relationships are pacing items” This is a quote from discussions with COL Newell ...COL Battaglia wrote in an article he submitted for publication to MILREVIEW, “A commander’s most valuable contribution to his unit is to foster a productive and mutually trusting relationship with the host nation counterpart...” Both said it in different ways yet hit the same point – our strength will only be as good as our relationships with others.

Be prepared to share intelligence: It’s in GEN McChrystal’s guidance – “Share the same battle-rhythm and information...integrate them into your command and control structures...” We must be prudent with OPSEC, but must also realize the need to embrace the development of these forces. There was a slide deck COL Newell sent me and it had a great bullet on it that addresses this. It said, Ask ‘Why can’t I?’ instead of ‘Should I?’

Common to all these points is the understanding that a change in mindset required. Our own forces should be trained and equip to conduct full spectrum operations. Now

we must refocus these “operational forces” into means for assisting a foreign nation’s security forces. In effect, our forces become a generating force. This is the purpose behind our BCTs augmented for Security Force Assistance.

We can establish training standards and conduct the training of foreign security forces. However, we must keep in mind that an American solution may not be culturally acceptable to the local population...or any other foreign culture for that matter. We don’t want to create another little “American Army.”



In a forthcoming Military Review article, Admiral Stavridis, SACEUR, points out the potential pitfall. He notes: “In this process we should avoid the temptation to ‘Americanize’ those whom we partner with. Rather, we should impart the concept of service and professionalism, and allow them the flexibility to fit these concepts into their culture.”

A recent discussion with COL Drinkwine highlights the importance of training their (ANSF’s) leaders, he said “ANSF units cannot survive bad leadership, unlike our Army and police.” We must also avoid the trap of short-term thinking. To think about “training” for Security Force Assistance, means to think and plan deeply and for the long term. We had a discussion recently with COL Bob Shaw at the COIN Academy in Iraq and he shared with us the importance of focusing on the future leaders for long term success.



The generals and colonels with whom we work today may no longer hold important positions 5 to 10 years down the road. In order to make a real impact for the future, we must also focus our attention on training, education, and experience of the younger sergeants, captains and majors, who will be the future of the Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces. These will be the officers and NCOs who carry their more capable security force into the future.

So what about Equip?

Three E's of Equip

- Equip them physically** (Image: A pile of wooden sticks or poles)
- Equip their institutions** (Image: A group of soldiers in camouflage uniforms standing in a line)
- Equip them mentally** (Image: A soldier in camouflage uniform sitting at a desk, reading a document)

 LTC William R. Caldwell IV, Commanding General

Equipping them properly physically, institutionally, and mentally is key to sustainability. As you all know, if we build the capacity of their operational forces without building the corresponding institutional capacity, they will never be able to sustain their force.

Equip them physically: Equipping them physically includes materiel and infrastructure – everything from boots to buildings. As we proceed in doing this, we must ask hard questions. Can they sustain what we give them? Is it nested with their training? Is it what they need? Does it make sense for the type of security they will be required to provide? We need to consider ease of maintenance and operation, along with long-term sustainment costs.



Accountability of this equipment will also be a big part of these sustainment costs. Accountability will also be one of the more difficult areas to develop in foreign security forces because, like many other aspects, culture plays a role.

Moreover, various considerations go beyond military equipment. They extend to law enforcement, schools, and infrastructure. Logistics makes up a key aspect of an operation, and logistics is absolutely key to a successful SFA effort. Either we build up their capacity or we end up employing our capability. This is the stark choice we face in the austere environment of Afghanistan.

Equip their institutions: Foreign Security Forces must be able to generate their own capability. As noted earlier, our operational forces will also act as generating forces. However, we must work ourselves out of that job...they must be able to generate their own forces. Not only must we train US and NATO trainers, but we must also train the Afghan trainers. We have to equip the Afghan trainers so they have the wherewithal to generate their own forces. The objective must be to equip their training institutions across the spectrum. Equipping their academies, officer basic courses, basic training, advanced training will be crucial to their ability to sustain themselves.



If, as Chairman Levin said last week, “We need a surge in the number and strength of the Afghan Security Force. We need to expand the ANA and ANP well beyond the current target...” Then success here will only be possible when they have the capacity to generate their own forces.

Equip them mentally: At the same time, there is the realization that numbers mean little without the right mindset. We have to equip the security force from the ground up. This task begins with basic literacy and continues up through various echelons of military training and education.



With our assistance, professionals and recruits must understand their role with regard to their government, their country, and their people. And, this understanding must be rooted in the values, traditions, and habits of another culture. Perhaps just as important, they must understand how to believe in themselves. They must believe they constitute the best Afghan Security Force out there.

We also must change our mindset that equipping them mentally is more than just literacy rates...we have to go remember that. We don't want to make them a model of ourselves. We are assisting them to become the best force that they can be, to secure the Afghan people and respond to threats against Afghanistan. Competence and capability creates confidence.

As Dr. John Nagl recently wrote in his prepared statement for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, we must work on “developing the Afghan security force that can fulfill the mission of countering the insurgency and providing a sufficient level of security – not on mirror-imaging the force structure of a...Western army...”

So how do we best advise them?


Three A's of Advise

-  **Advise at the Ministerial Level**
-  **Advise them with our JIIM partners**
-  **Advise them at the ground level**

 LTC William B. Caldwell III, Commanding General

We've all heard analogies used with screwing in light bulbs...How many generals does it take to screw in a light bulb? – don't answer that. How many advisors does it take to screw in a light bulb? None...we let the foreign security force do it. We must look at advising as a way to work ourselves out of a job...enabling them to do what they really desire to do – provide security for their own people.

Advise at the Ministerial Level: At all levels we must understand their governing systems and their bureaucracies. This is particularly relevant at the ministerial level. We need to learn their systems and advise. It is not our function to impose our systems on them. Yet, an advisory linkage between the ministries and the security forces is critical to the sustainability and legitimacy of both the government and the security forces.



As you know, this must involve more than military advisors. For any kind of predictable success, we will require participation and input from multiple agencies and organizations across government, and, indeed, across the globe.

Advise them with our JIIM partners: In COIN, it is clear that a comprehensive approach remains crucial to all facets of security force assistance. At various levels, including ministerial, non-military agencies and organizations retain special significance. They help develop the entire security force. The security force must be a complete force, not just a military force. “Completeness” requires inputs and advice from the entire spectrum of interagency and international partners. Learning to work with and understand what the interagency and our multinational partners bring to the table to help develop the security force as a whole is critical to our mission. As the success of the operational security forces build, the importance of these partners will grow.



Advise them at the ground level: At the ground force level, every element of our force must be engaged in developing the indigenous security force from infantry to support staff. Advisors with the requisite mindset must capitalize on the sense of legitimacy that links effective security forces with the will of the people.



To do this successfully requires a unique leader...an advisor who gets it...an advisor who understands the importance of sharing risks when appropriate and building rapport. The rapport built by the advisor has a direct relationship on the trust developed between the advisor and his/her counterpart. The advisor must also understand that each unit and situation is unique. The amount of hands on involvement by the advisor with the security force depends on their level of competence and that will vary by unit and location.

Rapport is a function of understanding, respect, and trust.

Advisor Qualities

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mature• Professional• Competent• Patient• Knowledgeable		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Confident• Culturally Effective• Situationally Aware• Standards Focused
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Rapport is the single most important aspect of gaining influence; it is a function of understanding, respect, and trust.

 LTC William B. Caldwell, Jr. Commanding General

Trust is absolutely key. Just a look at the book by Steven M.R. Covey, The Speed of Trust. It provides a great breakdown on trust, how we build it, and how we reestablish it if lost. Throughout the book he emphasizes the key point that deeds must match words.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, wrote recently in JFQ, “When [the enemy] finds a say-do [or deeds-words] gap...they drive a truck right through it....we must be vigilant about...closing any gaps, real or perceived, between what we say about ourselves and what we do to back it up”


What we are talking about here with respect to building trust is two fold – there is the trust between us and the security force we are assisting and there is the trust between the security force and the Afghan people they defend. This is where the complexity lies...this is why the understanding of culture is so very important.

So that’s it...fairly straightforward – or is it?

If you walk out of here today with nothing else, I would ask that you take with you the importance of having the right mindset to conduct security force assistance. We are engaged in a battle of the minds on various levels, in various surroundings, and in various ways.

Our mindset must focus on how their organizations, institutions, systems, capabilities can be enabled – not ours.

“Success” in Counterinsurgency



“A victory is not [just] the **destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization**. It is that, plus the **permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population**, isolation not enforced upon the population but **maintained by and with the population**.”

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1964



LTC William D. Caldwell, US Army, Commanding General

As we develop their security forces to achieve their objectives we must overcome the temptation to do what we know and do best, whether relevant or not to the situation, we must accept that we are bound by unique situations.

We should recognize that the complexity of the environment is what makes this tough...remember - to do these tasks well requires a change in mindset for our full spectrum Army.

You all are at the heart of this tough work. Our leaders have not disappointed our Nation since the creation of our Army and...we will not as we face a complex future. We are moving in the right direction to embrace security force assistance. It is key to our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to continue to press forward with our work. We have to get it right...we owe it to our men and women in uniform...walking point for our Nation...sipping T.E.A. and building trust. It is these young Soldiers and leaders that will ultimately lead to success.