

ECOWAS and the Liberia Experience: Peacekeeping and Self Preservation

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Preface

There is a wide array of information available on the performance of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military arm, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG), in restoring peace to Liberia. My intent was not to revisit the Liberian civil war and the protracted regional involvement that helped to end the fighting. Rather, having spent seven years working on African issues, I was intrigued that West African nations could work together in promoting peace when their differences have impeded other collaborative endeavors. This paper examines some of the ECOWAS states and the underlying reasons for their involvement in Liberia.

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Executive Summary

Title: ECOWAS and the Liberia Experience: Peacekeeping and Self Preservation

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Thesis: The cooperation of member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in restoring stability to Liberia was more a reflection of their individual interests than it was a group effort to ensure regional security.

Background: In 1975 West African nations convened in Lagos and adopted the ECOWAS Treaty to promote regional integration and establish an economic union of the area's Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone countries. ECOWAS has been moderately successful. It constructed highways, promoted anti-drug policies, and created a regional travelers' check, but the original goals remain elusive. Boundary disputes, periods of civil unrest in many of the countries, and enduring tensions between the French-speaking and English-speaking states impeded the

formation of a real community.

Despite its economic shortcomings, ECOWAS had one notable success. Its military arm, the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), restored peace and stability to Liberia. Liberia endured a violent, seven-year civil war as a result of a 1989 attempt by rebels to overthrow the government. Over the objections of some member states, ECOWAS created and deployed a military force to Liberia. The five-nation 3,500-person force that landed in Monrovia in 1990 would swell to a presence of more than 10,000 and represent the majority of the Community by 1996. Upon its 1998 departure, ECOMOG had negotiated peace accords and cease-fires, disarmed rebels, evacuated expatriates, and created conditions for transparent elections.

Buoyed by its success in Liberia, ECOWAS sent peacekeeping forces to other countries in turmoil. It further proposed the formation of a stand-by crisis response force and the creation of a permanent mechanism for conflict resolution. A cursory look at the experience suggests that West Africans were united in seeking to end the carnage. Stability and the humanitarian situation were concerns, but the participating states were motivated by their unique self-interests: domestic security, a desire to exert greater influence over the region, and pursuit of a better standing in the international community.

Conclusion: Despite its success in restoring peace to Liberia, ECOWAS is an economic body, not a military force. West Africa's fragility makes conflict resolution and mitigation a necessity. Nonetheless, ECOWAS should lessen its focus on forming a permanent mechanism to manage disputes and raising a regional army, and instead return to its original mission of economic development and integration to alleviate the economic and social tensions that fuel instability.

Welcome to West Africa

Mere mention of the region West Africa evokes images of civil unrest, refugees, famine, drought, pestilence, and corrupt military dictators living lavish lives at the expense of their countries and citizens. A still widely circulated 1994 article by Robert D. Kaplan published in *The Atlantic Monthly* presents a very pessimistic view of this African subregion, which he describes as "*the* [sic] symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger."^[1] To illustrate his point, he wrote of extortion by government officials, the need to hire armed bodyguards for a simple night out on the town, and mob violence carried out by all levels of society.^[2] According to Kaplan, West Africa is home to some of the "unsafest" places in the world.^[3]

Regrettably, many of the images described by Kaplan are accurate. Civil unrest is a

constant threat to West African governments. Poverty is prevalent, and coupled with high population growth rates, will remain an obstacle to modernization and development. Diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis although treated in other parts of the world, go undiagnosed or ignored, and claim countless numbers each year. These are the realities of West Africa and they remain difficult to correct in the short-term due to the political, social, and economic underdevelopment of the region.

In spite of these depressing, harsh conditions, there are glimmers of hope. Democratization is spreading, economies are slowly growing, and African leaders are taking the initiative to resolve conflicts on the continent. One of the most notable examples of this new direction for Africa is the 1990-1997 West African peacekeeping and humanitarian operation in Liberia. Member nations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) temporarily set aside their differences and through military force, diplomatic pressure, and humanitarian assistance restored peace and stability to war-torn Liberia.

Buoyed by their success in Liberia, ECOWAS nations have since intervened in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, and further proposed the establishment of a regional military force and a permanent conflict mitigation body, the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, Resolution of Conflicts, Peace-keeping [sic] and Security.¹⁴¹ While the ECOWAS success is a remarkable accomplishment for an area known for strife, in seeking to build on the Liberia success, ECOWAS states appear to have overlooked two important factors: 1) ECOWAS is not a peacemaking body, and 2) selfishness, not selflessness drove regional cooperation. The fundamental objectives of ECOWAS continue to be increased economic development and regional integration. The economic and social threats that growing chaos in Liberia posed to the greater region influenced the decision to intervene in Liberia and the creation of a military arm. Progress in developing a more economically sound western Africa may alleviate some of the conditions that gave rise to recent crises, and lessen the need for a full-time military force.

ECOWAS, in reflecting on the Liberia experience, also appears to have forgotten that there was no consensus on the decision to intervene. The West African nations had competing interests and what the organization achieved was more a result of the sixteen member states coming together to satisfy their individual needs than it was a manifestation of a shared desire to end the bloodshed. Self-preservation overruled any common commitment to peace, stability, or regional cooperation, although member states have convinced themselves otherwise.

Because of increased transnational threats to countries and regions, it may be necessary for ECOWAS states to maintain a military capability which can be tasked for specific circumstances. However, it is now premature for the region to construct a permanent peacekeeping mechanism and raise an armed force when the resources could be used to promote development and combat social problems. The Liberian experience offers valuable lessons for future peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, the individual reasons of West African states involved that made the peacekeeping effort possible, and economic considerations may impede any systematic approach to conflict mitigation and management.

The Origins of ECOWAS

On May 28, 1975, heads of state and government of fifteen West African countries--Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo--convened in Lagos to sign the treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).^[5] Cape Verde joined the body two years later in 1977, bringing ECOWAS membership to its current composition of sixteen nations.^[6] ECOWAS, as the African leaders envisioned it, would foster the development of an economic union in the subregion to "raise the living standards of its peoples, and to [sic] maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent."^[7] ECOWAS goals included the harmonization of national policies, increased integration, common environmental protection

policies, the creation of joint enterprises, the formation of a common market, adoption of uniform trade policies, and the standardization of legal practices.^[8]

Twenty-four years after its creation, the Community has a scant list of achievements: liberal immigration and travel policies, free movement of some consumer goods; construction of "highways" between Lagos and Nouakchott and between Dakar and N'djamena, which is not an ECOWAS member; and harmonization of drug control laws despite ineffective measures to stem the transit of narcotics.^[9] ECOWAS also launched a traveler's check, an initiative they hope will lead to the formation of a single monetary zone.^[10] These few successes would have occurred as a result of the region's porous borders, the straddling of national boundaries by ethnic groups and families, close ties among some heads of state, or out of necessity.

Despite some minor successes, as an economic body ECOWAS has achieved few of its goals. ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate readily admits that the Community has not met the expectations of its constituency.^[11] Accordingly, the ECOWAS Secretariat continues to list among its primary challenges and aspirations the creation of a single monetary zone, increased private sector involvement in the region, and the harmonization of economic/financial policies and commercial laws.^[12] During the October 1998 ECOWAS summit, Kouyate renewed his appeal for increased regional cooperation on economic matters, stressing that Community should model itself after the European Union and strive for greater economic and political concord.^[13]

The reasons for ECOWAS's apparent failure as an economic body are numerous. In 1975 and still today, there continue to be great disparities in the wealth and development of member states. Oil-rich Nigeria, despite a long history of political uncertainty, is the economic powerhouse of the region: both Nigeria's population and Gross National Product more than double those of all the other ECOWAS states combined.^[14] Poverty plagues the region and of the sixteen states in West Africa, the United Nations Development Program ranks fourteen as low in

human development.^[15] Of the 174 countries assessed in 1998, the bottom four are all West African: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sierra Leone.^[16] West African countries are typically rich in natural resources; however, their conversion of these resources to economic prosperity remains elusive. Member countries either have failed to tap this potential source of wealth or have squandered it, and thus generally remain poor and in need of development and humanitarian assistance.^[17] The poorest have little to bring to a regional bargaining table.

In addition to the rift created by differing levels of development, language continues to divide West Africa. Almost forty years after independence from the colonial powers, tensions persist between the nine Francophone and the five Anglophone nations. In an attempt to rectify the colonial legacies, ECOWAS adopted French, English, and Portuguese as the Community's official languages. For further balance, chairmanship of the body traditionally alternates between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. Until the 1988 attempted coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau, it and the other Lusophone state, Cape Verde, had little impact on regional programs and activities.

Language barriers, varying levels of economic and social development, the lack of a common currency and differing styles of governance--military dictatorships; experiments with Marxism and socialism; quasi-success and several failures in instituting democratic practices--served as obstacles to the formation of a common market and economic integration. These conditions and pervasive intrastate political and social problems persuaded member states to look inward. As a result, West African states concentrated more on their individual situations than they did on developments in the region. That is, they did until the collapse of Liberia and its ramifications proved too significant to ignore.

While ECOWAS members struggled to resolve the conflict in Liberia and curtail the spread of instability, they neglected aspects of their economic agenda, including deficit reduction, food security, and inflation management.^[18] Mali and Ghana even suggested that economic goals

were being held hostage while the Community pursued other objectives.

Alas, Liberia

Chaos consumed Liberia for almost eight months before its neighboring states decided on, rather were forced into, active intervention. Liberia had a turbulent history, and in a region known for turmoil it was relatively easy for its neighbors to expect that Liberia's problems eventually would work themselves out. Liberia's fragility as a state emanated from its 1847 creation by freed American slaves.^[19] The founders, commonly known as Americo-Liberians, created a strict, hierarchical social system, placing themselves at the apex and the indigenous populations at the bottom. Although they only represented an approximate five percent of the population, for almost a century and a half they wielded political and economic control of the entire country.^[20]

The reign of the Americo-Liberians reached its culminating point during the 1971-1980 presidency of William Tolbert. Tolbert ascended to power following the death of President William Tubman, Liberia's strong man from 1944-1971. Tolbert was Tubman's vice president, and their combined thirty-six year rule brought only modest improvements to the lives of ordinary Liberians.^[21] Discontent flourished under Tolbert's reign, which was characterized by corruption and harassment. A crackdown on anti-Tolbert, Americo-Liberian elites and riots in 1979 over the price and availability rice, a staple for all Liberians, further paved the way for political upheaval.^[22]

In 1980, Samuel Doe, a 28-year old Master Sergeant in the Liberian National Guard, led a coup d'état. Doe and his followers stormed the executive mansion, assassinated President Tolbert and his immediate security forces, and formed a revolutionary government.^[23] Subsequent executions of leading political figures and government officials effectively ended Americo-Liberian dominance. The Krahn, Doe's group and another ethnic minority, assumed the position once held by Americo-Liberians in Liberia's social structure. Doe ruled with a heavy hand and

sanctioned Krahn violence against other ethnic groups as well as against his detractors. Ethnic tensions along with government corruption and the economic and social problems common to developing African countries set the stage for a violent reaction.

Such a response came in the form of Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, former official in the Doe Government, and fugitive from justice in the United States.^[24] On December 24, 1989, Taylor led a band of a few hundred rebels from a staging base in Côte d'Ivoire across the border into Liberia with the aim of ousting Doe and re-establishing Americo-Liberian supremacy.^[25] By late January 1990, Taylor's motley supporters had advanced from the border and seized Nimba Country in north central Liberia, killing thousands of innocent civilians and forcing even more to seek refuge in nearby Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.^[26] Taylor and his supporters, calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), reached the capital city of Monrovia in June of the same year. The NPFL failed to force Doe out of the presidency and a standoff between Taylor, an NPFL splinter group, and the remains of the Liberian army ensued. A full-scale war involving numerous rebel groups and factions developed, tearing apart the country and its people for seven years.^[27]

West Africa to the Rescue

Initially, international response to the crisis in Liberia was muted. In 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War captured headlines. Both the United States and the United Nations declined to intervene in restoring security to Liberia, advocating "African solutions to African problems."^[28] West Africa was on its own. Individual states and various African leaders, in the early days of the conflict, invoked regional agreements, appealing for but never achieving a cease-fire or negotiated settlement. This approach conformed to standing African practices. Negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration were the preferred means for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and were in accordance with the 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter.^[29] The OAU Charter served as guidance for the ECOWAS treaty

which decreed:

- Non-aggression between Member States.
- Maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness.
- Peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active co- operation between neighboring countries, and promotion of a peaceful environment.^[30]

These non-violent methods failed in Liberia, and by May 1990 its neighbors were desperate. The fighting affected regional trade and tourism, produced hundreds of thousands of refugees, and threatened to spill over into the border states. Under extreme pressure from Guinea and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS heads of states formed a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprised of representatives from the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, and tasked it to identify a peaceful solution to the crisis.^[31] The Committee's initial attempts to negotiate a cease-fire were thwarted by Doe's refusal to step down. Other tactics, such as imposing travel restrictions, freezing assets located outside of Liberia, and restricting rebel use of sovereign territories for training fighters and for staging bases, were equally useless. Taylor and the emerging rebel factions were more interested in gaining ground and political power than in negotiating a solution to the conflict. When the SMC failed to forge a peace settlement, ECOWAS reluctantly concluded intervention was necessary.

Despite some opposition to intervention, during a two-day meeting in July 1990 in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS sub-committee on Defense drew up a plan for a military intervention force.^[32] The SMC states met again in August and adopted the "ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia" which ordered the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia (ECOMOG).^[33] On August 23, 1990, only a few weeks later, 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia deployed to Liberia. Their mission was peacekeeping and

humanitarian assistance and their tasks included:

- Imposition of a cease-fire.
- Disarmament of the warring parties.
- Ending the carnage of civilians.
- Imposition of an embargo on the acquisition and import of arms.
- Establishment of an interim government and preparation for elections.
- Evacuation of foreign nationals.^[34]

ECOMOG forces immediately seized the capital Monrovia and were able to enforce a temporary cease-fire. Taylor, angered by what he considered to be an attack on Liberia's sovereignty, led his rebels in a violent counter-attack. ECOMOG, in defending itself, changed from a humanitarian body into a political-military force. This new role became even more apparent when regional peacekeepers went on the offensive following the capture of Doe outside of ECOMOG headquarters by a rebel group.^[35] The transformation was complete after ECOMOG helped to install an interim government in Monrovia. Simultaneously, Taylor formed his own "government" in Gbarnga. These two acts effectively divided Liberia and forced ECOMOG to choose sides. As the only protector of the interim government and the opportunity for peace that it offered, ECOMOG forces had no option but to remain in Liberia as peacemakers, not peacekeepers.

For the next seven years, ECOMOG was the only source of stability in Liberia. Ironically, there was little concert within the peacemaking force and its regional sponsor, as member states debated the mandate and management of the force. Yet, as the conflict persisted, the ECOMOG presence enlarged. At its peak, the combined West African force comprised more than 10,000 troops, and included soldiers from the first five countries to deploy as well as from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and Benin.^[36] Côte d'Ivoire contributed a medical team, and some of the

smaller states made modest financial contributions. As the civil war endured and the force size grew, ECOMOG's role and mission also changed. Observers reported as many as three distinct ECOMOGs during the Liberian conflict.^[37] The ECOMOGs varied according to the character traits of the force commanders and the political will of West African heads of state. In the early years of the war, ECOWAS believed a solution was on the horizon and assertively pursued peacekeeping activities. By the mid-nineties, rebels considered ECOMOG to be a party to the conflict, as self-defense and the protection of Monrovia and environs had become priorities for the West African mission. Traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disarmament characterized the last years of the war. Additionally, by 1995 ECOMOG had also assumed the onerous task of protecting some 160 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) observers.^[38] Despite ECOMOG's multiple personalities and ever changing responsibilities, the body would facilitate thirteen peace agreements, oversee the disarmament of 24,000 combatants, create a safe environment for transparent elections, distribute ballot boxes and other election materials; and provide security for the July 1997 presidential and national elections.^[39]

The Long Reach of Liberian Instability

Looking at the players involved and the final scorecard, it appears that ECOWAS states overcame their differences in support of a common cause. In reality, preservation of the unique self-interests of the West African states propelled them to work together to resolve the Liberia crisis. The desire to curb the suffering and the spread of anarchy was a close second. Security was a critical issue as crime rates in Liberia's border states soared in tandem with the influx of refugees.^[40] Liberia's neighbors became increasingly concerned about their own peace and security as rebel groups used their territories for training and the transshipment of arms.^[41] West African leaders also feared they would lose the public's confidence in their abilities to govern and provide security. Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea, whose leaders rose to power through the military, had citizens resident in Liberia. Rebel groups accused these foreign nationals of endorsing

opposition factions. The civilians, regardless of their political sentiments, became targets for various rebel groups; the expatriates and citizens at home looked to their governments for protection.^[42]

The ramifications of the Liberian civil war touched most West African states and convinced some that action was necessary. Nevertheless, within the SMC and the larger ECOWAS community, there was no consensus on intervening in Liberia. Guinea and Sierra Leone, two of three countries bordering Liberia, joined Nigeria and became staunch proponents of military action. Both Guinea and Sierra Leone had absorbed thousands of refugees.^[43] Concerned about their internal stability, they were adamant that a regional effort was required. Nigeria, as the most powerful state in the region, promoted itself as the region's policeman and advocated a regional effort to restore stability. Côte d'Ivoire, another Liberian border state and safehaven for refugees, asserted that ECOWAS had gone beyond its mandate and argued that intervention would contravene the OAU charter. Senegal did not have a refugee problem but shared Côte d'Ivoire's views on adhering to the ECOWAS Treaty and the OAU Charter. SMC members Togo and Mali were not directly affected by the crisis, but remained wary of entering the fray and declined to participate in the proposed peacekeeping mission. Burkina Faso, which provided assistance to NPFL rebels and whose president had a close relationship with Taylor, vehemently decried the decision to intervene as well.

The official explanation for West African intervention in Liberia was to end the senseless slaughter of Liberians and to restore stability by means of a cease-fire, an interim government, and democratic elections. A more accurate explanation is ECOWAS states recognized containing and defusing the conflict was essential to their individual survivals.

Charity Begins at Home

Nigeria

While most of West Africa debated the relevance of a regional peacekeeping force in Liberia, Nigeria was ready and eager to deploy. Nigeria provided the bulk of the funding, forces, military and political leadership, and materiel without which ECOMOG would not have been possible. As the self-appointed policeman of the region, Nigeria subscribed to ending the war and restoring stability. Nevertheless, there were other factors dictating Nigerian involvement.

Nigeria's prime motivation was the protection of its citizens. More than 70,000 Nigerians lived and worked in Liberia at the onset of the war.^[44] They became rebel targets after factions learned of an April 1990 Nigerian government shipment of light assault weapons and ammunition to Doe supporters.^[45] Attacks against Nigerians peaked on August 8 when NPFL guerrillas murdered as many as one thousand civilians who had sought protection at the Nigerian embassy.^[46] The Nigerian government had previously threatened to retaliate against rebel forces if its nationals were harmed. Following the slaughter on the sovereign grounds of the embassy, Nigeria was even more determined to take action.

Nigeria was also concerned about the possible spread of instability and what that meant to Nigerian interests in the region. Some of Nigeria's closest allies at the time, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, were all dangerously close to Liberia and directly threatened by the chaos. The growing refugee population was only one menace to regional stability. Dissidents from the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone had joined Taylor's forces and there was a general fear they would take his struggle to their homelands.^[47] In preventing the destabilization of the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Nigeria assured itself of partners during a period when it was faced growing criticism for domestic human rights abuses and political repression.^[48]

Nigeria had another ally it wished to protect. Although there were occasional tense periods, Liberia had been a close, supportive English-speaking associate in an area dominated by Francophones. Doe and Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida had a personal relationship, and

Doe even ordered that one of the University of Liberia's schools and a highway be named after Babangida.^[49] To reciprocate, Babangida assisted in rescheduling some of Liberia's external debts and made a donation to the university.^[50] The loss of Liberian support would have been a severe blow to Nigerian influence in the region.

Mali

While Nigeria was unwavering on the need for regional action in Liberia, other states were not as convinced. When ECOWAS decided to send troops to Liberia, Mali initially objected, citing the ECOWAS Treaty and the principle of non-intervention. However, there was more to Mali's opposition than concern about treaty violations. In the early 1990s, Mali's domestic situation was precarious and required the full attention of the government and the military's capabilities. As Liberia succumbed to domestic and political discontent, in Mali dictator Moussa Traoré also struggled to maintain control. In Bamako and other cities, students and opposition politicians staged pro-democracy demonstrations, and Traoré used Mali's military forces to occasionally put down protests. Concurrently, in Mali's arid and extremely underdeveloped northern regions, Tuareg nomads staged a rebellion and demanded autonomy. The Traoré Government was ruthless in quelling the Tuareg uprising, often using excessive military force.^[51]

Mali's outlook changed in 1991 when students and soldiers drove Traoré from office. He was replaced by a democratically-elected civilian president, Alpha Omar Konaré, who was an avowed internationalist, philosopher, and strong advocate for regional peace and stability. After negotiating a peace settlement with Tuareg groups and integrating some of the former combatants into the armed forces, he turned his attention to conflict resolution. Malian forces were dispatched to peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, Haiti, and the Central African Republic and in 1996, Konaré committed 600 troops to the regional effort in Liberia.^[52] Konaré's contribution was a reflection of his desire to return peace and security not only to the region, but also to Mali. The legacy of Traoré's military dictatorship was a powerful, competent military. By offering peacekeepers to

ECOMOG as well as to other combined operations, Konaré was able to occupy supporters of the former regime, who if left idle at home, might attempt to derail his nascent government. ^[53]

Mali's interests in regional security were more than a desire to control the impact of Liberian instability on West Africa. Mali's involvement in ECOMOG was an attempt to curb Nigerian hegemony. Nigeria already dominated ECOMOG, and President Sani Abacha, Babangida's successor, sought to exert greater influence over ECOWAS. He used extreme measures and coerced West African states into electing him as ECOWAS chairman. Mali had been in line for the ECOWAS leadership position, but Konaré earned Abacha's wrath when his government co-sponsored a United Nations Resolution condemning Nigeria for human rights abuses. Although Mali's meager troop contribution was no match for the thousands of soldiers sent by Nigeria, Malian participation sent a clear message to Nigeria and other ECOWAS members: regardless of ECOMOG composition, the peacekeeping mission would reflect a regional endeavor. Tensions between Mali and Nigeria were typical of the Francophone/Anglophone divide and the French-speakers determination to limit Nigeria's reach.

Niger

Like Mali, Niger sent peacekeepers to Liberia to keep the peace at home and to capture Nigeria's attention. In the early 1990's, there was extreme political uncertainty in Niger as party leaders of its "cohabitation" government were constantly at odds. Falling uranium prices from its principle export led to inflation and unemployment. Again like Mali, Niger also confronted a Tuareg rebellion in its north. When ECOMOG first deployed, Niger's government could not afford the luxury of contributing troops to the regional operation when they were needed to enforce domestic security.

In 1996 the military overthrew the democratic, civilian government in a bloodless coup d'état, and the new president, Ibrahim Baré, looked differently at intervention in Liberia. Above

all, he needed a way to keep the troops busy. Rebel incidents in the north had subsided, lessening the need for an enhanced military presence. Additionally, not all members of the armed forces supported the coup, and some remained loyal to the former president even though Baré was a military officer. The military was also disgruntled over nonpayment of their salaries.^[54] As in the case of Mali, offering troops to ECOMOG would likely thwart efforts by the elements of the military to wreak havoc at home. Baré further hoped that by contributing troops, he would burnish his image with the international community which criticized his regime for the coup, human rights abuses, and political oppression.

Baré was also very close to Abacha and sought ways to forge closer ties to its southern neighbor. Nigeria appreciated the support of another Francophone nation and in 1997 transported as well as financed the small Nigerien contingent deployed to Liberia.

Senegal

Despite a having professional military and an active peacekeeping history, Senegal was extremely wary about participating in the ECOMOG operation.^[55] Unlike Guinea and Sierra Leone, Senegal did not have a refugee problem, and unlike Nigeria, there was not a large Senegalese population in Liberia. At the outbreak of the Liberian war, Senegal did not face the type of domestic uncertainty which challenged Mali and Niger. Already a respected member of the African and international community, Senegal was not searching for greater recognition. As a result, Senegal turned its attention to the Middle East, where it had contributed forces to the Gulf War coalition. Eventually, both domestic and regional politics influenced Senegalese participation in, as well as early withdrawal from, the peacekeeping exercise.

Senegal's perspective on its intervention in Liberia began to change towards the end of Desert Storm when President Abdou Diouf succumbed to internal and external pressures to

become more involved. Domestically, Diouf had formed a coalition government and needed high-level positions for his political opponents. He created a new ministry for regional integration, and a political rival assumed the position as minister.^[56] This new ministry also enhanced Senegal's ability to play a greater leadership role in regional development and integration, which were Diouf's goals for his impending tenure as ECOWAS chairman. Although economic issues topped Diouf's agenda for ECOWAS, it would be difficult to escape Senegalese participation in regional peacekeeping.^[57]

Externally, both Charles Taylor and the United States encouraged Senegal to contribute to the peacekeeping force. Taylor repeatedly expressed his distrust of Nigerian forces, hinting he would have his rebels lay down their arms to a peacekeeping force more representative of the region, or to the Senegalese.^[58] Such a promise suggested that Liberia's future and the stability of the region depended on Senegal. The United States, a longtime friend of Senegal, placed even more pressure on the Diouf government. During Diouf's September 1991 state visit to the United States, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker urged Diouf to send troops to Liberia, even pledging U.S. financial support for peacekeeping operations.^[59] Senegal eventually committed 1,500 troops, and the first deployment arrived in late October.

Senegalese forces, however, would not remain in Liberia for long. Reneging on his earlier promise, Taylor did not instruct his forces to lay down their arms. On the contrary, Senegalese peacekeepers came under attack by NPFL fighters and six were killed. The Senegalese public, which had opposed the peacekeeping operation, called for the withdrawal of the military. Coincidentally, as the situation in Liberia became more precarious, security within Senegal began to erode. Dissidents in the Casamance region renewed their armed opposition against the Government, and military forces were required to maintain peace and protect the civilian population. As a result of the twin threats, Senegal redeployed its forces in January 1993, but would continue to be an active participant in the peace process.^[60]

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso, like Mali and Niger, was a latecomer to regional peacekeeping efforts. As was the case with Nigeria, Burkina had specific interests in Liberia. Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré was not ambivalent about regional involvement in Liberia and domestic politics did not influence his stance. Publicly, Compaoré opposed intervention, citing the OAU Charter and the ECOWAS Treaty on state sovereignty. Privately, Compaoré had close ties to Taylor and supported his quest for power. Burkina also sought to limit the Nigerian sphere of influence, and a Taylor rather than a Doe government would help to check Nigerian domination of the region.^[61]

Compaoré's support for Taylor stemmed from a variety of complex reasons. At the core were personal relationships. President Compaoré was the son-in-law of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Houphouet's daughter, before her marriage to Compaoré, had been married to the late son of former Liberian President Tolbert. The Doe regime assassinated the Tolberts, and Houphouet was eager to avenge the death of his former son-in-law and see a "more friendly" government in power.^[62] He requested and received Compaoré's willing assistance. Burkina Faso opened its territory to the NPFL and Taylor sent and received arms and other supplies through Burkina Faso, aided by elements of the Compaoré Government.^[63] In addition, Taylor established training camps in Burkina, and Burkinabé mercenaries also fought alongside NPFL rebels.^[64] Burkina's staunch support for Taylor would make it difficult for the region and the international community to accept its eventual participation in ECOMOG.

President Compaoré began to modify his position in the mid 1990s as he prepared for a one-year term as chairman of the Organization of African Unity. As head of an organization that promoted peace, it would be unseemly for the Burkinabé to openly support Taylor and the NPFL. Compaoré further hoped that offering forces to ECOMOG would elevate his international standing. Still, there continued to be credible reports of assistance to Taylor and his rebels despite

Burkinabé protestations to the contrary.^[65]

In 1997 Burkina Faso pledged 350 troops to the peacekeeping operation; however, its past history made deployment challenging. Western donors did not offer the airlift provided to other ECOWAS states, and Nigeria, which transported Nigerian soldiers to Liberia, did not step forward. Burkina Faso's commercial airline flew Burkinabé troops to Liberia. Nevertheless, ECOMOG, remained convinced that Burkina Faso supported Taylor and forbade Burkinabé troops from deploying in NPFL-controlled areas, requiring them to patrol with Nigerian units.^[66] Even as Burkina Faso's military reportedly performed well in Liberia, speculation about Compaoré's real intentions for providing a contingent lingered.

Ghana

Ghana was more forthright than the other ECOWAS nations about its participation in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation. Ghana provided safe-haven to a large community of Liberians who fled the violence, but maintained that ECOMOG was primarily about member states, not Liberia and regional security. Then Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah, publicly explained that "the Liberian situation--assumed international dimensions because several thousand Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals [had] been holed up in Liberia and [were] suffering because of the fighting."^[67] Protection of the 10,000 Ghanaians in Liberia was the immediate concern. However, Ghana provided troops to ECOMOG, because it considered itself an island of stability in a tumultuous and unpredictable area and believed it could assist in restoring stability.

Ghana brought political impartiality and extensive peacekeeping experience to the regional endeavor. Unlike Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Ghana did not have a political stake in the outcome of the Liberian civil war. President Jerry John Rawlings believed Ghana could be an honest broker in negotiating a peaceful settlement and would serve as a counter-balance to Nigeria.^[68] However, for Ghana it was not just Nigeria's political ambitions that were intractable.

The Rawlings Government deemed Nigerian forces to be poorly disciplined and did not want them running amok in the region.^[69] In contrast, Ghana's military was exceptionally qualified for the ECOMOG security and humanitarian mission as two-thirds of Ghana's 7,500-strong military is regularly deployed to international peacekeeping operations.^[70] Ghanaian soldiers have participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978, where they honed their peacekeeping skills.^[71] ECOWAS valued Ghana's expertise and assigned a Ghanaian, General Arnold Quainoo, as the first ECOMOG commander.^[72] His tenure was brief due to unease between the Ghanaians and Nigerians and his passive approach to the conflict. A series of assertive Nigerians replaced him.^[73] Even under aggressive Nigerian leadership, the Ghanaians training served them well. The Ghanaian Government reported only twenty-five peacekeepers killed between October 1990 and April 1996.^[74]

There was a broad regional commitment to restoring peace and stability to Liberia, but the West African states that contributed forces to ECOMOG had ulterior motives. Self-aggrandizement and internal, rather than regional, security motivated ECOWAS states. These reasons were not compatible with the ECOWAS mission and undermined the cooperative spirit of the peacekeeping initiative. Lack of a shared commitment to regional goals will only hinder future efforts to promote economic integration and regional stability.

Future Peacekeeping Plans

ECOMOG's mandate in Liberia ended on February 2, 1998.^[75] Despite some obstacles, the West African force completed its mission. After numerous attempts, it imposed a lasting cease-fire; disarmed warring parties; protected and evacuated civilians; and created an environment conducive to free and fair elections. Filled with confidence over the outcome in Liberia, ECOWAS ordered the deployment of forces to Sierra Leone where a 1997 coup attempt threatened the legitimate government and created yet another humanitarian and refugee crisis. An attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau in 1998 also provoked ECOMOG intervention. Two new crises

coming so soon after the prolonged engagement in Liberia convinced ECOWAS states of the need for a more structured, comprehensive system for ensuring regional security. The ECOMOG mandate was intended to be temporary, and the two existing pacts on protecting the region, the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, were insufficient. The Non-Aggression agreement addressed the importance of peace and stability to the Community's objectives. It emphasized the primacy of state sovereignty but did not mention intrastate conflicts or threats from outside the ECOWAS community. The Defence pact included domestic conflict and external threats and further empowered the Community to take collective action against threats to the region. The latter protocol was the framework for the ECOMOG peace plan, but after seven years of conflict, ECOWAS realized it needed more precision.

In December 1997, ECOWAS heads of state and government endorsed the creation of a mechanism for the "collective management of regional security."^[76] During subsequent meetings, ECOWAS defense and internal affairs ministers developed and approved a strategy for identifying, monitoring, and responding to subregional conflicts. The plan, the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, Resolution of Conflicts, Peace-keeping and Security, drew upon ECOMOG's lessons and sanctioned:

ECOWAS intervention in the internal affairs of Member States where conflict in a country threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region or erupts following the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government.^[77] Member states further supported the formation of stand-by military body for swift deployment to troubled areas.^[78] To determine when intervention is appropriate, ECOWAS recommended monitoring indicators such as the price and availability of food, environmental disasters, political developments, civil-military relations, and internal security.^[79] Ironically, the determinants ECOWAS suggested to predict strife in the region are the very matters ECOWAS should consider in pursuit of its economic agenda. In addition to adoption of the peacekeeping

apparatus, as a supplemental security measure, ECOWAS endorsed a separate proposal imposing a moratorium on the movement and manufacture of light weapons.^[80] Mali had long championed the moratorium, but it only gained region-wide support following the devastation of Liberia.

Mali's Ambassador to the United States, Cheick Oumar Diarra, described the permanent mechanism as the "first step" towards regional stability but acknowledged the challenge is formidable.^[81] There are numerous fault lines within the community. These include language, strategic objectives such as Nigeria's aspirations to influence the region and Ghana's interest in breaking out of regional and into world politics, and the capabilities and varying degrees of politicization of the national armies. These differences have hampered ECOWAS's performance as an economic union and will remain hurdles to future joint activities.

The ECOWAS Identity Crisis

West Africa did a good thing and the region deserves international praise and gratitude. The countries worked through ideological differences, conflicts of interests, and rivalries, and also risked Nigerian dominion of the region to restore peace to Liberia. Nigerians were the most visible element of the peacekeeping force, but ECOMOG was a regional effort. ECOWAS members deployed what troops they could, contributed financially when possible, and offered their capitals for negotiations. To maintain the regional character of the operation, Mali, the Gambia, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria all hosted ECOWAS conferences, or meetings with Taylor or other faction leaders. This type of cooperation is unprecedented on the African continent. The Community demonstrated that regional cooperation is possible and very necessary.

The peacekeeping operation in Liberia and the proposal for a permanent apparatus for conflict mitigation indicate a regional political will to combat threats to stability. The impetuses to take action, however, were unique to each country. Selfishness propelled ECOWAS members to join ECOMOG and surprisingly enabled member states to work together. These same self-

interests have prevented the countries from doing more as a region and will undermine a permanent peacekeeping organization. Rivalries will resurface, and there will only be consensus on how to manage Nigeria. Nigeria will undoubtedly be the most influential element of any peacekeeping or peacemaking effort. Its materiel and financial strength will translate into political weight, making it extremely difficult to effect an operation that goes against Nigerian will. A permanent structure also complicates both the decisions to intervene and to avoid a conflict. Both courses are ripe for accusations of bias based on language, ethnicity, or other social and political divisions.

The regional and international focus on peacekeeping has detracted from the original ECOWAS mission. For instance, Western donors have engaged many of the West African nations in peacekeeping and military capacity-building exercises, and the OAU has proposed raising subregional armies modeled on ECOMOG. Underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, budget deficits, high debt service, and poor infrastructure make an ideal environment for breeding instability. For example, an electricity shortage during the spring and summer of 1998 created tense situations, as West African governments accused each other of willfully severing the flow of electricity through the region and demanding hard currency payment in advance for electrical services. Economic security will alleviate some of the tensions and facilitate future peace-promoting activities. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, emphasized this basic need when he cautioned ECOWAS foreign ministers, “In the end, only economic growth will ensure lasting stability in West Africa.”^[82]

Economic growth will promote a more secure environment. It will also better prepare West Africa to respond to crises. ECOMOG may have noble intentions in establishing a permanent peacekeeping mechanism, but it currently lacks the necessary resources. Nigeria contributed significantly to the ECOMOG budget and there were small contributions from countries that did not provide troops to the operation. Despite the region’s efforts, donor support from the West in

the form of direct contributions, debt forgiveness, balance of payment support, and materiel and other transportation assistance sustained the peacekeeping mission. As recent as 1997, at the peak of the ECOWAS success as a peacekeeping body, member states were 45.5 million dollars in arrears to an organization whose annual budget is less than 10 million dollars.^[83] If member states cannot make their annual contributions to an organization designed to advance economic and social growth, the Community will be woefully unprepared to respond to future turmoil.

Historically, West Africa is the most fragile region on the African Continent. There will be strife, humanitarian crises, environmental disasters, and political instability. It is highly probable that ECOWAS, with one success under its belt, will have to raise a force and intervene again to restore security. The likelihood of peace or security operations in the future does not justify the exclusive focus on conflict management. ECOWAS should redirect its efforts and concentrate on attaining the goals it set twenty-five years ago. As a community, ECOWAS states have very little to unify them. A stake in the region's future through greater economic integration will pave the way for future cooperation in peace and stability and beyond. ECOWAS recognized this need when developing its long-term security program: "Economic Development can be more effectively pursued in an atmosphere of greater security...[and] effective economic integration and development is essential for security."^[84] ECOWAS should heed its own advice.

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Notes

^[1]Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, 44.

^[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., 45.

[4]Economic Community of West African States, Meeting of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, *Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, Resolution of Conflicts, Peace-keeping and Security Final Communiqué*, (Banjul: 1988) Rev. 1.

[5]Economic Community of West African States, *Revised Treaty*, 24 July 1993, 1.

[6]United States Department of State, *ECOWAS Background Notes*, (Washington: 1998).

[7]*ECOWAS Treaty*, Article 3.1.

[8]Ibid.

[9]*ECOWAS Survey*, (Abuja: ECOWAS Secretariat, 1998)

[10]Paul Ejime, "ECOWAS Still Bugged [sic] Down by Politics and Conflict." Panafrican News Agency. 4 November 1998.

[11]Idem, "West African Community Struggling to Stay on Track," Panafrican News Agency. 6 January 1998.

[12]*ECOWAS Survey*.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, eds. Michael Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 407.

[15]United Nations Development Program, *1998 United Nations Human Development Index*. Online at <http://www.undp.org/hdro>. The human development index assesses, health and life expectancy, and GDP in determining the development standards of a country. Countries with high human development indices include the United States, Canada, and other industrialized nations. South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are examples of countries ranked medium in human development.

[16]Ibid.

[17]West Africa is rich in mineral resources. Guinea's bauxite wealth is the base of its economy. Sierra Leone is rich in diamonds, and there are regular reports that diamonds finance the country's civil war. Niger, which based its growth on high uranium prices in the 1970s and early 1980s, has not recovered from the dramatic decrease in demand and price. Additionally, Niger's petroleum deposits remain largely unexplored due to irregular political instability and Libyan interference.

[18]Economic Community of West African States, Executive Secretariat, *Annual Report by the*

Executive Secretary 1996/1997 July 1997, 60.

[19] Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Liberia: A Country Study* (Washington: American University, 1984), 43.

[20] Comfort Ero, "ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, on-line edition at <http://www.jha-sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a010.htm>, 25 September 1995, 1.

[21] *Ibid.*, 45.

[22] Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia* (Geneva: United Nations, 1996), 6.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Carl Ek, CRS Issue Brief 96025, *Liberia: Issues for the United States*. (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1996). Taylor received a degree in economics in the United States. He was arrested in 1984 in Massachusetts and escaped from custody in 1985 during his deportation hearings.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 163. By mid-1991, an estimated 700,000 Liberians had fled their homeland.

[27] Howe, 410. The predominant parties to the Liberian conflict included the Armed Forces of Liberia; the Independent National Patriotic Front, a splinter group of Taylor's NPFL; the United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy, which split into factions based on ethnicity; and the Liberian Peace Council.

[28] Wippman, 165. At the onset of the crisis, the U.S. argued that Liberia's problems were an internal matter. West African states attempted to raise the issue at the United Nations, but the Security Council followed the U.S. lead and recommended an African remedy. The UN would later endorse ECOWAS intervention and dispatch an observer group to Liberia. They U.S. supported the ECOWAS PKO through a multi-million dollar non-lethal assistance package.

[29] Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 25 May 1963, Article III.

[30] ECOWAS Treaty Article 4. (d), (e), and (f).

[31] Howe, 405.

[32] Adibe, "The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership" in *Beyond UN*

Subcontracting: Task-sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs. ed. Thomas G. Weiss. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), 70.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ek, 4.

[35] Wippman, 169. After the abduction, Doe was tortured and killed. Images of his mutilated body were televised throughout the region.

[36] Segun Adeyemi, "UN Security Council Commends ECOMOG," *Panafrican News Agency*, 31 July 1997.

[37] Brian L. Browne, Former U.S. Department of State Desk Officer for Liberia, interview by author, 22 February 1999.

[38] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Adjusts Mandate of Liberian Mission," *Press Release SC/6123*, 10 November 1995.

[39] U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, *Regional Peacekeeping: ECOWAS and the Liberian Peace Process*, (Washington, 1998), 4 and 14.

[40] The author was resident in Guinea from 1990 to 1992 and recalls a dramatic increase in muggings, committed mostly by English-speaking non-Guineans. Burglaries of American and European expatriates' residences also rose. The majority of those apprehended by residential security guards were Liberian nationals.

[41] While, the Government of Burkina Faso continues its denials, intelligence identified and eyewitnesses reported the continued transit of weapons to Liberia. Libya also played a role in the movement of weapons, a particular concern for Mali and Niger, which were both dealing with rebellions by the Tuareg populations, also supplied by Libya.

[42] Terry Mays, "Nigerian Foreign Policy and its Participation in ECOMOG" in *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, eds. Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 108. On 8 August 1990, Taylor's NPFL stormed the Nigerian embassy where 2,000 Nigerians had sought safehaven. They robbed the Nigerians and then reportedly murdered one-half of the group.

[43] Wippman, 158. By July 1990, Liberia's border states, particularly Guinea, provided safe haven to tens of thousands of Liberians. The teeming masses further strained the resources of the already impoverished countries.

[44] Mays, 108.

[45] Lindsey Barrett, "Nigeria's Pivotal Role," *West Africa*, 24-30 March 1997, 467.

[46] Mays, 108.

[47] *Ibid.*, 114

[48] Adibe, "Partnership," 69.

[49] Mays, 113.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] Kalifa Keita, *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 12.

[52] Cheick Oumar Diarrah, Ambassador of the Republic of Mali to the United States, interview by author, 1 February 1999.

[53] *Idem.*

[54] Following the coup, most Western donors suspended bilateral assistance to Niger. Military and civil service salaries went unpaid as the government constantly reallocated limited resources to pay for the most pressing needs.

[55] Robert Mortimer, "Senegal's Role in ECOMOG" in *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, eds. Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), 124. Senegalese forces were part of an OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad in 1981, and in an ad hoc force in Zaire in the late 1970s.

[56] *Ibid.*, 126.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] *Ibid.*, 127. Mortimer notes that in the early years of the war, U.S. financial assistance for PKO was only \$2.8 million. After the Diouf visit, the U.S. increased its contributions to \$3.75 million allocated to Senegal, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. In addition, some \$42 million of Senegalese debt to the U.S. was forgiven.

[60] Adibe, "Managing," 54.

[61] Diarrah.

[62] Martin Lowenkopf, "Liberia: Putting the State Back Together," in *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, ed. William Zartman, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 1995), 95.

[63] Browne.

[64] Ben Asante, "The ECOMOG Miracle," *West Africa*, 24-30 March 1997, 462.

[65] Browne.

[66] Idem.

[67] Adibe, "Partnership," 71.

[68] A source, mid-level intelligence professional at a national intelligence organization who wishes to remain anonymous, interview by author, 12 April 1999.

[69] Idem.

[70] Idem.

[71] United Nations Peace and Security Operations, on-line at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>.

[72] Howe, 409

[73] Asante, 463.

[74] Mid-level source.

[75] Tapitapia Sannah, "Mandate of ECOMOG Ends," Panafrican News Agency, 2 February 1998.

[76] Economic Community of West African States, Meeting of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, *Draft Mechanism for the Prevention Management, Resolution of Conflicts, Peace-keeping and Security*, (Banjul: 1998.)

[77] Ibid.

[78] Economic Community of West Africa, Meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, *Final Report*, (Abuja: 1998.)

[79] ECOWAS Final Communiqué.

[80] Economic Community of West African States, Twenty-first Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, *Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa*.

[81] Diarrah.

[82] (Unclassified) Department of State Message to ECOWAS foreign ministers, Subject: ECOWAS: Under Secretary Pickering's Message to the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting in Abjua

October 26-27," 270150Z Oct 98.

[\[83\]](#) *ECOWAS Annual Report*, Item 10.

[\[84\]](#) *ECOWAS Draft Mechanism*, 2.